Country Reports on Terrorism 2014

June 2015

United States Department of State Publication
Bureau of Counterterrorism
Released June 2015

Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act.
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CHAPTER 1
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Major trends in global terrorism in 2014 included the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL’s) unprecedented seizure of territory in Iraq and Syria, the continued flow of foreign terrorist fighters worldwide to join ISIL, and the rise of lone offender violent extremists in the West. Despite the fragmentation of al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, weak or failed governance continued to provide an enabling environment for the emergence of extremist radicalism and violence, notably in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq. Continuing a trend noted in last year’s report, terrorist groups employed more aggressive tactics in their attacks. In ISIL’s case, this included brutal repression of communities under its control and the use of ruthless methods of violence such as beheadings and crucifixions intended to terrify opponents. Boko Haram – operating in the Lake Chad Basin region of northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and southeast Niger – shared with ISIL a penchant for the use of brutal tactics, which included stonings, indiscriminate mass casualty attacks, and kidnapping children for enslavement. ISIL targeted religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis in particular, but also Shia Muslims and Sunni tribesmen who defied its rule. The 2014 calendar year also witnessed a powerful regional and international mobilization to counter ISIL that halted the group’s initial advances in Iraq. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September constituted a significant step forward in international efforts to cooperate in preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from conflict zones.

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The ongoing civil war in Syria was a significant factor in driving worldwide terrorism events in 2014. The rate of foreign terrorist fighter travel to Syria – totaling more than 16,000 foreign terrorist fighters from more than 90 countries as of late December – exceeded the rate of foreign terrorist fighters who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point in the last 20 years. Many of the foreign terrorist fighters joined ISIL, which, through intimidation and exploitation of political grievances, a weak security environment in Iraq, and the conflict in Syria, secured sufficient support to conduct complex military operations in an effort to seize contiguous territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria for a self-declared Islamic caliphate. ISIL routinely and indiscriminately targeted defenseless civilians, including religious pilgrims, while engaging in violent repression of local inhabitants.

ISIL showed a particular capability in the use of media and online products to address a wide spectrum of potential audiences: local Sunni Arab populations, potential recruits, and governments of coalition members and other populations around the world, including English-speaking audiences. ISIL has been adroit at using the most popular social and new media platforms (YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter) to disseminate its messages broadly, with near-instantaneous reposting and the generation of follow-on links and translations into additional languages following ISIL’s initial publication of online propaganda. Content included brutal images, such as hostage beheadings and boasts of slave markets of Yazidi girls and women. In 2014, ISIL expanded its messaging tactics to include content that purported to show an idealized version of life under its rule and progress in building the institutions of an orderly state. ISIL’s use of social and new media also facilitated its efforts to attract new recruits to the battlefields in
Syria and Iraq, as ISIL facilitators answered in real time would-be members’ questions about how to travel to join the group. Individuals drawn to the conflict in Syria and Iraq were diverse in their socioeconomic and geographic backgrounds, highlighting the need for comprehensive counter-messaging and early engagement with a variety of communities to dissuade vulnerable individuals from traveling to join the conflict.

In 2014, ISIL began to foster relationships with potential affiliates beyond Iraq and Syria. Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah pledged allegiance to ISIL in October 2014, and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, operating primarily out of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, officially declared allegiance to ISIL in November. Questions remained, however, about the meaning of such affiliates – whether representative of a command relationship, commonality of strategic goals, or merely opportunistic relationships.

The prominence of the threat once posed by core al-Qa’ida (AQ) diminished in 2014, largely as a result of continued leadership losses suffered by the AQ core in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQ leadership also appeared to lose momentum as the self-styled leader of a global movement in the face of ISIL’s rapid expansion and proclamation of a Caliphate.

Though AQ central leadership was weakened, the organization continued to serve as a focal point of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula – a long-standing threat to Yemen, the region, and the United States; al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb; al-Nusra Front; and al-Shabaab. Other violent Sunni Islamist extremist groups associated with AQ included the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban, and the Haqqani Network, which operated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, also have ties to AQ. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide “inspired” by the group’s ideology may have operated without direction from AQ central leadership, making it difficult to estimate their numbers.

Adherents of ISIL and AQ conducted terrorist attacks in the West in 2014 in so-called "lone offender attacks" including Quebec and Ottawa, Canada (October 20 and October 22, respectively) and Sydney, Australia (December 15-16). In many cases it was difficult to assess whether attacks were directed or inspired by ISIL or by al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. These attacks may presage a new era in which centralized leadership of a terrorist organization matters less; group identity is more fluid; and violent extremist narratives focus on a wider range of alleged grievances and enemies with which lone actors may identify and seek to carry out self-directed attacks. Enhanced border security measures among Western states that have increased the difficulty for known or suspected terrorists to travel internationally likely encouraged groups like AQ and ISIL to inspire and rely on lone actors already resident in the West to carry out attacks and thereby realize their goal of terrorizing Western populations.

ISIL and AQ were far from the only serious threat that confronted the United States and its allies. Iran continued to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, principally through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). These groups included Lebanese Hizballah, several Iraqi Shia militant groups, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide support to the Asad regime, dramatically
bolstering its capabilities, prolonging the civil war in Syria, and worsening the human rights and refugee crisis there. Iran supplied quantities of arms to Syria and continued to send arms to Syria through Iraqi airspace in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. Finally, Iran used Iraqi Shia militants and high profile appearances by Qods Force officials on the front lines of Iraq to claim credit for military successes against ISIL and to belittle coalition airstrikes and U.S. contributions to the Government of Iraq’s ongoing fight against ISIL.

ISIL and AQ affiliates, including al-Nusrah Front, continued to use kidnapping for ransom operations and other criminal activities to raise funds for operational purposes. Much of ISIL’s funding, unlike that of AQ and AQ-type organizations, did not come from external donations but was internally gathered in Iraq and Syria. ISIL earned up to several million dollars per month through its various extortion networks and criminal activity in the territory where it operated, including through oil smuggling. Some progress was made in 2014 in constraining ISIL’s ability to earn money from the sale of smuggled oil as a result of anti-ISIL Coalition airstrikes that were conducted on ISIL-operated oil refineries.

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President Obama has repeatedly stressed that the fight against terrorism is not one the United States can or should pursue alone. We have been working to shift our counterterrorism strategy to more effectively partner with countries where terrorist networks seek a foothold. Accordingly, we have built an effective Global Coalition to Counter ISIL; more than sixty partners are contributing to this multifaceted effort to stop ISIL’s advances on the ground, combat the flow of foreign fighters, disrupt ISIL’s financial resources, counteract ISIL’s messaging, and undermine its appeal.

The shared foreign terrorist fighter threat has prompted even closer cooperation among U.S. federal agencies and our international partners, particularly in Europe. In September, President Obama chaired a UN Security Council (UNSC) session on the foreign terrorist fighter threat, and the UNSC subsequently adopted Resolution 2178. We have seen increased international focus on this problem and the development of more effective counterterrorism laws overseas, as well as enhanced border security efforts and a greater willingness to share threat information among partner nations.

Partners in North Africa and Asia also took steps in 2014 to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities through new laws and the development of other means to identify, interdict, and prosecute foreign terrorist fighters and those who support them. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates have all enacted legislation or regulations in 2014 to address the foreign terrorist fighter issue.

In West Africa, the countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger mobilized forces in 2014 to help Nigeria contain the growing threat posed by Boko Haram. With the authorization of the African Union (AU), these countries announced the launch of a new Multinational Joint Task Force to coordinate operations against Boko Haram. In Somalia, AU troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda continued to push al-Shabaab from towns, thus supporting the people and government of Somalia’s efforts to build security and stability.
While countries worldwide worked to enact legislation and developed and implemented programs to address violent extremism, we remain concerned about counterproductive actions some governments have taken in the name of addressing terrorism – actions such as political repression and human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, which could heighten political grievances and exacerbate the terrorist threat. These actions could become conditions that terrorists themselves exploit for recruitment – for example, banning political parties or suppressing freedom of speech by imprisoning bloggers and journalists. Multilateral and regional institutions can provide the appropriate framework to address these challenges.
AFRICA

Africa experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2014. In East Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remained the primary terrorist threat despite a series of significant setbacks. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces were able to supplant al-Shabaab control of several urban areas inside Somalia in 2014, forcing al-Shabaab out of lucrative port cities and further into the countryside. In addition to the group’s declining revenues, al-Shabaab lost three critical members of its leadership circle to airstrikes – the group’s leader, the head of intelligence, and the chief of external operations and planning. The loss of territory, revenue, and leadership hampered al-Shabaab’s operational capabilities for a time, but the organization regrouped in new safe havens to continue planning and launching attacks and suicide bombings in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. In Somalia, al-Shabaab conducted a complex assault against the Mogadishu International Airport on December 25, killing three contractors – one American, one Kenyan, and one Ugandan - and eight Ugandan AMISOM soldiers. Djibouti suffered its first bombing in May when two suicide operatives detonated their explosive devices at a French restaurant in the capital. One Turkish citizen was killed along with the two suicide bombers. Al-Shabaab launched mass-casualty attacks in several Kenyan towns and villages along the porous border with Somalia that resulted in over 200 deaths, Kenya’s deadliest year against al-Shabaab to date. While still focused on striking targets outside Somalia, particularly within countries contributing troops to AMISOM, al-Shabaab attempted to delegitimize the Federal Government of Somalia through assassinations, suicide bombings, and other asymmetric attacks within the country.

The United States continued to support counterterrorism capacity building throughout the Horn of Africa, including bolstering of AMISOM’s operational efficacy, contributing to the development and professionalization of Somalia’s security sector, and improving regional critical incident response capabilities. In the wake of the 2013 Westgate mall attack in Nairobi, various East African countries increased their efforts to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents. In October, Kenyan Defense Forces interdicted a vehicle with five suspected al-Shabaab operatives, several suicide vests, and other explosive materiel at the Moyale border crossing between Kenya and Ethiopia. Border security initiatives remained high on the list of national security and counterterrorism priorities in East Africa.

In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northeast, with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, resulting in over 5,000 casualties in 2014. This violence spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. The kidnapping of 276 female students from a secondary school in Chibok, Borno State, brought global attention to the conflict and highlighted Boko Haram’s deliberate targeting of non-combatants, including children.

France’s Operation BARKHANE, an operation focused on countering terrorists operating in the Sahel, continued and was supported by important contributions of the UN peacekeeping mission.
in Mali to bolster and restore that country’s stability. Peace accord discussions, hosted by Algeria, continued through year’s end in northern Mali.

**TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP**

Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.-funded and implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism. Areas of support include:

1. enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations;
2. integrating the ability of North and West African militaries, and other supporting partners, to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts;
3. enhancing border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements;
4. strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity;
5. monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and
6. reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (joined in 2014), Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

TSCTP has built capacity and cooperation despite setbacks caused by a restive political climate, violent extremism, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress with select partner countries. Prosecutorial capacity to adjudicate terrorism cases has been improved in Niger through training for prosecutors.

Regional cooperation, a strategic objective of U.S. assistance programming in this region, has increased substantially in West Africa among most of the partners of TSCTP. Countries bordering Nigeria agreed to form a Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram in late 2014, and Nigeria’s neighbors remained actively engaged in countering Boko Haram throughout the region. The TSCTP partners are joined in this effort by the AU and by Benin, who is not a TSCTP partner.

**PARTNERSHIP FOR REGIONAL EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM**

First established in 2009, the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including:

1. reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks;
2. developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations;
enhancing border security; countering the financing of terrorism; and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism.

Active PREACT partners include Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Comoros, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Sudan are also members of PREACT.

In 2014, the U.S. government, through PREACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and ultimately counter the threat posed by, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, and other terrorist organizations. PREACT complements the U.S. government’s dedicated efforts, including support for AMISOM, to promote stability and governance in Somalia and the greater East African region. Joint training exercises for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan first responders and law enforcement professionals have supported efforts to enhance regional coordination and cooperation, protect shared borders, and respond to terrorist incidents. Similarly, training for Ugandan and Kenyan prosecutors has supported efforts to improve prosecutorial capacity to adjudicate terrorism cases.

BURKINA FASO

Overview: Burkina Faso showed an increase in its overall willingness to expand its involvement in regional counterterrorism and stability operations, enabled by approximately US $10 million that has been provided to its security forces through Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206 funding initiatives.


Several officials, including Burkina Faso’s Director General of Internal Security, expressed concern that Burkina Faso’s security forces lacked interagency coordination and incident command structure, and asked for assistance in this area. During a 2014 assessment of host country needs and capabilities, the U.S. Department of State determined that incident command structure is one of the most pressing needs of Burkinabe security forces. Further complicating this issue is the problem of overlapping areas of jurisdiction faced by the police and gendarmerie – which has led to confusion over which force would have primary responsibility in the event of a terrorist incident.

Burkinabe security forces actively have sought and received training from the United States on key areas requiring technical assistance. In 2014, Burkinabe law enforcement and judicial officials received training on cross-border security, criminal justice procedures, and prosecution of terrorists through the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law. The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program provided trainings and equipment related to managing terrorist incidents, forensic examination of terrorist...
crime scenes, and post-blast investigation. Burkina Faso adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in 2013 in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Burkina Faso has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land and air ports of entry.

Burkina Faso’s Counterterrorism Strategy, *Mission de Securitization du Nord*, strives to eliminate the possibility of terrorist activities along its northern border.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Burkina Faso is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style body that is part of the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS). Burkina Faso law enforcement has the will to improve its ability to counter terrorist financing, but lacks resources and experience. In recent years, the Burkinabe government put in place a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) under the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This unit is a task force composed of magistrates, police, gendarmerie, and financial experts. The FIU continued to work on developing database connectivity with regional neighbors and other international parties, such as the United States. There are some laws in place that help the unit carry out its mission, such as a requirement for local banks to report large deposits. Other laws and customs, however, complicate their mandate. For example, Burkina Faso is a cash society, making money difficult to track. Also, an agreement between West African countries for the free movement of people and goods allows individuals from those countries uninhibited entry to and exit from Burkina Faso with any amount of money.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Burkina Faso was active in regional organizations and international bodies, including the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the GCTF. Burkina Faso is a member of the G-5 Sahel group that was created in February 2014 to enable regional collaboration.

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**BURUNDI**

**Overview:** Burundi demonstrated its continued commitment to addressing international terrorism in 2014, and contributed six battalions to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A counterterrorism unit, formed in 2010, consists of elements of the police, military, and the Burundi National Intelligence Service. In the aftermath of the September 2013 al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi, the Burundian National Police (BNP) conducted several counterterrorism operations throughout the country in an attempt to disrupt and dismantle potential terrorist operations. However, the BNP was hampered by a lack of training, resources, and infrastructure. In addition, the BNP focused counterterrorism efforts on the Muslim community and foreigners in Burundi, rather than basing its actions on operational intelligence. This reflects the BNP’s belief that these groups pose the greatest terrorist threat to Burundi.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Burundi has provisions in its penal code defining forms of terrorism. Sentences for acts of terrorism range from 10 to 20 years in prison to life imprisonment if the act results in the death of a person. Burundi continued its participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the International Law Enforcement Academy. Through ATA, BNP officers received counterterrorism training to bolster their leadership and management skills, build investigative capacity, and identify fraudulent documents.

Burundi’s land and water borders are porous, and therefore pose significant border security challenges. Burundi does not use biometric screening capabilities such as fingerprinting or retinal scans. Burundi screens travel documents, however, at official border crossings.

Deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security included corruption, resource constraints, limited judicial capacity, lack of training, and porous borders lacking security.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Burundi is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body but is an observer of ESAAMLG, the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. While the government has created counterterrorist financing laws, it has yet to commit funding, provide training, or implement policies. Very few people in the country have access to the formal banking sector. The anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance regime in Burundi does not include regulatory requirements for or supervision of money/value transfer services, precious metal and jewelry dealers, real estate agents, exchange houses or new payment methods. Each local commercial bank operation is recorded within the bank’s system and the banks exchange information with their foreign correspondent banks through their compliance officers. However, banks are not asked to share this information with the Burundi government’s Financial Intelligence Unit. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Burundi is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), and through PREACT received funding for military and law enforcement counterterrorism training. Burundi cooperated with neighboring countries to exchange information on suspected terrorists. Burundi has also contributed battalions to AMISOM to stabilize the situation in Somalia.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Burundian government does not have any formal programs to counter violent extremism. However, several international organizations fund vocational training and economic development programs designed to provide positive alternatives for populations vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations.

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**CAMEROON**

**Overview:** Cameroon became a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2014. Countering terrorist threats remained a top security priority for the
Government of Cameroon, and the government worked with the U.S. government to improve the capacity of its security forces. Boko Haram took advantage of weaknesses in Cameroon’s border security to conduct a number of terrorist attacks in the country’s Far North and East Regions in 2014, including targeted killings and kidnappings of Cameroonian and foreigners. Cameroon responded to the attacks with an increased security presence in these regions.

In 2014, the United States provided a number of training programs on terrorism and security to help Cameroon address the Boko Haram threat in the Far North. In addition to bolstering the operational capacity of its security forces, Cameroon’s prospects for preventing terrorism also depends on the ability of the government to address humanitarian concerns in its northern regions as well as socio-economic and political challenges—such as widespread youth unemployment, poor transportation infrastructure, inadequate public service delivery, endemic corruption, and political marginalization.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: In 2014, Boko Haram was responsible for targeted killings of Cameroonian in Mayo-Sava, Mayo-Tsanaga, Mayo-Danay, and the Logone and Chari Divisions of the Far North Region – including the villages of Kolofata, Fotokol, Waza, Amchide, and other localities at the border with Nigeria. Terrorist incidents in 2014 included:

- On June 30 in Mayo Sava Division of the Far North Region, Boko Haram killed the village chief of Magdeme, who they suspected was collaborating with security forces.
- On May 16, Boko Haram kidnapped 10 Chinese engineers in the Far North Region of Cameroon, where they were working on a road construction project. The assailants attacked the engineers’ camp in Waza, and took the hostages to Nigeria before eventually releasing them in October.
- On July 6, a group of 10 men on motorcycles stormed the Lamida of Limani in the Mayo-Sava division and kidnapped two teenagers, both students at the local high school.
- On July 27, Boko Haram launched a cross-border attack on Kolofata and kidnapped over a dozen people, including the Lamido (traditional ruler) of Kolofata and the wife of Cameroon’s Vice-Prime Minister, Amadou Ali. The assailants took the hostages to Nigeria before releasing them, along with the Chinese nationals, in October.
- Between October and December, Boko Haram targeted civilians and military patrols in different areas of the Far North Region using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, stationary improvised explosive devices, and mines.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Certain provisions of the 1965 Penal Code were used to prosecute acts of terrorism. These include sanctions for efforts to undermine state authority, threats to public and individual safety, destruction of property, threats to the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation, hostage taking, and the use of firearms and explosive substances.

Prior to 2014, Cameroonian law did not explicitly criminalize terrorism. However, in December, the National Assembly adopted legislation specifically addressing terrorism. The Law for the Fight Against Terrorism confers the death penalty for those found guilty of carrying out, abetting, or sponsoring acts of terrorism, including any activity likely to incite revolt in the population or disturb the normal functioning of state institutions. The bill was controversial, and
members of the political opposition claimed that the definition of terrorism was too broad and could be used as a tool for political repression.

Faced with the security challenges at its borders with Nigeria and the Central African Republic, the Cameroonian government increased coordination and information sharing among law enforcement, military, and intelligence entities, including the General Delegation for External Research, the National Army, the Rapid Intervention Unit (BIR), and the National Gendarmerie. During the year, Cameroon received U.S. capacity building training to improve its counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts, including programs on the civil–military response to terrorism and the legal aspects of defense. These measures supported Cameroon’s improvements in the detection of and responses to terrorist attacks, although further efforts are needed for the country to be able to more effectively deter terrorist incidents.

In 2014, Cameroon continued to issue regional biometric passports aimed at providing enhanced security for residents of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States zone. In response to terrorist incidents, Cameroon reinforced its border security by establishing more control posts and deploying additional military units, including the BIR, to the Far North Region of the country. The government also stepped up screening efforts at ports of entry and highways, using terrorist screening watchlists as well as biographic and biometric technology in some cases. However, the capacity of security forces to patrol and control all land and maritime borders remained limited due to inadequate staffing and resources, leading to some uncontrolled border crossings.

Cameroonian military and police units proactively confronted and disrupted the activities of suspected Boko Haram members. Several large arrests were made. According to reports, the police arrested 104 Boko Haram members, including 84 minors and 20 adults, operating in a madrassa in the Mayo-Danay Division of the Far North. The adults were allegedly teaching their students how to become messengers, combatants, and suicide bombers for Boko Haram.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Cameroon is a member of the Central African Action Group Against Money Laundering (GABAC) which holds Financial Action Task Force (FATF) observer status and is seeking to become a FATF-style regional body. Through its membership in GABAC, Cameroon has adopted a legislative architecture to implement anti-money laundering and financial supervision actions. It established a financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Investigation Agency, which processes suspicious transaction reports and initiates investigations. There were no prosecutions or convictions for money laundering during the year. Under the newly adopted legislation, any person convicted of financing or using financial proceeds from terrorist activities would be sentenced to death. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Cameroon actively participates in AU peacekeeping operations, and its military schools train soldiers and gendarmes from neighboring countries. Cameroon has pledged forces as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram with neighboring countries.
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Cameroonian authorities have taken a series of measures to counter violent extremism, including forming partnerships with local, traditional, and religious leaders to monitor preaching in mosques. The Government of Cameroon partnered with faith-based organizations such as the Council of Imams and Religious Dignitaries of Cameroon (CIDIMUC) to educate citizens on the dangers of radicalization and violent extremism, promote religious tolerance, and present religion as a factor for peace. This objective was furthered through targeted messaging in mosques, special prayer sessions, press releases, and through roundtable discussions and conferences bringing together people from various religious backgrounds. One of CIDIMUC’s strategies has been to work for improving the living conditions of imams.

CHAD

Overview: The Government of Chad considered countering violent extremist threats a priority at the highest level, with a particular focus on countering potential terrorist threats from across the Sahel region. Chad’s counterterrorism strategy focused on promoting regional stability and securing its borders. Chad provided combat forces to the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that also included Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Niger, and took an active role in leading that coalition and fighting violent extremists in Nigeria and neighboring states. This follows Chad’s important contribution to the French intervention in northern Mali, Operation SABRE; and its contribution to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Chadian criminal law does not explicitly criminalize terrorism. However, certain general provisions of the Penal Code (1967) have been used to prosecute acts of terrorism. In addition, in 2014, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights began certain reforms, including drafting a revised Penal Code that eliminates the death penalty and criminalizes terrorism, piracy, and pedophilia.

While Chadian law enforcement units displayed basic command and control capacity, some Chadian units had limited investigation, crisis response, and border security capacity. Specialized law enforcement units possessed some necessary equipment and better tactics. Essentially all 22 police brigades performed counterterrorism functions, however interagency cooperation and information sharing was rarely practiced. Law enforcement units had a mixed record of accountability and respect for human rights.

Frequently, the head of the police and security are replaced suddenly and without explanation. In addition, law enforcement and security chiefs are sometimes appointed for political reasons rather than merit and therefore are limited in their capability of identifying the type of training, skills, and equipment needed.

In 2014, the Government of Chad increased border-crossing screenings to prevent infiltration by members of Boko Haram and Central African militias and transit of illegal arms, drugs, weapons, and other contraband into the country. Border patrol was provided by a combination of border security officials, gendarmes, police, and military. Border officials, particularly police
at the Ngueli bridge border crossing between N’Djamena and Kousseri in Cameroon, took security measures that included: eliminating taxi and motorcycle traffic; searching cars, trucks, and pedestrians at points of entry to screen for weapons, drugs, explosives, and other contraband; and continuing the use of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) biometric screening system, that was adopted in 2013. Chad has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land and air ports of entry.

Chadian security forces executed several cordon and search operations in the Lake Chad region in 2014, extending south to the capital, in an effort to prevent spillover from ongoing security operations on the opposite side of Lake Chad undertaken by the Nigerian government directed against Boko Haram. In May, Chadian customs officials intercepted two containers of arms and ammunition allegedly destined for Central African Republic (CAR). In June, the Minister of Territorial Administration announced the arrest of two suspects and the seizure of 12 rocket propelled grenade, 43 machine guns, 80 anti-tank rockets, 33 rockets, and over 11,000 rounds of ammunition as a result of increased patrols in the capital of N’Djamena.

Chad continued its participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 2014, ATA provided training on Quality Control in Civil Aviation Security and Interviewing Terrorist Suspects, and provided two boats to assist the Chadian River Police Brigade.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Chad is a member of the Action Group against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), an observer to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), with the same mandate and status as a FATF-style regional body. GABAC worked directly with Chad’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the National Financial Investigative Agency (ANIF). In 2014, ANIF joined the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units.

Chad’s underdeveloped financial sector is primarily cash-based and lacked sufficient capacity to enforce banking regulations. ANIF faces serious resource constraints, and financial intelligence reporting and analysis is limited. Additionally, law enforcement and customs officials require training in financial crimes enforcement. Several banks reported suspicious transactions, but the practice was not universal. The government also lacks sophisticated equipment to monitor transactions and does not track money transactions through wire transfer services (i.e. Western Union), hawala remittance systems, or SMS mobile money transfers.

In August 2014, ANIF held a two-day seminar for financial institutions to increase awareness of their obligations in the fight against terrorist financing, including suspicious transaction reporting.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** In 2014, Chad participated in the Lake Chad Basin Commission’s effort to establish the MNJTF, and deployed a contingent of 700 troops along Chad’s Lake Chad border to prevent infiltration by Boko Haram. It has also cooperated actively
with Cameroon in operations to counter the threat of Boko Haram in its border regions, and continued to work with Sudan on the joint border commission the two countries had established in 2012 to better control Chad’s eastern border. It also began talks with Niger and Libya to form a tripartite border commission.

In January, Chad assumed one of the rotating seats on the UN Security Council. Chad participated in MINUSMA, providing 1,400 troops to combat violent extremists. Chad is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and participated in the Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group in March in Dakar, Senegal. Chad is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and the AU.

The G-5 Sahel was created in February 2014 to enable region-wide collaboration on the Sahel-Sahara region’s political and security situation, and Chad participated in the five G-5 Sahel meetings held among the five member countries: Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali, as well as representatives of the AU, UN, the Economic Community of West African States, the EU, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

In a July 2014 visit to Chad, France’s president Francois Holland launched Operation BARKHANE, a successor to Operations SERVAL and EPERVIER formerly based in Mali and Chad. In August, France deployed 1,300 troops to Chad as a base of operations for its regional initiative to fight terrorism in the Sahel.

In 2014, Chad served as a base of operations for U.S. air surveillance in search of the Nigerian Chibok schoolgirls kidnapped on April 14-15.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** As a participant in the TSCTP, Chad participated in targeted projects to counter violent extremism. Activities included building the capacity of national civil society organizations; engagement of community and youth empowerment; promotion of interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance; and media and outreach work. President Idriss Déby Itno (Déby) instructed the High Council for Islamic Affairs to monitor religious activities closely in mosques to counter violent extremism.

President Déby encouraged religious tolerance through public statements and urged religious leaders to promote peaceful cohabitation among religious groups. During the celebration of Eid al-Fitr, he urged each religious group to advocate for harmony among all Chadians. Leaders from the country’s principal religious organizations, including the secretary of Evangelical Mission for Harmony and the vice-president of the Episcopal Conference publicly stated they supported President Déby’s public statements advocating religious tolerance.

The Regional Forum on Interfaith Dialogue, composed of representatives of evangelical churches, the Catholic Church, and the Islamic community, met three times in 2014 to promote religious tolerance and counter prejudice. On January 25, President Déby presided over the group’s fifth annual National Day of Peace, Peaceful Cohabitation, and National Concord, which consisted of prayer and pardon for people of all faiths and aimed to promote tolerance and eliminate verbal and physical violence.
On August 20, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant leaders launched a project to teach values of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence for refugees and Chadian returnees from CAR.

**DJIBOUTI**

**Overview:** Djibouti remained an active and supportive counterterrorism partner in 2014. Djibouti hosts Camp Lemonnier, which serves as headquarters to the U.S. Africa Command’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Djibouti’s efforts to counter terrorism focused on increased training for Djibouti’s military through the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program, and deploying soldiers to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) campaign.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** On May 24, two suicide bombers attacked the La Chaumière restaurant in a popular area in downtown Djibouti City. A female suicide bomber entered the restaurant and detonated a suicide vest in the midst of three tables situated in the bar. Immediately following this initial blast, a male attacker threw a grenade onto the patio and then detonated his suicide vest. One Turkish citizen was killed and more than 20 others were injured, some severely. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack and stated that it targeted Djibouti because the country hosts foreign militaries and contributes troops to AMISOM.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Djibouti has a legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes and tries terrorists in criminal courts using its penal code. Counterterrorism remained a high priority for all Djiboutian law enforcement entities in 2014, due to Djibouti’s geographic location, porous borders, and the May al-Shabaab attack. Djiboutian officials arrested and detained individuals connected to the terrorist attack. At year’s end, no dates were set for their prosecution.

Djibouti’s law enforcement organizations consist of the Djiboutian National Police (DNP), the Djiboutian National Gendarmerie, and the Djiboutian Coast Guard. In 2014, all three organizations received equipment and training through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, as well as the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone. ATA assistance focused primarily on counterterrorism instruction covering post-blast investigations, crisis response, and tactical operations. Djibouti’s law enforcement organizations routinely interacted with U.S. government personnel, and the DNP, Gendarmes, and Djiboutian Coast Guard frequently sought U.S. input to identify potential terrorist suspects.

Generally, Djibouti’s law enforcement organizations have personnel and units that have received training in complex investigations and crisis response. The majority of law enforcement units, however, lacked operational experience responding to terrorist incidents or significant crises. Specialized law enforcement units possessed some necessary equipment yet lacked sustainment training to maintain the skills they have been taught through ATA and ILEA.

Djibouti’s most visible counterterrorism efforts were checkpoints and cordon-and-search operations within the capital city. There was also an increased emphasis at border control points to screen for potential security threats, which included the prohibition of any vehicle entering Djibouti from Somalia after the May 24 bombing. The Government of Djibouti requested and
received assistance from the U.S. government to conduct a post-blast investigation. The Government of Djibouti also enhanced protection of soft targets, including hotels and grocery stores, but it is unclear to what extent this level of increased protection will be sustainable.

Djibouti adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System in 2003 in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Djibouti has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land, sea, and air ports of entry. Djibouti has regularly issued passports to non-citizen Somalis with close personal or business relationships to the Djiboutian government, as well as to residents of Somalia with no legal claim to Djiboutian citizenship.

While the airport and seaport are important entry points, the vast majority of travelers cross into Djibouti by land at one of three land border points, one of which is the Loyada border crossing at the Somali border. The DNP has control over border checkpoints and the Djiboutian Armed Forces has responsibility for patrolling the border. Djiboutian law enforcement personnel acknowledged the difficulty of securing their land borders as well as the coast. Officials at the DNP-manned checkpoints remained susceptible to bribes.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Djibouti’s request for observer status at the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, was pending at year’s end. The Central Bank of Djibouti houses a Fraud Investigation Unit (FIU). Given its very limited financial and human resources, the FIU is unable to perform its core functions and instead focuses on banking supervision. The FIU has made no referrals of cases to law enforcement involving suspected terrorist financing.

Djibouti’s Central Bank places the responsibility for staying updated on sanctions lists with the financial institutions themselves. Many of the financial institutions operating in Djibouti have software packages that include links to the lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities from the UN, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the EU. The Djiboutian Central Bank monitors compliance with these lists through routine supervision and audits of the financial institutions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Djibouti is a member of the AU, is headquarters to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and has deployed troops to AMISOM. In February, Djibouti hosted the Second Gulf of Aden Counterterrorism Forum, a regional meeting that brought together counterterrorism officials from Djibouti, Somalia, and Yemen to examine shared challenges and discuss best practices. Djibouti is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Most of the Government of Djibouti’s strategic communication efforts focused on countering radicalization of the youth population. Members of Parliament and representatives from the Ministry of Islamic Affairs
held monthly meetings in Djibouti’s low-income neighborhoods. The Ministry of Youth and Sports organized sports leagues to engage youth in positive activities. In addition, the Government of Djibouti, via the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, increased its legal authority over all Islamic matters and institutions to counter the potential for radicalization to violence in mosques.

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**ERITREA**

**Overview:** In 2014, the Government of Eritrea continued to claim that it sought to be a partner in the war on terrorism. Eritrean officials in Asmara, at the UN, and at the AU, issued statements and told Embassy staff that Eritrea wanted to move out of a long period of regional isolation and animosity. Eritrean officials engaged in shuttle diplomacy with nations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to discuss regional stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and regional initiatives to counter transnational challenges, especially migration and human trafficking. The UN Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) continued to accuse Eritrea of sponsoring regional armed groups. The Eritrean government denied the accusations and continued to levy charges that Ethiopia supported groups committed to the violent overthrow of the Eritrean regime. Eritrea’s poor relations with Ethiopia, Djibouti, the United States, and the SEMG limited opportunities for cooperation or counterterrorism dialogue.

In May, the United States re-certified Eritrea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In considering this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed Eritrea’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.

The Government of Eritrea has been under UNSC sanctions since December 2009 as a result of past evidence of support for terrorism and regional destabilization. UNSCR 1907 (2009) imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political leaders, calling on the nation to “cease arming, training, and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region.” The SEMG’s October report found no evidence that Eritrea is supporting al-Shabaab or opposition groups in South Sudan.

Lack of transparency on how governing structures function means that we do not have a clear picture of the methods the Eritrean government uses to track terrorists or maintain safeguards for its citizens. For a number of years, members of the police have refused to meet with security officials from western nations to discuss policy matters, although the U.S. government had informal contact with law enforcement counterparts in 2014.

The Government of Eritrea remained prone to labeling any persons who advocate change or political reform, or who appear to oppose the Eritrean President, as terrorists.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Articles 259-264, 269-270, and 282 of the Eritrean Penal Code, grandfathered into present-day law from 1957, criminalize terrorist methods; measures of intimidation or terrorism; acts of conspiracy carried out by organized armed bands; offenses that make use of arms, means, or support from foreign organizations; use
of bombs, dynamite, explosives, or other terrorist methods constituting a public danger; genocide; and war crimes against the civilian population. Other sections of Eritrean law could also be used to prosecute terrorism, including acts related to offenses against public safety; offenses against property; offenses against the state; offenses against the national interest; offenses against international interests; attacks on the independence of the state; impairment of the defensive power of the state; high treason; economic treason; collaboration; and provocation and preparation.

Entities including the Eritrean Defense Forces, National Security Agency (NSA), Police, Immigration and Customs authorities all potentially have counterterrorism responsibilities. There are special units of the NSA that monitor fundamentalism or extremism. Chain of command may work effectively within some security and law-enforcement elements, but there are rivalries and responsibilities that overlap between and among the various forces. Whether information sharing occurs depends on personal relationships between and among given unit commanders. Many soldiers, police officers and immigration and customs agents are young national service recruits or assignees, performing their jobs without adequate training.

The Government of Eritrea, justifying its behavior based on alleged threats from Ethiopia, continued to reject the need to prioritize adherence to international human rights standards, and instead based many of its law enforcement decisions and practices on statutes resembling martial law.

The Eritrean government closely monitors passenger manifests for any flights coming into Asmara, and scrutinizes travel documents of visitors, but does not collect biometric data. Government officials lack training and technology to recognize fraudulent documents. The Government of Eritrea does not share information gathered at ports of entry with the United States.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Eritrea is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. This gap prevents any overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist financing. Eritrea’s general lack of transparency on banking, financial, and economic matters makes the gathering of definitive information difficult. On September 8, the Government of Eritrea issued Proclamation No. 175/2014 on “Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Financing of Terrorism,” which criminalized terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Eritrea is a member of the AU, and would like to reactivate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority (IGAD); however, Eritrea’s return to IGAD is opposed by both Ethiopia and Djibouti, both of whom have had military conflicts and have unresolved border disputes with Eritrea.

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**ETHIOPIA**
Overview: Following al-Shabaab’s failed October 2013 bombing attempt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian security intensified counterterrorism efforts in 2014. Although Ethiopia suffered no terrorist attacks during the year, the persistent risks posed by al-Shabaab dominated the Ethiopian government’s security posture. This threat contributed to the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) joining the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) at the beginning of the year. The integration of Ethiopia’s forces into AMISOM was a milestone in the multinational effort against international terrorists, since ENDF counterterrorism operations in Somalia have been instrumental in preventing al-Shabaab’s dispersion into Ethiopia.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Government of Ethiopia continued to use the Antiterrorism Proclamation (ATP), implemented in 2009, to prosecute crimes associated with terrorist activity. The government also used the ATP to suppress criticism, and continued to prosecute and convict journalists and opposition political figures under the proclamation, including the high-profile “Zone 9” case against six bloggers and three journalists.

The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) – with broad authority for intelligence, border security, and criminal investigation – is responsible for overall counterterrorism management in coordination with the ENDF and the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP). In 2014, the ENDF, EFP, NISS, and regional special police successfully blocked al-Shabaab attacks on Addis Ababa and other major towns in Ethiopia. NISS has the mandate to facilitate interagency and international coordination, although rivalries and overlapping authorities between NISS and ENDF hinder information sharing and overall counterterrorism strategy, including coordination with the United States. In 2014, the Ethiopian government received training and equipment through the U.S.-funded Regional Strategic Initiative, the International Law Enforcement Academy, and the Antiterrorism Assistance program.

Border security is a persistent concern for the Government of Ethiopia, and the government worked to mitigate uneven border controls by expanding the presence and reach of military forces in border regions with Somalia and by joining AMISOM. Ethiopia adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System in 2003 in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Ethiopia has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land and air ports of entry. Ethiopia’s vulnerable borders include the frequently transited southern and eastern borders with Kenya and Somalia, especially in Dolo Odo – a town located in southeast Ethiopia on the border with Somalia – and Moyale, located on the Kenyan border.

Regional police in the Somali region captured two accomplices of the al-Shabaab suicide bombers responsible for the May 24 attack in Djibouti.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Ethiopia is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The FATF removed Ethiopia from its monitoring process due to the overall improvement in the legal and regulatory framework and addressing its action plan. In 2014, Ethiopia passed regulations for freezing terrorists’ assets.
In 2014, the Ethiopia took part in the Cross Border Financial Investigation Training, but the lack of capacity and experience within law enforcement remained an impediment to effective responses. Additionally, Ethiopia’s poor record-keeping system in general, and lack of centralized law enforcement records in particular, hindered the ability to identify and investigate trends in money laundering and terrorism financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Government of Ethiopia participated in AU-led counterterrorism efforts as part of the AMISOM forces in Somalia. Ethiopia is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and participates in its counterterrorism programs and trainings. The Ethiopian government also supported counterterrorism efforts in Somalia with the Somali National Army and other regional security groups in Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Ethiopia remained concerned about violent extremism and looks to engage in local mediation and conflict mitigation strategies to defuse ethnic or religious tensions, especially in the Oromia and Somali regions. The Government of Ethiopia’s continued restrictions on activities of civil society and NGOs imposed by the Charities and Societies Proclamation hinders the expansion of robust NGO activity, including countering violent extremism programming targeting at-risk youth and engaging communities and credible leaders.

**KENYA**

**Overview:** Kenya is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and a strong partner of the United States in the fight against terrorism. Kenya faced a continuing terrorist threat from al-Shabaab, against which Kenya Defense Forces engaged in military operations in Somalia since 2011. Despite some successes, including the discovery of a large unexploded vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Mombasa, Kenya continued to face serious domestic security challenges, growing radicalization and violent extremism within its own borders, and a spike in al-Shabaab attacks in 2014. While no single incident drew the level of international attention garnered by the 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall, more than two dozen terrorist incidents occurred throughout Kenya in 2014, resulting in more than 200 dead and many more injured – making 2014 the deadliest of the past four years. There were allegations of violations of human rights by Kenya’s police against civilians during counterterrorism operations, including allegations of extra-judicial killings. There were also reports that highlighted a public perception of a bias against members of the Somali community.

Kenyan officials cooperated closely with the United States and other partner nations on counterterrorism issues – including investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases – and pledged deeper cooperation. Kenya is one of six countries participating in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. SGI focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level.
The Kenyan government focused increased attention on preventing the flow of foreign fighters, including Kenyan nationals, to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as on Kenyan national foreign fighters returning from abroad.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Of the two dozen terrorist attacks in Kenya in 2014, al-Shabaab publicly claimed responsibility for three major attacks.

- On June 15, armed attacks in the village of Mpeketoni in Lamu County left at least 48 people dead.
- On November 22, a bus hijacking in November in Mandera County in Northeast left 28 people dead.
- On December 2, an armed attack in December at a quarry also in Mandera County left 36 workers dead. While Kenya had seen deadly attacks in these counties near the Somali border before, the brutality of the Mandara County attacks in which non-Muslims — including women — were singled out for killing, was especially troubling and prompted some non-Muslims, particularly civil servants and teachers, to flee the areas.

Other notable deadly incidents included multiple explosions in March in Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood that left seven dead; bombings in May targeting buses and a hotel in Mombasa and Nairobi that left seven dead; bombings in May in Nairobi’s Gikomba Market that left 12 dead; and a series of additional attacks in June and July in Lamu County and coastal Tana River County that left at least an additional 45 people dead.

The discovery in March of a powerful and sophisticated but unexploded vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in an impounded car at a Mombasa police station was also significant.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Kenya’s 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act together provide a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. In December, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed into law the Security Laws (Amendment) Act 2014, a set of provisions that altered 20 existing laws in an effort to further strengthen further Kenya’s legislative framework to fight terrorism. Positive steps included the criminalization of the receipt of terrorist training, creation of a coordinated border control agency, strengthening the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a relaxation of evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony. Other provisions, including those that affected freedom of speech and the rights of the accused and refugees, sparked controversy and garnered criticism that they violated constitutionally-guaranteed civil liberties and contravened Kenya’s international obligations. In December, a Kenyan High Court judge suspended implementation of eight provisions of the Act and formed a three-judge panel to fully examine the Act’s constitutionality. [In January 2015, the High Court temporarily suspended the implementation of eight provisions of the Act, determining that the provisions in question raised human rights concerns. In February, the High Court struck down the eight provisions on the grounds of unconstitutionality.]
During the year, the Kenyan judiciary demonstrated independence and competence, but remained hampered by a lack of key procedures to allow effective use of plea agreements, cooperation agreements, electronic evidence, and other undercover investigative tools.

In line with the security sector reorganization outlined in the 2013 Kenyan Constitution, the Government of Kenya divided counterterrorism functions among the three branches of the National Police Service – the Kenya Police (including the investigative Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, and the Administration Police – as well as non-police agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces. Operational effectiveness was impeded by poor interagency coordination among and within police, intelligence, and military forces; limited resources; insufficient training; endemic corruption; and an unclear command and control of, and politicization of, some terrorist incidents. In an effort to reverse this trend and improve operational effectiveness, the government made significant leadership changes.

Kenyan security and justice sector officials participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored capacity-building programs funded and implemented by the U.S. Departments of State, DHS, DOJ, and DoD, in a range of areas including crisis response, investigations, and prosecutions. Notable among these was the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program’s East Africa Joint Operations exercise, a month-long crisis response training series – hosted in Kenya for Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian law enforcement personnel and first responders – that culminated in a large-scale simulation of a terrorist incident.

Border security remained a challenge for Kenya due to the country’s vast, sparsely populated border regions and porous borders, as well as corruption. Kenyan officials emphasized the importance and challenges of border security in their initial discussions with U.S. counterparts in the context of the Security Governance Initiative. A lack of capacity on border security and inadequate systems of national identification hampered law enforcement’s ability to identify and detain potential terrorists.

However, terrorist screening watch lists, biographic and biometric screening, and other measures were largely in place at major Kenyan ports of entry. Kenya continued its partnership with the United States to strengthen Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System border controls at major ports of entry, adding new ports of entry and upgrading systems nationwide.

The Kenyan government focused increased attention on preventing the flow of foreign fighters, including Kenyan nationals attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as Kenyan national foreign fighters returning from abroad.

Kenyan security services detected and deterred a number of terrorist plots during 2014, and responded to about two dozen significant terrorist incidents. Kenyan law enforcement, in large-scale security operations in April and May called “Usalama Watch,” rounded up thousands of potential suspects, primarily in the Nairobi and Mombasa areas. However, the operations were widely criticized as fraught with abuse, corruption, and violations of civil liberties – including in a report of Kenya’s own civilian oversight body, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority.
Allegations of abuses, extra-judicial killings, and arbitrary detentions by Kenyan security services persisted in 2014. A July report by Kenya’s civilian oversight body, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority, indicated that 332 Somalis had been deported to Mogadishu and outlined a range of violations by police of constitutional guarantees, including detention of suspects without arraignment before a court past the constitutional limit of 24 hours; extortion; and overcrowding in detention facilities. The report also included a set of time-bound recommendations, to which the government had not responded to by year’s end.

The Independent Policing Oversight Authority made progress in fulfilling its mandate by investigating multiple cases of police misconduct and referring these to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, two of which had already moved to the prosecution stage by year’s end.

At the end of 2014, several major terrorism cases remained ongoing, including the trial of accomplices in the Westgate Shopping Mall attack and the case of the unexploded Mombasa VBIED.

Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked with regional organizations and the broader international community, including the United States, to increase its counterterrorism capacity and to secure land, sea, and air borders.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Kenya made progress in implementing its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism regime, and was removed from the FATF’s continuing monitoring process in 2014 due to achieving the goals of its work plan. On December 16, the NGO Coordination Board deregistered 510 organizations for failure to provide required financial reporting and indicated it would deregister an additional 15 for suspected links to terrorist financing. The list of 510 was public and many of those groups were reinstated after filing the necessary paperwork. The list of 15 groups with suspected ties to terrorism has not been made public.

Kenya’s Financial Reporting Center also continued to make progress in becoming fully operational, and continued to build its capacity to monitor the formal financial system and expand the number of reporting entities that it served. It remained hampered by a lack of essential resources, however, including an electronic reporting system for suspicious transactions. The Central Bank of Kenya took steps to encourage more people to use the formal financial sector to increase financial integrity by ensuring regulatory oversight.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Kenya is a member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the East African Community. Kenya’s primary contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM since 2012. In 2014, Kenya hosted a head-of-
state level meeting of the AU’s Peace and Security Council focused on counterterrorism, as well as regional meetings of East African Community intelligence and police chiefs. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings and the aforementioned crisis response exercise involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring countries to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Kenya took some steps to increase engagement with civil society on issues of countering violent extremism, including participation by government officials along with religious and civil society leaders in the First National Conference on Security and Countering Violent Extremism in January, at which a Violent Extremism Advocacy and Accountability Charter was developed and adopted. The Kenyan government also developed, but had not implemented by year’s end, a comprehensive National Counter-Radicalization Strategy. Senior leaders made some overtures to communities at risk of violent extremism, but also used divisive and inflammatory rhetoric, especially in the wake of terrorist incidents that further increased tensions. “Usalama Watch” and other heavy-handed security operations risked further alienating communities at risk of violent extremism. Some Kenyan civil society organizations actively worked to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, often with assistance from the United States and other international partners, without significant government involvement.

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**MALI**

**Overview:** The Government of Mali remained a willing U.S. counterterrorism partner, despite serious challenges, which included renewed fighting and insecurity in some northern regions, and a protracted peace process that hampered the return of government services and security to the north. The government’s counterterrorism efforts remained focused on violent extremist elements who continued to play a destabilizing role in Mali’s largely ungoverned northern regions. Despite continued security efforts and successes in expelling violent extremists in some parts of the vast northern region, violent extremist groups remained active, exploiting the lack of effective control of swathes of territory by governmental forces, northern armed groups, and troop drawdowns linked to the reconfiguration of French military operations. The government’s ability to effectively disrupt terrorist activities was hampered by the Malian army’s defeat in May at the hands of northern armed rebel groups in Kidal.

Mali relies heavily on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and French forces to provide a measure of stability and security to the northern regions. MINUSMA significantly expanded its northern presence in 2014, including in Kidal, and it continued to work with the Malian government and armed groups to facilitate the redeployment of Malian administrators and security forces to the north.

The United States resumed initial security assistance cooperation with Mali in 2014, with an emphasis on institution building, civilian control, and respect for human rights. To help strengthen Malian counterterrorism crisis response capacity, the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program offered an initial crisis management seminar for senior Malian officials involved in planning responses to terrorist incidents.
The French military’s 18-month mission in Mali, Operation SERVAL, was replaced in July by an integrated counterterrorism force for the Sahel region entitled Operation BARKHANE. In cooperation with Malian forces, BARKHANE launched numerous operations to degrade remaining violent extremist elements operating in northern Mali, including al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Murabitoun (AMB), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar al-Dine (AAD). Other key counterterrorism efforts included a September French and Malian joint military operation in response to increased improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. On December 10, Malian and French forces eliminated 10 members of AMB, including Ahmed el Tilemsi, a senior leader of AMB and founding member of MUJAO.

Mali is one of six countries participating in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. SGI focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** AQIM, MUJAO, AMB, and AAD continued to conduct terrorist attacks in 2014; IEDs were used with higher frequency and success compared to 2013, and regularly targeted MINUSMA, French, and Malian forces. Detonated IEDs alone resulted in over 100 injuries to these forces and the deaths of 19 MINUSMA personnel in 2014, a stark increase from the four peacekeeper deaths in 2013. Violent extremists also used rocket or mortar fire, landmines, and suicide bombings. Incidents linked to terrorism included:

- Between May 27 and September 15, a total of 27 IED, landmine, and rocket or mortar attacks targeted MINUSMA premises and personnel (15 IED or mine incidents and 12 rocket or mortar fire incidents). This included a June 11 suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in Aguelhok that killed four peacekeepers and injured six, along with four Malian Defense and Security Forces elements.
- On September 2, four UN peacekeepers from Chad were killed when their truck was blown up by a landmine near Kidal.
- On September 18, five UN peacekeepers from Chad were killed when their truck drove over a mine in the Kidal region.
- On October 3, nine UN peacekeeping troops from Niger were killed in an ambush in the Gao region of Mali.
- On November 25, an IED targeted a governmental convoy carrying the Minister of Rural Development, killing two Malian soldiers and injuring nine.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Mali’s criminal justice system continued to implement the new penal code of 2013, intended to help counter terrorism and transnational organized crime. In an effort to prioritize and strengthen criminal justice institutions with a responsibility for terrorism-related activities, Malian authorities began staffing the specialized counterterrorism unit’s judicial component (composed of police, investigators, and judges). The Malian Ministry of Justice and Police Agencies began to work directly with the U.S. government to promote efficient practices and conduct appropriate rule of law training. Around 25 members of the Malian police and Gendarme also participated in a U.S. Africa Command-funded Crime Scene Investigation Course focused on the collection and storage of evidence.
The Malian Armed Forces and Air Force under the Ministry of Defense remained the primary entities responsible for securing Mali against terrorist threats. The General Directorate of State Security under the Ministry of Security has the authority to investigate and detain persons for terrorism offenses. Law enforcement and military units did not coordinate on counterterrorism missions, inhibiting their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Law enforcement units displayed insufficient command, lacked resources and control capacity, and had a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. In order to improve its counterterrorism crisis response capacity, the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program offered an initial crisis management seminar for senior Malian officials involved in planning responses to terrorist incidents.

The Ministry of Internal Security and Civilian Protection’s interagency working group to reform the security sector in Mali, conceived in 2013, had yet to move beyond the discussion phase; MINUSMA worked with the Malian government in 2014 to move this from discussion to action. Mali also lacked a national counterterrorism strategy.

Although Mali has basic border security enforcement mechanisms, law enforcement units lacked capacity, training, and mobility assets to effectively secure Mali’s porous borders. In May, Mali began using the U.S.-funded Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System at its international airport for passenger screening and biometric collection. The gendarmerie – which reports to both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior – and the national border police – under the Ministry of Interior – continued to provide paramilitary support to prevent and deter criminal activity at borders. Customs officials under the Ministry of Economy and Finance continued to monitor the flow of goods and enforce customs laws at borders and ports of entry. Access to the Interpol list is restricted to senior authorities and is made available to investigators upon request.

Customs officials have travel forms to collect biographical information from travelers at airports and manifests for information on goods transiting borders. When conducting investigations, customs officials and border police increasingly compare the biographic data on forms against presented travel documents or manifests against goods possessed. However, the exit and entry stamps used by border officials are inconsistent in size and shape due to poor training and resources, undermining efforts to authenticate travel documents. Additionally, illegal reproduction of these stamps is easy.

In May 2012, Mali introduced an updated machine-readable passport linked to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The new passport contains several security additions, including micro printing, ultraviolet features, and a full-color digital photo. However, Malian diplomatic and official passports have still not been updated. Unfortunately, many of the relatively sophisticated anti-fraud characteristics of the new Malian passport are rendered moot by the relative ease with which imposters can obtain fraudulent documents, such as birth and marriage certificates.

While the Prosecutor’s office estimates 200 arrests since 2013 for crimes in connection with terrorism and rebellion against the state, data on number of terrorism-related arrests made in
calendar year 2014 was not available at year’s end. Mali did not prosecute any terrorism cases in 2014. As in 2013, resource constraints, a lack of training in investigative techniques, and inexperience with trying terrorism cases continue to plague a weak judicial system. Although no longer in the immediate post-coup environment of 2013, the government remained primarily focused on achieving a peace agreement with northern armed groups.

Mali is very cooperative in working with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens in the country. In March, the Malian government extradited Alhassane Ould Mohamed – also known as Cheibani – to the United States to face charges for the murder of one U.S. diplomat and the attempted murder of another U.S. diplomat in Niger in 2000. Cheibani, who had been providing support to AMB, was captured by French forces in late 2013. Efforts also began in 2014 on a Special Program for Embassy Augmentation and Response program with the Malian National Guard, aimed at developing the country’s capacity to effectively respond and coordinate with the United States to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks directed at U.S. citizens in Mali.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mali is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In May 2013, the National Assembly passed a law amending the Penal Code and the Penal Procedures Code and created a judicial unit focused on the fight against terrorism and trans-border crime. A prosecutor in charge of this “anti-terrorist” judicial unit was appointed in July 2014. In November, the prosecutor formed an investigative team composed of judges and gendarmerie, rendering the court operational. The court has the authority to implement Article 30 related to financial terrorism, including a mechanism to freeze assets administratively.

The Malian government freezes and confiscates terrorist assets without delay. The asset seizure must first be authorized by a judge in the new judicial unit targeting terrorism and trans-border crimes. Assets can be frozen indefinitely during the investigation period. However, coordination between investigative agencies is poor, thus not all suspected cases make it to court.

Because the majority of transactions in Mali are cash-based, it is difficult to monitor and regulate money/value transfer and other remittance services given resource constraints. Additionally, non-financial businesses and professions are not subject to customer due diligence requirements.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** During 2014, Mali continued its cooperation with regional and international partners both militarily and politically, and remained active in bodies including ECOWAS, the UN, and the AU. Mali is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

The Malian military participated in multinational counterterrorism operations in 2014, including Operation BAOBAB in cooperation with Operation BARKHANE, and the Mauritanian military. The AU created a follow-up and support group for the political and security situation in Mali and
has held six meetings in Mali with international partners on enhancing international cooperation to bring political stability and security in Mali. President Keita participated in the inaugural “G-5 of the Sahel” summit in Nouakchott in December to discuss security and terrorist concerns with fellow heads of state from the Sahel.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** While Mali has no official strategy in place to counter violent extremism (CVE), the Malian government has developed a National Reconciliation Policy that considers the need to delegitimize extremist ideologies and the promotion of social cohesion between communities. CVE considerations are also integrated into Mali’s "Program for Accelerated Development in the Northern Regions," as well as a draft decentralization policy. The Ministry of Religious Affairs, by working with the High Islamic Council and other religious associations to promote moderate Islam and maintain a secular state, is developing a coherent approach to address rising radicalization in Mali. Conversely, efforts to prevent increased radicalism and recruitment by violent extremist groups have been hindered by the absence of the Malian government in much of the north.

Mali volunteered to serve as an initial pilot country for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, a public-private funding mechanism designed to support local, community-based projects to strengthen resilience against violent extremism.

**MAURITANIA**

**Overview:** The Mauritanian government continued to oppose terrorism actively and effectively, building on an approach that hinges on improving the capacity of security forces and securing the country’s borders. As in years past, the Mauritanian authorities cooperated with the United States on counterterrorism efforts and seized opportunities to participate in U.S.-sponsored training on counterterrorism tactics and techniques. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained the leading terrorist threat to Mauritania in 2014, although it has not conducted a successful attack in Mauritania in several years.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Mauritania’s national counterterrorism laws define terrorism as a criminal act, describe court procedure in terrorism cases, and proscribe punishment for convicted terrorists. The Mauritanian government continued to send prosecutors and investigative magistrates to terrorism prosecution training organized by the United States and other international partners.

Mauritania’s National Gendarmerie – a paramilitary police agency – and its National Security Directorate – which falls under the Ministry of Interior – are the primary law enforcement units performing counterterrorism functions. Cooperation and information sharing between the two organizations occurred sporadically.

Throughout the year, security forces personnel participated in eight courses funded by the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which conferred expertise in relevant tactical and technical skills related to border security and investigative capacity building, with a particular emphasis on regional cooperation.
Border security remained a priority of the Mauritanian government, yet remained difficult due to a lack of capacity and different formations of security forces bearing responsibility for the various sections of the country’s long land borders. Mauritania’s border forces employed biometric screening capabilities at some, but not all, ports of entry. Information sharing efforts within the government and with other countries remained nascent.

Mauritanian authorities continued to arrest terrorist suspects during the reporting period. In contrast to years past, no terrorism prosecutions took place in 2014. Terrorism-related arrests in 2014 included:

- On October 1, the Mauritanian authorities apprehended Haiba Ould Zouein, an alleged leader in AQIM, in Vassala, a village located along the border with Mali. At year’s end, Ould Zouein remained in pre-trial confinement.
- On October 12, Mauritanian security forces arrested four men in Zouérate – a city in the country’s northwest – who had allegedly declared their allegiance to and sought to recruit fighters for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The authorities released one of the detainees after two days and charged the remaining three with attempting to provide material support to a terrorist group. At year’s end, they remained in pre-trial confinement.
- On November 5, Mauritanian security forces captured Ali OuldSoueilim in F’dérik, a town in the country’s far northwest. Suspected of collaboration with unspecified terrorist groups, Ould Soueilim was in custody and awaiting trial at year’s end, after more than six years in hiding.

In addition, on November 17, the Supreme Court of Mauritania upheld the prison or death sentences of five appellants convicted of terrorism-related offenses. Among the petitioners was El Khadim Ould Semmane, who is reputed to be the former leader of the Mauritanian branch of AQIM.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mauritania is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and maintains observer status within the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa. On February 10, Mauritanian officials from the Ministry of Justice and the Central Bank’s financial intelligence unit met in Nouakchott with counterparts from the United States to outline the broad strokes of a legal framework to combat terrorist financing and money laundering.

Although legislation regulating alternative remittances exists, the Mauritanian government neither has the resources to monitor sizable flows of funds through the informal *hawala* money transfer system, nor considers doing so a priority.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Mauritania was an active member of the UN, the AU, and the Sahel G-5 – a regional cooperation partnership organized in February. On December 19, Mauritania hosted the first meeting of the presidents of the five member states of the Sahel G-5: Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. All signatories pledged to cooperate to combat urgent cross-border security threats – namely, terrorism and organized crime. Mauritania is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

On March 26 and 27, Mauritanian officials participated in a two-day Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) workshop on border security, co-sponsored by the U.S. and Senegalese governments, in Dakar. On April 22 and August 4, Mauritania co-hosted meetings of the GCTF’s capacity building coordination group in Nouakchott.

In early May, Mauritania’s Ministry of Justice and the UN Development Program co-hosted a two-day capacity building workshop on investigation and prosecution of criminal organizations, including terrorist groups. Over 60 Mauritanian prosecutors, investigative magistrates, police investigators, and customs officials participated in the seminar, which featured presentations on investigative techniques and coordination practices outlined in the GCTF’s Rabat Memorandum.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Malian government continued to manage programs designed to counter violent extremism and to offer alternatives to “at-risk” individuals. For example, in 2014 the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education trained over 300 former *mahadra* (Qur’anic school) students in vocational subjects at three education centers in Nouakchott, Atar, and Kaedi. Officials from Ministry of Interior and Decentralization introduced this program, and other aspects of the national strategy to combat terrorism and violent extremism, during public workshops that took place in regional capitals throughout the summer and fall. The government also continued to collaborate with independent Islamic religious organizations to promote non-violence, sponsoring radio and television programming on the themes of temperance in Islam, and paying monthly salaries of US $170 to 200 moderate imams who fulfilled stringent selection criteria.

**NIGER**

**Overview:** In 2014, the threat of terrorist activity by Boko Haram in the area near Niger’s southern border with Nigeria increased substantially. While most Boko Haram-related violence occurred outside Niger, a few isolated incidents occurred on the Nigerien side of the border, and suspected Boko Haram members were arrested there. Additionally, hundreds of Nigerian soldiers and tens of thousands displaced persons fleeing from Boko Haram crossed into Niger – adding to tensions in Niger’s region of Diffa. The Government of Niger deployed additional military and law enforcement resources to this area.

Suspected members of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other terrorist organizations continued to transit through the vast northern part of Niger in the areas bordering Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Chad. Weapons and contraband were believed to move through these areas, some of which were interdicted by the Nigerien military. The terrorist group Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) claimed responsibility for one attack against
government personnel in Niger. During 2014, with foreign assistance, the Nigerien military continued to increase its capability to patrol, collect information, and interdict in the north.

Niger remained an outspoken opponent of terrorism in the region, continued to cooperate with international partners – including the United States, and received substantial international counterterrorism assistance. Niger is one of six countries participating in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. SGI focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level.

Nigerien officials took credit for mediating the release of several Europeans held hostage by AQIM who were released in 2014, allegedly after payments were made.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Attacks included:

- On May 2, the president of the local Chamber of Commerce in the Diffa region was killed at his home by suspected Boko Haram sympathizers. Reports indicated that the victim was targeted and killed because he was believed to be an informant working for the Government of Niger. No arrests were made in connection with this murder.

- On May 20, in the village of Chetimawong in the Diffa region, the village chief and a shopkeeper were murdered by having their throats slit by suspected Boko Haram militants. It was believed that the village chief and the shopkeeper were targeted because they were suspected of providing information on Boko Haram to Nigerien security services. No arrests were made in connection with this incident.

- On October 30, three simultaneous attacks – using small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) – targeting Nigerien personnel and institutions were carried out in the Tillabery region. While no group claimed credit for these attacks, there were reports that the attackers had ties to MUJAO. The first attack targeted a mixed patrol of Nigerien National Police, National Guard, and gendarme personnel who were camped near the Niger/Mali border near the village of Zaroumdaray. The second attack targeted a gendarme post located at a Malian refugee camp near the village of Mangaize. The third attack, and subsequent prison break, occurred at a prison protected by the National Guard located in the town of Ouallam. These attacks resulted in at least nine Nigerien security service personnel being killed, several more being wounded, the theft of multiple weapons and ammunition, the destruction of one vehicle, and the escape of over 60 prisoners. Many of the prisoners were recaptured or returned of their own accord, but the ones connected to the attackers were still at large at year’s end.

- On November 19, MUJAO violent extremists attacked a gendarme post near the village of Bani Bangou in Tillabery region using small arms and RPGs. Although the gendarmes were able to repel the attack, one gendarme was killed and three others were wounded. The assailants managed to take a vehicle, several small arms, and ammunition from the gendarme post as they fled. A local telecommunications operation was destroyed in the attack, presumably in an attempt to prevent the gendarmes from contacting other security services for reinforcements.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security**: Niger’s legislation criminalizes acts of terrorism consistent with the international instruments on terrorism. Recent amendments to the code of criminal procedure created a specialized counterterrorism jurisdiction and authorized more robust investigative techniques. In 2014, Niger’s interagency counterterrorism investigative cell, the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT), was expanded to include a separate operational cell in the regional capital of Diffa.

The law enforcement and security services of Niger were actively engaged in detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in Nigerien territory. However, a lack of sufficient manpower, funding, and necessary equipment made this more difficult. Counterterrorism investigations in Niger are primarily the responsibility of the SCLCT, which is made up of representatives from Niger’s three primary law enforcement organizations: the National Police, the National Guard, and the gendarmerie. Information sharing occurred among the law enforcement agencies of SCLCT, and prosecutors at the Judicial Counterterrorism Center were consulted during investigations.

Niger’s long borders and vast swaths of harsh terrain make border security a challenge, specifically in the north along the borders with Mali, Algeria, and Libya. These borders are very difficult to secure and patrol, and are often exploited by smugglers. Niger attempted to improve its border security by increasing the number of border control facilities and requesting assistance from partners to construct and equip facilities. Niger continued to use rudimentary terrorism watchlists that it shares with the security services and at border checkpoints, although the lists were not frequently updated. The ability to conduct biographic and/or biometric screening remained limited to Niamey’s international airport. Niger’s air surveillance capability increased – Niger has the ability to collect advance passenger name records and is able to use these records in counterterrorism efforts. Information sharing within the Nigerien government is adequate but sometimes slow between services due to stove piping or a lack of communications equipment.

Resource constraints across the spectrum of basic needs – such as electricity, radios, reliable vehicles, computers, and other technology – and personnel, including resource constraints within the Ministries of Justice and Interior, made it difficult for the Government of Niger to carry out strong law enforcement and border security. Additionally, effective whole-of-government coordination in the fight against terrorism continued to present challenges, and capacity remained lacking in areas such as proactive investigations and non-confession-based prosecutions.

Throughout 2014, SCLCT arrested terrorist suspects on charges that included planning acts of terrorism, association with a terrorist organization, recruitment, and terrorist financing. Several proactive operations were conducted in the Diffa and Zinder regions, resulting in multiple arrests. At year’s end, approximately 100 terrorism suspects were detained in Niger awaiting trial. Most of the cases were under investigation by investigating judges.

Niger continued to receive counterterrorism assistance from a variety of international partners, including the United States. The EU supported a 50-person team (EUCAP-Sahel) in Niger to build capacity in fighting terrorism and other organized crime. A number of other international partners provided security sector assistance in Niger, including France and the UN.
continued to permit French forces to be based in Niamey as well as in other locations to conduct operations such as ground and air surveillance. The U.S. government, provided terrorism assistance to Nigerien law enforcement – primarily through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program and a Resident Legal Advisor from the DOJ.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Niger is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Niger’s porous borders and historical trafficking routes make it easy for terrorists to transfer large sums of cash. At year’s end, suspected AQIM and Boko Haram members were awaiting trial on charges of terrorist financing. In 2014, Niger’s financial intelligence unit, CENTIF, continued to increase its activities. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Niger supported the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by contributing a battalion of infantry. Additionally, Niger worked with Mali, Algeria, and Mauritania at the General Staff Joint Operations Committee in Tamanrasset, Algeria. Niger participates in a judicial cooperation organization, the Sahel Judicial Platform, with other countries in the region.

Niger increased its efforts to improve joint patrols and operations with Algeria. Niger also conducted joint patrols with Nigeria and Chad, and increased cooperation with Lake Chad Basin Commission member countries to fight against Boko Haram.

Nigerien officials continued to participate actively in regional programs organized by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel and Rule of Law Working Groups, although Niger is not a GCTF member.

Nigerien officials hosted and attended multiple international meetings concerning international efforts to combat the threat of Boko Haram. In August, the U.S.-African Leaders Summit in Washington included Niger as one of the six initial countries participating in the Security Governance Initiative. On October 7, the Lake Chad Basin Commission summit took place in Niamey; partner countries Benin, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon all pledged to field a Multinational Joint Task Force to counter Boko Haram.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Niger’s strategy to counter violent extremism includes the Sahel-Sahara Development and Security Strategy (SDSS), which aims to improve security through access to economic opportunities and employment, especially for youth; access to basic social services; capacity for good governance at the community and local authority level; and reintegration of forced returnees from Libya, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and Algeria. The SDSS launched three years ago, but at year’s end remained not fully funded; and therefore, results were limited.

Niger’s SDSS, supported by USAID’s Peace through Development II program, helped reduce the risk of instability and increase resiliency to violent extremism through such activities strengthening moderate, non-extremist voices through radio, social media, and civic education;
and working with religious leaders who promote religious tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict.

The Resilient Voices program, supported by the U.S. government, uses credible Nigerien voices to promote peace, tolerance, and respect for Nigerien identity.

In 2014, the Nigerien Ministry of Justice created a new position of Director of Reinsertion and Rehabilitation within its prison administration. While some very basic vocational training programs in prisons exist, there were no programs yet that focused specifically on rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist prisoners into mainstream society in 2014.

NIGERIA

Overview: The terrorist group Boko Haram carried out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, many injuries, tens of thousands of displaced civilians, and significant destruction of property in 2014. The states in which attacks occurred most frequently were Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. Attacks were launched also in Bauchi, Gombe, Kano, Niger, Plateau, Taraba states, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). While Boko Haram did not claim responsibility for known attacks in the south of the country, it is widely believed the group was responsible for the early December prison break in Ekiti state, and a June bomb attack on the Apapa oil depot in Lagos State. In May, the Nigerian government renewed a state of emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The state of emergency expired in November and was not renewed at year’s end. Despite the increased military presence in the region, Boko Haram continued to attack schools and take over large and small towns and villages in Borno (including Bama and Gwoza), Adamawa (including Madagali and Michika), and Gombe states, as well as Buni Yadi and Gujba in Yobe.

In April, Boko Haram invaded a secondary school in Chibok in Borno state, where they kidnapped more than 275 young female students who were taking examinations – the group’s largest mass kidnapping to date. Throughout the year, suspected Boko Haram members killed Nigerian government and security officials and civilians, including both Christians and Muslims.

The state of emergency provided the Nigerian government additional authorities to prosecute a military campaign against Boko Haram, including sweeping powers to search and arrest without warrants. The 7th Army Division, headquartered in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state, remained in charge of the operations within Borno, while the 3rd Division became more active in Adamawa state following the significant upswing in activity there. Despite an increased security budget from the National Assembly and the wide arrest authority, the military was unable to repel Boko Haram’s attacks on and control over several key towns in the Northeast. On more than one occasion, Boko Haram attackers forced the Nigerian military to retreat across the border into Cameroon.

The Nigerian government’s efforts to address grievances among Northern populations, which include high unemployment and a dearth of basic services, made little progress. Some state governments in the North attempted to increase education and employment opportunities, with
little support from the federal government. The United States called on the Nigerian government to employ a more comprehensive strategy to address Boko Haram that combines security efforts with political and development efforts to reduce Boko Haram’s appeal, address legitimate concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and protect the rights of all of Nigeria’s citizens.

In April 2014, to assist with Nigeria’s investigation and recovery efforts of the 275 girls kidnapped by Boko Haram in Chibok, Borno State, the United States deployed an Interdisciplinary Assistance Team composed of personnel from DOD, USAID, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The establishment of the Joint Coordination Fusion Cell (JCFC) and the Joint Coordination Planning Cell in May modestly improved coordination between the U.S. military and the Nigerian military and interagency coordination between the Nigerian security forces. However, such coordination was not seen between upper levels of the Nigerian military in the JCFC and commanders in the field.

Nigeria is one of six countries participating in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. SGI focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: In 2014, Boko Haram expanded its attacks primarily in 10 northern states. The number of attacks by female suicide bombers increased in 2014. Notable terrorist incidents committed by Boko Haram included:

- On January 14, 31 people were killed and 50 others injured when an improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in a crowded area near the main market in Maiduguri, Borno state.
- On February 16, a group of 100 armed persons believed to be Boko Haram rounded up and shot men in the village of Izghe in Borno state. A total of 107 persons were killed in the attack, which was labeled the “Izghe Massacre.”
- On February 25, 59 boys were killed in their dormitories at the Federal Government College of Buni Yadi in Yobe state. The female students were allowed to escape. Although no group formally claimed responsibility, Boko Haram is suspected to have carried out the attack.
- On March 14, Boko Haram attacked Giwa Barracks in Maiduguri, Borno state, where suspected Boko Haram members were detained. Approximately 600 prisoners were freed in the attack, which was filmed in a video released by the group.
- On April 14, Boko Haram attacked a girls’ secondary school in Chibok, in Borno state, and, according to the Nigerian police, abducted 276 girls. Of these, 57 students escaped while being transported to a remote camp. Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau stated in a video that the girls were considered “spoils of war” and would become brides of Boko Haram members.
- Also on April 14, two devices placed in vehicles were detonated in a motor park in Nyanya, a suburb of Abuja, in the FCT. The blasts killed approximately 100 persons with more than 200 injured.
- On May 20, two explosions at a busy market area in Jos, Plateau state, killed 118 people, according to officials.
• On June 2, Boko Haram attacked the Local Government Area (LGA) of Gwoza in Borno State and killed more than 200 residents of three communities.
• On July 2, 56 people were killed when a car bomb exploded in a busy market area of Maiduguri.
• On July 4, approximately 200 members of Boko Haram attacked the Damboa LGA in Borno state, destroying the divisional police headquarters, markets, homes, and vehicles. The attackers used IEDs, rocket propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft weapons to attack the Nigerian Army’s 7th Division. Officials stated that 12 soldiers, three police officers, and four civilians were killed.
• On July 28, a female suicide bomber in Kano killed three people and injured seven others.
• On July 30, a female suicide bomber killed two students at Kano State Polytechnic in Kano.
• On August 6, Boko Haram fighters captured the town of Gwoza in Borno, killed up to 100 people, and burned down the divisional police headquarters, the LGA secretariat, and other public buildings.
• On September 6, Boko Haram took control of the town of Gulak in Adamawa state and killed nearly 40 residents.
• On September 9, Boko Haram attacked the town of Hong in Adamawa and killed more than 100 residents, according to police.
• On October 30, Boko Haram took control of Mubi in Adamawa after Nigerian soldiers fled the town in anticipation of the raid. Officials stated several residents were killed, but no casualty figures were released.
• On November 10, a suicide bomber dressed as a student detonated a bomb at a boys’ school in Potiskum, Yobe state. Police believed Boko Haram carried out the attack, which left 47 people dead, including the suicide bomber, and 79 persons wounded.
• On November 25, two female suicide bombers killed at least 30 people in a crowded Maiduguri market in Borno. The first bomber set off her explosives and killed several persons; when others gathered around the scene, the second bomber blew herself up, killing about 30.
• On November 28, three bombs were detonated in an armed raid on the Central Mosque and other locations in Kano. More than 100 people were killed and over 120 injured. Several others were killed when police opened fire to disperse the crowd.
• On December 10, at least four people were killed and seven injured in a double attack by two young female suicide bombers near a market in Kano. Boko Haram militants are suspected of being behind the attacks.
• On December 13, more than 175 women and children were kidnapped and 35 people were killed by Boko Haram militants in the village of Gumsuri, Borno state.
• On December 25, a suicide bomber rammed into a military checkpoint in Bajoga, Gombe state, but failed to detonate his IED. The bomber was apprehended by police while trying to escape.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In April, President Goodluck Jonathan directed the Nigerian National Security Advisor to coordinate and promulgate the National Counterterrorism Strategy (NACTEST), which was made public in November. In 2012, the Terrorism (Prevention) Act was revised, and in February 2013 the revisions were enacted into
The law appointed the National Security Advisor as the coordinator for all counterterrorism intelligence activities and the attorney general as the lead official for enforcement.

The Nigerian government’s criminal justice institutions were not significantly strengthened in 2014, although several donor countries, including the UK, worked closely with the Ministry of Justice to assist in prioritizing how to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorism cases.

Several Nigerian government agencies performed counterterrorism functions, including the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), and the Ministry of Justice. The Nigerian military had primary responsibility for combating terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. While the counterterrorism activities of these agencies and ministry were ostensibly coordinated by the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), the level of interagency cooperation and information sharing was limited.

The Nigerian government participated in U.S. counterterrorism capacity building through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, including the training of more than 120 NPF members in the detection and handling of IEDs. This increased the NPF’s awareness and capacity to protect and preserve evidence from the crime scene of a suspected terrorist act. Through the ATA program, Nigerian police, customs officials, and immigration officers also participated in interagency rural border patrol training to build the law enforcement sector’s ability to utilize effectively all agencies in tackling rural border security challenges. The Nigerian government worked with the U.S. FBI to investigate specific terrorism matters.

The Government of Nigeria instituted the collection of biometric data for passport applications of all Nigerian citizens and upgraded the Nigerian machine-readable passports. Screening at the ports of entry of major airports in Nigeria, including Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Kano, improved, with passenger name records being collected in advance for commercial flights. Border security at rural and extended land borders with Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad was vulnerable to exploitation by Boko Haram.

Among the problems that deterred or hindered more effective law enforcement and border security by the Nigerian government were a lack of coordination and cooperation between Nigerian security agencies; a lack of biometrics collection systems and the requisite data bases; corruption; misallocation of resources; the slow pace of the judicial system, including a lack of a timely arraignment of suspected terrorist detainees; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to understand and carry out the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 (as amended).

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups in 2014 included:

- Aminu Ogwuche, the alleged planner of the April 14 Nyanya motor park bombing, was arrested in Sudan and extradited to Nigeria. He has been in custody since his extradition, and on November 10 requested bail in the Federal High Court. A bail hearing was rescheduled for November 24, when the Federal High Court reportedly ruled against the two count indictment against Ogwuche. The NPF, through its Interpol office, was involved in the extradition of Ogwuche but DSS is the investigating and prosecuting agency. Ogwuche remained in DSS custody at year’s end.
The case against Nigerians Abdullahi Mustapha Berende and Saidi Adewumi, charged under Section 5(1) and 8 of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 with recruiting terrorists, remained pending. A six-count charge by the Nigerian government stated the subjects traveled to Iran and rendered support to a terrorist group via provision of materials and terrorism training on use of firearms and other weapons. The two were said to have collected the sum of US $23,350 from the terrorist group in order to source and train terrorist-minded Nigerians fluent in English.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Nigeria is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The Nigerian government froze and confiscated terrorist assets as designated by U.S. Executive Orders and by UN Security Council Resolutions; however, delays — up to a few weeks in duration — sometimes occurred. While there was political will to freeze assets, bureaucratic processes occasionally caused delays of up to four weeks before authorities blocked these assets. This is a risk because of the possibility that those whose assets may be frozen will have time to transfer them to other jurisdictions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Throughout 2014, Nigeria participated in ministerial-level international meetings to address insecurity in northeast Nigeria — first held in Paris in May, then London in June, and lastly in Abuja in September. The effort was concentrated on ensuring a coordinated response to the threat Boko Haram presents to the region. While dialogue between Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Benin, and Nigeria focused on strengthening regional cooperation, the countries took only minimal steps in 2014 to increase cooperation or interoperability of their security forces. In August, the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit was stood up in Abuja to increase intelligence sharing between the countries’ external services. Talks remained ongoing through the Lake Chad Basin Commission to enhance the existing multinational task force to coordinate military action along the border regions. Nigeria is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

In 2014, the Nigerian government participated in or hosted several multilateral efforts. In January, Nigeria and the United States co-hosted in Abuja a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel Working Group on the Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law. In November in Abuja, the United States and Nigeria co-hosted the GCTF workshop on Prison Security Issues and Implementation of the Rome Memorandum. Nigeria was an active participant in other GCTF events in the region.

Nigeria, primarily through its ONSA, took a lead role in continuing a multilateral dialogue among regional countries — including through GCTF and TSCTP activities — on how to better coordinate regional efforts to confront networks of terrorist groups that span international borders. The Nigerian government has not invested significant resources or time enlisting regional organizations such as the Economic Organization of West African States and Economic Community of Central African States to assist with the Boko Haram problem, instead preferring to engage in direct, unilateral military action.
**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In March, the ONSA officially announced a program to counter violent extremism, including educational and employment opportunities and de-radicalization of former Boko Haram members, as well as detained terrorist members.

In 2014, several projects were funded by the TSCTP, including:

- A program to protect the human rights and security of almajiri children in northern Nigeria. The program works closely with Kano state government authorities to respond to the challenges facing street children in Kano who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist groups.
- A program to reinforce “Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation” efforts that will carry out training with youth, women, traditional leaders, and religious leaders on conflict transformation skills; and will organize media campaigns to promote conflict transformation strategies in four northern states – Kaduna, Nasarawa, Benue, and Taraba.
- A program to develop “Youth Leadership and Civic Engagement in Northern Nigeria through English Language Training,” focusing on at-risk youth in the Kano-Kaduna corridor.

**SENEGAL**

**Overview:** The Government of Senegal continued to take a firm stance against terrorism by strengthening its internal policies and continuing its support to multilateral peacekeeping missions such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Although Senegal did not have any terrorist incidents in 2014, regional trends – such as the rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria and instability in Mali – caused President Macky Sall to label terrorism as the biggest challenge to development in Africa.

The government worked closely with U.S. military and law enforcement officials to strengthen its counterterrorism capabilities. The risk of violent extremism and terrorist activity in Senegal remained elevated from transnational threats due to Senegal’s support of MINUSMA. While there was less terrorist activity within Senegal than in some other parts of the Sahel, the Senegalese government remained concerned that terrorists were crossing its porous borders to escape fighting in neighboring countries.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Since 2007, the criminal code has included criminal offenses for terrorist acts as defined in the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Article 279 of the criminal code, allows the state to prosecute an individual or group that “intentionally undertakes an act to disturb public order, or the normal functioning of national and international institutions, through intimidation or terror.” The maximum penalty is life in prison.

In October, the chief of the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, Senegal’s domestic intelligence agency, announced that Senegal will develop a department dedicated to fighting terrorism and will create new counterterrorism laws in the criminal code.
Senegal’s gendarmerie, national police, and judicial police have insufficient capacity and resources to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism. Senegal worked to improve its law enforcement capacity by participating in multilateral efforts, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and AU and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) programs. Senegal also continued participating in U.S. government counterterrorism capacity building programs, such as the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which focused on strengthening regional border security and enhancing counterterrorism investigative capacity. Senegal also received significant funding and training from the French government.

Senegalese officials identified a lack of border resources and regional cooperation as major security vulnerabilities. On October 21, the United States notified the Senegalese government that the port of Dakar no longer met U.S. Coast Guard security standards.

The United States continued to provide border security training to Senegalese personnel, including an official visit in July by a Senegalese delegation to the United States to learn about best practices recommended by the U.S. Coast Guard. DHS hosted international interdiction training in McAllen, Texas, in addition to providing tours of land, sea, and air borders for the Senegalese Director General of Customs and Deputy Commander of Gendarmes.

Senegal participated in France’s Action Plan Against Terrorism (PACT), a US $900,000 French capacity building project for local police and gendarmes involved in countering terrorist threats and for magistrates who hear terrorism-related cases.

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists or terrorist groups in 2014 included the arrest of El Hadji Malick Mbengue in Dakar by security forces. Mbengue was arrested for his alleged links to terrorists in Algeria planning to carry out attacks on American and French interests in Senegal.

Corruption and lack of infrastructure remained obstacles to more effective Senegalese law enforcement and border security, as well as a chronic lack of equipment, insufficient training, and the inability of authorities to maintain their current stock. Additionally, there was a lack of interagency cooperation and coordination across several of the government entities that deal with terrorism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Senegal is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force-style (FATF) regional body. At the regional level, Senegal implements the anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing framework used by member states of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Among WAEMU countries, Senegal was the first to have the new framework in place. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial Markets is the body responsible for the control of WAEMU financial markets. Article 279-3 of the Senegalese criminal code also allows for the prosecution of sponsors of terrorism. The text stipulates that individuals who “directly or indirectly finance a terrorist enterprise by giving, gathering or managing funds, valuables or goods or by providing advice” are subject to prosecution. The maximum penalty is life in prison. For further information on money
Regional and International Cooperation: Senegal is a member of the UN, AU, ECOWAS, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The government also participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Sahel Regional Capacity Building Working Group, and hosted the Second Cross-Border Workshop in Dakar from March 26-27. Additionally, Senegal’s military remained committed to MINUSMA and increased its troop contribution from 200 to 800 during 2014.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Strong cultural and religious traditions make Senegalese society resistant to extremist ideologies. Islam in Senegal is organized around several influential brotherhoods, which are generally tolerant and do not preach violent extremist ideology. These brotherhoods are also fairly resistant to external influences. In addition, the government continued its outreach to the brotherhoods to build partnerships and offer support in resisting violent extremist messaging and recruitment.

SOMALIA

Overview: In 2014, Somalia made significant progress in its counterterrorism efforts. The terrorist group al-Shabaab lost control of large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia, including the key port city of Barawe and other key towns along the main supply route in the Juba, Shabelle, Bay, and Bakol regions as a result of the successful AMISOM-led Operation Indian Ocean. In October, the Puntland Security Forces led an offensive against the al-Shabaab stronghold in northern Somalia’s Golis Mountains, which further degraded al-Shabaab’s operational capability. Separate U.S. military strikes that killed then-leader Mokhtar Abu Zubeyr, also known as Ahmed Abdi “Godane,” and Tahlil, the head of intelligence and security, left al-Shabaab in a leadership crisis. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab continued to conduct a broad spectrum of asymmetrical attacks throughout Somalia. These attacks included harder targets in Mogadishu, such as the Mogadishu International Airport, Villa Somalia Presidential Compound, and the Parliament, as well as an increasingly greater number of assassinations of government and security officials. The ability of the federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited. Somalia remained a safe haven for a number of international terrorists, who continued to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries, particularly in Kenya.

Minister for Foreign Affairs Abdirahman Beileh represented Somalia at the first ministerial–level plenary for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Brussels on December 3, 2014, where he reaffirmed Somalia’s commitment to work together under a common, multi-faceted, and long-term strategy to degrade and defeat ISIL.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: In 2014, al-Shabaab conducted suicide attacks, remote-controlled roadside bombings, and assassinations of government, security officials, and civil society leaders throughout Somalia. Al-Shabaab executed attacks in Mogadishu in a targeted campaign against Somali security forces and other government officials, and targeted government and foreign
structures, convoys, and popular gathering places for government officials, the Somali diaspora, and foreigners. Notable incidents in 2014 included:

- On January 1, al-Shabaab targeted the Jazeera hotel in Mogadishu using suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIED) in a staggered assault. After the first SVBIED detonated at the hotel frequented by Somali government officials and foreigners, a second VBIED exploded shortly after first responders arrived at the scene to tend to the injured. According to Somali officials, at least 20 people were killed and another 30 were wounded.

- On February 13, an al-Shabaab SVBIED hit a UN convoy outside the main gate of Mogadishu International Airport. The attack killed multiple bystanders but no UN employees, according to National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) officials.

- On February 21, al-Shabaab militants launched a complex attack against the Presidential Compound, known as Villa Somalia, using a Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) and a team of attackers, some armed with AK-47s and suicide vests. All militants were killed and at least five security officials died, according to the Office of the President.

- On May 24, al-Shabaab militants launched a complex attack against the Somali Parliament compound in Mogadishu using a suicide driver with a VBIED and a team of about seven attackers armed with AK-47s. Two members of Parliament reportedly sustained injuries when the militants detonated the VBIED at the main gate. Security forces reportedly killed all the militants during the attack. Casualties included around 12 security officials from AMISOM, NISA, the Somali National Army (SNA), and Somali National Police (SNP). In addition, some 24 security officials and civilians sustained injuries according to NISA officials.

- On August 4, al-Shabaab used suicide vests to attack and kill the Bosasso City Police Commissioner and about three bystanders in Bosasso City, Puntland, according to Puntland Security Services.

- On August 31, al-Shabaab militants attacked the NISA Godka Jilicow Detention Facility in central Mogadishu. The attackers reportedly employed a VBIED at the front gate of the facility followed by a ground assault using small weapons and grenades. NISA officers reportedly killed all the attackers, preventing them from breaching the interior of the facility.

- On October 12, al-Shabaab launched VBIED attacks against a cafe and restaurant frequented by Somali government officials in Mogadishu. According to a senior police official, a VBIED detonated at the Aroma Café may have been triggered by remote control, killing 11 people and wounding eight others.

- On October 15, attackers killed up to five people and injured several others at the Panorama Restaurant near the Somali National Theater using a VBIED.

- On November 8, al-Shabaab fighters attacked Interim Juba Administration (IIA) Security Forces (IIASF) at Koday, Lower Juba Region. Al-Shabaab militants retook control of Koday, which had fallen to pro-government forces during AMISOM operations October 25 to 27, inflicting heavy casualties, according to IJA officials.

- On November 16, al-Shabaab targeted Villa Somalia with mortar shells, resulting in no reported casualties or damage.
- On December 3, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated a VBIED within 200 meters of the main gate of the Mogadishu International Airport, according to NISA officials.
- On December 25, al-Shabaab operatives launched an attack using small weapons and Improvised Explosive Devices inside the Mogadishu International Airport compound, killing up to eight AMISOM soldiers and an American citizen contractor, a Ugandan citizen contractor, and a Kenyan citizen contractor, according to NISA officials. This attack involved the first one inside the airport compound since September 2009.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Federal Government of Somalia continued its efforts to improve security in Mogadishu. Somalia lacks counterterrorism laws, and possesses limited investigative and enforcement capacity to prosecute terrorists, terrorism financiers, and supporters effectively. Somalia currently follows an outdated penal code, last updated in 1963. Ministries responsible for drafting and submitting legislation to Parliament lack the capacity to draft comprehensive counterterrorism laws. Due to lack of civil judiciary capacity, the Somali government tried all terrorism cases in the military court system. Puntland also lacked regional counterterrorism legislation and tried all terrorism cases using its state military court. On March 21, the Puntland military court convicted 36 people accused of links to al-Shabaab. The court sentenced several individuals to life imprisonment, while others received the death penalty. On April 30, Puntland executed 13 al-Shabaab members and supporters whom the court convicted in March.

Somali law enforcement needs significant training assistance for basic investigation skills, cordon and search operations, and effective coordination with the judiciary. Through participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, the Somali National Police (SNP) received training and equipment to help build professional capacity to respond to critical incidents and coordinate with national and international law enforcement partners. Somalia lacked the capacity, transparency, and technical expertise to operate an effective judicial and law enforcement system, which, in turn, hinders the ability of the government to develop rule of law, prosecute criminals, and provide justice to the Somali population. NISA is the lead counterterrorism organization providing rapid-reaction response forces to respond to terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. Interagency cooperation and information sharing remained weak, and almost all Somali law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups were reactive in nature.

Somalia has porous borders. Most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents, leaving Somalia with little to no travel document security. Somalia currently does not have a central or shared terrorist screening watchlist, nor does it have biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Minimal cooperation occurred between the federal and regional governments to investigate suspected terrorists, kidnappings, and other incidents of terrorism committed inside and outside of Somalia. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent an investigative team to Mogadishu following the December 25 al-Shabaab attack inside the Mogadishu International Airport. FBI investigators continued to work with a team of AMISOM and NISA investigators, providing technical expertise and investigative assistance related to the attack.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In 2014, Somalia applied to become an observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, with the country officially becoming an observer of the MENAFATF in late December 2014. No laws criminalize terrorist financing. During the year, the Central Bank drafted a comprehensive anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) law with the help of the World Bank. At year’s end, the Central Bank sought assistance to translate the law to send to Parliament.

In 2014, government entities lacked the capacity to track, seize, or freeze illegal assets. The Somali *hawalas*, most of which operated abroad, employed self-imposed, minimum, international standards to continue operating in countries with comprehensive AML/CFT laws. In May, Merchant’s Bank, the largest U.S. bank servicing the Somali remittance sector, announced that it would close all Somalia-based accounts. In August, however, after a careful review of Dahabshiil (the largest money transfer operator in Somalia), Merchant’s Bank announced that it would resume services to Somali money transfer operators.

Somalia does not have a commercial banking sector, and the Central Bank lacks the capacity to supervise or regulate the *hawala* (money service businesses) sector. Somalia does not have laws or procedures requiring the collection of data for money transfers or suspicious transaction reports. The supervisory and examining section of the Somali Central Bank attempted to develop procedures to oversee the policies governing the establishment of commercial banks in the country. The section suffered from limited staffing and lacked additional funding to pay the salaries of its staff.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Somalia is a member of the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States, and Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. The Somali government expressed greater interest in increasing intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations against al-Shabaab with its Horn of Africa neighbors.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Somali government continued to build its capacity to deliver public messaging, to include Radio Mogadishu and state-owned television stations, which countered al-Shabaab’s messaging. The government continued to air the Islamic Lecture Series (ILS) on radio stations in the Somali cities of Beledweyne, Dhusamared, and Abudwaq. The ILS employs an hour-long, call-in radio talk show format designed to undercut al-Shabaab’s efforts to acquire religious support for its violent extremist ideology. The Minister of Information strongly advocated for forward-leaning strategies to inform the Somali people of al-Shabaab’s violent extremist messages and ideology.

**SOUTH AFRICA**
Overview: In 2014, the South African government increased its limited counterterrorism cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, South Africa’s State Security Agency (SSA) remained reluctant to engage with U.S. counterparts on counterterrorism issues. SSA’s Foreign Branch (SSA/FB) is the sole contact for counterterrorism-related coordination, and it determines which other entities within SSA or other parts of the government will be involved. In the wake of the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, South African police have indicated interest in advancing their preparedness for similar incidents.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The South African Police Service (SAPS) Crime Intelligence Division, the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, and South African State Security Agency are tasked with detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa. The SAPS have a Special Task Force specifically trained and proficient in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and hostage rescue. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) prosecutes cases of terrorism. All entities possess the knowledge, resources, intelligence capabilities, and techniques to effectively implement South Africa’s counterterrorism legislation.

In May, South Africa amended the Immigration Act aiming to “reduce the country’s vulnerability to the security threats of the modern world.” The new immigration laws include the requirement that visa applications must be done in person in order to collect biometric data, fingerprints, and a photograph. In recent years, South Africa introduced new passports with additional security features in line with international standards.

Measures in place to counter terrorism include advanced technology x-ray machines at some airport ports of entry.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: South Africa is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a FATF-style regional body. Its financial intelligence unit is the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), which is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Those required to report to the FIC include banks, financial institutions, car dealers, attorneys, gold dealers, gambling establishments, real estate agents, foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, money lenders (to include those who lend against shares, e.g., brokers), entities selling travelers’ checks, and Johannesburg stock exchange-registered individuals and companies. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: South Africa participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

TANZANIA

Overview: Tanzania has not experienced a large-scale terrorist act conclusively linked to an international terrorist organization since the U.S. Embassy bombing in July 1998. Smaller instances of alleged domestic terrorism, however, continued to concern government
Several bombings targeting religious leaders or institutions occurred in 2014, although at year’s end officials were still investigating whether the perpetrators were members of an organized terrorist group. Police, working with various security elements – including Tanzania’s interagency National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Immigration Services Department (ISD), and the Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service (TISS) – made several arrests of alleged terrorists in 2014, and officials were prosecuting these cases at year’s end. NCTC reported concerns over escalating radicalism and inadequate border security.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Tanzanian authorities reported two incidents:

- On April 13, 15 people were injured when a homemade bomb exploded at the crowded Arusha Night Park bar, where customers were watching an English Premier League match on television. Arusha is a popular destination for Western tourists in northern Tanzania, although this bar is generally only frequented by local residents. Police arrested the perpetrators and said that the assailants were members of a small group dedicated to the imposition of sharia law in Tanzania who wanted to attack Christians and westerners. Court cases against the perpetrators were continuing at year’s end.
- On September 6, two Tanzanian policemen were killed and another two were injured when assailants raided a police station in Bukombe district, Geita region. Police arrested suspects and said they were members of a small group dedicated to the introduction of sharia law in Tanzania who wanted to raid the police station to steal weapons to use in future attacks against Christians.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Tanzania’s legal counterterrorism framework is governed by the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act. The implementing regulations for the Act were published in 2012. In January 2014, a further amendment to the Act was implemented that strengthened Tanzania’s ability to respond to terrorist financing challenges, particularly with regards to UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373.

Tanzania continued its interagency coordination efforts in 2014, mainly through NCTC, but it had not used advanced investigative forensic techniques and streamlined prosecutions to detect, investigate, and fully prosecute suspected terrorists. NCTC is an interagency unit composed of officers from the intelligence, police, defense, immigration, and prison sectors who worked collectively on counterterrorism issues. The organization continued to lack specialized equipment, especially for border security, and NCTC officers lacked advanced training on intelligence analysis and crime scene investigation. When terrorist incidents occur, the police generally lead the investigation – although officials from the ISD and TISS also participate. Once the investigation is completed, the case goes to the Director of Public Prosecutions before being brought to court.

Border security in Tanzania remained a challenge for a variety of reasons, including problems of corruption and vast, porous borders. All major airports and border crossings screened for weapons, drugs, explosives, and other contraband; and continued the use of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System border management system. NCTC and the ISD generally worked together to ensure that all border posts had updated terrorist
Significant law enforcement actions related to terrorist activity included:

- In May, police arrested 16 people suspected of participating in various terrorist incidents in Tanzania over the last several years. Eight of the suspects were suspected of recruiting young people for terrorist activity. Seven others were suspected to be involved in several bombing incidents in Arusha while another, Jaffar Hassan Mondo, was arrested for attempting to apply for a Tanzanian passport using false names. All suspects were charged with various offenses including murder and attempted murder.

- On July 17, 17 suspects appeared before Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s Court in Dar es-Salaam to face terrorism charges, 16 of whom were charged with conspiracy and recruitment of people to commit terrorist acts throughout Tanzania between January 2013 and June 2014. One suspect, Jihad Swalehe, was charged separately with seeking financial support to facilitate terrorist attacks; conspiracy, promotion, and facilitation of the commission of terrorist acts; and the use of Facebook to coordinate attacks between March 21, 2013 and June 2, 2014. The prosecution said Swalehe communicated with individuals through Facebook, seeking material, financial, and technical support to plant explosives in undisclosed locations in Kenya.

- On July 21, in Arusha, police searched the house of and arrested Yusufu Hussein Ally, also known as Huta, and his wife Sumaiya Juma, for possession of seven Russian-made bombs and a German grenade. Ally was investigated by police in connection with several terrorist attacks in Arusha.

- On October 6, police arrested Yahaya Hassan Omari Hella – also known as “Sensei” – who police say admitted to being the leader behind several terrorist attacks in Arusha, Zanzibar, Mwanza, and Dar es Salaam over the past two years. He died on October 19, en route to the hospital after being shot by the police while allegedly attempting to escape from custody.

- Police in Somalia notified the NCTC in 2014 that three teenage boys from Zanzibar were arrested after attempting to join the al-Shabaab terrorist group. At year’s end, the court case remained ongoing in Somalia.

Through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, Tanzanian law enforcement officials received technical training in the areas of strengthening border security capacity, enhancing investigative capacity, and building response capacity to a critical incident.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June, the FATF noted Tanzania’s significant progress in improving anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts, as well as improving its legal and regulatory framework in this regard. As a result, FATF removed Tanzania from a list of countries subject to a monitoring process due to AML/CFT deficiencies. In 2014, Tanzania became a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Tanzania’s Financial Intelligence Unit received 65 suspicious transaction reports related to money laundering in 2014, a slight decrease from the 68 received in 2013.
In January, Tanzania passed implementing regulations which assign specific responsibilities to various government entities in order to implement UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Tanzania is a member of the AU, the Southern African Development Community, and the East African Community, all of which implement counterterrorism initiatives. In addition, Tanzania participated in counterterrorism training programs sponsored by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – even though Tanzania is not a full member. The NCTC continued to coordinate with partner organizations although the East African Police Chiefs’ Organization and the Southern African Police Chief’s Organization. Police officials also continued to work closely with Interpol. Tanzania is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Tanzania has especially close relationships with police and counterterrorism officials in Kenya and Uganda, although these were hindered at times from a lack of effective mechanisms to share information electronically.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The current focal point of NCTC’s counter-radicalization strategy is its community policing program. Through this initiative, which has been active in many perceived counterterrorism hot spots for several years, officials aim to build better relationships within key communities and are better able to detect threats tied to radicalization.

**UGANDA**

**Overview:** In 2014, the Government of Uganda was a strong advocate of cross-border solutions to security issues, effectively supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and showed continued and strong political will to apprehend suspected terrorists and disrupt terrorist activity in Uganda. Terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab, however, continued to put consistent pressure on Uganda’s security apparatus primarily due to Uganda contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Uganda’s ability to respond to such threats remained inconsistent, given its resource and capacity limitations, porous borders, and corruption at all levels of government.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Uganda continued to use the Anti-Terrorism Act (2002) as its main legal framework for deterring, disrupting, and prosecuting terrorist activity and incidents in Uganda. The Uganda Police Force (UPF) Counterterrorism Directorate is the lead Ugandan law enforcement entity charged with investigating, disrupting, and responding to terrorist incidents. While Ugandan law enforcement officers assigned to this directorate are highly motivated, the UPF overall was limited in its capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents due to the lack of manpower, resources, basic skills, and competencies. In addition, police officers are particularly susceptible to corruption. Moreover, the bulk of the counterterrorism police and other law enforcement elements are centrally located in the capital, which limits the effectiveness of law enforcement in the border regions and all
areas outside Kampala. The UPF still lacks the technological resources needed to conduct comprehensive terrorism investigations in the most effective manner. Following the Westgate terrorist attack in Nairobi in 2013, the UPF has held regular interagency meetings to ensure coordination among its security agencies.

The United States continued to provide significant counterterrorism assistance to the UPF, specifically through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which builds capacity in the areas of counterterrorism investigations, crisis response, and border security.

Border security remained a persistent concern for the Ugandan government, which continued to work to expand enforcement and monitoring capacity. Uganda continued to employ biometric security measures at airports.

On September 13, Uganda demonstrated its ability to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat when Ugandan security services conducted an extremely complex and large operation to disrupt an al-Shabaab terrorist cell that was in the final planning stages of an imminent attack on unknown targets in Kampala. Approximately 16 suspects were arrested on September 13, and five more were arrested on September 15 and 16. After initial investigations, 10 suspected terrorists remained detained at the end of 2014. Security agencies continued to pursue leads throughout the region to garner additional evidence. As of the end of 2014, no trial dates had been announced.

In October, the Constitutional Court ruled on a legal challenge over the jurisdiction, extradition, and treatment of the 12 individuals arrested for orchestrating the July 2010 al-Shabaab bombings following the World Cup, upholding Uganda’s detention of the suspects. One of the victims of those attacks was an American citizen.

The UPF cooperated with the United States on several terrorism-related cases. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation maintained strong relationships with the UPF.

The United States and UPF continued to try to operationalize a 2013 Memorandum of Cooperation to modernize its criminal records management system to replace the outdated system currently used to identify criminal and terrorist suspects. In addition, while the U.S. government provided the UPF substantial counterterrorism training, the UPF lacked training in tactical operations, incident command, cybersecurity, handling of suspects, and crime scene management.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In February 2014, Uganda made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. In October, the FATF noted that Uganda had taken positive actions by establishing its financial intelligence unit and issuing guidance to reporting entities.

In 2014, Uganda made some progress on implementing the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA), which passed in 2013, including the appointment in August of an interim executive.
director of the Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA), which under the AMLA would be responsible for monitoring and regulating remittance services and wire transfer data. The FIA was not fully established at year’s end, however. Once the board of the FIA is fully constituted, the agency will receive reports from financial institutions on suspicious financial activity. The Bank of Uganda asks local banks to report suspicious transactions, but there is no clear implementation mechanism for enforcement or investigation of potentially suspicious activity. The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the UPF maintained responsibility for investigating financial crimes. However, the CID remained understaffed and poorly-trained, with only limited ability to investigate and prosecute money laundering violations. The AMLA also does not capture Uganda’s large mobile money sector within its regulatory framework.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Uganda is a strong force for regional stability, security coordination, and counterterrorism efforts, and is an active member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the East African Community (EAC), the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and as such is a strong force for regional stability, security coordination, and counterterrorism efforts. Uganda contributed troops to AMISOM to counter al-Shabaab, and continued to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in coordination with the DRC, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In January, UPF and the Somali National Police Force signed a memorandum of understanding to enhance cooperation between the two forces to include training, equipment, and intelligence sharing. Additionally, as a member of the EAC, Uganda signed a regional counterterrorism strategy with other member nations in April that provides for greater counterterrorism cooperation.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Ugandan authorities have shown some interest in partnering with the U.S. government and Ugandan Muslim leaders to conduct more systematic and targeted outreach within the expatriate Somali community in Uganda, particularly since Somali youth living as refugees are often targeted for recruitment by al-Shabaab.

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**EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC**

In 2014, countries in the East Asia and Pacific continued to weaken the ability of terrorist groups to operate in the region and constrained the activities of large terrorist organizations. Governments became increasingly concerned about the growing threat of the Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which became a major impetus for further counterterrorism efforts in Indonesia and Malaysia, as citizens from both countries travelled abroad to fight with ISIL. The emergence in July of a recruitment video calling for Indonesians to join ISIL further mobilized efforts of the Indonesian government, civil society, and religious groups to counter the ISIL threat. Indonesian government officials banned support for ISIL, and then-President Yudhoyono outlined a series of measures to counter ISIL. Malaysia also demonstrated its political will at the highest levels of government to confront the threat of ISIL and other terror threat groups.
The Philippine government’s Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – creating a new Bangsamoro autonomous government in Mindanao – was signed in March. However, violent clashes with fighters from terrorist groups and splinter groups erupted periodically in central Mindanao, indicating that a lasting peace settlement remains a challenge.

Indonesia and Australia continued their co-chairmanship of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Detention and Reintegration Working Group (DRWG), which grew out of the former Southeast Asia Working Group. The inaugural DRWG meeting was held in August in Indonesia.

Australia maintained its position as a regional leader in the fight against terrorism, and worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region’s counterterrorism capacity through a range of bilateral and regional initiatives in organizations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum. In mid-December 2014, a lone-offender ISIL sympathizer held 17 hostages in a Sydney café; three were killed, including the gunman, and four were wounded.

The Japanese government continued to participate in international counterterrorism efforts at multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. Japan made progress with, but at year’s end still had not ratified, the Palermo Convention on countering terrorist financing.

CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU)

Overview: China’s attention to counterterrorism is increasing, both domestically and abroad. China experienced several terrorist and other violent incidents in 2014. As a result, China tightened its security in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) to prevent additional domestic acts of terrorism, including by implementing stricter government controls on religious expression and practice. The main focus of China’s counterterrorism efforts is the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a terrorist organization that China alleges maintains influence in Xinjiang. China tightened its security clampdown in the XUAR, characterizing it as an effort to prevent additional domestic acts of terrorism.

The Chinese government has claimed that Chinese citizens operated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Middle East, and has taken action to prevent its citizens from traveling to Syria and Iraq.

Counterterrorism cooperation activities between the United States and China remained limited, though the two countries continued to discuss ways to enhance cooperation. These included efforts aimed at stemming the transnational flow of foreign terrorist fighters, countering terrorist funding networks, increasing information sharing on terrorist threats, and assisting the Government of Iraq in its rebuilding efforts.

China held 12 bilateral dialogues on counterterrorism in 2014, including one with the United States in July. China remained engaged on counterterrorism in the Asia-Pacific region and Central Asia, conducting bilateral and multilateral joint exercises.
China has criticized the U.S. response to some domestic incidents of violence that China characterized as terrorism, alleging that U.S. expressions of concern over the treatment of China’s ethnic minorities and the U.S. failure to label all such incidents as terrorism represented a double standard. China frequently refers to Uighur activists abroad – including those in the United States – as complicit in supporting "terrorist" activity, but has not provided credible evidence to support those claims.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** The lack of information provided by China about alleged terrorist incidents in China made it difficult in some instances to verify details of those and other violent incidents. In many of the domestic incidents that China labeled as terrorism, China alleged that ETIM influenced or directed the violence through its online propaganda. China also generally prevented foreign journalists and international observers from independently verifying official media accounts, which are often the only source of reporting violent incidents in its territory.

Among the violent incidents in China over the year, the U.S. government identified sufficient evidence to consider the following incidents terrorist attacks:

- On March 1, 33 people were killed (including four perpetrators of the attack) and 141 injured when eight knife-wielding men and women attacked passengers at a railway station in the city of Kunming.
- On April 30, an explosion at Urumqi South Train Station in Xinjiang killed three people, including two attackers. Chinese officials attributed this attack to ETIM.
- On May 22, four men attacked a crowded market in Urumqi with a car bomb, killing themselves and 39 others, while wounding more than 90 other individuals.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In October, China’s National People’s Congress reviewed draft legislation for the country’s first counterterrorism law. The draft included proposals to establish a counterterrorism intelligence center aimed at improving international cooperation and better coordinating information sharing across the government, military, armed police, and law enforcement authorities. The draft legislation also stipulated measures on tightening internet security management, inspection of dangerous materials, prevention of terrorist financing, and border controls. Some aspects of the draft CT law, including its broad definition of terrorism and trade-related requirements for foreign telecoms and internet service providers have elicited human rights and business concerns from many foreign observers. At the end of 2014, the CT law had not been passed.

Over the year, there was an increase in the number of stories in Chinese media of operations targeting alleged terrorists. Following the March 1 knife attack in Kunming, China’s leaders arrested and tried hundreds of people in Xinjiang. However, because of the Chinese government’s tight control of information, it remained difficult to determine whether particular raids, detentions, arrests, or judicial punishments targeted individuals who were seeking political goals, voicing local grievances, or orchestrating criminal or terrorist acts. For example, according to state media, 37 civilians and 59 individuals labeled as terrorists were killed after a July 28 incident in front of a police station and government offices in Kashgar Prefecture’s Shache (Yarkand) County. While the police arrested 215 people in connection with the incident and sentenced a dozen individuals to death for their alleged involvement in the attack, some
residents reported that the incident stemmed from local protests against the detention of women and girls who had refused to remove their headscarves. According to state media, law enforcement authorities in XUAR eliminated what they considered to be 115 terrorist cells in 2014. These reports claimed that about 40 percent of the 115 terrorist cells were found through clues authorities obtained during intensive interrogation of detained suspects.

In May, a mass trial was held at a sports stadium in Xinjiang where three people were sentenced to death and another 53 received lengthy jail terms after being convicted of terrorism charges. Three individuals accused of organizing the October 2013 Tiananmen car crash were executed in August 2014 on terrorism charges. In 2014, Chinese authorities sentenced ethnic activists to imprisonment on terrorism-related charges, exhibiting what appeared to be a failure to distinguish between peaceful dissent and violent extremism.

Hotan’s city government mobilized over 30,000 volunteers in massive terror searches following violence in late July. The Xinjiang government offered substantial cash rewards to the public for providing information that led to the arrest of terrorists.

China continued to stress the importance of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, but Chinese law enforcement agencies generally remained reluctant to conduct joint investigations or share specific threat information with U.S. law enforcement partners. Despite several requests to Chinese law enforcement officials for more detailed background information on Chinese media-reported arrests and operations, U.S. law enforcement agencies received little new information. Overall, China’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States remained limited.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** China is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, both of which are FATF-style regional bodies. The Chinese government has strengthened its preventive measures to counter terrorist financing, with an emphasis on requiring financial institutions to collect and maintain beneficial ownership information, and making Suspicious Transaction Reports more comprehensive. Additional issues remain to be addressed, including guidance for designated non-financial businesses and professions; delisting and unfreezing procedures; and defining the rights of bona fide third parties in seizure/confiscation actions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** China continued collaboration on UNSC counterterrorism issues and voted for UNSCRs 2170 and 2178. China is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and in November hosted in Beijing the GCTF Symposium on “Strengthening International Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Terrorists’ Use of the Internet.”

China cooperated with other nations on counterterrorism efforts through military exercises and assistance. In August, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan held a
counterterrorism exercise (Peace Mission 2014) within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In October, China and Indonesia held a bilateral counterterrorism exercise. Following the 2013 inaugural joint exercise, China and India held a counterterrorism exercise in November 2014. Also in November, China and Russia carried out a regularly scheduled China-Russia bilateral exercise. China also held separate dialogues and consultations with the AU and 12 countries, including Afghanistan, the United States, the UK, France, Turkey, the Republic of Korea, and Uzbekistan.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** While China does not have an official strategy or program in place to counter violent extremism, the government implemented a number of programs aimed at countering radicalization and violent extremism, concentrating much of its efforts in Xinjiang. Local counterterrorism working groups have been established at the county, municipal, and provincial levels across China to coordinate “stability maintenance,” law enforcement, ethnic and religious affairs, and a propaganda campaign countering the so-called “Three Evils” of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism. Xinjiang government officials required imams to take political education classes as a means of persuading them to discourage extremism and condemn violence. In Xinjiang, authorities placed restrictions on private religious practices, and closely monitored Uighurs returning from madrassas overseas. In March, the Xinjiang government announced a crackdown on videos and audio recordings that the government defined as promoting terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. According to the notice, it was forbidden to disseminate such materials on the internet, on social media, and on online marketplaces.

Chinese public security authorities released a strategic communications brochure in July in an attempt to educate the public about how to respond to various forms of violent attack. Copies of the brochure, called the “Citizens Anti-Terror Handbook,” were handed out in Xinjiang, as well as in other major cities throughout China. The pamphlet advises people to look out for “terrorist suspects” who dress or act suspiciously. Similarly, in December, Xinjiang police issued a list of 75 “specific signs” that might indicate someone is a religious extremist, which included wearing Islamic veils in public, reading religious books, and abstaining from alcohol.

Many Chinese government policies may exacerbate ethnic tension in Xinjiang and contribute to increased radicalism and violent extremism. In China, official government accounts of terrorism focus almost exclusively on Xinjiang-related violence. For further information, we refer you to the State Department’s 2014 *Report on International Religious Freedom* at: [http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm).

**Hong Kong**

Hong Kong continued its effective security and law enforcement partnership with the United States through the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s successful joint operation of the Container Security Initiative; through participation in U.S. government-sponsored training in related topics; and through engagement with U.S. counterterrorism agencies.

Counterterrorism remained an operational priority for the Hong Kong Police Force, as demonstrated by existing policies on prevention, protection, and preparedness. The Police
Security Wing coordinates potential terrorist threat information with relevant counterterrorism units. The Police Counterterrorism Response Unit provides a strong deterrent presence, assisting police districts with counterterrorism strategy implementation, and complementing the tactical and professional support of existing police specialist units – such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, Special Duties Unit, and VIP Protection Unit. Hong Kong’s strategic trade regime buttresses U.S. efforts to restrict commodities, software, and technology to terrorist organizations or individuals. Hong Kong law enforcement officers attended U.S. government-sponsored capacity building training at the International Law Enforcement Academy on advanced post-blast investigations, personnel and facility security, law enforcement techniques to combat terrorism, and financial investigations.

Hong Kong is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Hong Kong, and financial institutions are required to continuously search for terrorist financing networks and screen accounts using designations lists provided by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UN 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) and 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committees’ lists. Filing suspicious transactions reports irrespective of transaction amounts is obligatory, but Hong Kong does not require mandatory reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements.

**Macau**

Macau’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States included information exchange as well as regular capacity building through participation in U.S. government-sponsored training. The Police Intervention Tactical Unit (UTIP), which falls under the Macau Public Security Police Force, is responsible for protecting important installations and dignitaries, and for conducting high-risk missions, such as deactivation of IEDs. UTIP’s Special Operations Group’s mission is counterterrorism operations. Macau law enforcement officers attended U.S. government-sponsored capacity building training at the International Law Enforcement Academy on personnel and facility security, financial and crime scene investigations, combating terrorism, computer investigations, and evidence protection.

Macau is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Macau, and banks and other financial institutions are required to continuously search for terrorist financing networks and screen accounts using designations lists provided by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UN 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) and 1988 (Taliban) Sanctions Committees’ lists. Filing suspicious transactions reports (STRs) irrespective of transaction amounts is obligatory, but Macau does not currently require mandatory reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements.

Macau cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through Interpol and other security-focused organizations, including through FATF and APG. On December 15, Macau’s Financial Intelligence Unit signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network that allows the two jurisdictions to exchange information on STRs.
INDONESIA

Overview: With more than 17,000 islands, Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic nation. As a result, securing land and sea borders remains an ongoing challenge. Although Indonesia does not provide a safe haven for terrorists, terrorists meet and train in the isolated area near Poso, Central Sulawesi.

In 2014, Indonesia expanded international counterterrorism cooperation, including with the United States. Indonesia sustained pressure on terrorists and their networks, particularly those operating within its borders, but continued to face challenges trying to stem the flow of Indonesians traveling abroad to engage in terrorism. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) became a major impetus for further counterterrorism efforts. The emergence in July of a recruitment video calling for Indonesians to join ISIL focused the attention of the government and civil society and religious groups on countering the ISIL threat. Indonesian government officials have estimated that up to 300 Indonesians may have traveled to the Middle East since 2012 to engage in terrorist activities.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: The Eastern Indonesia Mujahedin (MIT) claimed responsibility for the September 18 murder of M. Fadli in Poso, Central Sulawesi. MIT is a Poso-based terrorist group led by Abu Wardah, also known as Santoso, one of Indonesia’s most wanted terrorists.

Fatal shootings of police officers on March 28, June 2, and August 16 in the Bima region of West Nusa Tenggara province were handled as acts of terrorism. The targeting of police and security forces by terrorists is a trend that has emerged since 2009.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Indonesia follows a strong rule-of-law-based counterterrorism approach. After investigation by police, terrorist suspects’ dossiers are sent to the Task Force on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crimes, which is part of the Attorney General’s Office, for prosecution. Relevant legislation includes the Law on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism (15/2003), the 1951 Emergency Law, and Indonesia’s Criminal Code.

Counterterrorism efforts are police-led, with Detachment 88 – the elite counterterrorism unit of the police – leading operations and investigations. Counterterrorism units from the Indonesian military may be called upon to support domestic counterterrorism operations and responses on an as-needed basis. Law enforcement units are increasingly able to detect, and in some cases prevent, attacks before they are carried out.

Law enforcement personnel participated in a range of training and professional development activities, including through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, with training focused on building sustainable police capacity in tactical crisis response and investigative skills.

In August, government officials banned support for ISIL. However, this ban is a proclamation and does not have the force of law. Officials are considering measures to revise Indonesia’s legislative framework to make it more effective. Authorities made at least 10 arrests of alleged
ISIL supporters. The Ministry of Communications and Information blocked 20 ISIL-related websites. To complement these actions, officials recognized the need for a counter-messaging campaign; these efforts were nascent at year’s end. Many of Indonesia’s countermeasures against ISIL also addressed the broader threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, whether affiliated with ISIL or other violent extremist groups operating in the Middle East.

In September, then-President Yudhoyono outlined a series of measures to counter ISIL. To prevent the travel of potential foreign fighters, Yudhoyono called for increased scrutiny of passport and visa issuances. The government held a series of coordination meetings with foreign officials, including from transit and destination countries. Yudhoyono announced that Indonesian citizens abroad and foreigners within Indonesia would be monitored more closely. He said the surveillance of terrorist prisoners would be tightened and called for heightened vigilance throughout Indonesia, especially in areas vulnerable to or with a history of violent extremism. In December, authorities in Malaysia arrested and later deported seven Indonesian citizens, accompanied by five children, who were planning travel to Syria to join ISIL.

Indonesia’s efforts dovetailed with obligations outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2170 and 2178. For example, Indonesia condemned ISIL and sought to prevent the movements of terrorists, including through enhanced controls related to the issuance of identity papers. Indonesia implemented several of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF’s) good practices for a more effective response against foreign terrorist fighters.

Immigration officials at major ports of entry, especially larger international air and sea ports, have access to biographic and biometric domestic-only databases. Military and police personnel are often posted at major ports of entry to ensure security. Police maintain a watchlist of suspected terrorists, but there are not always clear lines of coordination among stakeholder agencies. Indonesia shares information through Interpol, but does not regularly screen through Interpol at immigration checkpoints. Information sharing with countries in the region is often on an ad hoc basis, and there is no centralized database or platform for the sharing of information with countries in the region or internationally.

As of early November, there were 274 terrorist prisoners held in approximately 26 prisons throughout Indonesia, overseen by the Directorate General of Corrections, under the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Some of Indonesia’s most hardened terrorists and ideologues are incarcerated in several prisons on the island of Nusakambangan, off the southern coast of Java. Authorities remained concerned about the potential recidivism of released terrorist prisoners. As an example, Muhammad Sibgotulloh was detained in Malaysia in early December, suspected of attempting to travel to join ISIL, and was returned to Indonesia two weeks later. Sibgotulloh had previously served a three-year jail term based on support lent to Umar Patek, one of the principal makers of a bomb used in the 2002 Bali terrorist attacks.

Police conducted periodic raids against suspected terrorists, with a particular focus on Poso, Central Sulawesi. By mid-November, law enforcement officials had arrested 44 suspects on terrorism charges, including 10 ISIL-related arrests. During a raid on New Year’s Eve in Ciputat, near Jakarta, police killed six alleged terrorists. At least one of the suspects was
reportedly planning travel to Syria. Evidence seized indicated the group was responsible for a series of bank robberies – used to fund terrorism – and the April 2013 bombing of a Buddhist temple in Jakarta. On September 13, police in Central Sulawesi arrested seven people, including four Uighurs from China’s Xinjiang Province, for alleged links to MIT. On September 20, law enforcement authorities arrested five suspects with ties to terrorism in connection with the series of shootings in the Bima region of West Nusa Tenggara province; one suspect was killed.

In January, judges at the South Jakarta District Court sentenced four men to prison terms ranging from six to seven-and-a-half years for their roles in a failed plan to bomb the Burmese Embassy in Jakarta in May 2013. On March 3, Haris Fauzi was sentenced to nine years in jail for his involvement in a failed plot to assassinate the vice mayor of Makassar, South Sulawesi, in 2012. Fauzi is associated with a terrorist group affiliated with Abu Roban, and had participated in terrorist training camps in the Poso area.

Despite these domestic convictions, Indonesian law lacks the provisions to criminalize and prosecute acts of, and support for, terrorism committed abroad. Frequent personnel rotation at various agencies – including the police, Attorney General’s Office, and judiciary – represents a challenge to building long-term institutional expertise. Prosecutors sometimes use other laws and criminal statutes not specific to terrorism to prosecute and convict terrorists. As a result, these individuals are not counted or tracked through the justice system as convicted terrorists, creating a potential loophole in disengagement and de-radicalization efforts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Indonesia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a regional Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style body, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. In 2013, Indonesia’s House of Representatives passed Law 9 of 2013, “the Bill on Prevention and Eradication of Crimes of Financing of Terrorism” (TF Law) and the legislation became effective in March 2013. Fifteen defendants have been prosecuted under this law since its passage. According to the UNSC and the FATF, Indonesia has not yet fully implemented UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. By November 26, Indonesia had issued orders to freeze the assets of all 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) sanctioned individuals and entities. Indonesia is working on a joint regulation to ensure that its freezing process is “without delay,” in accordance with UNSCRs 1267, 1988, and 1373. The FATF continued to include Indonesia on its Public Statement list, noting that Indonesia needs to address certain deficiencies in the TF law regarding identifying and freezing terrorist assets.

The passage of the TF Law was an important step forward and Indonesia has filed cases under this new legislation; while the law could have stronger conspiracy and preparatory act provisions, it does allow for investigation and prosecution of TF offenses. However, the law does not meet international standards because the mechanism to freeze terrorist assets as applied to UNSCRs 1267, 1988, and 1373, does not “freeze without delay.” The TF law requires steps to be taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the police, and the court system, among others, before terrorist assets can be frozen and/or confiscated, thus impeding the ability to freeze “without delay.” Indonesia is working to address this issue.

Indonesia does not oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports or regulate and monitor them to prevent misuse and terrorist financing. Although non-profit
organizations such as religious and charitable organizations are licensed and required to file suspicious transaction reports, the TF Law does not require monitoring or the regulation of such organizations to prevent misuse, including terrorist financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Indonesia participates in counterterrorism efforts through several international, multilateral, and regional fora including: the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), ASEAN, APEC, and others. Indonesia expanded regional and international cooperation, especially in response to the foreign terrorist fighter issue. Indonesia participated in a range of GCTF workshops where participants shared best practices and lessons learned, thereby supporting the capacity building efforts of other countries. In August, with co-chair Australia, Indonesia launched the GCTF’s new Working Group on Detention and Reintegration. Indonesia remained active in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC). Indonesia completed a second year as the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force of APEC. Under Indonesian leadership, the task force was upgraded to a working group. Indonesian efforts drove the creation of a five-year plan focused on the security of supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. In September, Indonesia co-sponsored UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Indonesian officials recognized the importance of addressing radicalization to violence and countering violent extremism (CVE). CVE programs are included in counterterrorism efforts, but because of limited resources and the vast amount of territory of the Indonesian archipelago, CVE efforts are not yet comprehensive. Government efforts are augmented by contributions from various civil society organizations that are active in CVE efforts. Some of the groups offered positive alternatives – such as sports, film-making, camps, and rallies – for populations vulnerable to violent extremism, especially youth.

Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) supported a school outreach program that included former terrorists, survivors of terrorist attacks, law enforcement personnel, and religious leaders. The BNPT continued to use the Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT), a program located in more than 20 of Indonesia’s provinces, as a platform for broader outreach. Forum participants are usually civic and religious leaders who coordinate activities with the communities on CVE-related programming. The FKPT network also conducts programs designed to maximize the positive influence of families and community members regarding the reintegration of former terrorist prisoners. Over time, officials aim to establish a Forum in each of Indonesia’s 34 provinces. BNPT planned to continue a program that invites religious leaders from the Middle East to meet terrorist prisoners in Indonesia, with the aim to foster a more moderate and peaceful mindset among convicted terrorists.

A de-radicalization blueprint for terrorist prisoners issued by the BNPT in late 2013 has yet to be fully implemented. Counterterrorism officials, in coordination with the Directorate General of Corrections and other relevant law enforcement agencies, have planned to open a de-
radicalization center in Sentul, south of Jakarta. There is ongoing debate about how to handle the most hardcore ideologues, but the evolving consensus is to confine these prisoners in one of Indonesia’s maximum security detention centers.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Overview: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. In May 2014, the DPRK agreed to re-open its investigation into the abductions, but as of the end of 2014 had not yet provided the results of this investigation to Japan.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, the United States recertified North Korea as a country “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed the DPRK’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of DPRK capabilities.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The DPRK is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In July 2014, it was admitted as an observer, but not a full member, of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Nevertheless, the DPRK failed to demonstrate meaningful progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) infrastructure. While encouraging the DPRK’s continued engagement with FATF and APG, FATF highlighted continuing concerns about North Korea’s “failure to address the significant deficiencies in its [AML/CFT] regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.” At each of its plenary meetings throughout the year, the FATF renewed its call on members to “protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism risks emanating from the DPRK.” For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Overview: The Republic of Korea has strong counterterrorism capabilities and enjoys robust cooperation with the United States and the international community. In 2014, the Republic of
Korea did not face any major domestic terrorist threats; however, South Korean citizens serving as tourists and missionaries have in prior years been victims of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and East Africa. Domestically, agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities continued to closely monitor and cooperate with the United States on the prevention of cyberattacks and the mitigation of threats posed by foreign residents with potential ties to terrorist groups. South Korean and U.S. law enforcement agencies have worked closely on information sharing through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) and the Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreement, and have held joint investigations on known and suspected terrorists. In October, the Republic of Korea conducted a bilateral counterterrorism consultation with the People’s Republic of China.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The National Assembly failed to pass a comprehensive counterterrorism law, first proposed in 2001. As a result, South Korean legal authorities have no legal framework to proactively and consistently investigate individuals with material or ideological ties to terrorism. Therefore, South Korean authorities use criminal statutes for suspected terrorism cases.

The Republic of Korea derives its authority to perform counterterrorist activities from Presidential Directive 309, last revised in 2013. In spring 2014, National Assembly members submitted for deliberation several bills regarding cyberterrorism and compensation for victims of terrorist acts, including medical and recovery assistance. At year’s end, the bills were with the National Assembly Intelligence Committee.

In the lead-up to the 2014 Asian Games, a group of international police prevented sixteen foreign nationals from entering the country due to terrorism suspicions.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Republic of Korea is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body, and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. In May, a law was revised to stipulate that the Republic of Korea implement all international treaties and resolutions related to countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267, 1988, and 1373. The Korea Financial Intelligence Unit, established by the Ministry of Finance and Economy, works with law enforcement agencies to monitor suspicious transactions and develop CFT policy. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Republic of Korea continued to strengthen bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism efforts in 2014. The Republic of Korea is a member of the UN, APEC, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation, the OECD, the G-20, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. South Korea is also a partner country of OSCE and NATO. The Republic of Korea remains actively engaged in global efforts to counter the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, and participated in the October implementation meeting on UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters.
MALAYSIA

Overview: Both domestically and on the international stage, Malaysia’s counterterrorism efforts in 2014 largely focused on mitigating the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and foreign terrorist fighters. Prime Minister Najib submitted to Parliament a White Paper on the threat of ISIL in November, which emphasized the risk of Malaysian foreign terrorist fighters returning home to destabilize the country. Malaysian authorities arrested approximately 50 suspected ISIL supporters in 2014. When he presented the White Paper to Parliament, the Prime Minister said that authorities had identified 39 Malaysians fighting with various militant groups in Syria and Iraq, 17 of whom were fighting with ISIL. The Prime Minister also announced that five Malaysian foreign fighters had returned home from Syria and Iraq, three of whom had been arrested, with police monitoring the other two.

President Obama’s April visit to Malaysia resulted in the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Comprehensive Partnership, which included efforts to strengthen security and law enforcement cooperation such as maritime and border security. With the positive developments from the summit, U.S. cooperation with Malaysia on counterterrorism and other transnational security issues continued to improve. The United States and Malaysia signed an Immigration Memorandum of Understanding in October, and a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement in December – both of which further strengthen bilateral security cooperation.

Malaysia is not considered a terrorist safe haven, but some violent extremists have been known to operate and hide in isolated littoral areas of the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Militants allegedly from the Philippines and linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group conducted four cross-border kidnapping for ransom operations in eastern Sabah, Malaysia. In April, a Chinese tourist and a Philippine hotel employee were kidnapped by armed men from a diving resort off the coast of Semporna. In May, a Chinese manager of a fish farm was kidnapped from an island near Lahad Datu; and in June, a Philippine and a Malaysian national were kidnapped from another fish farm in Kunak. In July, at a diving resort on Mabul Island, armed men killed a Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) officer and kidnapped another officer, who remained in captivity at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA), and chapters VI (Offenses Against the State) and VIa (Offenses Relating to Terrorism) of Malaysia’s penal code were the primary legal tools for terrorism cases.

In January, the RMP restructured the former Special Task Force (Operations/Counterterrorism) into a new Special Branch/Counterterrorism Unit, which now has the lead role in counterterrorism efforts. Malaysian authorities made efforts to improve interagency cooperation and information sharing, including participation in regional meetings, Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) regional workshops, and training conducted through Malaysia’s Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), which is part of Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In January, Malaysian authorities released from detention the remaining six individuals who had been held under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which was repealed in 2012 with the introduction of SOSMA. The six included three Malaysians, two Indonesians, and a Philippine citizen detained under the ISA in November 2011 for alleged membership in Darul Islam Sabah, which is linked to Jemaah Islamiya (JI).

In November, Indonesian authorities released from prison JI bomb-maker Taufik Abdul Halim, a Malaysian citizen who spent the past 12 years in jail for attempting to bomb a Jakarta shopping mall in 2001. Malaysian police monitored Taufik after his release, as he is the brother-in-law of wanted terrorist Zulkifli Abdul Khir, also known as Marwan.

In December, Malaysian authorities arrested and subsequently deported to Indonesia three men and four women intending to join ISIL in Syria. The seven Indonesians were traveling with five children.

As of year’s end, the trial of al-Qa’ida operative Yazid Sufaat, who was arrested in 2013 for recruiting Malaysians to fight in Syria, had not yet begun. Sufaat was charged with inciting or promoting the commission of terrorist acts under Section 130G(a) of Malaysia’s penal code. One accomplice, Muhammad Hilmi Hasim, remained in custody awaiting trial under for aiding and abetting the commission of terrorist acts. Sufaat’s other accomplice, Halimah Hussein, remained at large at year’s end.

The SOSMA trial of 30 suspects – 27 Philippine nationals and three Malaysians – involved in the February 2013 Lahad Datu incursion began in January and was ongoing at year’s end. The suspects were on trial for harboring terrorists, membership of a terrorist group, recruiting terrorists, and waging war against the king.

Iranian citizen, and suspected member of the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Masoud Sedaghatzadeh, arrested in Malaysia in February 2012 after failed attempted bombings in Bangkok, remained in Malaysian custody. A Malaysian court had ordered Sedaghatzadeh’s extradition to Thailand in 2012, but his appeal remained pending at year’s end.

Malaysia has a no-fly list, but passengers are compared to that list by the immigration officer at the port of entry and the decision to deny entry is made at the airport. Malaysia does not regularly screen at immigration checkpoints through Interpol.

In July, in response to the continued threat of kidnapping for ransom and other transnational threats, the Malaysian government enacted a maritime curfew along the eastern coast of Sabah. The government extended the curfew multiple times and at year’s end it was still in effect. The government also announced in July that an additional 330 police officers and 350 army personnel would be deployed to eastern Sabah to strengthen the border.

Of the approximately 50 suspected ISIL supporters Malaysian authorities arrested (not including non-Malaysian citizens who were deported), prosecutors filed charges in 22 cases. The charges
included incitement, abetment, and soliciting or giving support to a terrorist organization. At least two of the individuals were charged with illegal firearms possession.

Malaysian police also arrested – and subsequently deported – 13 alleged supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and a Somali member of al-Shabaab. Several of the deported LTTE suspects had allegedly planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli diplomatic facilities in India. In July, the Malaysian Home Minister said that, since 2009, Malaysia had deported 67 foreigners suspected of being involved in militant activities in Malaysia and overseas.

Malaysia demonstrated its political will at the highest levels of government to confront the threat of ISIL and other terrorist groups. Malaysia’s existing legal system is capable of disrupting terrorist plots before they are carried out, and before fighters travel to foreign conflicts. Malaysia has laws against conspiracy, attempt, incitement, solicitation, aiding, abetting, and promoting terrorist acts, and most of the same inchoate offenses that are prosecutable in the United States. However, as authorities were unable to file charges in roughly half of the terrorism-related arrests, a significant challenge is Malaysia’s need to strengthen proactive cooperation between police and prosecutors from the outset of an investigation.

Malaysia continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, with programs focused on strengthening law enforcement capacity to secure Malaysia’s borders from terrorist transit.

The U.S. Department of State’s Export Controls and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program conducted capacity building activities for customs, police, immigration, coast guard, and strategic trade officials. EXBS also strengthened international and regional coordination of maritime security efforts. Malaysia participated in the Container Security and Megaports Initiatives, as well as the UN Office and Drugs and Crime Container Control Program.

In October, the U.S. government conducted a three-day workshop for over 60 Malaysian police and prosecutors designed to promote greater cooperation in the proactive investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Malaysia became an official observer country of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in October, and has expressed interest in becoming a full member. In November, a FATF team conducted an assessment of Malaysia. Malaysia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body.

Malaysia has a well-developed anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework, and a capable Financial Intelligence and Enforcement Unit within Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank of Malaysia. Nevertheless, the ISIL White Paper noted that Malaysia was at risk of becoming a terrorist finance hub, suggesting that existing laws should be strengthened.
In August, Parliament passed an amendment to the 2001 Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorist Financing Act, which broadened the government’s investigation and enforcement authority, in line with FATF standards. The amendment came into effect on September 1.

Law enforcement and customs officials are responsible for examining trade-based money laundering and invoice manipulation, and their relationship to underground finance and informal remittance systems. Malaysia took strong steps in 2014 to counter and reduce unauthorized money services businesses – including a series of raids in November.

In response to FATF’s 2012 revised international standards, Malaysia’s National Coordinating Committee for Countering Money Laundering assessed money laundering and terrorist financing threats facing the country. The review was completed in 2014, and Malaysia is implementing new measures to mitigate the risks identified, including intensifying joint law enforcement investigation efforts, forming dedicated AML/CFT law enforcement units, and strengthening Malaysia’s AML/CFT framework.

Malaysia does not oblige non-profit organizations (NPOs) themselves to file suspicious transaction reports, but they are required to file annual financial statements that are scrutinized by the Registrar of Societies (ROS), which may file such reports. Law enforcement works with the ROS and other charity regulators to prevent misuse and terrorist financing in the NPO sector, especially in vulnerable areas like religious or charitable NPOs. ROS also conducts an annual conference for its members on the risks of terrorist financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:**  Malaysia actively participated in UN, ASEAN, and other regional and international forums. As part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 2014-2015 Work Plan for Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime, Malaysia is one of the lead countries for two key priority areas: 1) cybersecurity and terrorists’ use of the internet, and 2) counter-radicalization. In March, Malaysia hosted an ARF workshop on cyber-confidence building measures.

The SEARCCT hosted 17 training events in 2014, including seminars on crisis management, transportation security, and chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear response training. The U.S. government supported three SEARCCT events in 2014, including programs on countering the financing of terrorism and countering violent extremism. Malaysian officials participated in several GCTF events, including workshops on strengthening the judiciary, detention and reintegration of terrorist prisoners, and foreign terrorist fighters.

A team from the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program visited Kuala Lumpur in November to consult with Malaysian officials on establishing a similar program.

In 2014, Malaysia continued to facilitate peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Malaysia’s mediation efforts helped lead to the Philippine
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front signing the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro in May.

Malaysia considers ISIL a terrorist organization and was a co-sponsor of UNSCR 2178. In addition to robust law enforcement activity, Malaysia hosted several regional capacity building efforts to strengthen anti-ISIL efforts in Southeast Asia.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In October, Malaysia’s Islamic Development Authority (JAKIM), which oversees the majority of the country’s mosques and Islamic scholars, issued a *fatwa* against ISIL that labeled the organization illegal under Islamic law and declared that followers that died fighting with ISIL were not “martyrs.” JAKIM promoted anti-ISIL messaging through its Friday sermons and sought to educate Malaysia’s Muslims on the peaceful meaning of jihad.

SEARCCT conducted several regional programs on countering violent extremism and the dynamics of youth and terrorism. These programs included a January workshop on promoting community-oriented policing to counter violent extremism, and a November program that brought together government officials, civil society leaders, journalists, and representatives of the private sector to develop effective strategies to counter violent extremist narratives online.

The Global Movement of Moderates (GMM), a Malaysian-based organization founded by Prime Minister Najib, conducted several countering violent extremism programs, including a public forum on youth and terrorism. In September, GMM formed a task force in partnership with the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement focused on countering violent extremist ideologies.

**PHILIPPINES**

**Overview:** Counterterrorism cooperation between the Philippines and the United States continued to improve in 2014. Terrorist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), were unable to conduct major attacks compared to previous years due to continuous pressure from Philippine counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. Terrorist groups’ acts included criminal activities designed to generate revenue for self-sustainment, such as kidnapping for ransom, extortion, and bombings for hire. Although Philippines counterterrorism efforts sustained pressure on terrorist organizations, members of these groups were suspected to have carried out attacks against government, public, and private facilities, primarily in the central and western areas of Mindanao; others were linked to extortion operations in other parts of the country. In addition, terrorist and rebel groups in the southern Philippines retained the capability and intent to conduct bomb-making training, small-scale shootings, and ambushes.

The Government of the Philippines made progress in implementing its 2011–2016 Internal Peace and Security Plan that calls for the transition of internal security functions from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to the Philippine National Police (PNP). The increasing role and capability of the police in maintaining internal security in conflict-affected areas will permit the AFP to shift its focus to enhance the country’s maritime security and territorial defense capabilities. To date, however, this transition continued to be slow and ineffective. Continued
violent extremist activity, as well as counterterrorism capability gaps between the AFP and PNP, slowed this transition and forced the AFP to continue playing the lead counterterrorism role in the Philippines.

The Philippine government’s Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) creating a new Bangsamoro autonomous government in Mindanao, if successful, paves the way for a peaceful solution to the 40-year-old conflict in Mindanao. The Philippine government hopes to reduce tensions in the South and the political attraction of violent extremist groups by providing greater political and economic autonomy for the predominately Muslim-majority areas of Mindanao. As a result, some of the groups who traditionally were committed to Moro secessionism now either back the peace deal or have splintered into less coherent groups like the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).

After the March signing ceremony of the CAB, however, violent clashes with the BIFF continued in central Mindanao, indicating that violent spoilers to a lasting peace remain. At the same time, continued heavy military and police presence in Mindanao and other regions of the country, including active ongoing operations against terrorist groups, including the ASG, JI, the NPA, and other violent extremist groups with ties to terrorists like the BIFF, resulted in displacement and disruption of civilian activities, and in some instances provided impetus for recruiting or fundraising efforts by local terrorist group members.

The Philippine government submitted to Congress draft legislation known as the “Bangsamoro Basic Law” in 2014 to establish a new autonomous government entity in the Southern Philippines, as stipulated by the CAB. However, with several splinter groups – including rogue elements of the MILF, the BIFF, and others – claiming they will not be bound by the law and are unwilling to forsake violence, a number of small-scale terrorist attacks occurred.

The Government of the Philippines recognizes the potential threat posed by radicalized Philippine citizens supporting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the risk of ISIL elements traveling to the Philippines to promote violent extremism in the country or seek safe haven. Members of numerous groups – including ASG and BIFF – pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014. The Government of the Philippines has condemned the actions of ISIL and other extremist groups in the Middle East, describing their use of violence as a “crime against humanity.” The President’s Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) convened an ad hoc interagency technical working group on persons of interest in conflict areas in July. The working group meets regularly every two to three weeks, and actions taken by this group include tightening passport issuance, increasing Bureau of Immigration screening at major departure points, and dedicating increased resources to monitoring online ISIL-related activity.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** There were dozens of small arms and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, kidnappings for ransom, and extortion efforts by suspected members of terrorist groups in the Philippines in 2014. High-profile incidents included:

- On January 29, an eight-year-old girl and a pregnant woman were injured when a powerful explosion ripped through the public ferry terminal in the town of Datu Piang.
The PNP said the bombing was an apparent attack by the BIFF to divert the attention of security authorities involved in an operation to arrest senior group leaders.

- On March 2, 16 individuals, including 11 soldiers and five civilians, were hurt in a landmine explosion that hit a convoy of ambulances in Bansalan, Davao del Sur. The landmine was allegedly planted by NPA guerrillas operating in the area. The convoy was transporting several soldiers reportedly injured in an earlier encounter with the NPA to a local hospital when the landmine detonated and damaged the passing ambulances.
- On May 21, policemen foiled an attempt by as many as 100 NPA communist rebels to take over the town hall of President Roxas city in Cotabato, killing three guerrillas and forcing the rest to retreat. The police chief of President Roxas was wounded in the firefight.
- On May 22, suspected members of the ASG group demanded US $670,194 in exchange for the release of a Chinese businesswoman and her daughter, kidnapped by at least 10 armed men in early May in Isabela City, Basilan.
- On December 9, five people were killed and 42 wounded in an explosion aboard a bus in Bukidnon, Mindanao. Authorities filed charges against Garnet Lintang, a commander of the BIFF operating in Central Mindanao.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The 2007 Human Security Act (HSA) is the principal counterterrorism legislation of the Philippines. The law defines terrorism and provides methods for law enforcement to conduct investigations of terrorist suspects. Many aspects of the law have not been used due to a number of strict procedural requirements in the law, however, including notification to subjects of surveillance before activities can begin and damages of approximately US $12,000 for every day of detention if an individual accused of terrorism is ultimately acquitted.

President Aquino has prioritized the adoption of amendments to the HSA in three main areas: revise the definition of terrorism to conform to international standards; ease the strict monetary penalties and prison terms against law enforcement officials involved in cases where individuals are wrongly accused and later acquitted; and remove barriers to support investigations. The ATC Project Management Center, in coordination with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) Secretariat and the Presidential Legislative Liaison Office, ensured the final version of the HSA was fully in line with the Terrorism Financing Prevention Act and other Anti-Money Laundering Act and Philippine government initiatives prior to submission to the House of Representatives.

Units with a specialized counterterrorism focus, including the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the PNP Special Action Force (SAF), have limited investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity. Multiple agencies have jurisdiction over counterterrorism efforts, creating confusion and inefficiency in leading investigations and in response to terrorism incidents. Roles and responsibilities between law enforcement and military units that have a counterterrorism mission are often not well delineated. Law enforcement units display moderate command and control capacity. Specialized law enforcement units possess some necessary equipment, but have many unfulfilled needs. Law enforcement units have a mixed record of accountability and respect for human rights. The ATC provides guidance to agencies responsible
for enforcing terrorism laws, but its capacity and authority to ensure cooperation and coordination between agencies is limited.

The PNP maintains legal responsibility for ensuring peace and security throughout the county, including arresting terrorists and conducting terrorism investigations. In some of the conflict-affected areas, the PNP has relied upon the AFP to conduct counterterrorism operations. The PNP SAF is the national operational support unit for law enforcement counterterrorism efforts. The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in the Philippines assisted the PNP’s SAF, Anti-Kidnapping Group, Anti-Cybercrime Group, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal/K9 units by providing counterterrorism-related training and equipment. This assistance strengthened the PNP’s capacity to respond to terrorism-related incidents. In 2014, the ATA program in the Philippines conducted 33 courses with 658 participants, on training platforms both within the Philippines and internationally.

In 2014, the Philippines continued to improve the security of its passports. Three million machine-readable passports remained in circulation at year’s end. In August 2009, the Philippines started to produce "e-passports" containing a biometric chip. Six million Philippine passports in circulation are e-passports, accounting for 65 percent of all valid passports, according to the Philippine Passport Office. At the main international airport in Manila, the Philippines participated in the Interpol Border Management Program.

The first phase of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) was completed in 2014, which included the build-out of the physical AFIS facility at NBI headquarters, and the digitization of 850,000 fingerprint records.

In the area of transportation and port security, the Philippines has committed to align its priorities with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to increase security capabilities at its airports, seaports, and bus terminals. The TSA and USCG have committed a significant amount of technical assistance to the Philippine Office for Transportation Security (OTS). In 2014, TSA conducted a counterterrorism bus exercise with APEC, the U.S. Department of State, and OTS to outline best practices and introduce a risk identification tool for implementation. Additionally, TSA and OTS conducted joint aviation security assessments/inspections at Manila International Airport and Clark International Airport to align policies with international standards, and increase the capacity of OTS oversight personnel. USCG conducted a joint table top exercise at several Philippine seaports, and sponsored a Philippine delegation to observe port security procedures in Seattle, Washington.

In 2014, the United States continued to work with the Government of the Philippines to monitor and investigate groups engaged in or supporting terrorist activities in the Philippines. The government launched numerous operations, particularly in the Southern Philippines, to arrest and disrupt organizations like the ASG, JI, BIFF and NPA. There were a number of ongoing operations against and prosecutions of terrorist suspects that included:

- On January 27, “Operation Darkhorse” was supposed to end after two days. The campaign was extended until February 1 to allow government forces to seize more BIFF facilities, leading to the capture of four BIFF camps and a makeshift explosive factory in
Maguindanao. The weeklong offensive left 52 BIFF members and one AFP soldier dead, while injuring 49 BIFF members and 20 AFP soldiers. Eight civilians were also hurt and more than 35,000 were displaced during the operations.

- On April 14, two suspected members of a kidnapping syndicate were killed while six others, including an alleged member of the MILF and a police officer, were captured following a raid and exchange of fire in Zamboanga. The raid was executing an arrest warrant for 12 suspects, but four of them escaped during the shootout.
- On April 29, clashes between government forces and ASG members over control of a jungle training camp in Sulu resulted in 26 casualties, including one AFP Marine. After 10 hours, government forces successfully drove the ASG members from the camp in Sitio Kanjimao, Barangay Buhanginan, Patikul town.
- On June 11, terrorist financier and high-ranking ASG member Khair Mundos was arrested by Philippine authorities in Manila near the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Mundos was on trial at year’s end, facing local bombing related charges.
- On June 17, security forces captured two ASG militants in Zamboanga City, including one who was allegedly involved in the 2011 kidnappings of an American teenage boy and his mother, as well as a separate kidnapping of an Australian man in 2011. Philippine Police and Army troops captured Jimmy Nurilla and Bakrin Haris in a raid on their hideout in Sangali village. Nurilla was suspected of being involved in a number of kidnappings, including that of American Kevin Lunsmann, who was 14 when he escaped from his Abu Sayyaf captors in 2011 after five months in captivity in Basilan.
- On June 22, four suspected members of ASG were arrested in separate police and military operations. The four included a suspect in the kidnapping of six Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2002, two of whom were beheaded.
- On July 7, during an operation in Isabela City, Basilan, police intelligence and combat forces captured an ASG suspect linked to the mass abduction of teachers, students, and a Catholic priest 14 years ago. The captured suspect was identified as Salih Ali, also known as Abu Ali, who had a standing warrant for arrest for nine counts of kidnapping.
- On July 11, Philippine authorities in Cebu arrested Australian citizen Musa Cerantonio, a popular pro-ISIL ideologue active on social media, for suspicion he was radicalizing Philippine citizens to join the group. Cerantonio was deported back to Australia.
- On July 14, a court decision was promulgated in a 2003 vehicle-borne improved explosive device attack at the Awang Airport in Cotobato organized by the MILF and JI which resulted in the death of a Philippine Army Sergeant. Five defendants were convicted of murder and attempted murder.
- On October 7, authorities arrested Ricardo Ayeras, Andrescio Valdez, and Ricky Macapagal in Manila on suspicion of plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Manila. One of the three suspects, Ayeras, was implicated in the 2003 Maguindanao airport bombing.
- On October 20, troops seized several suspected ASG camps in Patikul, Sulu. The Philippine military kept up the pressure on ASG following the 2013 kidnapping and subsequent release of two German hostages, in which the ASG is suspected to have received a ransom of more than US $5 million.

In 2014, substantive hearings in the prosecution of three defendants – accused of kidnapping two U.S. nationals in Mindanao in 2011 – commenced in Zamboanga. Additionally, substantive
hearings continued in 2014 in Cebu in the prosecution of four defendants accused of murdering two U.S. soldiers and one Philippine Marine in an IED attack in Kagay, Jolo, in September 2009.

In 2014, the Philippines continued coordinating with U.S. law enforcement authorities, especially regarding U.S. fugitives and suspected terrorists. In particular, Philippine authorities provided assistance in the U.S. investigation of the kidnapping of two U.S. nationals in Mindanao in 2011. In December 2014, four Philippine nationals were indicted in the United States on conspiracy, hostage-taking, and weapons charges stemming from this kidnapping.

An under-resourced and understaffed law enforcement and judicial system, coupled with widespread official corruption, resulted in limited domestic investigations, unexecuted arrest warrants, few prosecutions, and lengthy trials of cases. Philippine investigators and prosecutors lacked necessary tools to build strong cases, including a lack of clear processes for requesting judicially-authorized interception of terrorist communications, entering into plea bargains with key witnesses, and seizing assets of those suspected in benefiting from terrorism.

The Philippines received counterterrorism assistance from Australia, the UK, Canada, and Japan. This work focuses generally on capacity building on investigation, case management, intelligence, and special operations training with the PNP and the AFP.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body and the Egmont Group. In recent years, the Philippines significantly improved its financial regulatory regime and remains focused on effective implementation of international standards.

The U.S. government supported the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC), the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the PNP’s Directorate of Intelligence, Anti-Kidnapping Group, and the SAF in successfully forming a Joint Terrorist Financing Investigation Group (JTFIG) in 2014. The JTFIG acts as an “intelligence fusion center” to complement the other intelligence groups tasked with investigating terrorism and terrorist financing. The JTFIG expanded to include the NBI and PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group.

The AMLC has been able to identify, freeze, and obtain forfeiture judgments and writs of execution for bank deposits and real estate assets linked to the International Islamic Relief Organization and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement – both U.S.-designated terrorist groups under E.O. 13224 – with a total estimated value of US $237,000.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 2170, the AMLC has frozen the assets of six members of ISIL and al-Nusrah Front. Under Section 8 of the Terrorist Financing Prevention and Suppression Act, all transactions with the named individuals designated by AMLC are prohibited. The AMLC freezes assets of those listed at the 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) and 1988 Taliban sanctions committees through AMLC Resolution TF-01.

Non-profit organizations are not covered institutions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. There is no single authority for entities in the non-profit sector, making monitoring and coordination of regulatory bodies difficult.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Philippine government representatives participated in several regional events in 2014:

- In May, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) sponsored a workshop in Tagaytay City focused on Combating the Financing of Terrorism.
- In October, the Philippines supported the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counterterrorism.
- In November, a pioneering project called “Training on Collaborative Intelligence, Investigation, and Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Cases” was implemented with the UNODC to encourage close collaboration among these sectors to ensure successful prosecution of terrorism cases.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Philippine government continued its counter-radicalization program, Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient Communities in Conflict Affected Communities). During the year, the Philippines worked with the Global Counterterrorism Forum to apply the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. Government offices, including the President’s Law Enforcement and Security Integration Office and the Philippine Center for Transnational Crime, led interagency collaboration on countering violent extremism through counter-radicalization and de-radicalization initiatives.

Training on rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, funded by the U.S. Department of State and implemented by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, was provided to 24 experts in the Philippines from different agencies and the private sector.

The Philippine government also continues to support a counter-radicalization program in the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology facilities housing ASG or other terrorist suspects pending trial.

**SINGAPORE**

**Overview:** In 2014, Singapore and the United States expanded counterterrorism cooperation, including increased information sharing on known and suspected terrorists. U.S. agencies welcomed the closer engagement and continued to see the potential for more strategic and productive agency-to-agency relationships. In November, Singapore announced it would contribute to the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, declaring that contribution an integral part of its ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, and pledged staff and midair refueling assets to the Coalition. Singapore seeks to actively prevent foreign terrorist fighters from traveling to Syria and Iraq, and has detained Singaporean residents attempting to do so. The government and Muslim community organizations, such as the Islamic Religious
Council of Singapore and the Religious Rehabilitation Group, actively promoted tolerance and provided a counter-narrative to violent extremists.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists without trial. The ISA authorizes the Minister for Home Affairs (MHA), with the consent of the president, to order detention without judicial review if it is determined that a person poses a threat to national security. The initial detention may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the detention for an unlimited number of additional periods up to two years at a time with the president’s consent. Singapore’s existing legal framework, in conjunction with the ISA, provides the government the necessary tools to support the investigation and prosecution of terrorism offenses. Law enforcement agencies displayed coordination, command, and control in responding to threat information affecting Singapore’s security.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Singapore is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. In 2014, Singapore tightened currency reporting requirements, lowering the threshold for currency declarations when bringing in or taking cash out of the country from US $22,200 to US $14,800. The Monetary Authority of Singapore also commenced consultations in 2014 on revised regulations to strengthen the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism framework for financial institutions to bring it in line with the FATF’s revised recommendations of February 2012. Singapore’s robust financial regulatory framework makes terrorist financing illegal and the government, in cooperation with the financial services industry, remains vigilant against this threat. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Singapore is an active participant in counterterrorism cooperation efforts in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC; has supported UN Security Council Resolutions condemning terrorist activities – including co-sponsoring UNSCR 2178; and announced at the 2014 East Asia Summit that it will host a regional conference on countering violent extremism. Singapore participates in regional exercises, which occasionally have counterterrorism components.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Singapore’s efforts to prevent youth radicalization focus on education and outreach efforts. The government also encourages interreligious and interethnic dialogue through Interracial and Religious Confidence Circles, community forums that bring leaders from Singapore’s religious and ethnic communities together to discuss issues of concern, and build trust. The government has highlighted opportunities for constructive engagement for those concerned with the conflict in Syria and Iraq, such as promoting legitimate charities working to ease suffering in conflict zones.

Singapore’s Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, the Islamic authority in charge of Muslim affairs in the country, maintains a Facebook presence and holds outreach and education events to counter terrorist propaganda and recruitment efforts.
Singapore’s Religious Rehabilitation Group, a volunteer organization, has had success in counseling detainees held under the ISA. The comprehensive program includes religious and psychological counseling, and involves the detainee’s family and community.

THAILAND

Overview: Thailand’s counterterrorism cooperation continued to be productive, although domestic political challenges remained the government’s key security priority. In late 2014, Thai security officials expressed moderate concern about the threat to Thailand from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), particularly given the reported travel of fighters from neighboring Southeast Asian nations to the Middle East. There was no confirmed evidence of Thais joining ISIL, however, and no direct evidence of operational linkages between ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgent groups in southern Thailand and ISIL or other international terrorist networks.

While Thai officials have long expressed concern that transnational terrorist groups could establish links with southern Thailand-based separatist groups, there have been no indications that transnational terrorist groups were directly involved in the violence in the south, and there was no evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai insurgent groups and regional terrorist networks.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Thailand incorporated terrorism offenses into its penal code in 2003, but most terrorism prosecutions fail to prove the necessary element of specific intent and therefore result in deportation or conviction on less serious offenses.

Law enforcement units demonstrate some capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Multiple entities – including the Royal Thai Police, Department of Special Investigations, and elements of the Thai military – have law enforcement responsibilities in counterterrorism cases. Semiannual reshuffles of senior ranks of government and security officials, and shifts directed by the post-coup government, hampered continuity in leadership. Interagency cooperation and coordination is sporadic, information sharing is limited, and the delineation of duties between law enforcement and military units with counterterrorism responsibilities is unclear. Law enforcement officials with counterterrorism responsibilities receive U.S. training, including through the Bangkok-based joint U.S.-Thai International Law Enforcement Academy. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State provides Antiterrorism Assistance training programs designed to enhance Royal Thai Police capacity to counter terrorism.

Land borders are relatively porous. In June 2012, the Thai government removed the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) from eight major points of entry and installed a locally developed program. At year’s end, PISCES remained in place at Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, which handles the majority of arrivals, but its continued implementation remained unclear. All passengers originating in Thailand traveling to or overflying the United States will continue to be vetted through the Secure Flight Program.
Thailand has an active market in fraudulent documents. Local law enforcement pursues fraud cases concerning official documents such as passports, birth certificates, and national identification; however, it does not prioritize investigating non-official documents such as financial records, school transcripts, and employment letters. Thailand has initiated investigations into multiple passport fraud rings, but has not yet conducted any prosecutions. Information sharing within the Thai government and with neighboring countries appeared limited.

In April, two dual Lebanese nationals suspected of being associated with Hizballah were detained in Bangkok and subsequently deported. Police stated they received intelligence that the pair plotted to attack an area in the capital popular with Israeli tourists. Separately, a Hizballah operative – who was storing 10,000 pounds of urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok when he was detained in January 2012 – was released and deported to Sweden in September 2014 after serving two years and eight months in prison.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Thailand belongs to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Thailand’s Counter Terrorist Financing Act (CFT), together with subordinate laws, came into effect in early 2013. The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is in the process of revising the CFT Act in order to quicken the designation process and to make updates to the Anti-Money Laundering Act.

In 2014, two unlicensed money changers were shut down and charged by the Bank of Thailand, which is revising its regulations to tighten control of similar financial activities. While AMLO did not identify and freeze terrorist assets of sanctioned individuals and organizations in 2014 in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions including 1267, 1988, and 1373, it froze US $581 in assets of one person designated on Thailand’s domestic list as an individual engaged in terrorist financing activities. The case was being scrutinized by AMLO’s litigation division at year’s end.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Thailand participated in international counterterrorism efforts, including through APEC, ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Following the May 2014 coup, the Internal Security Operations Command continued to organize outreach programs to ethnic Malay-Muslims to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Ongoing shortcomings of the justice system, however, contributed to support for the ethno-nationalist insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. NGOs also reached out to communities in the southern provinces to provide services, identify the underlying causes of the area’s violence, and provide outlets for peaceful political expression.
While Europe continued to face terrorist threats from a variety of sources in 2014, a primary area of concern in many countries was the emergence of the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters participating in the conflict in Syria and Iraq in the ranks of such groups as al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Significant numbers of foreign terrorist fighters came from countries such as France and Belgium in Western Europe, while, on a per capita basis, certain western Balkan countries such as Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina also figured as significant foreign terrorist fighter source countries. At the same time, violent extremist groups espousing left-wing and nationalist ideologies continued to operate in Europe, such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) in Turkey.

Returning foreign terrorist fighters were deemed responsible for terrorist attacks in a number of countries, including Belgium, where in May, a French citizen killed four people at a Jewish museum in Brussels. In March, three persons, including a police officer and a gendarme, were killed in an incident involving three young men who were believed to be foreign terrorist fighters returning to Europe from Syria. Terrorist incidents attributed to other groups were reported in a number of countries, including attacks in Chechnya in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation in October and December, attributed to the Caucasus Emirate, and in Turkey in October, attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.

By virtue of its location, the international transport hubs on its territory, and its long border with Syria and Iraq, Turkey remained the main transit route for foreign terrorist fighters. In 2014, Turkey increased cooperation with source countries to develop an extensive banned-from-entry list of known or suspected terrorists and introduced tougher traveler screening procedures, making it more difficult for foreign terrorist fighters to cross its borders. Turkey’s border security challenges, however, continued to be aggravated by its failure to impose visa requirements for certain major foreign terrorist fighter source countries such as Libya.

To counter the foreign terrorist fighter threat, European countries strengthened existing legislation and, where necessary, introduced new legislation aimed at criminalizing participation in terrorist elements in foreign conflicts, in keeping with commitments made under UN Security Council Resolution 2178; however, some European countries are struggling to successfully prosecute cases under the new laws. Countries such as France and Albania adopted such legislation, for example. In the Western Balkans, major law enforcement actions have been conducted resulting in arrests of persons allegedly returning from or intending to travel to Syria and Iraq, or facilitating and supporting such travel. Concern about foreign terrorist fighters was also an important factor in efforts to improve border security and improve the effectiveness of traveler screening and information-sharing among law enforcement bodies. The European Council, for example, urged the adoption of an EU Passenger Name Record system and a number of Schengen Area countries called for improvements in border security and information sharing measures under the Schengen Information System.

Individual countries implemented strategies to counter terrorism and address the foreign terrorist fighter threat, such as Norway’s National Action Plan, the Netherlands’ Comprehensive Program to Combat Jihadism, and Denmark’s Countering Violent Extremism Action Plan. Many strengthened programs to counter the messaging of violent extremism, stop radicalization to
violence, and thwart the recruitment efforts of ISIL and similar groups. Community groups and religious leaders played a key part in these efforts.

While taking strong action against terrorist threats internally and in the region, European countries also made important contributions to countering terrorism worldwide. Approximately 40 European countries, plus the European Union, joined the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and participated actively in its efforts. The important efforts of France in West Africa, Spain in North Africa and the Sahel, and Denmark in Afghanistan, are representative of the counterterrorism contributions of individual European countries elsewhere in the world.

**ALBANIA**

**Overview:** Albania continued to be a strong supporter of counterterrorism efforts in 2014 and joined the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In August and December, Albania donated a sizeable amount of weapons and ammunition for Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq. Albania is a source country of foreign terrorist fighters going to Syria and Iraq.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Albania criminalizes terrorist acts; financing of terrorism; collection, transfer and concealment of funds that finance terrorism; conducting transactions with persons in the UN list; recruiting and training people to commit terrorist actions; incitement of terrorist actions; and establishing, leading, and participating in terrorist organizations.

In 2014, Parliament added three statutes to Albania’s Criminal Code aimed primarily at strengthening the government’s ability to address the problem of Albanian nationals who travel to fight in the conflict in Syria. The changes made it illegal to (1) participate in; (2) organize the participation of; or (3) call for participation in military action in a foreign country. Specifically, these statutes punish participation in “military or paramilitary organizations in an armed conflict taking place in the territory of a foreign country,” unless a person is a citizen of the foreign country, a member of the armed forces of one of the parties in the conflict, or a member of an official military mission of another country or an international military organization. The statutes also cover recruiting, training, equipping, or providing funds or other material support for people participating in these military actions. Those people guilty under these statutes are subject to maximum penalties of between three years (calling for participation) and 15 years (organizing the participation) in prison. These laws came into effect on September 3.

While Albanian law enforcement actively detects and deters illicit activities related to drugs and smuggling, it has not taken an equally aggressive approach to countering potential terrorist threats. With concern about terrorism increasing in connection with foreign terrorist fighters, however, the Albanian State Police announced plans in October 2014 to expand substantially its counterterrorism unit. A significant effort will likely be needed to equip and train the unit sufficiently to achieve the necessary level of capacity to counter terrorism effectively.

Albania does not have the capacity to collect biometric data other than that contained on biometric identity cards and passports presented at border crossing points. The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), funded by
the Department of State, provided a new information technology module to the Albanian government which gives it the capacity to incorporate online fingerprint identification functions, and is in the process of providing fingerprint scanning equipment to equip all 26 border crossing points. The border control module will allow Albanians to collect entry and exit information of international travelers.

The Customs agency has improved its performance at ports of entry and has strengthened its relationship with the Border Police.

In March, Albanian State Police acted against an alleged Syria fighter recruitment ring, resulting in the arrest of nine people for “Inciting Acts of Terrorism.” Two of the arrestees were imams at mosques on the outskirts of Tirana that allegedly promote violent extremism. As of December 31, 2014, the investigation was ongoing.

Corruption, combined with a poorly functioning judicial system, continued to hinder Albania’s law enforcement efforts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Albanian financial intelligence unit (FIU) is a member of the Egmont Group. Albania is also a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body.

Albania has adopted measures against persons and organizations listed by the UN as financiers of terrorism, and it has established a preventive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) system that includes extended due diligence and the obligation to file suspicious transaction reports and currency transaction reports.

The FATF currently lists Albania on its list of High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions. Since June 2012, Albania has been working with FATF and MONEYVAL to address the identified weaknesses in AML/CFT. In 2013, Albania adopted a new law against financing terrorism to comply with the FATF and MONEYVAL Recommendations and has focused on its implementation in 2014, resulting in the confiscation of approximately 10 million euros (approximately US $11,189,000), a large increase from the 213,000 euros (approximately US $241,712) confiscated in 2013.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Albania is a member of the UN, OSCE, NATO, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The Albanian government participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters roundtable for Balkan countries hosted by the State Department on the margins of the UNGA.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Albania provides financial support to the Albanian Islamic Community (AIC), the official administrative
body of the Albanian Sunni Muslim community, and actively engages it to discuss radicalization to violence and terrorist recruitment.

AUSTRIA

Overview: Austria was vigilant in its counterterrorism efforts and U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation was generally strong. Austria’s Office for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT), the key counterterrorism agency within the Ministry of the Interior, reported that, while no specific climate for fostering terrorist attacks existed within Austria, radicalization within violent Islamist extremist groups increased. The country’s traditional, broad perception that Austria is safe from terrorist attacks was challenged by a significant rise in the number of foreign terrorist fighters from Austria headed to Syria and Iraq. The BVT charged or monitored those returning from Syria, as well as other potentially violent radicalized individuals among second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants. Continued concerns over data privacy protection, amplified by public debate about suspected NSA locations and activities in Austria, slowed the implementation of counterterrorism legislation and agreements in some cases.

Austria is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and has taken a whole-of-government approach to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178 as well as Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) good practices on foreign terrorist fighters. Throughout 2014, the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Foreign Affairs have increased enforcement and engagement to counter incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and combat the problem of foreign terrorist fighters, with law enforcement agencies focusing on intelligence gathering and investigations and Integration officials (within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) focusing on public outreach and engagement to prevent radicalization to violence.

The BVT estimated the number of Austrians fighting in Syria and Iraq at approximately 160, predominantly of Chechen, Turkish, and Balkan origin. Twenty-five are suspected to have been killed in Syria, while an estimated 60 have returned to Austria. Formal criminal investigations have been launched against 117. In December, a prosecutor submitted the first terrorism court case in Austria specifically against an ISIL sympathizer accused of membership in ISIL and of financial support to Syrian fighters.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Austria has a broad legal framework to combat terrorism. Relevant statutes criminalize training in terrorist camps abroad and allow wiretapping of individual suspects or small groups with the permission of an independent judge or ombudsman. Plans for structural reform of Austria’s CT-agency BVT were being discussed by the end of 2014.

The Austrian Parliament passed additional counterterrorism legislation in December (effective January 1, 2015) to enhance existing counterterrorism laws. The counterterrorism legislation amends existing law on the use of symbols and prohibits the use and distribution of symbols attributable to ISIL, al-Qa’ida, and any organization linked to these groups. Limited exemptions
from these restrictions apply to media coverage, films, theater, and exhibits, provided that they do not serve to propagate the ideology of a terrorist organization.

As part of the same legislative package, an amendment to the border control law allows border authorities to confirm that minors have received parental permission to leave Austria when there is a suspicion that the minors are traveling to participate in fighting activities abroad. Border authorities are empowered to deny departure to a minor and withhold his or her passport until an investigation is complete. An amendment to the Austrian citizenship law allows authorities to withdraw citizenship from an Austrian who voluntarily and actively participates in fighting in an armed conflict if the individual holds a second citizenship.

Law enforcement officials have increased surveillance and arrests, with the most significant being the November 28 arrests of 12 suspects in a nation-wide series of raids involving 900 police officers in raids against 40 locations in various Austrian cities. The key suspect, Vienna-based ISIL sympathizer Mirsad Omerovic, alias Ebu Tejma, is being held in pre-trial detention. In December, the BVT also created an office for tracking and reporting radical content on the internet. The BVT then passes this information on to social media providers, such as Google or Facebook, with an official government request to delete the content.

In reaction to the challenge of foreign terrorist fighters during 2014, law enforcement agencies called for expanded police powers to monitor foreign terrorist fighter suspects more effectively. Under current law, police must delete all data collected on a violent extremist suspect after nine months if it cannot be proven that the monitored suspect committed any violations. This data would not be available in the event that police reopen an investigation. Austria’s Ministers for Interior and Justice have pressed for amended legislation to extend data retention provisions.

Border security forces make effective use of security measures including biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry and information sharing internally and with other EU countries. Border security officials at ports of entry have discretion when determining those documents and passengers subject to screening on arrival.

Austrian law enforcement routinely cooperated in investigative areas with U.S. law enforcement, from the informal sharing of preliminary investigative information to joint, multilateral investigative projects and enforcement operations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Austria is an active member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and has developed comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation, including the enactment of a new Sanctions Act; undertaken reforms of the financial intelligence unit operational procedures and supervisory framework; developed and published secondary legislation (regulations), thematic and sectorial guidelines, and explanatory notes. Austria is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

The Austrian Parliament approved the bilateral agreement with the United States on the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in October, and pertinent formalities for the law to become effective were concluded by the end of 2014. Under the agreement, Austrian banks will
require U.S. citizens resident in Austria to waive bank secrecy and allow the exchange of account information with the United States.

Non-profit organizations are not required to file suspicious transaction reports as part of their license to operate or as a matter of law.


Regional and International Cooperation: Austria is a member of various regional security platforms, including the OSCE, the Salzburg Forum, and the Central European Initiative, which it chaired in 2014. Austria regularly leads law enforcement training programs with Salzburg Forum countries and the Balkan states.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Austria continued efforts to counter violent extremism, largely in response to the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon as detailed above. In addition, the Austrian government undertook or continued several other initiatives. The Integration Office within the Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with the Islamic faith community, released a flyer addressing misinterpretation of the Quran by violent extremists.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Islamic Faith Community undertook an information campaign in mosques, Islamic organizations, and community centers that includes education outreach to the majority population to differentiate between Islam and what Austria describes as jihadism, or violent extremism. In November, the Austrian government opened a counseling center and a de-radicalization hotline, aimed at friends and family members of potential violent extremists.

The Austrian government is in the process of revising the existing 1912 Law on Islam, updating the rights and responsibilities of the Islamic communities. The law would further formalize Islam’s place within Austria and contain provisions related to religious education, pastoral care in hospitals and prisons, afford some recognition of Islamic holidays, and formalize some Islamic traditions.

AZERBAIJAN

Overview: Azerbaijan maintained its strong counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and actively opposed terrorist organizations seeking to move people, money, and material through the Caucasus. The country remained focused on its counterterrorism efforts, to include prosecuting numerous individuals under statutes related to terrorism, confiscating sizeable quantities of illegal arms and munitions, and seeking to arrest foreign terrorist fighters returning to Azerbaijan from conflicts abroad. Azerbaijan also amended its law on terrorism to stiffen penalties for involvement in foreign mercenary activity.
Azerbaijan indicated its willingness to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) by continuing to share information and working to disrupt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq and Syria and of illicit funding to support violent extremist groups there. Influential figures, including the heads of the Caucasus Muslim Board and the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations, undertook efforts to counter ISIL ideology publicly.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Azerbaijan continued to use counterterrorism legislation, first adopted in 1999, that governs the investigation and prosecution of individuals who have committed or plan to commit terrorist acts. The Ministry of National Security is primarily responsible for combating terrorism, although the Ministry of Internal Affairs also plays a role as the country’s primary law enforcement entity. Both ministries effectively demonstrated the ability to detect and deter terrorist activities, as well as prosecute foreign terrorist fighters returning to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani law enforcement officers participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program and received technical training in counterterrorism skills.

Authorities demonstrated a capability to effectively use watch lists and biographic/biometric information at ports of entry. Information sharing within the host government and with other countries was strong. Collection of advance passenger name records on commercial flights was possible.

Authorities also amended the law on terrorism in April 2014, increasing penalties for fighting as a mercenary or recruiting or sponsoring mercenaries, specifically designed to counter Azerbaijani citizens’ involvement in groups such as ISIL.

Significant law enforcement actions related to counterterrorism included:

- On June 20, the Ministry of National Security announced that it had detained 18 violent extremists in Baku’s Badamdar neighborhood. Authorities stated the individuals were becoming radicalized and showing indications of carrying out violent activity and potentially travelling to Syria.
- On September 23, the Ministry of National Security announced that it had arrested 26 individuals who had fought as foreign terrorist fighters outside Azerbaijan, many as ISIL-affiliated terrorists in Syria and Iraq.
- On December 1, authorities carried out a counterterrorism operation following an attack on a Baku mosque, one of the perpetrators of which was alleged to have fought with a Kurdish militia against ISIL in Syria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Azerbaijan is a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Azerbaijan has increased its professionalism in anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) since 2009, when it adopted AML/CFT legislation. This legislation created a financial intelligence unit, the Financial Monitoring Service (FMS), and imposed the necessary obligations on financial institutions to conduct customer due diligence and report suspicious
transactions to the FMS. Institutions from outside the formal financial sector that conduct monetary operations, however, are often not required to report, which presents vulnerabilities.

In order to bring Azerbaijan’s legislative framework into conformity with international standards, including those of the UN, the EU, and the FATF, Azerbaijan continued to implement MONEYVAL recommendations to address AML/CFT issues. The U.S. government has been one of the FMS’ leading partners since its formation, currently working through Treasury and the FDIC to provide technical assistance and training to the Prosecutor General’s Office and others to improve enforcement capabilities. USAID also previously supported these efforts.


Regional and International Cooperation: Azerbaijan remained an active member of the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other regional organizations. Azerbaijan also continued to work with NATO on counterterrorism initiatives. Additionally, Azerbaijan took part in working group meetings of Caspian Sea littoral states to coordinate law enforcement efforts aimed at combating terrorism as well as smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: In response to reports of growing Sunni Salafi movements, as well as evidence of numerous Azerbaijani citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq, Azerbaijani officials made attempts to counter domestic radicalization to violence and violent extremism. Specifically, authorities sought to bring mosques under greater control by installing cameras inside, replacing Salafi clerics with moderate leaders, forbidding Salafis from taking leadership roles in mosques, banning books promoting extremist views, and increasing control over public television. These methods sometimes failed to distinguish between persons who incited violence and persons who rejected violence but sympathized with some of the philosophical goals of various political movements. Additionally, government leaders regularly spoke out against radicalism, and frequently pledged to combat the political influence of radical groups and to undermine such groups’ ability to obtain financial support.

BELGIUM

Overview: Belgian authorities maintained an effective counterterrorism apparatus that was overseen by the Ministries of Interior and Justice in 2014. They continued to investigate, arrest, and prosecute terrorism suspects and worked closely with U.S. authorities on counterterrorism matters. The Belgian government has formed a task force focused on countering radicalization to violence and developed a national strategy to address the issue.

The new coalition government, which assumed power in October, announced a number of new measures aimed at disrupting the significant number of Belgian foreign terrorist fighters who have traveled to Syria and Iraq. These include strengthening and enforcing legislation that would prohibit traveling abroad to participate in armed groups, and stripping dual nationals of their Belgian citizenship if they are convicted of these or other terrorism crimes. Belgian
officials announced stricter enforcement of regulations that allow them to prohibit passport issuance of or revocation of passports to disrupt the travel of suspected foreign terrorist fighters.

As one of the leading countries of origin for foreign terrorist fighters in Europe, Belgium has focused efforts on identifying, disrupting, and decreasing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. According to Belgian government statistics, of the estimated 358 foreign terrorist fighters of Belgian origin, approximately 47 have been killed and 87 have returned to Belgium. Both the Ministry of the Interior and the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) continued their implementation of new strategies to address the foreign terrorist fighter problem in 2014. A December 2013 study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization estimated that Belgium has the highest per capita number of Syrian foreign terrorist fighters of any European country.

Belgium is an active member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conducting air strikes and sending support personnel to the campaign against ISIL in Iraq. On December 18, the Council of Ministers approved the extension of the mission through June 30, 2015, as well as the deployment of up to 50 military trainers to Iraq in 2015. The number of personnel and length of the training mission will be determined based on a Ministry of Defense needs assessment.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: On May 24, a shooter killed four individuals at the Brussels Jewish Museum. Mehdi Nemmouche, a French-Algerian dual national arrested by French authorities a few days later near Marseilles, is the key suspect in the shooting. He was extradited to Belgium on July 30 and was in prison awaiting trial at year’s end. In early December, the French police arrested five additional individuals in Marseilles for their alleged participation in helping prepare for the Brussels Jewish Museum attack. Nemmouche reportedly fought in Syria with ISIL from December 2012 through March 2014.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Belgian government continued to make use of counterterrorism legislation that was reinforced in 2003 to provide authorities with enhanced powers to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects. On October 13, the Belgian government took the final step to implement the Prevent and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) Agreement with the United States by publishing a royal decree in the country’s official register.

Following the May 25 general elections, a new federal government was sworn in on October 11. The government’s coalition agreement proposed a number of measures to be taken in the fight against violent extremism. The new ministers were in the process of drafting legislation at year’s end.

Belgian law enforcement units can capably detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The primary actors in this apparatus are the Belgian Federal police and its counterterrorism division, the Civilian and Military Intelligence Services, Office of the Federal Prosecutor, and the Crisis Unit. The Inter-Ministerial Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis plays a coordinating role, particularly with regard to foreign terrorist fighters.
Belgium worked closely with other Schengen zone states and Turkey to improve efforts to share information and interdict prospective foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Syria, including increasing border checks aimed at disrupting and decreasing the flow of the fighters. All new Belgian passports contain biometric data. Belgium has advocated for more systematic screening by partners at Schengen borders; of the approximately 20,000 asylum applications filed in Belgium in 2014, 94 percent were made at local offices in Belgium rather than at ports of entry into the country. Belgian officials have expressed concern that 80 percent of the approximately 10,000 unsuccessful asylum applicants simply disappear rather than accepting assistance to return to their country of origin.

Significant law enforcement and judicial actions related to counterterrorism included:

- On September 29, the trial began in Belgium’s largest terrorism trial ever, against the “Sharia4Belgium” organization founder Fouad Belkacem (aka Abu Imran) and 45 other organization members, some in absentia, on various terrorism-related charges. A verdict had not been issued at year’s end.
- On October 14, a Brussels Court handed down sentences to Rachid Benomari, Mohamed Said, and Mustapha Bouyahbaren for their participation in al-Shabaab activities in Somalia in 2011 and 2012. Benomari was sentenced to 18 years in prison, Said received a five-year sentence, and Bouyahbaren received a five-year suspended sentence. The three have appealed the ruling.
- On May 21, a Brussels Court sentenced 19 terrorist suspects for their active or passive participation in al-Shabaab activities in Somalia.
- On December 17, the Hof van Cassatie (Supreme Court) partially overturned the January 2014 appellate court ruling against the so-called Hamdaoui cell, also known as the “Sint-Jans Square Gang.” Hassan Hamadoui and other members of his cell were accused of participating in extremist chat rooms, of plotting possible terrorist attacks in Belgium, and of traveling to fight in Chechnya; all received prison sentences ranging from five to eight years. Hamdaoui’s appeal was rejected by the Hof van Cassatie and his 12-year sentence affirmed, but seven of his accomplices were granted a new trial because the prosecution failed to translate evidence and other documents into Flemish, as required by court procedures.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as well as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body. Belgium’s financial intelligence unit, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financieres (CTIF), is tasked with tracking and investigating reports of financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorist financing, and has broad authorities under Belgian legislation to conduct inquiries and refer criminal cases to federal prosecutors. Belgium is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. According to the 2013 CTIF annual report (the most recent report), of the 1,168 financial crimes cases that CTIF referred to prosecutors, only 25 (2.14 percent) were connected to possible terrorist and/or proliferation financing, a slight increase from the previous year (1.32 percent).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Belgium continues to be a leader in regional cooperation and information exchanges, and the agreement among the parties in the new coalition government specifically refers to the importance of sharing information as a component in combating violent extremism. Belgium participates in EU, NATO, OSCE, and Council of Europe counterterrorism efforts, and is a member of the advisory board of the UN Counterterrorism Center. In December 2013, former Belgian Interior Minister Joelle Milquet hosted a ministerial meeting of her counterparts from EU member states affected by the foreign terrorist fighter problem. EU officials and representatives of the United States worked to develop additional areas of cooperation in border controls, radicalization prevention, and information sharing. In May 2014, Belgium hosted a follow-up meeting that was expanded to include officials from Turkey, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia.

As an EU member state, Belgium has contributed trainers and capacity building expertise to EU counterterrorism assistance programs in Sahel countries, including the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité; and the Belgian Federal Police have provided training to counterparts in the Maghreb.

Belgium is not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) but has participated in GCTF workshops. Belgium is implementing UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178 to mitigate the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and to restrict terrorist financing.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Countering violent extremism (CVE) remains a high priority for the Belgian government. The government has identified unemployment, alienation, and discontentment as potential drivers of radicalization to violence in some communities.

Belgian government support for projects such as the city pair program between Columbus, Ohio and Vilvoorde is designed to facilitate positive community engagement between the government, police force, and the Muslim community. The city pair program allowed for community leaders to exchange best practices in countering violent extremism and improving integration, thus providing unprecedented access to the municipal services and local minority community of Vilvoorde. Based on this exchange, Vilvoorde officials hope to create law enforcement and community advisory groups, similar to the DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties/FBI roundtable for the Somali community; to begin diversity training for law enforcement; to develop online counter-narratives to ISIL propaganda; to establish teacher and student exchanges that focus on cross-cultural education and sensitivity training; to design positive media campaigns for Muslims; and to found a Citizens Academy for the Belgian police force, modeled after U.S. programs.

OCAM’s “Plan R” (Action Plan Against Radicalization) promotes a series of measures designed to address radicalization to violence in Belgium, including the exchange of best practices between agencies and regions, the refusal of visas to extremist preachers, the increased financial screening of Belgian extremists, the watchlisting of foreign terrorist fighters, and the facilitation
of contact between social services and the families of foreign terrorist fighters and returnees. OCAM has also worked to develop better cooperation with the prison system, and now has plans for a prison de-radicalization program based on community policing models.

Among the components of the government’s strategy on preventing radicalization to violence is an effort to counter extremist messaging on the internet. The Ministry of Interior is working to increase cooperation with the internet industry in Belgium, working with the big five internet providers to suppress violent extremist content.

The government counter-radicalization strategy includes an interagency effort to support local government actors who work with returnees from Syria and Iraq to monitor their reintegration into society and provide them with guidance and support. The new government has suggested it may link the receipt of social services for returnees and their families to mandatory participation in de-radicalization programs.

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**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

**Overview:** Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner and continued to make slow progress in increasing its counterterrorism capacity in 2014. BiH law enforcement agencies generally keep close track of foreign terrorist fighter suspects in BiH and have carried out operations against them, although internal cooperation needs to improve. BiH’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, tasked with improving coordination between BiH’s many security and police agencies to better counter potential terrorist threats, has faltered significantly over the last year. Islamist extremist ideology and regional nationalist extremist groups both remain potential sources of violent extremism in BiH.

BiH has seen a significant number of its citizens travel to Syria and Iraq over the last year. In August, the BiH government began to consider a proposal to donate ammunition to the Government of Iraq to assist in its counter-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) efforts. In November 2014, BiH joined the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and in December sent its Foreign Minister to Brussels to participate in the U.S.-led coalition ministerial.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** BiH does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework, but in July, Parliament enacted the first “foreign terrorist fighter” law in the Balkans region in an effort to discourage BiH citizens from participating in foreign paramilitary groups. The bill, which does not address BiH citizens who serve in the armed forces of internationally-recognized countries, criminalizes organizing, managing, training, equipping, or recruiting individuals or groups of people to fight abroad, and joining paramilitary groups and imposes both imprisonment and monetary fines.

Much of BiH’s coordination and cooperation issues are caused by overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions. The problem is also the result of personal, political, and institutional rivalries that exist among most police agencies as well as with the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and BiH Court. Many of these rivalries are deeply ingrained and difficult to overcome.
In October and November, BiH authorities arrested a combined total of 27 suspects in two separate actions under “Operation Damascus,” which targeted BiH citizens who went to fight in Syria and Iraq as well as those who supported them or aided them in their efforts.

On September 4, Bosnian authorities, in cooperation with Italian authorities, arrested in BiH Bilal Bosnic, a Cremona preacher, and another 15 activists, seizing large quantities of weapons. Bosnic was accused of having recruited and funded foreign terrorist fighters sent to Syria and Iraq.

On terrorism-related prosecutions, in October, the BiH Appeals Court ordered a new trial for Haris Causevic, who was convicted in 2013 of a terrorist act and sentenced to 45 years in prison for the June 2010 bombing of a police station in Bugojno, which killed one police officer and injured six others. The Appeals Court agreed with the defense that the first panel had prevented it from calling additional witnesses and ordered a new trial. The case will not be re-tried in whole, but only the parts where the defense can call these witnesses. This is the second time since 2013 that a court has overturned a terrorism case on appeal.

To track entries into BiH, the BiH Border Police (BP) use a computerized database and software system to support immigration and passenger information collection. The system links all 55 border crossings and all four airport locations (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja Luka) via the State Police Information Network, a network developed and donated by the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), funded by the U.S. Department of State. Both the BP and the Foreigners Affairs Service (FAS) field offices are connected to this system. It provides the BP and FAS with immediate access to other supporting databases (including Interpol) to run appropriate checks and cross-checks. All law enforcement agencies in BiH have the capability to add data into this system, and any derogatory information will come up as a “hit” when a subject’s passport or BiH identification card is passed through the scanner at the point of entry. The BP has both legal authority and physical facilities at border crossings to detain individuals for up to 24 hours while they consult with SIPA and the BiH Prosecutor’s Office regarding next steps regarding questionable individuals.

Through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, Bosnian law enforcement received training in instructor development, critical incident management, and management of antiterrorism curricula.

Separately, ICITAP is working with the FAS to provide a biometrics system that will permit it to better monitor individuals entering and leaving BiH. This system is compatible with EU systems, and BiH has now met the requirements to share biometrics data with the EU. ICITAP is also helping to upgrade the existing Emergency Operation Center at the BiH Ministry of Security. In the event of a terrorist attack, these centers would be able to work together to ensure that required resources are made available anywhere in BiH. ICITAP, with Department of State funding, is also assisting with the construction of mobile command posts which can respond to the scene of any disaster and coordinate responses.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** BiH belongs to the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism
(MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, which in 2014 expressed concerns that BiH needed to improve its laws to better deter and detect money laundering and terrorist financing. BiH is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

The new law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing created a financial investigation department within the government that is empowered to forward information and data to appropriate authorities concerning money laundering and funding of terrorist organizations. The bylaws and amendments to Criminal Code had not been implemented as of the end of 2014.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** BiH’s criminal code and related legal framework are generally harmonized with UN and EU counterterrorism standards. In September, BiH voted to support UN Security Council Resolution 2178, which requires countries to take certain steps to address the foreign fighter threat. The Bosnian government participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters roundtable for Balkan countries hosted by the State Department on the margins of the UNGA.

BiH law enforcement agencies regularly interact with their U.S. and European counterparts on counterterrorism investigations. Interpol has a Sarajevo branch office that enjoys good cooperation with all law enforcement agencies throughout the country, all which have direct access to its databases. Regional cooperation at the professional law enforcement level with Croatia and Serbia improved in 2014.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The main religious communities in BiH (Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) continued to work together through the Interreligous Council to promote tolerance and confront acts of bigotry or extremism directed at any of the communities. Among public figures, the leader of the Islamic Community in BiH, Reis Kavazovic, continued to speak out against “misinterpretations of Islam” that lead to extremist violence, and the Bosniak Member of BiH’s Tri-Presidency, acting in his capacity as a political party leader, issued a statement in October that was sharply critical of ISIL and condemned those who support it. In academia, a noted professor from the faculty of Islamic Sciences at the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo published a piece in Bosnia’s leading daily newspaper in November, condemning the ISIL terrorist organization.

**BULGARIA**

**Overview:** Continued migration of asylum seekers from Syria to Bulgaria as well as increasing evidence of the transit of foreign terrorist fighters through Bulgaria raised the country’s counterterrorism profile in 2014. In response, the Government of Bulgaria has worked to enhance its prevention and enforcement tools, including new foreign terrorist fighter legislation
and the development of a National Counter Terrorism Center. Bulgaria is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

The Prosecution Service promised indictments in early 2014 against defendants in the 2012 airport bus bombing case in Burgas, but they had not been issued by year’s end.

U.S. agencies maintain a regular exchange of counterterrorism information with various entities within the Bulgarian government and assisted it to detect and react to terrorist threats within Bulgaria.

The Ministry of Interior and State Agency for National Security have responded strongly to evidence of possible domestic support for ISIL. In November, police arrested a group of Muslim men from Roma communities in the Pazardjik area for inciting war and anti-democratic activities. The men are followers of a controversial imam who posted pictures online of himself and some of his followers wearing clothing and holding a banner imprinted with the ISIL logo.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has designated a Counterterrorism Coordinator, who is a key point of contact for Post on issues like foreign terrorist fighters.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Bulgaria prosecutes suspected terrorists under several general provisions of the Penal Code but lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework. In 2014, the Minister of Justice introduced a new Penal Code which included updated counterterrorism statutes. The draft was not passed before the government fell and parliament was dissolved. With the arrival of a new government in November, the future of reforms to the code is unclear.

Law enforcement cooperation between U.S. agencies and their Bulgarian counterparts has historically been strong. However, the previous government reshuffled and reorganized key police units, and the resulting reassignment of personnel and imposition of new rules slowed joint casework. The new administration has promised to reverse many of the changes.

The Interior Ministry has operational units responsible for deterring, detecting, and responding to incidents, including the Specialized Unit for Combating Terrorism (SOBT), Security Police, and Special Police Forces. Specialized law enforcement units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training but lack resources in regional areas where the terrorism threat appears strongest.

The influx of asylum seekers in 2014, primarily from Syria, put significant strain on law enforcement. The Interior Ministry reassigned scores of local police to the border area to assist the besieged border police. The result has been increased deterrence against illegal border crossings but significantly less capacity for other law enforcement issues.

The establishment of the National Counterterrorism Training Center (NCTC) in 2014 provides the first inter-ministerial standing task force to develop law enforcement sensitive watch lists, coordinate between law enforcement and security services on counterterrorism checks and incidents, and build a common operating picture of the threats to national leadership facing
Bulgaria. Officials at the center will have the ability to receive and provide information to border guards, customs officials, counterterrorism officials, intelligence officers, and the police. The center has also served as a taskforce center when coordinating inter-ministerial counterterrorism operations. Through Regional Strategic Initiative-funded Antiterrorism Assistance program support in counterterrorism skills and other initiatives, the Department of State provided technical training to NCTC staff and worked with them to develop a national counterterrorism strategy.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bulgaria belongs to the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL). Bulgaria is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. The Financial Intelligence Directorate of the State Agency for National Security (FID-SANS) has primary responsibility for anti-money laundering measures for all reporting entities. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) also has a Special Supervision Directorate to investigate banks for compliance with money laundering and terrorist financing requirements. Although reporting by non-bank institutions, such as gaming entities, investment intermediaries, notaries, non-profit organizations (NPOs), and leasing companies has increased, it remained low. FID’s resources remained limited, particularly with respect to performing onsite inspections in non-banking institutions. Publicly available information on persons who own, control, or direct the activities of NPOs was not consistently maintained. In 2014, the government did not identify, freeze, seize, or forfeit any terrorism-related assets. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Bulgaria is a member of and active contributor to counterterrorism initiatives at the UN, EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and NATO. Law enforcement officials benefit from joint investigations and training opportunities with international partners. Bulgaria’s aforementioned participation in GCTF activities is an example of this contribution.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Grand Mufti of Bulgaria issued a statement and, along with the National Council of Religious Communities in Bulgaria, adopted a decree condemning ISIL and its violent activities. The Grand Mufti has been a voice of tolerance and moderation but he has complained that the Government of Bulgaria is not a strong enough partner in this effort.

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**CYPRUS**

**Overview:** The Government of the Republic of Cyprus collaborated closely with the United States, the EU, and other countries – bilaterally and multilaterally – in international counterterrorism efforts in 2014. In March, the Cypriot Supreme Court rejected the appeal against the Criminal Court’s 2013 conviction of Hossam Yaacoub Taleb, a Lebanese Hizballah operative, for conducting surveillance activities on Israeli targets in Cyprus.
Cyprus’ counterterrorism partnership with the United States included regular, routine protection for transiting U.S. military personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels throughout 2014; and participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance and Regional Strategic Initiative programs, which strengthened the government’s capacity to counter terrorism.

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus government-controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and a northern third, administered by the Turkish Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus government does not exercise effective control over the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part an independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).” The United States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any country other than Turkey. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus patrols the buffer zone separating the two sides, but people, narcotics, and other illicit goods routinely cross uncontrolled.

Turkish Cypriots lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism effectively. Within these limitations, however, Turkish Cypriots cooperated in pursuing specific counterterrorism objectives.

Cyprus is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In October, the government approved French civil aviation authorities’ request to access Paphos airbase to support humanitarian operations in Iraq. The government began an interagency review of its legal framework for addressing foreign terrorist fighters, including a review of its 2010 counterterrorism law to begin to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2178. Cyprus police have conducted a seminar on the foreign terrorist fighters issue. In September 2014, the police investigated five people for possible facilitation of travel to conflict areas abroad, but nothing suspicious was revealed.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Cypriot government has not yet tried a case under the 2010 National Law on Combating Terrorism, but has used the criminal code to prosecute terrorism-related offenses; for example, the prosecution pursued criminal charges against Yaacoub for his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets in Cyprus. In March 2014, the Cypriot Supreme Court upheld the Yaacoub convictions for participation in a criminal organization, participation and acceptance in committing a crime, and money laundering. In November 2014 Yaacoub, a Swedish national of Lebanese origin, completed his criminal sentence and was escorted to Sweden. Cypriot law enforcement continued to develop the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents, under the coordination of the National Counterterrorism Coordinator with a specialized antiterrorist squad in the Cyprus National Police’s (CNP’s) Emergency Response Unit.

In 2014, the Council of Ministers approved a new National Counterterrorism Strategy for the Republic of Cyprus, based on the four pillars of the corresponding EU strategy: “Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Respond.” Cyprus began participating in the newly-established Europol Data Fusion Center to help identify potential terrorist threats, strengthened security measures at borders and crossing points, and advocated adoption of an EU Directive on Passenger Name Records. U.S. training programs and analytic exchanges strengthened the capacity of Cypriot law enforcement to detect surveillance and prevent attacks on airports, bus, and rail systems.
CNP continued a screening watchlist mechanism. On the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office watchlist, among others, are all persons subject to travel bans and asset freezing sanctions by UNSCRs and EU decisions concerning terrorism. In cooperation with FRONTEX Eurosur Program, the CNP has also conducted training programs concerning false and falsified document detection, border security processing techniques, and recognition of foreign terrorist fighters at sea and airports.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Cyprus is a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Cyprus’ financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS), is a member of the Egmont Group.

The Republic of Cyprus government implemented new UNSCR 1267/1989 (Al-Qa’ida) and 1988 (Taliban) sanctions listings and informally tracked suspect names listed under U.S. Executive Orders (EO), including EO 13224. In June, the Council of Ministers proposed new legislation criminalizing and establishing penalties for circumvention of UN or EU sanctions, including terrorist financing. The proposal, which was pending before the House of Representatives at year’s end, aims to criminalize infringements of UNSCRs and relevant sanctions adopted by the EU, as well as impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** In addition to hosting and participating in OSCE counterterrorism programs, Cyprus participated in counterterrorism initiatives of the UN and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended meetings of the Working Group on the External Aspects of Terrorism of the Council of the EU, an ad hoc working group on Lebanese Hizballah’s military wing, and a regional conference on foreign terrorist fighters.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Cyprus continued to participate in the EU Commission’s Radicalization Awareness Network meetings, with particular focus on the health, police, and prison sectors. The government exchanges best practices with partners on addressing terrorists’ internet recruitment efforts. The Police’s Counterterrorism Office conducted training of first line police officers and prison employees about radicalization to violence.

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**DENMARK**

**Overview:** The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands) has devoted significant assets to counterterrorism programs, as well as to initiatives to counter violent extremism in Denmark and abroad. Denmark continued to cooperate closely with the United States, the UN, and the EU on specific counterterrorism initiatives, such as the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). Denmark remained a prominent target for global terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida, due in part to the crisis that began in 2005 when the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published political cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad with a bomb, and because of Denmark’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts, including involvement in the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). No large-scale terrorist attacks occurred within Denmark in 2014.

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) estimated that at least 110 Danish citizens and residents have voluntarily left Denmark to fight in Syria and Iraq, a significant number of whom have likely fought on behalf of ISIL. Danish security services have focused on addressing the issue of foreign terrorist fighters and monitoring the individuals who have returned; there is concern that Danish fighters could return to Denmark with terrorist training and seek to radicalize others.

Denmark has contributed air strikes, military personnel, and trainers to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Denmark introduced a national countering violent extremism (CVE) action plan in September 2014 and has already allocated approximately $10 million to CVE efforts.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Denmark continued to use its terrorism legislation from 2006, which allows greater information sharing between Denmark’s two intelligence services, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS). The legislation also permits official surveillance and wiretapping of terrorist suspects with a valid warrant and sufficient evidentiary proof.

In addition to the Danish National Police, the two Danish agencies most involved in countering terrorist threats in Denmark are PET and DDIS. Danish security and law enforcement organizations have adequate information sharing, thanks to the Danish government’s Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), which was established to share information between PET, DDIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

Denmark continued to support border security via travel document checks for non-Schengen Area travel; has biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry; shares information within its own government and with other countries as appropriate. Security forces patrol and control Denmark’s land and maritime borders. Additionally, Denmark has a very competent Customs and Tax Authority (SKAT). As a member of the Schengen Agreement, Denmark has open borders with its EU neighbors and there are no passport controls at the land borders or in the airport terminals servicing most Schengen Visa area flights.

Counterterrorism-related law enforcement actions include:

- In October, Moroccan-born Danish citizen Sam (formerly Said) Mansour, commonly known as “the Bookseller from Bronshoj” was charged with promoting terrorist propaganda. Mansour was convicted and on December 4, sentenced to four years in prison. Mansour had previously been sentenced, in April 2007, to three-and-a-half years
in prison for producing and distributing graphic videos encouraging participation in violent extremism.

- On October 22, 11 Danish citizens of Kurdish origin were found not guilty of financing terrorism. Their trial began in September 2013. The men, aged 29-73 years, were accused of having collected approximately $23 million for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated as a terrorist organization in Denmark. The defendants had allegedly channeled money to the PKK through the Kurdish-language broadcast station Roj TV. The defendants were acquitted on the grounds that prosecutors could not prove that the defendants knew that the money raised for the television station went to the PKK. The prosecutor has appealed the court ruling.

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- On December 18, Danish police arrested a 21-year-old Danish citizen in the Copenhagen suburb of Allerød and charged him with violating criminal code paragraph 136,1, “inciting terrorism.” The defendant is accused of posting a link on his Facebook page to a video of an ISIL spokesperson in Syria. In the video, the spokesperson calls for the killing of citizens from countries taking part in the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The defendant had just returned from Lebanon, where he had been arrested earlier at the Syrian border inside a vehicle filled with weapons and explosives.

- Also on December 18, a 26-year-old Danish citizen was charged in absentia for violating paragraph 136/2, “explicitly expressing support for terrorism.” In late June, the individual had posted on Facebook a number of pictures from the central square of the Syrian city of Raqqa which showed the accused posing next to several severed heads posted on a nearby fence, as well as photos of beheaded bodies filled with bullet holes. The accused was not present in Denmark when charged, and was presumed to still be in Syria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Denmark is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, cooperates closely with other Nordic financial intelligence units (FIUs), and is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of FIUs. Danish authorities can freeze assets within hours or days with a valid court order, however the confiscation process requires a full trial which may take months to years, depending on appeals.

In 2014, Denmark assisted Ethiopia in its efforts to combat terrorist finance, supporting a 17-month intensive capacity building and technical assistance program focused on institutional development within the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ). The project has utilized expertise of the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime. As part of this Danish-supported program and an internally developed action plan, Ethiopia has undertaken considerable efforts to enhance its counterterrorist finance legislative framework and has demonstrated significant political commitment to addressing strategic deficiencies.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Danish government is committed to close cooperation with international organizations, particularly within the UN framework and through
the EU, to ensure that it has both the capacity and the support needed to counter terrorism. Denmark actively participates in the UN, GCTF, EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, Interpol, Europol, the Middle Europe Conference, the Bern Club, and the EU Counterterrorism Group.

Denmark continued to be a close ally in counterterrorism capacity building in Afghanistan, contributing up to 750 troops in 2014, together with police, diplomats, and technical assistants. Afghanistan is also the single largest recipient of Danish foreign aid, receiving nearly US $30 million of non-military aid in addition to significant coalition military support. Afghanistan is currently the centerpiece of Danish efforts to develop an integrated approach where all relevant actors – such as the UN, NATO, individual nations and NGOs – coordinate efforts to systematically strengthen political, development, and security-related efforts.

The stabilization program for the Sahel region, launched by the Danish government in 2013, continued to contribute to international efforts towards preventing the Sahel from becoming a terrorist safe haven.

On April 18-19, the Governments of Burkina Faso and Denmark hosted a GCTF-affiliated workshop focusing on countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. The workshop aimed at improving understanding of the sources and drivers of violent extremism in the region and discussed concrete ways of addressing the issue.

In June, Burkinabé Minister for Territorial Administration and Security and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Denmark to the UN opened the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy meeting where Denmark and Burkina Faso focused on countering violent extremism in the Sahel and West Africa, and forging stronger collaborative international efforts in the region.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In September, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration, and Social Affairs presented an Action Plan to prevent radicalization and violent extremism. This plan details 12 specific areas for improving CVE efforts domestically. The plan calls for strengthening local officials’ actions by expanding the legal authority to use social services for persons aged 18 to 25. (Note: the authority previously existed only for minors below the age of 18.) This change is expected to improve cooperation between social workers, local law enforcement, schools, and national counterterrorism experts (PET and DDIS). The Action Plan also funds additional training for recognizing signs of radicalization to violence. Other parts of the Action Plan include monitoring of online extremist content; improving prevention methods by providing mentors, and encouraging youth to attend youth dialogues; and establishing a new exit center to help those at risk of radicalization. The third group of efforts includes the creation of a new Nordic Ministerial Network to coordinate CVE efforts across the region and pursue specific engagement with developing countries via Denmark’s Peace and Stabilization Fund, a part of Denmark’s foreign aid. The new CVE Action Plan also calls for mobilizing civil society by increased dialogue with PET, creating a new national hotline for parents and caregivers to report concerns, and providing training for civil society on how to recognize radicalization and react appropriately. Denmark’s CVE Action Plan now includes funding for law enforcement to provide strategic communication and counter narratives online in addition to continuing offline
efforts. The exit program frequently uses individuals who can debunk the glorification of terrorism and the mystique of becoming a foreign terrorist fighter, as well as support for civil society groups includes training for an NGO that promotes stories of victims of terrorism.

Denmark has law enforcement resources dedicated to monitoring of internet-based violent extremist messaging. Under the 2014 national CVE action plan, Denmark will coordinate at a national level prior work with counter-narratives, including voicing stories from victims and families affected by violence and from former foreign terrorist fighters. Denmark provides training and resources to civil society groups seeking to present alternative narratives.

The exit program was initially designed to allow members of criminal gangs find a way out of the gang and back into lawful society; it has since been adapted successfully for use with extremists as well. The program provides a case manager, job training and placement, housing assistance, and other social services as needed to transition gang members or extremists back into productive members of society. In addition, the prison system provides a number of educational and vocational resources to all criminals.

FRANCE

Overview: France was an excellent counterterrorism partner in the face of the mounting challenge of foreign terrorist fighters. French government agencies worked with their U.S. counterparts for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information and partnered in fostering closer regional and international cooperation. France’s security apparatus and legislation afford broad powers to security services to prevent terrorist attacks. France experienced five particularly serious attacks from December 2014 to January 2015, the most serious being the January 7 to 9 attacks on the Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine and the Hyper Cacher (Jewish kosher grocery).

The Government of France was concerned about the possibility of attacks against its interests in France and worldwide, and has taken steps to counter the potential threat posed by its nationals traveling abroad to engage in terrorist activity. The return of French nationals who joined groups fighting in the civil war in Syria is a major and increasing threat. On December 17, the Interior Minister estimated there were 1,200 French citizens or French residents linked to fighting among violent extremist groups in Syria, with approximately 390 in the theater; approximately 60 have been killed in combat. France’s main counterterrorism apparatus is its Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (DGSI), which replaced the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur on May 12, 2014 and is tasked with counter-espionage, counterterrorism, and the surveillance of potential threats on French territory, along with economic protection issues including organized crime and corporate espionage.

France is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamist State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was instrumental in passing UN Security Council resolutions 2170 and 2178, participates fully in multilateral counterterrorism fora, and has taken decisive domestic action to restrict terrorist financing and to limit the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. France has also conducted air strikes and contributed military personnel and trainers in Iraq.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: France has a system of non-jury courts for terrorism trials and a broad definition of what is considered a terrorist offence – the so-called “association of wrongdoers” offence – which allows it to cast a wide net and imprison a broad range of suspects. Under French law, foreigners can be deported if they are believed to pose a serious threat to public order.

A November 13, 2014 law took steps to counter the threat of foreign terrorist fighters via three key objectives: to prevent people from leaving the territory when there are reasons to believe that they intend to engage in illicit terrorist activities abroad; to counter online propaganda by blocking websites advocating terrorism (the law calls for blocking to be carried out under judicial supervision, to avoid infringement on the freedom of speech); and to criminalize individual preparation of acts of terrorism. This legislation builds on 2012 counterterrorism legislation that allows authorities to prosecute French citizens who return to France after committing an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camps (notably in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region) with the intention of returning to France to commit terrorist attacks. Some groups raised data privacy concerns about both the 2014 legislation and earlier expansions of French government domestic surveillance powers.

France has two national police forces: the General Directorate of National Police (DGPN) and the Directorate General of the National Gendarmerie (DGGN), both subordinate to the Ministry of Interior. (The DGGN is part of the Defense Ministry but the Interior Ministry manages its policing functions.) The DGPN is responsible for civil law enforcement and criminal investigations in cities and large towns and is staffed with approximately 150,000 personnel. The DGSI combines law enforcement capabilities with domestic intelligence gathering.

France works diligently to maintain strong border security and implements national and EU border security legislation.

The following high profile arrests or law enforcement actions related to counterterrorism took place in 2014:

- On February 17, a police investigation into people linked to the “Cannes-Torcy” terrorist cell revealed 900 grams of explosives as well as weapons in an apartment in Mandelieu-Napoule, near Cannes.
- In February, the French courts cancelled the deportation order against Ali Belhadad, an Algerian national with a French residency permit, so he would be tried in France. Police said Belhadad was connected to a violent extremist group linked to Mohammed Merah, the man who killed seven in south-central France in March 2012.
- Also in February, police arrested two men – a French citizen, and a Spanish citizen – affiliated with a leftist anarchist group, for Molotov cocktail attacks in Tarbes and Pau (southeastern France) in 2013. French citizen Damien Camelio, 31, was later sentenced to two years imprisonment for his role in attacking a church, a prison, and a military installation.
- On May 30, police in Marseille arrested Mehdi Nemmouche, a 29-year-old French citizen of Algerian origin; he was extradited to Belgium and charged with killing four at the
Jewish Museum in Brussels on May 24; Nemmouche is allegedly a former Syria foreign terrorist fighter.

- Police made the first arrests under France’s new foreign terrorist fighter legislation in late November, arresting two for selling ISIL flags and other terrorist propaganda online.
- On December 21, a 20-year-old French citizen of African origin – a recent convert to Islam – was shot dead after entering a police station in Tours and slashing three police officers with a foot-long knife. The attack closely followed two other street attacks by mentally disturbed assailants and raised alarms throughout France.
- Throughout the year, police arrested dozens of people, including minors, throughout France, for being foreign terrorist fighters in Syria or Iraq, for recruiting others to fight, or for promulgating violent extremist propaganda online. Most were focused on Syria and Iraq, although there have been reports of French fighters elsewhere. Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said in December that “the dismantlement of jihadist networks is an absolute priority for the police” and said, as of December 17, 2014, there were 103 judicial cases against violent extremists concerning 505 suspects.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** France is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). France belongs to, or is an observer in the following FATF-related bodies: Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Observer to the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, Observer to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Observer to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, and Observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force. France is a member of the Egmont Group and member of the Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone.

In mid-January 2014, the French Treasury froze the assets of “Perle d’Espoir” (Pearl of Hope), a nonprofit association registered in 2012. On November 18, the French arrested two employees, President Yasmine Znaidi and Naibl Ourfelli, charging them with terrorist financing and conspiracy.

The French financial intelligence unit “Tracfin” said that regular "1901 Law" non-profit organizations (NPOs) are not obliged to file suspicious transactions reports. NPOs are not regulated or monitored by Tracfin. According to the French monetary and financial code, only monetary and financial professions, government administrative structures, and related NPOs are regulated and monitored.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** France is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Sworn in in 2013, France’s Jean Paul Laborde remained the Executive Director of the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC). France played a strong role on the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 Sanctions Committees. In regional organizations, France participated in the drafting of the European Council’s Counterterrorism Strategy action plan, and helped create and implement NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit.

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Declaration, both of which include major counterterrorism measures for member states. Through the OSCE, France engaged in new measures to counter transnational threats, including terrorism.

The Government of France undertook joint counterterrorism operations with countries including the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain. France also played an active role in efforts to support counterterrorism capacity building in other countries both bilaterally and within the EU.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** France has an overall strategy to counter terrorism that includes countering violent extremism. France considers its integration programs for all French citizens and residents a major tool in countering radicalization and violent extremism. Many of these programs target disenfranchised communities and new immigrants.

The Ministry of Education works to instill "universal values" in all French pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or country of birth. Ministry regulations mandate that all French public schools teach civic education, and that all students attend school until age 16. The government also offers adult vocational training for older immigrants and minorities who have never attended French schools. The Interior Ministry plays a significant role in countering radicalization to violence by increased police presence in disenfranchised areas, neighborhoods, and regions with high criminality and juvenile delinquency rates.

The Ministry of Justice implements rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former criminals. According to the Ministry of Justice, as of December 1, there were 185 Muslim chaplains employed by the French penitentiary system.

According to the Interior Ministry, a toll-free hotline implemented in spring 2014 for families of radicalized citizens has received some 625 “pertinent” notifications and prevented between 70 and 80 French citizens from departing to fight in Syria.

**GEORGIA**

**Overview:** In 2014, Georgia continued its robust engagement with the United States across a range of counterterrorism-related issues and remained a strong U.S. counterterrorism partner. However, there are continuing concerns about Georgia as a transit and source country for international terrorism. Media reported that, as of December, between 50 and 100 Georgian nationals from the Muslim-majority regions of Adjara and the Pankisi Gorge were fighting in Syria and Iraq for either al-Qa’ida affiliates or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), including senior ISIL commander Tarkhan Batirashvili (aka Omar al-Shishani). Given Georgia’s geographic location, violent Islamist extremists continued to transit through the country between the Russian Federation’s North Caucasus and Syria and Iraq.

Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and former Foreign Minister Maia Panjikidze publicly committed to provide humanitarian support as part of Georgia’s contribution to and membership of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Following the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2178, the Georgian government initiated changes to its criminal code related
to foreign terrorist fighters and modified regulations to strengthen document security along the border with Turkey. Georgian and Turkish nationals are allowed to cross the border in both directions using identification cards that lack the security features of passports, thus increasing the likelihood that fraudulent documents could be used at the critical Turkish-Georgian border checkpoint on the route to Syria through Turkey.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Georgia continued to enhance its counterterrorism legislation in 2014. In April, the Georgian government amended the Criminal Code to criminalize participation in international terrorism, recruitment for membership in a terrorist organization, and failing to hinder a terrorist incident. The Georgian government amended other terrorism-related articles in the Criminal Code in July to bring them into line with international best practices and make them more precise for use in criminal prosecutions. In November, Georgia updated its legislation on surveillance to provide for additional oversight of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is primarily responsible for counterterrorism and for conducting surveillance within the country. As of December, the Georgian government was preparing additional amendments to the Criminal Code and other relevant legislation related to foreign terrorist fighters to fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 2178. The country would benefit from additional legislation to allow for the creation of a means to identify and sanction individuals who are not included on UN sanctions list and to improve the Georgian government’s ability to prosecute terrorism cases.

Counterterrorism units within Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs have the lead in investigating terrorism-related incidents, and in December, the Georgian government established a new interagency mechanism that would operate as a joint task force to conduct a major counterterrorism operation, if needed. Overall, the Georgian government is largely capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorism incidents. However, several ministries and offices share counterterrorism responsibilities, creating challenges to cooperation and information sharing. Nonetheless, the Georgian government took steps toward improving interagency coordination. The government set up a counterterrorism working group within the country’s State Security and Crisis Management Council to promote regular communication among relevant agencies and a crisis management unit within the same Council that would coordinate the government’s response in the event of a major terrorist incident.

Georgia continued efforts to strengthen its overall border security, in part due to its goal to attain visa-free travel to the EU. However, Tbilisi’s lack of control over its Russian-occupied territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, harsh terrain, and a continuing tense relationship with Moscow limited the country’s ability to secure its northern border. In 2014, Georgia took steps to strengthen document security by imposing stricter conditions on issuing a second passport and, since late July, issuing biometric passports. Georgian law enforcement used UN sanctions lists as terrorist watchlists and advance passenger name records on commercial flights at ports of entry, to help detect potential terrorist movement. More comprehensive biometric and biographic screening at ports of entry would enhance this capability, however. With significant U.S. support, the Georgian Coast Guard is now better equipped to patrol the country’s maritime borders, with the exception of Russian-occupied Abkhazia’s coastline, and the Georgian government continued to improve its ability to detect and interdict WMD. Georgia shares cross-border terrorism-related information with its southern neighbors – Turkey, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan – through police attaches and working-level interaction at border crossings. Chains of supervision at the border hamper official cross-border communication, however, as border guards and patrol police at border checkpoints must check with Tbilisi before sharing information with senior law enforcement in neighboring countries.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Georgia is a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Georgia’s amendments to terrorist financing legislation – to address shortcomings highlighted in MONEYVAL’s 2012 evaluation – came into force in January, and in March, the Georgian government adopted a strategy and action plan for combating money laundering and terrorist financing to further improve regulations and build capacity. In response to recommendations from MONEYVAL and the FATF, the government established the Interagency Commission on Implementation of UNSC Resolutions to coordinate the government’s immediate compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Georgia is actively engaged on counterterrorism issues at the international, regional, and bilateral levels, and participates in regional organizations such as the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and its amending protocol, the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw Convention) came into force in Georgia in May. As of December, Georgia had concluded bilateral law enforcement and counterterrorism treaties with 23 countries. In 2014, Georgian law enforcement officials participated in counterterrorism-related training and capacity-building exercises with the Governments of Turkey, the UK, Israel, and Slovakia, as well as with the George Marshall Center in Germany, the OSCE, and the UN.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In 2014, Georgia increased its nascent efforts to prevent radicalization in vulnerable populations, but more focus – particularly in the areas of economic development, community policing, prison reform, and outreach to Muslim communities – would strengthen the government’s ability to identify and provide alternatives to at-risk individuals. In order to increase the integration of Muslim youth into Georgian society, the Georgian government now allows students to pass exams in languages other than Georgian, and the government attempts to better advertise educational opportunities and scholarships to vulnerable populations. The Muslim-majority Adjara region already enjoys significant autonomy, and legislation passed in February gives more autonomy to municipalities and villages, including in the Muslim-majority Pankisi Gorge.
Overview: The threat from violent extremism increased in 2014 in connection with the threat posed by domestic radical groups as well as foreign terrorist fighters. Germany investigated, arrested, and prosecuted a sharply increased number of terrorist suspects and disrupted terrorist-related groups within its borders, many of whom were connected to al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), other violent Islamist extremists, Kurdish nationalist, and neo-Nazi terrorist organizations. Security officials estimated over 550 residents in Germany have departed the country to participate in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, the majority of which joined violent Islamist extremist groups in the fighting there. A third of these may have already returned to Germany. German officials actively investigated these returnees for any terrorist threat resulting from their experience abroad and possible desire to continue to support violent extremist causes. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the United States remained excellent.

Germany is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and has provided arms, material support, and training to Kurdish security forces. The German government has committed support for further counter-ISIL training efforts in Iraq. Germany voiced its support for UNSCRs 2170 and 2178 and is currently preparing legislative amendments to specifically criminalize terrorist finance and foreign terrorist fighter travel, although German law already criminalizes both the provision of financial or material support for terrorist groups or acts as well as attendance at terrorist training camps. Germany is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and supported the GCTF good practices on foreign terrorist fighters. Domestically, the German government has increased enforcement efforts to prevent, interdict, and counter foreign terrorist fighter travel and has voiced support for strengthening EU and Schengen measures to do so. In September, the Ministry of Interior issued a ban against actions in support of ISIL, making it explicitly illegal to join, recruit, provide material support for, propagandize for, or display the symbols of ISIL. German security officials actively made use of existing provisions allowing them to seize passports of those deemed to pose a security risk and began preparatory work on other measures to block travel, such as limitations on national identification cards. In November, the Bundestag (parliament) approved a 2015 budget that included increased spending on law enforcement and domestic intelligence efforts to counter the foreign terrorist fighter threat.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The German government continued to apply its comprehensive counterterrorism legislation, which criminalizes membership in or support for domestic and foreign terrorist associations. The Criminal Code also makes a range of terrorism-related preparatory actions illegal, such as participating in terrorist training or acquiring weapons or explosives with the intent to commit attacks that endanger the German state.

German border management data systems, equipment, and infrastructure are highly developed. Data on suspected terrorists is shared between federal and state law enforcement agencies. The German passport and other identity documents incorporate strong security features. Germany does not collect entry/exit data. Collection and retention of Advance Passenger Information (API) is limited and Passenger Name Record (PNR) analysis is not used. Germany supports an EU-wide PNR directive and entry/exit systems rather than systems managed by individual member states.
Counterterrorism arrests, prosecutions, and trials:

ISIL-related:

- Throughout the year, German police, prosecutors, and courts took various actions against ISIL members, supporters, or returned foreign terrorist fighters. At year’s end, the Federal Minister of Justice said authorities were carrying out approximately 300 investigations or prosecutions nationwide related to ISIL membership or support.

- In March, as part of a nationwide series of raids, police arrested German citizen Fatih Kharaman in Berlin, Turkish citizen Fatih I. in Frankfurt, and German-Polish dual national Karolina R. in Bonn. The three were indicted for providing financial or propaganda support to ISIL, and Kharaman and Fatih I. were also charged with ISIL membership and terrorist training during travel to Syria. In September, prosecutors indicted Kharaman for membership in Junud al-Sham, which fights alongside ISIL and other violent extremist groups. Also in September, the Federal Prosecutor General added additional terrorist finance charges against Karolina R. and also indicted Ahmed-Sadiq M. and Jennifer Vincenza M. for membership in and financial support to ISIL.

- In June, the German Federal Police arrested a French citizen returning from Syria and subsequently extradited him to France on terrorism charges. The man arrived in Berlin by plane from Turkey and was detained upon arrival. He was suspected of having traveled to Syria to join ISIL forces, where he was wounded participating in combat.

- In October, the Federal Prosecutor General indicted German citizen Harun P. for membership in the foreign terrorist group Junud al-Sham, as well as for murder and conspiracy to commit murder. P. traveled to Syria in September 2013 where he received paramilitary training and participated in a February 2014 attack on the central state prison in Aleppo that left two soldiers and five inmates dead. Prosecutors also charged him with attempting to incite the group to murder a teenaged German girl in Syria. Czech Police arrested him at the Prague Airport in April and later extradited him to Germany.

- In October and November, police and prosecutors carried out a series of investigations and raids resulting in the arrest of multiple alleged members or supporters of ISIL. Police in North Rhine-Westphalia arrested Tunisian citizen Kamel Ben Yahia S., Russian citizen Yusup G, Moroccan-German citizen Mounir R., and Lebanese citizen Kassem El R. for providing financial, material, and recruitment support to ISIL.

- In November, police including special counterterrorism units, arrested a German citizen suspected of being a returned ISIL fighter in Wolfsburg.

- In November, a court in Stuttgart opened the trial of Lebanese citizens Ismail Issa and Ezzeddine Issa and German citizen Mohammed Sobhan Ayubi on charges of support for terrorism. Ismail Issa is also charged with membership in a foreign terrorist organization (ISIL). Police arrested Ismail Issa and Ayubi in November 2013 while they were transporting night vision equipment, medication, tools, and binoculars intended for ISIL. Ezzeddine Issa (Ismail’s brother) and Ayubi allegedly assisted him with financing, procurement, and transport. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

- In December, a court in Frankfurt convicted Kreshnik Berisha of membership in a foreign terrorist organization (ISIL) and sentenced him to three years and nine months in prison. Berisha was arrested upon his return to Germany in December 2013, after having left for
Syria in July of the same year. This was the first trial involving a returned foreign terrorist fighter from Syria to be concluded.

Other significant cases included:

- In November, a court in Düsseldorf convicted four members of an AQ terrorist cell, ending a trial that began in July 2012. The court found three defendants (Moroccan citizen Abdeladim El Kebir, German-Moroccan citizen Jamil Sedikki, and German-Iranian citizen Amid Chaabi) guilty of membership in a foreign terrorist group and sentenced them to terms of nine years, seven years and five-and-a-half years in prison, respectively. The court found German citizen Halil Simsek guilty of support for terrorism and fraud and sentenced him to four-and-a-half years. The charges stemmed from El Kebir’s travel to a terrorist training camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and subsequent recruitment of his co-defendants for the preparation and execution of one or more bombing attacks in Germany. The United States provided evidentiary support and expert testimony in the case. The defendants filed an appeal in federal court, which was pending at year’s end.
- In January, a Frankfurt court sentenced Emrah Erdogan to seven years in prison for membership in terrorist organizations (AQ and al-Shabaab) and incitement of robbery.
- In February, a court in Hamburg convicted German-Afghan dual national Sulaiman Sadiki of membership in the foreign terrorist organization the Islamist Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and sentenced him to three years in prison. Sadiki attended an IMU/AQ terror camp in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in 2009 and assisted with logistical tasks including weapons transport, as well as with the production of an IMU propaganda film. Sadiki fled before the trial’s conclusion but Bulgarian authorities arrested and subsequently extradited him to Germany.
- In March, a court in Düsseldorf sentenced Josef Dweik to two-and-a-half years in prison for membership in the foreign terrorist organization the German Taliban Mujahedin, which he joined in the Afghan-Pakistan border region in 2010, intending to participate in the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The Federal Prosecutor General’s Office indicted Dweik on terrorism charges in September 2013.
- In May, a court in Düsseldorf sentenced 29-year old Lebanese-German dual citizen Ahmed Krekshi to three-and-a-half years in prison for support of the foreign terrorist organization IMU. Krekshi transferred over US $4,700 to the IMU and contributed to propaganda efforts, as well as gathering intelligence on Germany.
- In August, a Düsseldorf court convicted Turkish citizen Özkan Güzel and sentenced him to 26 months in prison for membership in the Turkish foreign terrorist organization the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C). The court found that Güzel had been involved with the DHKP-C since 1998 and that he was raising funds meant to support armed conflict.
- In August, the Federal Criminal Police arrested Turkish citizen Mehmet D. on suspicion of membership in the foreign terrorist organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Federal prosecutors accused him of directing PKK activities (including fundraising and overseeing financial management) in northern and central Germany under the code name "Kahraman" since January 2013.
• In September, the Federal Criminal Investigative Police (BKA) arrested three German citizens (Steven N., Abdullah W., and Abdulsalam W.) on suspicion of membership in terrorist group al-Shabaab. The three were arrested upon arrival in Frankfurt on a flight from Kenya and were reportedly considering travel to Syria to join violent extremist groups there. The following day, authorities in Kenya arrested two additional German citizens who were also thought to be members of al-Shabaab.

• In September, the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court opened the trial of German citizen Marco René Gäbel, German citizen Tayfun Sevim, German-Turkish dual citizen Koray Nicholas Durmaz, and Albanian citizen Enea Buzo on terrorism-related charges. Authorities charged that the four formed a terrorist group and attempted to murder the leader of a far-right-wing political party in March 2013. Additionally, Gäbel is charged with attempted mass murder in a failed attempt to bomb the Bonn train station in December 2012, which potentially carries a life sentence. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and an observer to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America against Money Laundering, all of which are FATF-style regional bodies. Germany’s financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group. In June, based on improvements reflected in its most recent FATF Mutual Evaluation Follow-up Report, FATF removed Germany from the Follow-Up process. German agencies filed 19,095 suspicious transaction reports in 2013 (the latest figures available), a 33% increase over the prior year. Agencies designated 208 of them for suspected terrorist financing, a significant decrease as a share of reports. Germany remained a strong advocate of the UNSCR 1267/1989 (Al-Qaida) and 1988 (Taliban) sanctions regimes.

Police and prosecutors began investigations and trials in a number of terrorist financing cases related to ISIL during the year, as noted above. None of these had reached a conclusion by year’s end.

In April, the Federal Ministry of the Interior banned a Hizballah-affiliated charity, the Lebanese Orphan Children Project (Waisenkinderprojekt Libanon) and seized nearly US $80,000 in assets. The group is suspected of transferring over US $4 million to Hizballah’s Al-Shahid Foundation since 2007. In June, a court issued a temporary injunction against parts of the ban after the organization filed a legal challenge, but left the assets frozen; a final ruling was still pending at year’s end.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Germany is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and continued to participate in various multilateral counterterrorism initiatives. German cooperation with regional and international organizations on counterterrorism includes the UN and UN Security Council, EU, OECD, OSCE, NATO, Council
of Europe, G-7, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Interpol. Within the GCTF, Germany is a founding supporter of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, and the Institute’s Executive Director is a seconded German official. Germany also supports GCTF capacity building projects. Germany has advocated strongly within the EU for improved counterterrorism and border security efforts.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Germany has numerous programs to counter violent extremism at the state and federal levels. The Federal and State Ministries of Interior have formed a working group to ensure coordination and more effective support for efforts to analyze and counter the appeal of violent extremism, which meets regularly to compile and disseminate information and best practices.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior continued its counter-radicalization assistance center for concerned parents and friends of violent extremists; the center was established in January 2012 and has expanded to include a nationwide telephone hotline with clients referred to a region-specific advising partner. The hotline has received over 1,200 calls since its establishment. In September, the government folded the work of its HATIF (the Arabic word for telephone) program into the counter-radicalization assistance center, which has also taken on HATIF’s mission of assisting violent extremists who wish to exit the scene with reintegration.

In North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state with 17 million residents, state authorities continued and expanded the work of the “Pathfinder” initiative to work with communities to engage individuals believed to be susceptible to radicalization to violence. In some cities, NGOs or community organizations implement the programs, while in others, city government offices do so. In addition, North-Rhine Westphalia continued other programs to improve civic education and to provide opportunities for at-risk youth. In Berlin, the Violence Prevention Network runs a training program that serves ideologically motivated perpetrators both during and after detention.

In June, the state of Hesse opened a state-wide “Violence Prevention Network” supported by a counseling center in Frankfurt. The center’s mission is to advise at-risk youth and their friends, families, teachers, and classmates. Other states have announced similar plans or begun funding the work of NGOs involved in CVE and de-radicalization efforts, including Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Baden-Württemberg.

**GREECE**

**Overview:** In 2014, Greece continued to experience intermittent small-scale terrorist attacks such as targeted package bombs or improvised explosive device detonation by domestic anarchist groups. Generally, these attacks did not appear aimed at inflicting bodily harm but rather sought to make a political statement. Overall, Greek government cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism remained strong.

Senior Greek government leaders have emphasized that counterterrorism is one of their top priorities. The MFA has strongly condemned the actions of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and called on the international community to join the Global Coalition to Counter
ISIL, of which Greece is a member. Greece has pledged to provide ammunition to Kurdish Peshmerga forces fighting ISIL. In 2014, Greece also established a special legislative committee which began reviewing and updating its existing legal framework on terrorism to ensure authorities have the right tools in place to take action against foreign terrorist fighters.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Greece’s two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, experienced frequent, relatively small-scale anarchist attacks that used inexpensive and unsophisticated incendiary devices against the properties of political figures, party offices, private bank ATMs, ministries and tax offices, and privately-owned vehicles. Terrorist attacks included:

- On April 26, Revolutionary Struggle claimed responsibility for an April 10 car bomb attack targeting the offices of the IMF and Greek Central Bank.
- Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei claimed responsibility for sending a parcel bomb containing over one pound of explosives to a police station in Central Greece on April 29. This device malfunctioned and did not detonate.
- On December 12, an unknown group fired approximately 50 rounds of ammunition at the Israeli Embassy in Athens. This was similar to the attack that targeted the German Ambassador’s residence December 30, 2013. The attackers remained at large at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Article 187A of the Greek Penal Code codifies the terrorism statute. In addition, Article 28(1) of the Greek Constitution subjects Greek citizens to applicable international laws, to include those related to terrorism. Article 28 (2) and (3) subjects Greek citizens to applicable EU Laws, including the EU law against terrorism. As noted above, Greece is presently reviewing and updating its existing legal framework on terrorism to ensure authorities have the right tools in place to take action against foreign terrorist fighters. The Police Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes (DAEEV) is responsible for counterterrorism in Greece. DAEEV is proactive and attracts highly motivated and educated young police officers. This unit has demonstrated a high capacity to collect information, but it lacks capacity to use the volume of data it collects and to share it with other services within the Greek police and Coast Guard.

Greece has a weak document system for birth certificates and Greek ID cards, which compromise the integrity of the Greek passports. The national ID card is extremely vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution, and it has not incorporated any new security features such as digitized photo and biometrics. The government is working actively to address this vulnerability.

Christodoulous Xiros, key leader and hit-man for the terrorist organization 17 November, disappeared in January while on furlough from prison. [Note: The Greek police arrested Xiros in early 2015.]

Nikolaos Maziotis, a lead member of the terrorist organization Revolutionary Struggle, who was convicted in absentia for his participation in this terrorist organization by an Athens appeals court in 2013, was re-captured by police in July 2014. Hellenic Police also arrested Andonis Stamboulos for membership in a terrorist organization, as he was a known associate of Maziotis.
At the time of his arrest Stamboulos was carrying plans for an imminent attack on the headquarters of the ruling party and a list of potential high-profile targets.

On October 1, Greek police discovered two locations in Athens and Thessaloniki serving as hideouts for Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei. The trial of 19 suspected members of the group, which began in 2011 and was repeatedly postponed due to work stoppages by judges and judicial postponements, re-commenced on December 4.

In 2014, the Hellenic Police DAEEV directorate arrested at least seven suspected members of the DHKP/C to include the February 10 arrest of senior leader Hussein Tekin.

The porous nature of Greece’s borders remained a concern. While Greek border authorities have had success in stemming the flow of illegal migration at the land border with Turkey, their ability to control large-scale illegal migration via sea borders is limited. Recent regional upheavals have intensified illegal migration to and through Greece via the Greek Aegean islands.

In September, the antiterrorism assistance program (ATA) provided analytic methodology and threat analysis training to Hellenic Police, while the Hellenic Police and Coast Guard hosted a three-day regional seminar with participants from Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Romania, Spain and the United States. The seminar “Developing Border Protection Management Strategies to Counter Illicit Migration, Trafficking and Terrorist Migration” enhanced the capabilities of law enforcement, Coast Guard, and border control agencies across the Mediterranean.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit is tasked with ensuring that Greece meets its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which is essentially an autonomous institution, although nominally under the oversight of the Ministry of Finance, received 5,526 suspicious transaction reports through October 31, 2014.

Non-profit organizations are not obliged to file suspicious transaction reports. However, all banks – through which these organizations conduct transactions – are legally obliged to report suspicious transactions of any kind, regardless of the type of entity (for- or not-for profit), and the government may directly monitor such entities if necessary.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Greece engaged constructively on counterterrorism initiatives in international fora and regularly participated in regional information exchange and seminars through such bodies as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.
IRELAND

Overview: The United States and Ireland worked closely in bilateral and regional counterterrorism, law enforcement, and information sharing efforts. Garda Síochána (the local and national police service of Ireland, referred to as Garda in this report) has comprehensive law enforcement, immigration, investigative, intelligence, and counterterrorism responsibilities.

In 2014, there were incidents carried out in Ireland by dissident republican groups (sometimes referred to as criminal terrorist groups by the Irish Department of Justice). Some violent actions committed in neighboring Northern Ireland by members of dissident groups were traced back to support provided by persons living in Ireland. Attacks were directed at Northern Ireland’s law enforcement personnel and security structures to disrupt ongoing post-peace process community rehabilitation efforts. Irish authorities worked to address these legacy issues stemming from “The Troubles,” and were actively involved in dealing with transnational terrorism issues. The targets for other attacks by dissident republican groups in Ireland have been other republican factions, and the incidents often involve criminal activity. Major Garda successes in disrupting the activities of such groups and infighting between dissident factions seem to have weakened threat capabilities.

Ireland is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: There were no significant terrorist attacks in 2014. As of the end of November, however, there were 127 bomb squad mobilizations for possible improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2014, 43 of which resulted in the discovery of viable IEDs that were subsequently disarmed by Ireland’s Army bomb disposal teams. The list below details terrorism-related incidents reported in the public domain.

- In February, forensic tests on seven bombs sent to army recruitment centers in Great Britain showed that all of them had been mailed over a three-day period from Ireland. The bombs were all defused without incident. Irish authorities said that the parcels were sent as part of a new campaign being carried out by a group called the New IRA alliance.
- On May 10, police discovered a 66-pound bomb in the trunk of a car parked in a Dublin hotel. Garda said that the bomb was intended for use against security forces in Northern Ireland. A 55-year-old man was subsequently charged with the possession of explosives in relation to the bomb, and membership in the IRA.
- On May 25, five men were arrested when Garda found an explosive device (a beer keg with components for an IED) in their car. Garda said that the device was being transported to Northern Ireland by dissident republicans for an attack on security forces. Three of the five men were charged.
- On November 16, during a Garda operation targeting dissident republican groups, officers seized firearms and uncovered a suspected bomb-making operation. An army bomb disposal unit was called in to carry out a controlled explosion on bomb-making equipment found in one house. Two men suspected of having links to dissident republican groups were arrested.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2014, the Dáil (Irish Lower House) voted to renew the Offenses Against the State (Amendment) Act, which was first introduced following an IRA bombing in Omagh in 1998 that killed 29 people. The amendment allows for the drawing of inferences in certain circumstances in prosecutions and created offenses such as directing an unlawful organization, a category which includes the IRA. The law also extends the maximum detention time without being formally charged to 72 hours.

Ireland also introduced the Criminal (Terrorist Offenses) (Amendment) Act 2014 which would create three new terrorism offenses. The bill transposes into Irish law an EU Council Framework Decision on counterterrorism. When enacted, the offenses would be: public provocation to commit a terrorist offense, recruitment for terrorism, and training for terrorism. The new offenses would carry sentences of up to 10 years imprisonment upon conviction.

Law enforcement units have effectively demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The Garda Special Branch provides specialized law enforcement capability and has primary responsibility for counterterrorism response, with the military performing specific functions when requested by the civil authorities.

Ireland works closely with the UK on border security, including the sharing of biographic and biometric information. Ireland has been active in highlighting the need for the sharing of passenger name records (PNR) on flights in the EU.

Significant law enforcement action against terrorists or terrorists groups in 2014 included:

- On February 7, a Garda operation disrupted a major fundraising plan by dissident republicans involving the printing of counterfeit currency. The Garda seized fake notes worth US $24,000 along with two industrial sized printing presses, a cutting machine used to produce single notes, and computers programmed to impose graphics on the bills. Three men were charged in connection with the investigation.
- On February 18, the Garda arrested two Irish Defense Forces personnel in connection with dissident activity and the discovery of a pipe bomb. The soldiers allegedly had links to a dissident republican group in Northern Ireland. One solider was subsequently charged, and one was released.
- The Garda seized up to 20 million euros (US $24,019,300) in counterfeit 50 euro notes along with printing and computer equipment in April. A man with reported connections to dissident republicans was arrested.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. The Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Bill of 2010 enacted the EU’s third money-laundering directive into Irish law, giving effect to several of the FATF Recommendations. In 2014, the Criminal Justice Act 2013 which amended the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010 by providing for the cessation of mobile communications services where necessary for the aversion of terrorist threats went into effect.
A June 2013 FATF review found that Ireland relies exclusively on the EU listing system in relation to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and that there is still no mechanism in Ireland for the immediate freezing of funds of EU “internal” or “domestic” terrorists that fall outside this EU list. However, Irish Criminal Justice legislation does provide a legal basis for immediate asset freezing if such crimes are suspected.

Law enforcement authorities monitor non-profit organizations for purposes of monitoring breaches of criminal law, but Ireland has yet to fully implement the Charities Act of 2009, which regulates the activities of charities and non-profit organizations in Ireland.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Ireland works closely with the UK in securing the Common Travel Area (CTA). The introduction of the British Irish visa required the sharing of biometric and other information. The net result was a more integrated system for checking travelers. Ireland participated in an ad hoc grouping of ministers from nine EU countries that met to discuss issues related to stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

In addition to counterterrorism capacity building overseas, Ireland also cooperated on counterterrorism efforts with Northern Ireland. The Irish Defense Forces provide a robust explosive ordnance disposal capability to the civil authorities, routinely deploying to investigate and disarm ordnance around the country. The 2 Brigade, which is responsible for the Dublin area and a significant portion of the territory along the border with Northern Ireland, has responded to 79 reports of explosive devices in 2014 through November.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Ireland’s efforts to counter radicalization to violence focused on integrating minority groups into Irish society. These measures included providing social benefits, language training, health care, and the proactive advocacy work of an Ombudsman’s office in the affairs of immigrants. Through the Garda Racial, Intercultural, and Diversity Office, police officers are provided special training to assist with at-risk populations.

The primary strategy used by the Irish government is the Ethnic Liaison Officer program of the Garda. These officers liaise with representatives of the various minority communities in an area, and establish communication links with each of these communities. They support integration by involving members of ethnic minority communities in Garda and community social events.

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**ITALY**

**Overview:** Italy investigated and prosecuted terrorist suspects, dismantled suspected terrorist-related cells within its borders, and maintained a high level of professional cooperation with the United States and international partners. Terrorist and criminal activity by domestic anarchists and other violent extremists also remained a threat. Italy is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), conducting air strikes in Iraq.
contributing military support, trainers, and humanitarian assistance to the crises in Iraq and Syria, engagement with foreign leaders – including Middle East partners – in support of the coalition, and enhanced efforts to identify, decrease, and disrupt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Italy is implementing UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2170 and 2178 to mitigate the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters and to restrict terrorist financing. Italy promoted Europol as a venue for EU-level coordination of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation across national borders. Italian law enforcement’s primary focus has been on preventing returning foreign terrorist fighters from using Italy to create bases for international operations and recruitment. As a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Fund (GCTF), and consistent with its implementation of UNSCRs 2170 and 2178, Italy has endorsed the GCTF Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon. On December 11-12, 2014, it hosted in Rome a joint GCTF-UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) workshop on challenges and lessons learned in reintegrating returning foreign terrorist fighters.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Representative incidents included:

- On January 13, a Democratic Party Senator, Stefano Esposito, who was in favor of the construction of a controversial high speed railway Turin-Lyon, discovered three rudimentary explosive devices (Molotov cocktails) and a threatening note outside of his residence in Turin.
- On January 24, a small bomb exploded outside the office of a foundation linked to the French Embassy to the Holy See in Rome, damaging three cars and some windows. The incident occurred on the same day of the meeting between the French President and the Pope in Rome.
- On June 10, an anarchist group was considered responsible for an attack against an office of the Democratic Party in Florence that resulted in limited damages to the façade of the building.
- On July 1, an explosive device detonated outside the office of the right-wing association Casa Pound in Bologna, and another small bomb was found unexploded outside of the office of the PD, also in Bologna.
- On December 21, a bottle of flammable liquid exploded near the Rome-Florence high-speed train line, damaging electrical cables and causing train traffic to halt. A second bottle did not explode. The attack is being attributed to a violent anti-high-speed train group known as NO TAV. The attack follows two similar incidents using rudimentary explosive devices on high speed train lines on December 2 and December 18.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Italian government continued to make use of reinforced counterterrorism legislation enacted in 2005 that facilitates detention of suspects, mandates arrest for crimes involving terrorism, and expedites procedures for expelling persons suspected of terrorist activities. At year’s end, the Government of Italy was drafting new legislation that would criminalize the travel of persons and export of materiel in support of armed conflict; Italy currently only criminalizes the recruitment of combatants.

Italy’s long history of countering both organized crime and violent ideological movements has given it a strong legacy in fighting internal threats to security, and authorities are leveraging
those capabilities to counter terrorist recruitment, radicalization to violence, and networking. The Police, the ROS Carabinieri (gendarmes), Guardia di Finanza, other specialized law enforcement agencies, and the intelligence services coordinated their counterterrorism efforts and met regularly. Italian judges have the authority to swiftly expel non-citizens for “seriously disturbing public order, endangering national security, or religious discrimination.”

The Italian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) continued to implement a Memorandum of Cooperation with the United States, allowing the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to conduct aviation security assessments at three Italian commercial airports. Italy demonstrated its capability to quickly enhance measures to counter threats against civil aviation; in 2014, Italy worked with the TSA to increase measures at major commercial airports to counter the threat of various types of improvised explosive devices. In 2014, Italy received a record number – over 150,000 – of refugees, asylum-seekers and economic migrants crossing the Mediterranean from Libya, presenting serious challenges to the capacity of Italian border security officials to comprehensively screen all incoming migrants. For most of the year, Italy continued an anti-smuggling and search and rescue operation, called Mare Nostrum; the operation has formally wound down in favor of a multination EU FRONTEX border security operation called Triton. Senior Italian officials have indicated publicly they do not believe the Mediterranean exodus has been used by terrorists to penetrate Italy. The government has not reported any returning foreign terrorist fighters among these arrivals, but Italian authorities and the Italian public remained sensitive to this risk and were especially concerned about an increasingly unsecure Libya. EU data privacy concerns limit the sharing of biometric data with the United States.

Significant law enforcement actions related to counterterrorism included:

- On March 14, a Turin court sentenced two NO TAV (anti high-speed train) activists, Davide Forgione and Paolo Rossi, to two years and two months in prison. They had been arrested in August 2013 in a car containing materials meant to be used to make explosive devices.
- On April 2, police arrested 24 persons, including a former parliamentarian, accused of planning violent actions to claim the independence of the Veneto region.
- On May 30, Claudio Alberto, a NO TAV militant, was convicted and sentenced to four months’ imprisonment for intimidation against a worker outside of a high speed railroad construction site; Alberto and three other NO TAV members were sentenced to three years and six months in jail, but the court rejected the charges of terrorism over the objection of the government, resulting in the milder verdict. Other NO TAV activists were arrested in July 2014, accused of violence against a public officer, public damages, and the use of rudimentary explosive devices in Milan, Turin, and Lecce.
- On June 18, a Rome judge sentenced two Informal Anarchist Federation (IAF) affiliates, Gianula Iacovacci and Antonio Antonacci, to six years, and to three years and eight months, respectively for 13 violent attacks against the offices of multinational corporations, banks, and a landfill in the province of Rome.
- On July 11, a Genoa Court of Appeals upheld the 2013 conviction of Alfredo Cospito and Nicola Gai to 10 and nine years, respectively, in prison for a 2012 kneecapping attack.
against Roberto Adinolfi, Chief Executive Officer of the Ansaldo nuclear engineering company. The IAF had claimed responsibility for the incident.

- On August 27, authorities announced that they had been conducting an investigation on five persons suspected of being close to violent Islamist extremist groups. Some of them might have recruited foreign terrorist fighters willing to fight in Syria and Iraq.

- On October 14, the prefecture of Naples expelled a French citizen who repeatedly expressed approval for violent Islamist extremist movements.

- On November 11, police arrested a Tunisian man suspected of having established an Ansar al-Shari’a cell. During a random inspection of a car, the man tried to fire a bullet at police officers and escape. Investigators found an original ISIL flag in the caravan where alleged cell members lived. Another Tunisian member of the same group, suspected of drug trafficking, disappeared after the arrest of his associate.

- On December 22, 14 people were arrested and 31 placed under investigation in L’Aquila (Abruzzo) accused of domestic terrorism. The suspects allegedly belonged to a far-right movement ideologically inspired by the former Italian, neo-fascist “New Order” movement. The suspects were accused of incitement of terrorism, subversion of democracy, conspiracy, discrimination, and of racial, ethnic, and religious violence directed at state objectives. The charges documented repeated attempts by the group to procure weapons through robbery or from abroad.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Italy is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a FATF-style regional body (FSRB); it has observer status with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FSRB. Italy cooperated with foreign governments, including the United States, as an active member of the FATF and the Egmont Group. Italy also participated in the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 designation process both as a sponsoring and co-sponsoring nation. Italy is co-chair of the ISIL Counter Finance Group (ICFG).

The Italian judiciary and financial police (Guardia di Finanza) continued to identify and freeze the assets of sanctioned individuals and organizations and to prosecute terrorist financing cases. In addition, Italy carried out several counterterrorism operations and prevented international money transfers to terrorist groups. Judicial and law enforcement efforts to counter terrorist financing included monitoring financial transactions such as financial services companies specializing in wire transfers, bank transfers, pre-paid electronic cards, payments on fraudulent invoices, and cash-in-transit. Cash-in-transit to countries involved in terrorist activity has decreased slightly.

Italy does not require that non-profit organizations send suspicious transaction reports. Reporting entities are, however, required to consider the specific money laundering and terrorist financing risks when entering in a relationship or carrying out transactions that involve non-profit organizations.

Regional and International Cooperation: Italy is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and actively participates in its work. In its capacity as EU President, Italy hosted a December 11-12 GCTF Expert Workshop on Reintegrating Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Challenges and Lessons Learned. Italy also supported counterterrorism efforts through the G-7 Roma-Lyon Group, the OSCE, NATO, the UN, and the EU. The Italian government and law enforcement, in particular the Carabinieri, engaged actively in international law enforcement and military capacity building programs.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Italy has a long history of countering organized crime and radical ideological movements. Italy’s countering violent extremism toolkit includes an anti-radicalization program in its prison system. The Ministry of Justice’s Prison Police continued financing counter-radicalization programs to train 120 agents working in the four prisons where persons convicted of terrorism were incarcerated. Prison Police worked with Italy’s largest Muslim confederation to assist in de-radicalization efforts within the prisons. Outside of prison, Italy’s diverse immigrant community and well-pronounced regional distinctions made it difficult for terrorist recruiters to employ broad-based or counter-state narratives. To the extent domestic recruitment of violent Islamist extremists occurs, it appears largely concentrated in the more industrialized North, although there were unconfirmed media reports of alleged foreign terrorist fighters emerging from Rome and Naples.

KOSOVO

Overview: The threat of violent Islamist extremism has been slowly growing in Kosovo since its 1999 conflict, assisted in part by funding from foreign organizations that preach extremist ideologies. Approximately 150 to 200 foreign terrorist fighters from Kosovo have traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or al-Nusrah Front, of which approximately 20 have been killed. Violent extremist groups actively use social media to spread propaganda and recruit followers. To date, no terrorist incidents have taken place inside Kosovo. An online posting of a video showing a Kosovo foreign terrorist fighter beheading a youth in Syria in the summer contributed to the Government of Kosovo’s decision to launch its first large-scale counterterrorism operation. The Government of Kosovo has thus far focused its counterterrorism efforts on law enforcement. Kosovar security officials began initial efforts in this year to reach out to non-security ministries, independent media, NGOs, and religious organizations to enlist their support on preventing radicalization of young people and reintegrating foreign terrorist fighters. A six-month delay in forming a new government following June elections slowed such efforts, however. The new government immediately reapproved previous draft legislation prohibiting citizens from fighting in foreign conflicts.

The Government of Kosovo welcomed cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues. The United States has mentored and assisted law enforcement and judicial institutions on active counterterrorism cases. The United States has provided counterterrorism training opportunities through the Export Control and Related Border Security program, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training program, and the Office of Defense Cooperation.
Because the security and political situation in northern Kosovo continues to limit the government’s ability to exercise its authority in that region, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) work with the Kosovo Police (KP) to maintain a safe and secure environment and strengthen the rule of law, including at the borders. Kosovo’s ability to exercise its authority in the north has improved since the signing of the 2013 Brussels Agreement to normalize relations with Serbia, but the two countries have yet to fully implement the agreement. Although Kosovo and neighboring Serbia do not usually cooperate on counterterrorism issues, the governments have had an Integrated Border Management (IBM) plan in place since 2013 and have participated in joint U.S. government-sponsored training.

Kosovo is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and has taken steps to support the various lines of effort within the limits of its capabilities. It has primarily focused on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, tracking and restricting financing for terrorist groups, and providing humanitarian assistance to refugees from Syria. In 2014, Kosovo authorities arrested around 70 individuals suspected of terrorism, around 40 of whom were returned foreign terrorist fighters. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is tracking the finances of individuals and NGOs suspected of connections to terrorism. The Government of Kosovo is beginning to discuss ways to counter ISIL-related propaganda, but has taken no concrete steps. Kosovo is not a member of the UN and not an official party to UNSC Resolutions 2170 and 2178, however the Government of Kosovo has pledged to implement these resolutions unilaterally.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kosovo’s legislative framework is sufficient to prosecute individuals suspected of committing or supporting terrorist activities, but prosecutors lack experience in trying such cases. Kosovo officials recognized the need to improve interagency cooperation.

Kosovo has a comprehensive legal framework that covers all criminal aspects related to terrorism. The Criminal Code of Kosovo follows the UN model on counterterrorism criminal legislation and criminalizes all forms of terrorism, including commission, assistance, facilitation, recruitment, training, and incitement to commit terrorism. It also criminalizes concealment or failure to report terrorists or terrorist groups, organization and participation in terrorist groups, and preparation of terrorist offenses against the constitutional order and the security of the state of Kosovo. It defines a terrorist group as a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorism. In addition, the Criminal Procedure Code provides authorities with all the necessary powers to investigate and prosecute such cases, including the possibility to use covert measures such as wiretapping, undercover agents, disclosure of financial data, and interception of computer communications. It further gives authorities flexibility to investigate criminal activity during the planning stage in order to prevent crimes and terrorist acts. The Procedural Code also allows Kosovo courts to admit evidence from other countries, thus allowing prosecution of international terrorism in Kosovo. This framework provides the relevant authorities with the tools necessary to fight all forms of terrorism.

Kosovo authorities drafted legislation in 2014 that would criminalize participation in or support for a military group that operates outside of Kosovo.
Kosovo’s law enforcement authorities demonstrated some capacity to detect prospective foreign terrorist fighters and prevent them from joining the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Authorities are inexperienced in dealing with terrorism cases, however, and communications and information sharing remained a challenge for law enforcement. The Ministry of Internal Affairs revised its counterterrorism strategy. The Kosovo Police Directorate against Terrorism undertakes counterterrorism investigative functions, and has experienced resource constraints that interfere with its ability to track suspected individuals. Prosecutions of terrorism cases are handled by the Special Prosecution Office (SPRK), which is composed of local and international prosecutors. The law provides the SPRK with exclusive jurisdiction over terrorism cases. Prosecutors’ lack of experience in dealing with terrorism-related cases complicates efforts to prosecute. The United States is mentoring law enforcement and prosecutors on terrorism-related cases. Representatives from Kosovo attended training activities and conferences on counterterrorism-related topics sponsored by the EU and the United States.

Kosovo has issued biometric travel and identity documents since 2013. All major border crossing points, including Pristina International Airport, are equipped with computerized fraudulent/altered document identification equipment, for which a database is updated regularly with information from other countries. The electronic Border Management System does not interface with Interpol, however, and does not always function properly. The KBP and Directorate against Terrorism also use biometric equipment to enroll suspicious foreigners entering or applying for benefits in Kosovo and locals who may be affiliated with terrorism. Although the Law on Border Control obliges airlines to submit Airline Passenger Name Recognition lists to Kosovo, KBP has had technical difficulties using the information. KBP is working with the Civilian Aviation Authority to resolve this problem. KBP applies specific profiling techniques to identify persons attempting to travel to Syria and Iraq to join ISIL. In 2014, the KBP identified and blocked at least 12 such persons from leaving Kosovo and turned them over to the Directorate against Terrorism. Finally, with U.S. assistance, KBP is revising its curricula used to train border officers to focus more on early identification of persons affiliated with terrorism. Kosovo is not a member of the UN, Interpol or Europol; the UN Mission in Kosovo and EULEX serve as Kosovo’s intermediaries with these organizations, slowing down cooperation and preventing Kosovo from having access to their screening databases.

The Government of Kosovo mounted its largest counterterrorism operation to date in summer 2014 when it arrested 59 individuals suspected of terrorist activity. Investigations were ongoing, with no indictments filed; many of these suspects remained under house arrest at year’s end. The prosecution and the police were working together to collect evidence to indict these individuals. Kosovo authorities were working with EULEX to prosecute six other individuals arrested in June in connection with a separate case; all six suspects remained in detention at year’s end. Six terrorism suspects arrested in a November sting operation also remained in detention while authorities investigated the case.

Kosovo showed increasing political will during the year to address threats related to terrorism, and the state possesses the legal framework to do so. However, national institutions -- including investigative and prosecutorial elements -- have limited capacity, resources, and experience to handle terrorism cases effectively. The United States will continue to provide training and
mentoring assistance to build the capacity of these institutions overall and specifically as it relates to counterterrorism cases.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Kosovo financial intelligence unit is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force or any similar regional body. Kosovo has a Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which allows it to comply with international anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist finance (CFT) standards. This law also established enforcement mechanisms for the examination of reporting entities and narrowly defines terrorist financing. However, Kosovo is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-styled regional body, and lacks an appropriate registration and monitoring system to track NGOs that receive funding from suspicious entities.

Kosovo adopted additional legislation and regulations exclusively pertaining to Terrorist Finance. In January, authorities adopted the Strategy on Prevention and Combating Informal Economy, Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and other Financial Crimes. Other legislation, amendments, and directives are pending on AML, CFT, and its indicators.

Kosovo has not consistently frozen and confiscated assets without delay. Kosovo has at least one case in which €499,000 (US $595,550) was frozen per a court decision. The case is in its initial stages, and the prosecutor may only freeze bank accounts for 72 hours, during which time the pretrial judge is obliged to approve or reject the freezing order. Under a judge’s temporary order, assets may be frozen for 30 days, but owners may dispute asset freezes.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** The OSCE has provided training to Kosovo law enforcement on terrorism-related topics. Kosovo’s membership in many regional and international organizations has been blocked because a number of countries do not recognize its independence, which impedes cooperation on many issues, including counterterrorism. Further, due to Serbia’s opposition and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s non-recognition, Kosovo faces difficulties in participating in regional counterterrorism initiatives.

Kosovo has undertaken several efforts in support of counterterrorism capacity building and cooperation with other states. On December 5-6, Kosovo hosted a regional conference on “Challenges in the Combat against Organized Crime and Terrorism and Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe,” with support from the United States. Chief State Prosecutors from Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia participated. The conference served as a forum to promote and increase regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Kosovar government participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters roundtable for Balkan countries hosted by the State Department on the margins of the UNGA.

**MACEDONIA**
Overview: Counterterrorism efforts in Macedonia include the passing of a law criminalizing fighting for, aiding, or abetting foreign terrorist groups. Dozens of Macedonian citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq as foreign terrorist fighters in recent years, although there are indications that the foreign terrorist fighter law passed in September 2014 may be having some deterrent effect.

Macedonia is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Macedonia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that UN Security Council Resolution 2178 has been provided to all relevant government ministries for implementation. Completed or ongoing actions that further the resolution’s objectives include the passage of Macedonia’s revised foreign terrorist fighter law, the government’s hosting of a conference for European law enforcement and intelligence officials to discuss addressing the foreign terrorist fighters threat, the creation of an interagency foreign terrorist fighters-focused body, and the development of a counterterrorism action plan.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: There were no major terrorist incidents in Macedonia. A government building housing the Prime Minister’s office was damaged in the middle of the night on October 28 by unknown perpetrators. Although no one was injured, two rounds, possibly rocket-propelled grenades, were fired at the empty and closed building. According to a letter published in local media, a group calling itself the “National Liberation Army” (NLA) claimed responsibility for the attack. Some analysts dismissed the letter as not credible because it was released almost one week after the attack and did not make any demands. A letter, allegedly from the same group, also claimed NLA responsibility for two minor explosions outside police stations in Tetovo and Kumanovo on December 9.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Macedonia’s criminal code, criminal procedure code, and law on prevention of money laundering and terrorist finance contain comprehensive counterterrorism provisions. Domestic and international acts of terror are proscribed, and in September, the country’s counterterrorism law was modified to include a provision criminalizing participating in a conflict outside Macedonia’s borders as a foreign terrorist fighter.

The U.S. government is engaged in numerous efforts to strengthen criminal justice institutions and promote the rule of law. These include a number of Department of State-funded assistance projects that focus on the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Public Security Bureau, as well as justice sector projects that support the implementation of the recently adopted Criminal Procedure Code.

Macedonia’s security sector is well equipped and disposed to deal effectively with terrorism within its borders. Primary responsibility for detecting and investigating terrorism falls to the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence within the MOI. Interdiction and arrest capabilities lie primarily with the Special Units, namely the Rapid Deployment Unit and the Special Task Unit, also within the MOI. The “Alpha” units of the Skopje Police Department (also MOI) respond to kinetic activity within Skopje (approximately half of Macedonia’s citizens live in Skopje); however, this unit is also deployed outside of Skopje. Since all of these entities are within the MOI, there are generally no problems in coordination among them.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Macedonia is a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and has completed its fourth evaluation. Macedonia is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

Macedonia is not an offshore financial center, and the Law on Banks does not allow the existence of shell banks in Macedonia. Banks do not allow opening of anonymous bank accounts and bearer shares are not permitted.

With the latest changes to the anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism law from September 2014, non-profit organizations were taken off the list of obliged reporting entities.


Regional and International Cooperation: Macedonia is an enthusiastic counterterrorism partner both regionally and internationally, although Greece’s unwillingness to recognize Macedonia’s name sometimes limits Macedonia’s ability to fully participate in multilateral fora. Foreign Minister Poposki participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters roundtable for Balkan countries hosted by the State Department on the margins of the UNGA. In October, Macedonia hosted a regional conference for European law enforcement and intelligence officials to discuss counterterrorism and foreign terrorist fighter issues.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Macedonian government is developing a formal strategy to counter violent extremism (CVE) and has appointed a national CVE coordinator. There have been no significant efforts by the Macedonian government to create strategic communication or counter narratives, and there are no existing programs to rehabilitate and reintegrate terrorists into mainstream society.

THE NETHERLANDS

Overview: The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in the areas of border and transportation security, counterterrorist financing, countering violent extremism, and bilateral and international counterterrorism cooperation. Cooperation with U.S. law enforcement remained excellent. In its March 2013 quarterly terrorism threat assessment, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) raised the national threat level from “limited” to “substantial,” the second highest rank, indicating the chance of a terrorist attack is considered realistic. The main factor for elevating the threat level was the uptick in the number of Dutch nationals travelling to conflict areas, especially Syria, as foreign terrorist fighters. The Brussels shooting in May, and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) beheadings in late summer, combined with some pro-ISIL demonstrations in the Netherlands, propelled the threat of ISIL-based extremism to the top of the political agenda. In response, the
Dutch government released a *Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism* in August that included both existing and proposed measures to halt the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and elsewhere. The plan focused on risk reduction, travel intervention, disruption of recruiters, countering radicalization, addressing the use of social media, and information exchange and cooperation. Some new measures require a legislative change; others can be achieved through a change in policy or enforcement. Resilience by the Dutch population to terrorism and violent extremism remained high.

The Netherlands is implementing UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2170 and 2178. The Dutch government prevents outbound foreign terrorist fighters from leaving the country, when possible, through punitive and administrative measures (e.g., revoking passports or halting social welfare benefits). The government pursued criminal cases against prospective and returned foreign terrorist fighters and against foreign terrorist fighter recruiters. The government’s strategy to counter ISIL propaganda has a domestic focus: supporting opposing voices in the affected communities and suggesting to internet providers that they compare content of sites to their terms of use (Notice and Take Action). The *Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism* expresses plans to survey and propagate a list of online violent extremist websites to raise awareness with communities, parents, and professionals.

On September 24, the government announced its membership of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The Netherlands is represented in Combined Forces Command CENTCOM, which coordinates the mission. The Netherlands has conducted air strikes and contributed military personnel and trainers in Iraq.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Netherlands continued to use counterterrorism legislation and legislation that supplements the criminal code to address terrorism. On September 4, the government submitted draft legislation to Parliament regarding the revocation of Dutch citizenship for dual citizens after a conviction for preparing to commit a terrorist act. On December 18, the Ministry of Security and Justice began the consultation process on draft legislation to revoke citizenship, without a court ruling, of dual national foreign terrorist fighters who have joined a designated terrorist organization.

The Netherlands’ law enforcement institutions effectively demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. The reorganization of the police into one National Police structure that began in January 2013 continued in 2014 and is scheduled to be completed in 2016. This multi-year, country-wide reorganization effort is expected to improve police’s operational capacity and effectiveness. The Central Criminal Investigations Service of the National Police focuses on counterterrorism.

The Netherlands continued to strengthen its border security. Dutch ports of entry have biographic and biometric screening capabilities. The government coordinates and shares information related to foreign terrorist fighters with Interpol and Europol. The Netherlands makes efforts to prevent potential foreign terrorist fighters from traveling to the region; as of December 2014 it had revoked 53 passports of potential foreign terrorist fighters.
The Netherlands remained strongly committed to effective cooperation with the United States on border security. The Port of Rotterdam was the first European port to participate in the Container Security Initiative (CSI); in 2014 the two governments held discussions to have CSI go from a WMD-focused initiative to incorporate all threats.

Significant law enforcement actions related to counterterrorism included:

- On May 15, authorities arrested a returned foreign terrorist fighter who allegedly planned to commit armed robbery to fund foreign terrorist fighters in Syria. His case was awaiting trial at year’s end.
- On June 13, the prosecutor’s office appealed a 2011 verdict on five members of the Dutch chapter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to seek higher sentences. They are charged with membership of a terrorist organization and raising funds (often through coercion) for the LTTE. In 2011, they had been sentenced to between two and six years in prison. The case was awaiting further proceedings at year’s end.
- On June 24, authorities arrested one suspect on charges of incitement, recruitment, and forming a criminal organization with terrorist intent. The case was in investigative proceedings at year’s end.
- On August 6, Belgian police arrested two Dutch people at the Brussels Airport on charges of membership of a terrorist group, illegal weapons possession in a terrorist context, and financing terrorism. Dutch police officers are cooperating with the Belgian police on the case.
- On August 27-28, authorities arrested two suspects on charges of incitement, recruitment, and forming criminal organization with terrorist intent. The case is connected to the June 24 arrest and was under investigative proceedings at year’s end.
- On October 15, authorities arrested a man on suspicion of planning ISIL-inspired terrorist acts against local Amsterdam police officers.
- On November 25, authorities arrested three suspects on suspicion of preparing to commit terrorist acts in Syria. Three other individuals are considered suspects but were not arrested.
- On December 1, a district court sentenced a returned Dutch foreign terrorist fighter to three years in prison for preparing to commit murder with terrorist intent. This was the first trial of a returned foreign terrorist fighter from Syria and implemented the Dutch prosecution’s strategy to charge individuals with preparation for (extraterritorial) crimes when there is insufficient evidence the crime was committed.
- Also on December 1, a district court acquitted a woman from charges of recruiting four girls and two men to travel to Syria. The court argued that traveling to Syria in order to marry a foreign terrorist fighter does not constitute participating in the violent conflict; therefore recruiting young girls to marry foreign terrorist fighters is not recruiting for the violent conflict. The court also ruled that because the two men were the husband and former husband of the woman, and already radicalized, her encouraging them to go to Syria did not constitute recruitment. The prosecutor’s office announced plans to appeal.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Netherlands has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1990 and is one of the Cooperating and Supporting Nations of...
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, a FATF-style regional body. In its February 2014 report, FATF recognized that the Netherlands had made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies from the 2011 evaluation and should subsequently be removed from the follow-up process. The European Commission sets many rules for countering terrorist finance in directives that EU member states then implement via national legislation. The Netherlands cooperated with the United States in designating terrorist organizations and individuals as well as interdicting and freezing assets. Dutch authorities monitor financial transactions. Assets of persons on terrorist watch lists are frozen.

Assets are frozen immediately when an individual or entity receives a UN designation. The Netherlands also use EU listings and its own national designations. The list of individuals or entities is made public, but information on the amount of assets frozen or seized is not. As of December 2014, the assets of 18 individuals and three organizations were frozen. In May, Dutch authorities arrested a former Syrian fighter for attempting to commit crimes to raise funds for Syrian extremists.

Non-profit organizations may choose to apply to a private entity for a “seal of approval” certification for their financial transactions. Law enforcement can access this entity’s data based on court order. The FATF concluded that the requirements that have to be met in order to obtain this “seal of approval” are stringent. These requirements include knowing donors and beneficiaries and having safeguards to make sure directors and employees do not have a conflict of interests.


Regional and International Cooperation: The Netherlands sought bilateral, multilateral, and international opportunities for exchanging information and experiences on security, counterterrorism, and foreign terrorist fighter issues. The Netherlands is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and, in 2013, the Netherlands and Morocco proposed a Foreign Terrorist Fighters Initiative under the auspices of the GCTF. Several meetings organized in 2014, held in The Hague, Marrakech, and Abu Dhabi, led to the “The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Phenomenon” adopted on September 23 at the GCTF ministerial meeting. During this ministerial, the Netherlands and Morocco recommended a new working group on foreign terrorist fighters be established under the GCTF. This new working group, co-chaired by the Netherlands and Morocco, was inaugurated at a plenary meeting in Marrakech on December 15-16. The Dutch participated in an informal EU core group of 11 member states that focused on foreign terrorist fighters.

The Dutch have taken a lead role in the EU to establish protocols to combat terrorist finance and provide funds to the IMF for assistance to countries that lack the resources to implement these measures expeditiously. The Dutch cooperated with EU and OSCE counterterrorism efforts and contributed to the counterterrorism work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The Netherlands
hosted the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit and continued to chair the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism’s Nuclear Detection Working Group.

The Netherlands continued to finance a wide variety of counterterrorism capacity building projects such as the organization Free Press Unlimited in its project “Radio Life Link Somalia” and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation on its program on rule of law and criminal justice capacity and cooperation in North Africa. The government also supported the International Centre for Migration Policy Development and programs related to terrorism and countering terrorist finance carried out by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. The Dutch government provided assistance to the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism in Abu Dhabi and is a founding member of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta.

The Dutch government continued to work with the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) – an independent think tank on counterterrorism issues, established in The Hague in 2010 with Dutch government encouragement. The ICCT is implementing programs related to the collection and use of evidence collected by the military in the criminal prosecution of terrorist cases, the role victims can play in counter-radicalization, and rule of law capacity building projects in the criminal justice sector.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** CVE is integrated into the Dutch government’s approach to terrorism. The government’s strategy on CVE is the August 2014 *Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism*, which contains eight existing and proposed measures specifically focused on detecting radicalization and preventing new people from becoming foreign terrorist fighters. These include increased cooperation with Muslim communities, strengthening existing networks of local and national key figures, providing support to concerned citizens, supporting education institutions, setting up expert centers on social tensions and radicalization, directing actions at high-risk areas, mobilizing societal opposition and enhancing resilience against radicalization and tensions, and stimulating social debate about the values of democracy such as rule of law.

Local governments are responsible for countering radicalization to local governments with support such as tools and training provided by the NCTV. Many major cities are investing heavily in training local professionals. However, following the 2013 surge of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq (as of December 22, 2014 Dutch officials reported there were 168 known foreign terrorist fighters from the Netherlands), the NCTV and the General Intelligence and Security Service increased support to local authorities and partners. This support includes identifying high-priority areas that are of interest to, or might host, radicalized individuals. The NCTV also invests in information systems that combine reports and red flags from different sources in order to assess potential threats by violent extremists.

The *Comprehensive Action Program* addresses combating pro-violent extremist content on social media and the internet. The government tracks extremist content and uses administrative measures to stop the online spread of terrorist propaganda. Website hosting companies were requested to check the content of hosted websites against their user policies (Notice and Take Down).
Programs are created and tailored by local governments around individuals of concern and focus on identification, investigation, and prosecution. Targets of the program include those who are becoming radicalized, those who want to go to Syria and Iraq, recruiters, and foreign terrorist fighter returnees. Partners involved may include, but are not limited to: the municipal government, police, the public prosecutor’s office, youth care, and child protection services. Interventions on radicalizing individuals remain case-specific and vary in intensity and design. Several local governments have joined forces with a non-profit organization that coordinates interagency, individualized programs for at-risk or radicalized individuals. After returning to the Netherlands, foreign terrorist fighters undergo a threat assessment by the government. Some returnees are prosecuted. The Netherlands also rehabilitates and reintegrates returned foreign terrorist fighters into mainstream society.

NORWAY

Overview: Norway’s internal security service continued to assess that violent Islamist extremism remains the primary threat to the security of Norway. A small but outspoken group of violent Islamist extremists continued to be active in Oslo, although they were not responsible for any attacks. In 2014, a number of prominent cases raised concern about Norwegians radicalizing at home and traveling abroad to participate in terrorist activities. According to media reports, the Police Security Service (PST) publicly stated that more than 70 Norwegian residents had traveled to Syria and Iraq to fight in the conflict there.

In July, the government went on high terror alert upon receiving various streams of intelligence indicating that returning foreign terrorist fighters to Europe representing the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) were planning an attack, possibly in Norway. On November 5, the PST raised the terror alert for the next 12 months, saying that a terrorist attack in Norway by violent extremists was “likely.”

Norway is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and the government co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters. In October, the government announced it would send 120 trainers to participate in two capacity building missions for Iraqi security forces. Norway provided approximately US $200 million in 2014 to address the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Syria. Although not a member, Norway is active in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and participated in the December 9 Hedayah/GCTF Countering Violent Extremism Communications Expo in Abu Dhabi.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Terrorism is a criminal offense in Norway. Current laws criminalize conducting or planning to conduct a terrorist attack; receiving terrorism-related training; or providing material support to a terrorist organization with money, materials, recruitment, fighting, and related crimes. Maximum prison sentences are 30 years for serious terrorism offenses.

The PST is responsible for domestic security, including counterterrorism activities. A joint analysis cell with participants from the PST and the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), the external security service, became fully operational in 2014. Both the PST and the NIS have
placed significant resources in identifying, tracking, and taking action against Norwegian citizens who wish to travel to and from Syria and Iraq to engage in fighting. The PST and NIS maintain an evolving list of those who have traveled to Syria and Iraq, those who have returned, and those who have expressed an interest in traveling to the two countries.

Norwegian immigration authorities continue to use biometric equipment for fingerprinting arrivals from outside the Schengen area. Immigration to Norway is facilitated and regulated by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration, which processes all applications for asylum, visas, family immigration, work and study permits, citizenship, permanent residence, and travel documents.

Norway faces some legal and technical barriers to stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. The largest legal barrier faced by Norwegian authorities related to the foreign terrorist fighter issue is that Norway cannot revoke or permanently hold a citizen’s passport for expressing support for a terrorist group (or expressing an interest to travel to Syria and Iraq), nor return an asylum-seeker who expresses support for a terrorist group to an area with ongoing conflict, such as Syria or Iraq.

Since enacting the 2013 counterterrorism laws, the Norwegian authorities have filed criminal charges against approximately five Norwegian individuals, which would not have been possible prior to the adoption of the new laws.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Norway is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. The Government of Norway has largely adopted and incorporated FATF standards and recommendations. In response to UNSCR 2178, the government established an interagency group to combat money laundering and terrorist finance, which includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Foreign Affairs.

Non-profit organizations are subject to strict accounting and regulatory requirements and the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime is charged with monitoring and the periodic testing of these requirements.

While the government does not physically distribute lists, all relevant financial institutions are required to be updated and compliant with new lists, and they feed new lists directly into their own computer systems.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Norway is active in multilateral fora in counterterrorism efforts. Norway co-sponsored UNSCR 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters, and continued its support to the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). Norway remains a member of the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network, an umbrella network of practitioners and local actors involved in countering violent extremism that
is designed to enable the members to share and discuss best practices in spotting and addressing radicalization and recruitment leading to acts of terrorism. Norway has been an active participant in the GCTF and took part in the Horn of Africa Working Group meeting in Nairobi in March, as well as the Detention and Reintegration Working Group meeting in Bali in August. Through the GCTF, Norway has implemented several new projects in the area of counterterrorism and countering violent extremism (CVE).

Together with Turkey, Norway is supporting the development of a Countering Violent Extremism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa. Norway has provided US $150,000 to the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism, located in Algiers, for the project to strengthen controls over the cross-border movement of terrorists in spaces between official border posts. Norway continues to implement its agreement with the University of Pretoria’s Institute for Strategic Studies to build counterterrorism capacity in the police and judiciary systems of African countries, totaling US $1.1 million from 2013 to 2015. Norway also provided US $80,300 to a joint project led by the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to promote regional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In June, the Norwegian government published its national Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent Extremism, which is a whole-of-government approach to CVE. Priorities include strengthening research on CVE, improving national and local cooperation on counter-radicalization efforts, helping to promote reintegration of former violent extremists, and preventing online recruitment and radicalization. The Prime Minister has encouraged municipal governments to implement CVE efforts at the local level. Several municipalities around Oslo fjord, which PST assess is the most vulnerable to radicalization to violence, have increased their CVE efforts, including passing CVE action plans and increasing budgets for CVE and counter-radicalization activities.

**RUSSIA**

**Overview:** The Russian government continued to make Russia’s counterterrorism efforts a priority during 2014. This was especially true in light of the incident-free February 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games, organized in proximity to areas of the North Caucasus where ongoing violence and violent extremist activity had occurred, resulting in heightened concern over potential terrorist activity targeting the Games.

Russia was willing to work with the United States and multilaterally on counterterrorism issues, but challenges remained. While some bilateral counterterrorism joint activities were suspended in the wake of Russia’s purported annexation of Crimea, mechanisms for communication and cooperation remained, including in multilateral bodies. The Government of Russia continued to cooperate with the FBI’s investigation of the Boston Marathon bombing.

Terrorist attacks related to problems in the North Caucasus continued to occur in Russia. Separatists and violent Islamist extremists calling for a pan-Islamic Caliphate within the North Caucasus constituted the main terrorist threats. Domestic violent Islamist extremists committed two terrorist attacks in Chechnya, in the North Caucasus, in the second half of the year – the first
such major attacks in the region in a decade. The emergence and strengthening of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq in 2014 prompted some expressions of official Russian concern about ISIL’s potential to influence domestic insurgent groups.

On December 29, Russia’s Supreme Court issued a ruling recognizing ISIL as a terrorist organization and banned its domestic activity. With the ruling, participation in ISIL activities became a criminal offense under Russian legislation. In addition, Russia also took measures to address the issue of foreign terrorist fighters, which included law enforcement and judicial actions that resulted in the conviction of at least four Russian citizens, all of whom were sentenced to prison terms. Additional arrests were made but comprehensive information on foreign fighter cases was not publicly available.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that there were 78 “terrorist crimes” committed in Russia, but it prevented 59 “terrorist crimes” and eight “terrorist attacks” from January to December 2014. In 2014, the majority of terrorist attacks in Russia targeted law enforcement and security services using suicide bombing devices and improvised explosive devices placed in vehicles. Especially in the regions of Dagestan, Chechnya, and Kabardino-Balkaria, the attacks were targeted and, in most cases, resulted in the death or injury of one or two persons.

- On October 5, a suicide bomber killed five police officers and himself, and injured 12 persons in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya in the North Caucasus. This was the first suicide attack in Chechnya in 10 years. The Interior Ministry branch in Chechnya reported a suicide bomber detonated his explosives outside the concert hall where Grozny City Day celebrations were due to begin. The attack occurred on Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s birthday. News agencies reported that local police working a metal detector outside the concert venue became suspicious of the behavior of a young man in the crowd and as they approached him, he detonated the explosives. Authorities identified the culprit as 19-year-old Russian citizen Apti Mudarov.

- On December 4, a second attack occurred in Grozny. In the early morning, three cars carrying militants allegedly affiliated with the terrorist group Caucasus Emirate infiltrated the capital and clashed with police after reportedly attacking a police traffic stop. The group then stormed a centrally located nine-story building, which housed local media. The battle between militants and law enforcement lasted for at least 10 hours, according to official reports, and resulted in the deaths of all 11 militants, in addition to 14 police and one civilian. Official reports stated 36 police were injured. On December 5, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov ordered the burning of the homes of families of militants involved in the December 4 attacks and the expulsion of the militants and their families from Chechnya. According to first-hand accounts, as well as commentary from Amnesty International, on December 7-10, a total of seven houses of family members of known insurgents were burned to the ground in an act of collective punishment.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Russia has a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework that includes the provisions of the Criminal Code and various federal laws to include, “On Countering Terrorism,” “On Money Laundering and Terrorist

In 2014, Russia passed several amendments to its counterterrorism legislation that increased the penalties for, and broadened the definition of, terrorist-related crimes. The Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure, Administrative Code, and the Federal Law on the Federal Security Service were amended to include:

- Article 60.3, which makes generating or disseminating terrorist propaganda an aggravating circumstance in criminal proceedings;
- Article 64, which prevents judges from sentencing terrorists to terms less than those prescribed elsewhere in legislation, to include excluding the possibility of parole;
- Articles 83 and 78, which remove the statute limitations for terrorism and supporters of terrorist activity; and
- Various amendments that increase the maximum term of imprisonment to 35 years when a count of terrorism is added to other crimes.

In addition, Russia added two new components to Article 205.1 of the Russian Criminal Code on “Aiding and Abetting Terrorist Activity.” These additions criminalize across several counterterrorism laws the act of organizing terrorist financing, leading an act of terrorism, and leading an organization that conducts “terrorist crimes.”

An amendment to the Administrative Code introduced administrative liability for legal entities that collect funds or provide financial services in the preparation, organization, or commission of an act of terrorism. The penalty ranges from 10 million to 60 million rubles (approximately US $166,000 to US $1 million as of December 31, 2014). In addition, Russia amended the Federal Law “On the Federal Security Service” to authorize designated FSB officers to demand an individual’s identification, and conduct searches of persons, clothing, and personal belongings and vehicles.

The Russian government continued to use its “anti-extremism” legislation to prosecute peaceful individuals and organizations, including the political opposition, independent media, and certain religious minorities. Despite having counterterrorism as its ostensible primary purpose, the law criminalizes a broad spectrum of activities, including incitement to “religious discord” and “assistance to extremism,” and does not precisely define what is meant by “extremism.” The law includes no stipulation that threats of violence or acts of violence must accompany incitement to religious discord, for example.

The threat of prosecution under Russia’s “anti-extremism” legislation has an intimidating effect that results in restriction of freedom of speech and religious freedom under the guise of countering terrorism.

The FSB remains the primary agency responsible for counterterrorism activities within Russia. To a lesser extent, the Ministry of Interior (MVD) also has a role in counterterrorism matters.
The FSB International Cooperation Directorate, through a joint relationship with the National Antiterrorism Committee (NAC), has developed the “International Counterterrorism Database” (Russian acronym: MBD), which holds both an unclassified and a restricted section. The MBD is a repository of terrorism events, subjects, organizations, and methods to which international intelligence and law enforcement agencies can contribute. The FSB promotes this as the only international database that adheres to UNSCR 2178.

Russia issues International Civil Aviation Organization/EU (ICAO/EU) compliant passports with enhanced security features, such as holographic images on the hard plastic biographic data page. Russian citizens have the option of receiving a five- or 10-year version. Although ICAO/EU compliant passports were introduced in 2010, the previous style of passport (containing a photograph laminated to a bio-data page) continues to be issued and remains in widespread use. The older document has fewer and less sophisticated security features. Recently, the Russian government moved to further strengthen security features, passing a bill that mandated the inclusion of fingerprint data in Russian citizens’ foreign travel passports.

Border guards are responsible for air, land, and sea arrivals, although with over 12,000 miles of land border and over 23,000 miles of coastline, the extent to which they are able to patrol all land and maritime crossings is unclear. Border crossings, particularly on the frontiers between Russia and some former Soviet republics, may not be registered. Border guards have the capability of collecting biometrics at ports of entry, and while they currently do not do so regularly, on December 10 a Presidential Executive Order went into effect requiring biometrics collection for visas issued at Russian embassies in the UK, Denmark, Burma, and Namibia, in addition to requiring passenger fingerprint scanning at Moscow’s Vnukovo airport (one of three international airports in Moscow). This initial collection was reportedly a pilot program for an envisioned worldwide rollout, but federal legislation has yet to authorize or fund this program.

Standard operating procedures for the sharing of information within Russia’s government exist, but it is unclear how often these procedures are followed. A traveler to Russia must receive a visa from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (via an Embassy or Consulate abroad), be permitted entry by the FSB (through the Border Guard Service), and then be registered with the Federal Migration Service (until 2012 a part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but now an autonomous organization).

Law enforcement actions/prosecutions in 2014 reportedly included:

- On April 9, a court in the Rostov Region convicted five members of the criminal organization “Vilayat Galgaiche,” with sentences ranging from 14 years to life under Articles No. 205 (Act of Terrorism), No. 209 (Banditry), No. 210 (Creation of a Criminal Group/Organization and Participation Therein), No. 222 (Illegal Acquisition, Transfer, Sale, Storage, Transportation, or Bearing of Firearms, Components, Ammunition, Explosives, and Explosive Devices), No. 223 (Illegal Manufacture of Weapons), and No. 317 (Enforcement on the Life of an Officer of a Law Enforcement Agency).
- On May 17, a court in the Dagestan Republic convicted seven members of the “Yuzhnaya” (Southern) terrorist organization of terrorism and participation in an illegal armed group. The seven men’s sentences ranged from two to fifteen years.
On October 19, during an ensuing investigation and raid, the Ministry of Interior confirmed that law enforcement officers killed Aslan Aliskhanov, a 33-year-old Russian citizen implicated in organizing an attack, as he resisted arrest. Aliskhanov purportedly was a member of an illegal armed group and was on Russia’s wanted list for participation in alleged militant activity.

On December 5, a court in Volgograd convicted four Russian citizens of involvement in the 2013 double suicide bombings in Volgograd, which killed 34 and injured over 40 persons. Alautdin Dadayev and Ibragim Mamedov each were sentenced to 19 years in a maximum security prison on charges of terrorism and participation in an illegal armed group. Two other men, Magomed Batirov and Tagir Batirov, each were sentenced to three years and 10 months for aiding an illegal armed group.

On December 17, Russian authorities announced that they arrested Khasan Zakayev last August, who authorities believe helped organize the October 2002 terrorist attack/hostage crisis at a Moscow theatre, local media reported. He was charged with “preparation for a terrorist attack,” among other related crimes.

Also on December 17, the General Prosecutor’s Office approved the indictment of two Russians for allegedly preparing a terrorist attack in Moscow. Yulay Davletbayev and Robert Amerkhanov, both residents of Bashkortostan, were arrested in May 2014 and charged with preparing to commit a terrorist act, among other related crimes.

On December 23, the Supreme Court in Kabardino-Balkaria (North Caucasus) convicted 57 persons of participating in an armed rebellion on October 13, 2005 in Nalchik, with the goal of creating an Islamic caliphate. As a result of the rebellion, 35 law enforcement and military personnel were killed, along with 15 civilians. One hundred thirty one officials and 92 civilians suffered injuries. All 57 were convicted under the Criminal Code for participation in an “armed rebellion, terrorism, attempt on the life of a law enforcement agency, aggravated murder, and attempted theft of a weapon,” according to media reports. Five of the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment in a special regime colony. The remaining 52 were sentenced from four years and 10 months to 23 years in prison. Human rights groups alleged there is significant evidence that authorities had tortured at least 12 of the defendants in custody. For further information, we refer you to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
http://drl.j.state.sbu/reports/HRRWord.

Russian media reported that federal and local security organs continued their counterterrorism operations in the North Caucasus. These operations, although occurring throughout the region, were mostly focused in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Operations included roadblocks, raids of public venues such as cafes, and larger-scale military-style operations, especially in rural areas. On March 18, Caucasus Emirate confirmed the death of its top leader Doku Umarov. The FSB later claimed that Umarov was killed in a combat operation, but the precise date was not established. The initial claim of Umarov’s death was made by Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov in December 2013.

In 2014, the Russian government sentenced to prison at least four known individuals for fighting with militants against the Syrian government. Those known to have been convicted by the end of 2014 were sentenced to between two and four years in prison:
• Said Mazhayev, two years;
• Shamil Nurmagomedov, four years;
• Murat Nagoyev, four years; and
• Rustam Kerimov, three years, followed by a year of “restricted freedom” on traveling and running for political office.

Despite the tensions in the overall bilateral relationship with the United States, the FSB continued to cooperate on the Boston Marathon bombing case. Russia continued to disseminate threat information and responded to requests for information on counterterrorism matters, although its responses were often not substantive or timely. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the realm of security support during the 2014 Sochi Games, within certain limits, was effective.

While there were no known legal constraints to effective host government law enforcement and border security related to counterterrorism, attempts at judicial reforms have had little success due to a lack of political will and institutionalized corruption within law enforcement entities. Ethnic or clan ties in certain regions can make policing and prosecutions difficult. Important cases are often moved to Moscow or other regions to ensure a judge is not influenced by a clan.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Russia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and belongs to two FATF-style regional bodies: the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL), and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), in which it is a leading member and primary funding source. Through the EAG, Russia provides technical assistance and other resources towards improving legislative and regulatory frameworks and operational capabilities.

Russian banks must report suspicious transactions to the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Rosfinmonitoring), a financial intelligence unit and member of the Egmont Group whose head reports directly to the President of Russia. Rosfinmonitoring receives reports from all non-profit organizations. The Central Bank can access these transaction reports after requesting them from Rosfinmonitoring.

In 2014, Russia enacted additional changes to Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation assuring tighter control over possible money-laundering and terrorist financing activity in the non-commercial sector in Russia. The government established a lower reporting threshold (RUB 100,000 – approximately US $1,700 as of December 2014) for Russian NGOs that receive money and in-kind assistance from abroad.

The most current data on investigations and convictions of terrorist financing is from 2013. In that year, the Russian government investigated 10 cases of terrorist financing, and one case resulted in a conviction. In addition, it suspended two transactions and froze US $18,610 from entities on the national terrorist list. The total number of measures taken in 2013 was below the five year average. In the period 2008 – 2013 there were 80 total investigations and 21 convictions. In the same period, the government suspended 32 transactions totaling US $106,172.
The law requires the freezing of assets without delay, but no later than one working day. In 2013, two transactions were suspended and US $18,610 was frozen due to National Terrorist List concerns.

Non-profit organizations have mandatory reporting requirements on transactions of cash and other property from foreign states, international and foreign organizations, foreign citizens and stateless persons, if the value of such transaction is equal or greater than RUB 100,000 (approximately US $1,700 as of December 2014). Russia does not use a risk-based approach towards its regulation of the sector and this and other regulations are also used to tarnish the reputations of organizations with no connection to terrorism or extremism, fixing them with the label of “foreign agent.”


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Russia continued to work in regional and multilateral groups to address terrorism. Russia participated in Global Counterterrorism Forum activities, as well as in a meeting of experts from the Anti-Terrorism Centers of the OSCE. The Russian government supported UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178.

**SERBIA**

**Overview:** The Government of Serbia continued its efforts to counter international terrorism in 2014. Serbia’s law enforcement and security agencies, the Ministry of Interior (MUP)’s Directorate of Police and the Security Information Agency (BIA) in particular, continued bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. Serbia’s two main police organizations, the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Counter-Terrorist Unit, operated as counterterrorism tactical response units. Serbian and U.S. government officials collaborated against potential terrorist threats. Harmonization of law enforcement protocols with EU standards remained a priority for the Serbian government.

Serbia is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. As part of Serbia’s efforts to develop a national counterterrorism center, the government sent a working-level delegation to the United States in December to speak with experts at DOJ, the FBI, the NCTC, and other agencies. The Serbian delegation included members of the MUP’s counterterrorism department, BIA, the Office of the Prosecutor for Organized Crime, the Chief Prosecutor’s Office, and advisers to the Minister of the Interior. The visit provided best practices to the delegation on tracking, analyzing, and acting upon information about known or suspected terrorists. The Serbian delegation witnessed examples of successful interagency cooperation and how domestic counterterrorism efforts are incorporated into regional and global counterterrorism efforts.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Serbian government improved its legislative capabilities with regard to counterterrorism and foreign terrorist fighter issues. In
October, the Serbian Parliament ratified a foreign terrorist fighter bill – as an amendment to the criminal code – prohibiting Serbian citizens’ participation in foreign armed conflicts, or supporting fighters or organizations participating in armed conflicts abroad. Serbian authorities initiated their first case related to Serbian citizens traveling to fight in Syria. The Organized Crime Prosecutor’s Office indicted five individuals for conspiring to commit acts of terrorism, recruitment and training, and terrorist financing. The government has not yet ratified its National Counterterrorism Plan, which would establish the framework for future changes in legislation and authorizations for law enforcement in the case of terrorism and foreign fighter issues.

Serbia demonstrates some capabilities but does not have a strategic, interagency approach to handling terrorism-related matters. Serbia lacks non-criminal border control measures, such as the seizure of passports and travel bans, which could be used in cases in which security measures would be justified but prosecution would not be possible or desirable. Friction exists between law enforcement and prosecution elements, as well as between agencies competing for primacy on counterterrorism activities. Overlapping authorities and the lack of an overall coordination and cooperation plan further complicated efforts. Cooperation is most intense between the MUP Directorate of Police and the BIA, with sporadic friction over competencies and information sharing.

Transnational terrorism concerns within Serbia were similar to those in other Western Balkan states, which are located on an historic transit route between the Middle East and Western Europe. Serbia is also a source country of foreign terrorist fighters going to Syria and Iraq, particularly from its Sandzak and Presevo regions. Serbian authorities are sensitive to, and vigilant against, any efforts by foreign terrorists to establish a presence in, or transit through, the country. To this end, the Serbian government continued to cooperate with neighboring countries to improve border security and information sharing. The U.S. government’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program provided training courses to multiple entities within the government to address border security. However, long sections of Serbia’s borders are porous, especially those shared with Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia’s ability to monitor and screen travelers remained limited.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Serbia is a member of the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) and has observer status in the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, both Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies. Serbia is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

Serbia has yet to adopt a proposed bill allowing for the seizure of terrorist assets.

Serbia implemented UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, but does not have a list of designated terrorist organizations and individuals that would include, among others, persons and entities listed by the UN.

Serbian authorities have an ability to seize and forfeit terrorist assets pursuant to asset forfeiture mechanisms. Serbian authorities still lack an asset freezing mechanism. The proposed Law on Freezing of Terrorist Assets awaits adoption by the Parliament.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Serbia is engaged in limited regional and international cooperation on counterterrorism issues. Elements of the Serbian government, such as MUP and BIA, cooperate with Interpol and Europol on counterterrorism activities, including watchlists. The Serbian armed forces participated in multinational training exercises, some of which involved aspects that could be applied to counterterrorism activities; however, the majority of these training events and exercises were not directly focused on addressing terrorism. While Serbia is a member of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, Serbia is not involved in specific counterterrorism efforts through NATO, the UN, or the OSCE. Regarding regional border security, Serbia’s level of cooperation is strongest with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania; cooperation with Croatia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is less developed. Because of the political sensitivity in Serbia towards Kosovo’s political status, cooperation on border security is least developed between Serbia and Kosovo. The Serbian government participated in the Foreign Terrorist Fighters roundtable for Balkan countries hosted by the State Department on the margins of the UNGA.

**SPAIN**

**Overview:** Spain was an active partner with the United States in efforts to track and disrupt transnational terrorism. Spain deepened its cooperation with Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania to combat and contain the threat posed by al-Qa’ida (AQ), its affiliates, and like-minded groups. The domestic terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) has not launched any attacks since it announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity” in October 2011, although the group had not formally disbanded or given up its weapons arsenal by the end of 2014.

Spain has been an active member and an outspoken supporter of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since its inception. Spain is in the process of deploying a 300-strong military training mission to Iraq and will stand up and lead the Besmayah training center south of Baghdad.

Spain is actively working to improve its legal framework to more effectively counter the movement of foreign terrorist fighters from Spain to conflict zones, better pursue suspected terrorists without clear affiliation to a known criminal organization, and curtail terrorist preparatory activities online. In terms of terrorist prosecution, Spain already boasts a mature legal framework as a result of its long fight against ETA.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Spanish Criminal Code specifically punishes any act of collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist organization. Spain’s counterterrorism capabilities, coordinated by the national Center for Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime Intelligence (CITCO), have proven effective. The National Police and Civil Guard share responsibility for counterterrorism and cooperate well with the United States,
with strong information sharing and joint threat assessments. On December 5, 2013, Spain approved a national cyber security strategy to safeguard its critical information systems, and created the Cyber Defense Committee to coordinate its cyber-security across the various government departments.

Spain continued to focus on improved security and the detection of false documents at its borders. Spain participated in the U.S. Immigration Advisory Program, which maintains staff at Madrid-Barajas International Airport. The program allows for coordination between Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials, airline security personnel, and police regarding high-risk passengers traveling to the United States. Spain finished implementation of an automated system to read EU passports with biometric data and explosive trace detection equipment was also deployed at Spain’s five largest airports at passenger checkpoints. Spain continued to use a network of radar stations, known as the Integrated External Surveillance System, along its maritime borders. In September 2012, the Civil Guard began integrating Europol information in its fight against terrorism and organized crime. Previously, only the Spanish National Police had access to the Europol data.

The Spanish and Moroccan National Police participated in five joint operations against networks of foreign terrorist fighter recruiters and volunteers in March, June, August, September, and December. The raids led to 47 arrests, primarily in Morocco and the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, but also included apprehension of suspects in Barcelona and Madrid. Spanish and French law enforcement agencies and intelligence services carried out a joint operation in July that led to the arrest of two French terrorists in Melilla.

A number of ETA members were arrested in 2014, both in Spain and abroad. Juan Jesus Narvaez Goñi and Itziar Alberdi Uranga were arrested in Mexico in February. Maria Jesus Elorza Zubizarreta was arrested as she disembarked from a flight from Venezuela to Madrid in June. Tomas Elorriaga Kunze was arrested in a joint operation by German and Spanish police in November.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Spain is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. Spain was reviewed under the new round of FATF evaluations and found to have “a strong system to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, with up-to-date laws and regulations and sound institutions for combating these threats.” The evaluation also recommended improvements “such as the implementation of targeted financial sanctions to allow the freezing of terrorism-related assets.” For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Since 2004, Spain has been part of the informal working group on jihadism known as the 5 + 5. The group brings together defense ministers or their designees from five European countries (Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, and Malta) and five Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya). Its mission is to exchange information and discuss the operational implications of the threat from violent Islamist extremists in the European theater, including that posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters.
Four of the group’s members—Spain, Morocco, Algeria, and Portugal—held Seaborder 2014, a joint maritime exercise, in September. The full group met in December in Granada and expanded its mission to include cyber-terrorism/cyber-recruiting.

Spain’s participation in the G-4 with Portugal, France, and Morocco also has an operational objective. The four countries freely exchange tactics and intelligence on counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and organized crime/illegal immigration. Spain continued its work with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and invited France and Morocco to participate in two nuclear attack simulations, one held in Spain and one in Portugal.

Spain cites the lingering effects of its economic crisis as an impediment to further regional and international counterterrorism cooperation. All efforts are made to not reduce operational capacity, according to the Ministry of the Interior, but resource constraints reduce Spain’s ability to take part in international training exercises. Spain believes the EU should supplement the country in terms of counterterrorism and border issues especially given the uniqueness of Spain’s North African enclaves forming the southern border of the EU.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Spain is working toward final approval of a new national strategy for countering radicalization to violence that will establish a national group managed by the National Counterterrorism Coordination Center that liaises with local, multi-sectorial CVE groups. Spain is an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and participated in the May 14-15 First Expert Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Marrakech, and the Second Expert Meeting in Abu Dhabi on June 16-17. In Abu Dhabi, Spain and the United States together presented case studies on strengthening community resilience against radicalization and the related foreign terrorist fighters threats. The Spanish have also established a new mechanism to channel financial contributions from foreign countries to support Muslim communities in Spain, and Spain’s Prison System architecture has been modified to prevent radicalization to violence.

**SWEDEN**

**Overview:** The United States and Sweden maintained good cooperation on counterterrorism and law enforcement issues in 2014. U.S. agencies worked with their Swedish counterparts for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information. Sweden is also active within the EU, UN, and Council of Europe on countering violent extremism and the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters.

The Swedish government continued to highlight that terrorism can be motivated by right-wing, left-wing, or religious convictions. The Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) noted that the greatest terrorist threat in Sweden comes from violent Islamist extremists. The Swedish Security Service also expressed concern over the growing number of foreign terrorist fighters from Sweden traveling to Syria and Iraq to receive training and provide support to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as the possibility that returning foreign terrorist fighters could seek to commit terrorist attacks in Sweden or elsewhere.
The Swedish government appointed its first ever National Coordinator for Safeguarding Democracy from Violent Extremism. The Swedish government has described its approach to countering violent extremism as attempting to address underlying factors behind radicalization. The government seeks to “depolarize” Swedish society as a necessary step to counter violent extremism, with the idea that people who do not feel welcome and integrated in Swedish society might turn away from it, thereby turning to violent extremism.

The National Threat Advisory level in Sweden remained “elevated” (increased from level two to three on a scale of five levels) after first being raised in October 2010. Since then, Swedish law enforcement has disrupted several planned attacks.

Sweden is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and has made generous humanitarian contributions to ISIL-impacted populations in Iraq. Sweden is a significant donor of humanitarian assistance for ISIL-impacted populations, and in 2014 contributed US $43 million and US $29.4 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria and Iraq, respectively. SÄPO is concerned with rapidly increasing numbers of foreign terrorist fighters who have left Sweden to join violent extremist groups in Syria and claimed that at least 110 individuals have traveled, with estimates of those who have traveled reaching as high as 350. Some of these travelers have been killed, but others have returned to Sweden. SÄPO views the returnees with specific concern as they could potentially plan an attack in Sweden, or could radicalize and recruit others for travel. SÄPO reported to Swedish press that it is conducting several “pre-investigations” related to individuals who have returned from conflict areas with fighting experience.

Foreign terrorist fighters in Sweden are recruited mainly through word of mouth by friends or family, as well as online. Foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq from Sweden are most often young men of immigrant background, but not of Syrian descent. There is anecdotal evidence of women travelling to Syria as well, although their role upon arrival in Syria is less clear, with some appearing to travel to become wives to fighters or provide other logistical support to ISIL.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party continued to carry out significant support activities such as soldier recruitment and financing in Sweden in 2014.

The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency continuously reaches out to various agencies and communities to develop awareness of the foreign terrorist fighter threat, and the Counterterrorism Cooperative Council consisting of 13 government agencies coordinates Sweden’s interagency counterterrorism cooperation. The National Center for Terrorism Threat Assessment produces long- and short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests. SÄPO monitors returned foreign terrorist fighters to evaluate their condition.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Sweden’s legislation criminalizes incitement of terrorist acts, recruitment to terrorist organizations, and providing of terrorism training. While five people have been convicted under these laws, only two convictions have remained standing following appeals. In all other prosecutions, courts have deemed the evidence
presented in many trials inadequate to prove that those prosecuted would actually carry out their terrorist plots, had they not been intercepted.

Swedish law enforcement prepared for a reorganization in 2015 to unite the country’s current 21 separate country police departments into one national agency with seven regions; this reorganization aims to streamline police work through clearer guidance and centralization of law enforcement efforts.

Sweden amended its Act on Criminal Responsibility for Public Provocation, Recruitment, and Training concerning Terrorist Offences and other Particularly Serious Crimes (2010:299) in July 2014, to include the ratification of the international Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 13 April 2005. Sweden is also undertaking an internal investigation into how to implement the various provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2178, including the possibility of criminalizing the act of training with terrorist organization or waging war campaigns on behalf of terrorist organizations.

Sweden has a specialized division at the Prosecution Authority that deals with all terrorism-related cases. SÄPO has the main responsibility to counter terrorism in Sweden. There is timely sharing of terrorism-related information and prosecutors are consulted at early stages of investigations and work in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement. Law enforcement units have a record of accountability and respect for human rights.

SÄPO works in concert with the border police and the Migration Board in countering terrorism, and is the sole agency with jurisdiction over counterterrorism investigations. SÄPO chairs the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (NCT); a permanent working group within the Swedish Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council. The NCT is staffed by personnel from the National Defense Radio Establishment (FRA), the Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST), and SÄPO. SÄPO also convenes the National Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council (NTC, which works to increase Sweden’s ability to counter terrorism.) The Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Council consists of: the Armed Forces; the Civil Contingencies Agency; the Coast Guard; Customs; the Defense Research Agency; the Economic Crime Authority; the Migration Board; the National Bureau of Investigation; the National Defense Radio Establishment; the Prison and Probation Service; the Prosecution Authority; the Radiation Safety Authority; the Security Service; and the Transport Agency. This Council facilitates sharing of information across different Swedish agencies on counterterrorism issues.

Swedish citizen Johan Gustafsson, who was kidnapped by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) when visiting Mali in November 2011, remained in AQIM’s detention at the end of 2014. Gustafsson was last seen in an AQIM-released photograph from August.

There was significant law enforcement cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of international terrorism. Swedish law enforcement officials work closely with U.S. counterparts and cooperation has directly supported several investigations/cases.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sweden is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Sweden provided its latest Mutual Evaluation Report to the FATF in October 2012. The only new passage of legislation pertaining to Terrorist Financing in 2014 was the addition of an allowance to halt a transaction for two days for suspected terrorist financing, as well as an adjustment to increased rights for confiscation of assets.

The Finance Inspection agency (in concert with many other agencies) released a report on Financing of Terrorism under the FATF mandate in March. The report raised the issues of money flows both to and from Sweden, but commented that the flows are of “small scale and of legal origin” while noting Sweden’s vulnerability to many forms of terrorist financing. The report spoke of a knowledge deficit in many agencies about counterterrorist finance, noting this leads to a limited number of reported suspected terrorist financing activities. The economic crime unit and the tax authority are not required to look for terrorist financing when investigating financial crimes.

In November, the Finance Inspection launched a major investigation into Sweden’s largest banks and their handling of money laundering and terrorist financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Sweden is a member of the EU, and also participated in an ad hoc group of the EU and several member states to focus on foreign terrorist fighter issues. Sweden participates in the EU’s Schengen cooperation and uses the Schengen Information System II for information sharing, port of entry screening, lost and stolen passport information and watch listing. Under the auspices of the PNR agreement between the EU and the United States, Sweden collects and shares PNR information from commercial flights. Sweden co-sponsored UNSCR 2178 and supports the UN’s counterterrorism efforts. During the fall of 2014, Sweden was an active partner in formulating the EU’s counterterrorism/foreign terrorist fighter strategy for Iraq and Syria. Sweden also participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s workshop on Counterterrorism and Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Marrakech in December 2014.

Sweden continued to contribute to counterterrorism capacity building projects through its development aid work carried out by the Swedish International Development Agency, and also via funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime-Terrorism Prevention Branch and the OSCE. Sweden also supported the EU’s work with capacity building projects in prioritized countries and regions such as Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. Sweden provided trainers to the EU Training Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Sweden is a large donor to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism International Task Force (CTITF), with special focus on the CTITF workgroup that works on strengthening human rights in counterterrorism work.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In a response to a report by the Defense College on how to counter violent extremism (CVE), the Swedish government
appointed former Social Democratic Party (SDP) leader Mona Sahlin as its national CVE coordinator in July 2014. The Swedish government has tasked the coordinator to improve collaboration among agencies, local authorities, and organizations at the national, regional, and local level regarding efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.

The Swedish government is investigating how to enhance existing legislation to mitigate the risks posed by foreign terrorist fighters.

On the more general topic of youth and radicalization, the Swedish Media Council has conducted a study of how the internet and social media are used to promote anti-democratic messages that encourage the use of violence for an ideological cause aimed at young people. According to the study, preventive work should include efforts to equip young people with the tools necessary to challenge anti-democratic and violent messages targeting them from the internet, social media, their peers, and adults. Critical media training provided by schools for young people is an important measure to prevent violent extremism in Sweden. The Swedish Media Council has also developed an online training course for teachers.

Some municipalities strived to cultivate trusted relations with relevant community actors, to empower those best-placed to affect change, and to develop effective reintegration programs for returning foreign terrorist fighters. Such efforts were not coordinated at the national level, however.

TURKEY

Overview: Largely because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, Turkey has voiced increasing concern about terrorist groups near its border, including Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), al-Nusrah Front, and other al-Qa’ida (AQ)-affiliated groups. Throughout 2014, Turkey served as a source and transit country for foreign terrorist fighters wishing to join these and other groups in Syria. The Government of Turkey intensified efforts to interdict the travel of suspected foreign terrorist fighters through Turkey to and from Syria and Iraq. These efforts include the development and implementation of a “banned from entry list,” as well as the deployment of “Risk Analysis Units” to detect suspected foreign terrorist fighters at airports, land border crossings, and border cities. Cooperation with other source countries increased during the year in response to the foreign terrorist fighter threat, with both Turkey and source countries seeking to improve information sharing in particular. Turkey is an active member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Prominent among terrorist groups in Turkey is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Following three decades of conflict with the PKK, in late 2012 the Government of Turkey and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan began talks for a peace process. The talks continued in 2014. The PKK called for a ceasefire in March of 2013, which both sides largely observed, apart from ongoing small-scale PKK attacks.

In 2014, Turkey continued to face significant internal terrorist threats and took strong action in response. Activity by the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a terrorist
Marxist-Leninist group with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO views that seeks the violent overthrow of the Turkish state, threatened the security of both U.S. and Turkish interests.

Another terrorist group in Turkey is Turkish (Kurdish) Hizballah (unrelated to the similarly-named Hizballah that operates in Lebanon). The Government of Turkey also considers the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army (TKP-ML-TIKKO), and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), although largely inactive, to be threats. Because of their association with the PKK, the Turkish government considers the Syria-based Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing (People’s Protection Units – YPG) to be terrorist organizations. The appearance of Hamas leader Meshaal at a congress of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in December drew attention to the Turkish government’s relations with this group, which is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States.

Turkey is a long-standing counterterrorism partner of the United States. It co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with the United States. It received U.S. assistance to address the terrorist threat posed by the PKK in 2014. Although ongoing peace talks mitigated violence between the PKK and Turkish government forces, isolated incidents continued.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Noteworthy attacks included:

- On March 30, three individuals identified as members of ISIL killed a policeman, a Gendarmerie non-commissioned officer, and a truck driver at a checkpoint near Nigde. Five soldiers were also wounded. The assailants were subsequently captured and remained in custody at year’s end.
- During the week of October 6, at least 40 civilians were killed during two days of protests and associated violence. According to Human Rights First, security forces killed 15 persons during clashes between various Kurdish groups, including PKK supporters and Huda-Par (a political party with links to Turkish Hizballah).
- On October 25, masked gunmen shot dead three Turkish soldiers in the Kurdish-majority southeast of the country. The attack was attributed to the PKK.
- On October 29, a Turkish military officer wearing civilian clothes died after being shot in the head by two PKK militants while walking in a bazaar. On December 17, a 17-year-old boy was shot dead during armed clashes between police and assailants in mainly Kurdish southeast Turkey; one police officer was wounded.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Counterterrorism law enforcement efforts in Turkey remained focused on the domestic threat posed by several terrorist groups, including the PKK. Turkey’s methodology and legislation are geared towards confronting this internal threat. Efforts to counter international terrorism are hampered by legislation that defines terrorism narrowly as a crime targeting the Turkish state or Turkish citizens. This definition of terrorism can be an impediment to operational and legal cooperation against global terrorist networks. No significant counterterrorism-related legislation was enacted during the year.

Due to amendments made in 2013, Turkey’s counterterrorism legislation conforms more closely to EU freedom of expression standards, has a narrower definition of terrorist propaganda, and criminalizes propagation of the declarations of an illegal organization only if the content
legitimates or encourages acts of violence, threats or force. Nevertheless, the legislation remains broad-reaching and is still being broadly applied. In 2014, Turkish authorities continued to use it to detain and prosecute thousands of politicians, reporters, and activists.

While Turkey’s law enforcement capacity is generally advanced, criminal procedure secrecy rules continued to prevent Turkish National Police (TNP) authorities from sharing investigative information once a prosecutor is assigned to the case, which occurs almost immediately.

The Government of Turkey compiles a “banned from entry list” with a view to prevent travel into Turkey by individuals identified by foreign governments and internal security units as potential foreign terrorist fighters. Although the Turkish government does not have an automated Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) system, it has approached the Department of Homeland Security for technical assistance in developing its own automated system. Risk Analysis Units were established at 11 major international and domestic airports, land border crossings, and border cities in an effort to identify and interdict potential foreign terrorist fighters. Border forces have increased their ability to patrol and interdict persons and contraband from crossing the border.

The TNP has highly developed counterterrorism capabilities in a number of areas and is planning to expand its law enforcement training for other countries in the region.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Turkey is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an observer of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, a FATF-style regional group. In October, the FATF cited improvements in Turkey’s counterterrorist finance (CFT) regime and approved Turkey’s exit from the targeted follow-up process of the third round of mutual evaluations. No terrorist finance cases were prosecuted.

While the Government of Turkey has issued freezing orders without delay (three to five days), it remains unknown whether any assets have actually been frozen. Freezing orders are published in the official Gazette. The nonprofit sector is not audited on a regular basis for CFT vulnerabilities and does not receive adequate anti-money laundering/CFT outreach or guidance from the Turkish government. The General Director of Foundations issues licenses for charitable foundations and oversees them, but there are a limited number of auditors to cover the more than 70,000 institutions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Turkey is an active member of the UN, NATO, and the Committee of Experts on Terrorism. Turkey is a founding member of the GCTF and is co-chair with the United States; as co-chair, Turkey provides extensive secretariat support. Turkey also participated in OSCE expert meetings on the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism organized by the OSCE/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Secretariat.
The Government of Turkey is considering effective means to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178. As GCTF co-chair, it is developing policies in line with the framework of The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the "Foreign Terrorist Fighters" Phenomenon.

Turkey increased its cooperation with European countries regarding the activities of members of the DHKP/C. It also worked with countries from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East to interdict the travel of potential foreign terrorist fighters planning to travel through Turkey to Syria.

In 2014, the TNP offered counterterrorism-related training programs at its Antiterrorism Academy that are designed primarily for law enforcement officers from Central Asian countries.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Turkish government has two significant programs to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism. The first, administered by the TNP, is a broad-based outreach program to affected communities, similar to anti-gang activities in the United States. Police work to reach vulnerable populations (before terrorists do) to alter the prevailing group dynamics and to prevent recruitment. Police use social science research to undertake social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers. Programs prepare trainers, psychologists, coaches, and religious leaders to intervene to undermine violent extremist messages and to prevent recruitment.

The second program, administered by the Turkish government’s Religious Affairs Office (Diyanet), works to undercut violent extremist messaging. In Turkey, all Sunni imams are employees of the Diyanet. In support of its message of traditional religious values, more than 140,000 Diyanet religious officials throughout Turkey conducted individualized outreach to their congregations. The Diyanet similarly worked with religious associations among the Turkish diaspora to provide them with access to instruction and to assist them in establishing umbrella organizations. The Diyanet supported in-service training for religious officials and lay-workers via a network of 20 centers throughout Turkey.

**UNITED KINGDOM**

**Overview:** In 2014, the United Kingdom (UK) continued to play a leading role in countering international terrorism. On August 29, the UK raised its terrorist threat level from “substantial” to “severe,” indicating a terrorist attack is “highly likely,” due to the threat from Western foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq returning to the UK and potentially targeting the aviation sector. The UK had not raised its threat level to severe since the failed aviation attack in the United States in December 2009. Domestically, the UK government continued to implement its updated counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was released in 2011 and updated in 2013. The threat from radicalized fighters returning to the UK from Syria and Iraq resulted in a significant shift of counterterrorism resources and became the UK’s number one counterterrorism priority. However, the UK remained concerned about threats from al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, Libya, East Africa, as well as from home-grown violent extremists.
Northern Ireland continued to face a terrorist threat from a small minority of violent dissident republican groups who oppose the peace process. Police and prison officers remained their principal targets. Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) senior officials reported that a number of attacks involved weaponry of growing sophistication with tactics similar to those used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although tactically proficient, the dissidents lacked strategic acumen. The two principal loyalist paramilitary organizations, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) continued to exist. Tensions and in-fighting within both the UDA and UVF also persisted and remained a cause for concern.

The UK is an active member of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). From the start of the U.S.-led air campaign in Iraq, the UK has contributed by providing surveillance and reconnaissance support, conducting airstrikes, and delivering humanitarian assistance and munitions. The UK has eight Tornado aircraft based in Akrotiri for use against ISIL. The UK government made clear that UK troops would not have a combat role on the ground although British trainers have deployed to Iraq to help build Iraqi security force capacity. UK government agencies and NGOs have increased efforts to counter ISIL messaging under the auspices of its Prevent program of community outreach.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** While terrorist groups were active throughout the UK, the majority of attacks occurred in Northern Ireland, with the notable exception of the parcel bombs sent to armed forces recruitment centers in England in February. Dissident republican groups, the Real IRA (RIRA), Continuity IRA (CIRA), and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), remained actively opposed to the peace settlement in Northern Ireland. As of October, the UK’s Northern Ireland Office recorded 18 national security attacks in Northern Ireland.

- In February, the IRA claimed responsibility for parcel bombs sent to armed forces recruitment centers in England. Four suspected explosive devices were discovered at Army careers offices in Oxford, Brighton, Canterbury, and the Queensmere shopping center in Slough. Packages were sent to Aldershot, Hampshire, and another two armed forces careers offices in Reading, Berkshire; and Chatham, Kent. Downing Street said the small but potentially viable devices “bore the hallmarks of Northern Ireland-related terrorism.”

- On October 7, dissident republicans threw a 60-centimeter long pipe bomb at a police patrol vehicle. Although the device did not detonate, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) labelled it "advanced" and "sophisticated."

- On October 14, dissidents placed a pressure-activated device in the garden of an unoccupied home in Derry/Londonderry. Police arrived at the site after receiving a phone call, after which army experts disarmed a "complex and sophisticated device designed to maim and kill."

- On November 2, a horizontal mortar, fired by command wire, hit a police vehicle in Derry/Londonderry and damaged one of the rear doors before it bounced into a garden where it exploded. Police suspect that dissident republicans were responsible for the attack.
On November 16, suspected dissident republicans used a home-made rocket launcher to attack a police Land Rover in North Belfast. It struck the vehicle and caused some damage, but no one was injured.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:  UK laws allow the government to investigate and prosecute terrorists using a variety of tools. In July, the UK enacted the Antisocial Behavior Crime and Policing Act 2014, which amended the port and border security powers in Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The new code of practice increased the protection of individual freedoms during counterterrorism-related border stops. In November, Parliament began review of the Serious Crime Bill, on track to be enacted in 2015. The bill includes a provision which would make extra-territorial terrorist acts prosecutable in the UK.

The UK has a highly capable network of agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts. The Metropolitan (Met) police lead the UK’s national counterterrorism law enforcement effort. The Met police work closely with local police, MI5, and other agencies in terrorism investigation, prevention, and prosecution. Using a regional policing model, the Kent Police, UK Border Force, and various counterterrorism units across the UK prioritized Syrian foreign terrorist fighters/returnees as part of their investigative remit. For example, the Kent Police and the UK Border Force played a central role in identifying and disrupting the foreign fighter flow across the UK border crossing at Dover Port.

The relationship between U.S. Department of Justice personnel assigned to the Embassy and the Metropolitan Police Extradition Unit is robust and has led to seamless information sharing and resource allocation. For example, on September 4, the UK ordered Haroon Aswat, a UK-based individual, to be extradited to the United States to face terrorism charges. Aswat faces charges of conspiring to provide and providing material support to al-Qa’ida and for attempting to establish a terrorist training camp in the United States.

UK experts estimate at least 500 Britons joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq and around 27 have allegedly died in those countries. According to the Met, about 50 people per week are referred to de-radicalization programs. Police prevention is at its highest since the aftermath of the July 7, 2005 attack on London’s transport system. Police made over 200 terrorism-related arrests in 2014, a significant increase, as a result of conducting high numbers of counterterrorism investigations. Police charged at least 16 people for terrorism-related offenses after returning from Syria and Iraq.

2014 law enforcement actions in Great Britain included:

- On February 25, police arrested a former Guantanamo detainee, Moazzam Begg, on suspicion of Syria-related terrorism offences. Begg was one of four arrested in Birmingham in addition to a man aged 36 from Shirley, Solihull; and a 44-year-old woman and her son, aged 20, from Sparkhill, Birmingham.
- On September 25, British police arrested nine men in London on suspicion of encouraging terrorism and being members of banned organizations. One of the men identified is Anjem Choudary, one of the most high-profile radical Muslim preachers in Britain. Choudary, 47, was previously the head of Islamist group al-Muhajiroun or
Islam4UK, which was banned in 2010. Choudary is well-known for organizing demonstrations against Western military action in the Middle East and for publicly expressing support for the September 11 attacks on the United States and the July 7 bombings in London.

- On October 14, 2014, counterterrorism police arrested six people in raids across southern England following other detentions in London and the English Midlands. Two men, ages 23 and 26; and two women, ages 23 and 29; were arrested on charges related to suspected terrorism, while a 57-year-old man and a 48-year-old woman were detained on suspicion of failing to disclose information about terrorism. The 57-year-old man was also held on suspicion of “engaging in conduct in preparation of terrorist acts and arranging availability of money and property for use in terrorism.”

- On October 22, counterterrorism police arrested a 32-year-old man and a 25-year-old woman in two separate probes linked to violent extremism in Syria. The man was arrested on suspicion of having visited a terrorist training camp.

- On November 7, authorities arrested four men for suspected terrorism. Police rounded up the men, ages 19 to 27, from four different southern England locations. Armed police, rarely deployed in the UK, took part in three of the arrests, though no shots were fired. The force’s Terrorism Command, working with the regional South East Counter Terrorism Unit and Britain’s intelligence agency MI5, made the arrests as "part of an ongoing investigation into Islamist-related terrorism."

- On November 26, two British brothers were sent to prison for conspiring to attend a terrorist training camp in Syria, becoming the first Britons jailed after returning from the war-torn country. Hamza and Mohammad Nawaz, from London, were arrested in September 2013 after arriving in England by ferry from France. Police say they were carrying AK-47 ammunition brought home as a trophy as well as photos and videos from their time in Syria. The brothers pleaded guilty, and 23-year-old Hamza Nawaz was sentenced to three years in prison. His 31-year-old brother, described as the instigator of the plan, received four-and-a-half years.

In Northern Ireland, the Crime Operations Department is responsible for conducting terrorism investigations and works closely with MI5 and Gardai (Ireland’s police force) on a range of issues. PSNI senior officials reported that cooperation was “better than ever.” As a direct result of their efforts, there were major disruptions, arrests, and convictions, as well as seizures of arms and improvised explosive device components that impeded violent dissident republican activity. Between October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014 police seized 26.1 kilograms of explosives, almost three times the amount seized in the previous year. In an operation between October 8 and October 11, 2014, the PSNI Serious Crime Branch recovered 500kg of fertilizer, packs of homemade explosives, timer units, detonators, fuses, and six pipe bombs from a farmhouse in Kinawley, County Fermanagh.

2014 law enforcement actions in Northern Ireland included:

- On November 8, in Derry/Londonderry, Eamon Bradley was charged with two extra territorial offenses: possessing explosives with intent to harm and receiving weapons and explosives training in Syria. In October, Bradley was arrested upon his return from Syria, following media reports that he had been fighting in the civil war there. Bradley
spent two months attending a camp run by the Army of Islam group, learning to use various guns, mortars, and explosives.

- On November 10, PSNI, with the aid of MI5, raided a house in Newry and arrested 12 men, aged between 36 and 75. Six of the men were charged with directing terrorism and membership of a proscribed organization, conspiracy to possess explosives with intent to endanger life, conspiracy to possess firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life, and preparation for acts of terrorism. One man was charged with directing terrorism and membership of a proscribed organization. Five other men were released pending a report to the Public Prosecution Service. The operation was part of a wider investigation that began in March into the Continuity IRA. Police reported they were acting on MI5 intelligence that the Continuity IRA’s top officials were meeting at the property to plot a major terrorist attack. Among those arrested was Patrick Joseph ‘Mooch’ Blair, who had previously been accused of building the 1998 Omagh bomb.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The UK is an active member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and has observer or cooperating status in five regional FATF bodies: Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL); Eastern and Southern Africa ‘Anti-Money’ Laundering Group; Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering; and the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. Amendments to Schedule Four of the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force on December 3, 2014. These amendments were made by the Crime (International Cooperation) Act 2003 and implement the Freezing Order measure in relation to terrorism offences. These amendments require a UK court to consider executing an overseas (EU) asset-freezing request within a prescribed period. Additionally, two important pieces of legislation relating to terror finance – the Protection of Charities Bill and the CTS Bill – progressed through Parliament in 2014. The Charities Bill, which would enable the Charities Commission to more effectively counter terrorist financing in the non-profit sector was undergoing Parliamentary pre-legislative scrutiny at year’s end. The CTS Bill includes a provision to prevent kidnap and ransom insurance payments made to terrorists.

The UK prosecutes those involved in the financing of terrorism. Since 2001, 48 individuals have been charged under sections 15-19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (‘fundraising’); of these, 17 individuals were convicted. In the first half of 2014, one individual was convicted on charges of funding terrorism. Additionally, individuals suspected of funding terrorism were convicted of related offenses (fraud, money laundering, etc.), including at least one in 2014. The UK electronically distributes a consolidated list of all UK-designated terrorists and terrorist entities (to include UN targets, EU targets, and UK domestic targets under TAFA) to 15,000 financial institution subscribers, mainly in the UK and its overseas territories.

The UK actively met its obligations to restrict terrorist financing, including funding to extremist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, under UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2170 and 2178. In the second half of 2014, the UK placed asset freezes on six ISIL-affiliated individuals: Hassan Nur, Nasser Muthana, Aseel Muthana, Ruhul Amin, Reyaad Khan and Abdul Rahman Benhammedi. The UK Charities Commission also worked to counter terrorist financing. Of the regulator’s 85 open compliance cases as of October, 37 are Syria-related investigations.
The UK seizes assets in accordance with UNSCRs 1267, 1988, and 1373. Asset freezes under UN obligations are made as soon as corresponding EU regulations come into force. If aware of assets held in the UK, the government proactively notifies financial institutions to compensate for any delay in legal effect of the UN decision. For domestic asset freezes under UNSCR 1373, action is taken immediately. As of June 2014, the UK held approximately US $275,400 in frozen assets: US $163,600 under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010, US $17,800 under the EU terrorist asset freezing regime, and US $94,000 under UNSCRs 1267 and 1988. Her Majesty’s Treasury licenses funds to individuals subject to asset freezes for daily living expenses and legal costs; therefore the amount frozen reduces over time.

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) regulates money transfer and remittance services. HMRC requires remitters to understand to whom they are sending money, and collects originator and recipient information. UK charities have a duty to report suspicious activities under section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000; it is an offense to fail to report where there is a suspicion of terrorist finance. Such reports are filed directly with the police or with the National Crime Agency, and the Charities Commission (UK regulator) is informed. Charities with an annual income of US $40,500 per year are obliged to file serious incident reports (SIDs) of fraud, theft, or other criminal behavior to include support for proscribed organizations or individuals. Charities with annual income under US $40,500 per year “should” report such incidents, but failure to do so does not result in a criminal offense.

Charities are not a regulated sector for the purposes of SIDs, but a charity can file a SID directly with the UK regulator if it chooses to do so. From April 2013 through March 2014, UK charities filed 32 SIDs with the Charities Commission. Additionally, auditors and accountants of charitable organizations have a statutory whistleblowing requirement to report suspicious activities. From April 2013 through March 2014, auditors and accountants filed 85 such reports, of which only four related to suspected terrorism finance. Lastly, UK financial institutions file Suspicious Activity Reports with the National Crime Agency related to the financial accounts and transactions of UK non-profit organizations, a portion of which may be related to suspicion of terrorist finance.

Regional and International Cooperation: The UK is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. The UK cooperates with other nations and international organizations on counterterrorism, including the UN and UN Security Council, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, G-7, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Interpol. In January, the UK supported an UNSCR to counter kidnapping for ransom.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The UK has been following its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization since 2007. The Department of Communities and Local Government are responsible for integration work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities received all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office focuses on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their referral to counseling programs. The revised strategy calls for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, organizations that hold “extremist views,”
even those that are non-violent, are not eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programs.

The CTS Bill introduced in November includes measures to strengthen existing de-radicalization programs, including Channel, a voluntary counter-radicalization program targeted at people, usually youth, who have been identified as at risk of radicalization. The new bill will mandate all local government authorities to participate in the program. An additional provision obliges named organizations – such as universities, schools, prisons, probation providers, and local government councils – have a “duty to prevent” extremism/radical speakers. The Home Office will provide institutions with guidance, such as requiring universities to create policies to prevent extremist speakers, and prisons to provide evidence they are dealing with violent extremist prisoners.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Near East region remained a primary theater for terrorist activity in 2014, with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) exploiting and exacerbating the ongoing conflict in Syria and instability in Iraq to seize contiguous territory in western Iraq and eastern Syria for a self-declared Islamic caliphate. Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its affiliates continued to seek and take advantage of opportunities to conduct operations amidst this fragile political and security climate, including in Yemen, Syria, and North Africa.

In Libya, civil conflict, the proliferation of armed groups, and the breakdown of government functions provided space and safe haven for terrorist groups. Libya’s non-existent security institutions, coupled with ready access to loose weapons and porous borders provided violent extremists with significant opportunities to act and plan operations. There were indications that ISIL affiliates were active in Libya in 2014.

Expanding ISIL presence and operational activity in both Iraq and Syria further challenged the stability of both states. Iraqi security forces, including the Kurdish Peshmerga, in conjunction with Iranian-backed Shia militias, demonstrated some ability to confront this challenge. Global Coalition to Counter ISIL airstrikes stopped ISIL’s initial advance in Iraq, degraded its leadership, and targeted the group’s energy infrastructure. Aggressive pushes by ISIL into central and northern Iraq, as well as central and northern Syria, however, significantly challenged the capabilities of local partners to check ISIL advances. Syria was also a key theater for AQ regional activity, with al-Nusrah Front’s presence and activities threatening the Syrian opposition, Syrian civilians, and other states in the region. While Shia militias have declared opposition to the return of U.S. troops to Iraq and have threatened attacks, they refrained from launching strikes against U.S. personnel in 2014.

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has also taken advantage of the instability in the region, particularly in Libya and Mali. In 2014, AQIM and its affiliates staged separate large-scale attacks against Algerian and Tunisian security forces near the terrorist group’s stronghold in the Chaambi Mountain region that straddles the two countries in April and July respectively. In addition, AQIM increased its coordination with Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, partly as a result of the safe haven both groups found in an increasingly chaotic Libya. Kidnapping for ransom
operations continued to yield significant sums for AQIM, and it conducted attacks against security services across the Trans-Saharan region.

The Government of Yemen continued its fight against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), although struggled in this effort in the latter half of the year due to political instability brought on by the armed Houthi movement, who forcefully took control of the government in the fourth quarter of the year. AQAP continued to exhibit its capability by targeting government installations and Yemeni security and intelligence officials, and increasing attacks against and clashes with the Houthis. AQAP used its social media presence and online Inspire magazine to encourage lone offender attacks and released instructions for a non-metallic explosive device designed to bypass airport security barriers. President Hadi and other government officials continued to support U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Yemen, and encouraged greater cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni counterterrorism forces. This report solely focuses on 2014 and does not address the dynamics that have unfolded in Yemen in 2015.

The Egyptian government continued to confront terrorist groups Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) and Ajnad Misr, which conducted numerous deadly attacks on government and military targets in the Sinai Peninsula, Cairo, and the western desert; and increasing insecurity along Egypt’s extensive border with Libya.

Israel’s tenuous ceasefire with Hamas broke down in July 2014, culminating with the July-August Gaza conflict between Israel and militant groups in Gaza. Thriving smuggling activity through tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border region was ultimately severely restricted by persistent counterterrorism activity by Egyptian forces in the Sinai who subsequently created a kilometer-wide buffer zone along the Gaza border.

In 2014, Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism worldwide remained undiminished through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hizballah, which remained a significant threat to the stability of Lebanon and the broader region. [See Chapter 3, State Sponsors on Terrorism, for more information about Iranian activities.]

**ALGERIA**

**Overview:** Algeria remained a key partner in global counterterrorism efforts. Its military forces and multiple law enforcement, intelligence, and security services with clearly delineated responsibilities addressed counterterrorism; these include the various branches of the Joint Staff, the National Gendarmerie (GN), the Border Guards, and the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS), all operating under the Ministry of National Defense (MND), as well as the national police, or General Directorate of National Security, under the Ministry of Interior. The Government of Algeria continued an aggressive campaign to eliminate all terrorist activity, and it sustained policing efforts to thwart terrorist activity in the capital and other major urban centers. Military forces and security services, primarily the GN, operating under the MND, conducted regular search operations for terrorists in the mountainous Kabylie area, east of Algiers, and in the expansive desert regions in the southeast.
Within Algeria, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitoun, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, remained active terrorist threats. AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalik Droukdel, and Belmokhtar, both Algerian nationals, remained a threat and were at-large in the region at year’s end. These groups aspired to attack Algerian security services, local government targets, and Western interests. AQIM continued attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes. The terrorist group Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jazayer (JAK, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria), emerged in 2014 following a split from AQIM, and swore allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

There is a high threat of kidnapping, primarily in the mountainous areas east of Algiers and in the expansive desert regions near Algeria’s southern border. The Algerian government maintained – and advocated that others should also maintain – a strict “no concessions” policy with regard to terrorist groups holding its citizens hostage.

Rising regional political and security instability contributed to the terrorist threat to Algeria. Violent extremist groups and criminal networks in the Sahel attempted to operate around Algeria’s nearly 4,000 miles of borders. The threat of retaliatory attacks in response to international military intervention in Mali since 2013, weapons smuggled out of Libya or Tunisia, and human and narcotics trafficking were key external threats and made regional coordination on border security a necessity. The Algerian government frequently cited links between terrorist activity, organized crime, and narco-traffickers in the Maghreb and Sahel.

Algerian government officials and Muslim religious and political leaders publicly condemned ISIL and criticized acts of violence committed in the name of Islam. In September, the Algerian government underscored the potential risk from ISIL infiltration at a meeting of the High Council on Security (chaired by President Bouteflika with high-level civil, military, and security officials). To build trust and resilience among communities, the government has in place a development plan and a comprehensive national reconciliation policy. It provided social services and family outreach mechanisms to integrate at-risk youth and prevent marginalization, thus reducing the risk of travel to conflict zones for the purposes of joining terrorist activities.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: On April 19, terrorists attacked an Algerian military convoy in Tizi Ouzou province, killing 11 soldiers, and wounding five. AQIM claimed responsibility for the ambush. The Algerian government observed that AQIM’s Ramadan offensive in 2014 was significantly reduced relative to the past decade. On September 21-24, JAK-A abducted and beheaded a French citizen, Hervé Gourdel, in the Kabylie region, east of Algiers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Algerian government continued its decade-long push to increase the strength of its military and security forces and to professionalize and modernize them. Following restructuring in September 2013, a June 2014 presidential decree restored some judicial police authority to the DRS, Algeria’s intelligence service. It created a new Judicial Investigation Service under the jurisdiction of both the DRS and the general prosecutor of the court of appeal’s criminal division. A public decree related to DRS affairs could be considered an attempt to bring more transparency to the institution’s functioning.
The Algerian government underscored that border security remained a top priority to guard against the infiltration of smugglers and terrorists from neighboring countries. In September, President Bouteflika convened a meeting of the High Council on Security to increase border security, expand search operations to detect and disrupt terrorist activity, increase troops in southern Algeria, and strengthen coordination with neighboring countries on border security. Measures included increased border security, among them closed military border areas, new observer posts in the east, reinforced protection of energy installations, additional permanent facilities for border control management, new aerial-based surveillance technologies, upgrades to communication systems, and additional troops deployed on the borders with Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco. Algerian law enforcement and armed forces increased security cooperation with Tunisian counterparts to reduce the flow of arms. Border security measures included new joint checkpoints and patrols along the frontiers, information sharing, and training and equipment programs.

The Government of Algeria closely monitored passenger manifests for inbound and outbound flights and scrutinized travel documents of visitors, but did not fingerprint them. Algeria employed biometric screening systems to identify suspect travelers, undertook training, and was equipped to recognize fraudulent documents. The Government of Algeria used Interpol channels, alerts, and fusion notices to stay informed on suspicious travelers at land, air, and maritime borders.

Algerian security forces made a number of arrests in 2014. Official and private sector press announced trials for at least 50 suspected terrorists charged with support for or membership in a terrorist organization, kidnapping for ransom, attacks on security forces, and fake checkpoints. Human rights organizations believed there was overuse of pretrial detention by judges and magistrates. Media sources reported on the police’s excessive use of force resulting in alleged injuries and arrests in both legal and illegal protests. Law enforcement actions included:

- On May 5, Algerian army forces launched a counterterrorist operation near Tin-Zaouatine (Tamanrasset province), on the southern border with Mali. The MND reported a dozen terrorists were killed. According to a Council of Ministers communique, the nationalities of those killed were Malian, Tunisian, and Libyan.
- On August 30, the Algerian government announced that it secured the release without ransom payment of two Algerian diplomats who were kidnapped in 2012 in Mali by MUJAO.
- On November 26, the Minister of Justice confirmed that security forces had killed in October a JAK member involved in the Gourdel kidnapping. The Justice Minister announced December 23 that security forces killed the leader of JAK, Abdelmalek Gouri, along with two other perpetrators of the Gourdel kidnapping and murder.

To enhance its capacity to deal effectively with security challenges within its borders and defend against threats to regional stability, Algerian law enforcement agencies participated in Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program trainings to enhance investigative and screening capacities, border security, prevent terrorist transit or operations, and build response capacity to critical incidents. The Algerian government sent an interagency mix of officers to U.S. government-sponsored programs. In August, the State Department delivered a
Regional Border Control Management course for security officials from Algeria, Niger, and Tunisia. The U.S. DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) focused on capacity-building consultations with Algeria and mentoring in forensics, border security, criminal investigation, and evidence collection at crime scenes.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Its financial intelligence unit is also a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, an informal network of financial intelligence units.

Algeria continued its work on drafting revisions to various portions of its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) statutory scheme, including amending the Penal Code effective February 16, 2014 to bring the definition of a terrorist act into accordance with international standards, and has made progress. It will take time, however, to determine whether the laws enacted are being actively and evenly implemented. Algerian authorities are working on further revisions to the penal code dealing with AML/CFT with respect to terrorist finance and freezing of terrorist assets. The decree 13-318 of September 16, 2013 addresses how to identify, locate, and freeze the funds or property of terrorists, but needs revisions to make it compliant with international standards.

The Algerian law enforcement services collaborated with the United States on several workshops that addressed terrorist financing including workshops to dismantle complex criminal organizations and terrorist financial networks.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Algeria increased diplomatic efforts to fight terrorism in the region in 2014, while maintaining its non-interventionist military policy. It facilitated an inclusive national dialogue for Malian groups and officials, regional partners, and hosted talks among the stakeholders to help reach political resolutions, in coordination with the UN. Algeria also strongly supports UN efforts for a political solution in Libya.

Algeria is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and co-chair of GCTF’s Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group (SWG). In June, Algeria joined regional partners and international organizations to found the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law (IIJ). Algeria continued to play a leadership role in the GCTF’s efforts to raise awareness among governments to prevent the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations. As co-chair of the GCTF’s SWG, Algeria continued to champion the implementation and development of the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists. In October, Algeria, Canada, and the United States co-sponsored the first in a series of GCTF Kidnapping for Ransom technical workshops at the IIJ.
While Morocco and Algeria both participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the IIJ, and the GCTF, the level of their bilateral counterterrorism cooperation did not improve in 2014. Algeria and Morocco’s political disagreement over the Western Sahara remained an impediment to bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation.

When the UNSC adopted Resolution 2178 condemning foreign terrorist fighters, Algeria expressed publicly its support for the measure and commitment to the UN’s Global Counterterrorism Strategy. Algeria recalled its prior experience with returning foreign fighters from Afghanistan in the 1990s and the need to address the phenomenon comprehensively. In November, Algeria sent an interagency delegation to Brussels for the regional conference on foreign terrorist fighters that was jointly organized by the Swiss Confederation and the EU. In December, Algerian officials participated in the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group meeting in Marrakech. Algeria also attended a December meeting of the IIJ and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate on challenges regarding evidence collection and the ability to effectively prosecute cases involving foreign terrorist fighters.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) expanded international outreach efforts, including a cooperation agreement with the French Ministry of Interior. France will broadcast monthly the Friday prayer from the Grand Mosque of Paris on Algerian television and will welcome in France visiting Algerian imams who profess their views of a balanced and tolerant Islam and respect for the citizen and secularism.

Algeria is home to Regional Command for Joint Counter Terrorism Operations (CEMOC’s) Liaison and Fusion Center for information sharing and hosts the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. Algeria also participated in the G-5 Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso) and the Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Algeria worked with the EU on its European Neighborhood Police initiative and the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel.

Algeria actively participated in the 5+5 Defense Initiative, which brings together five European and five North African countries to address security issues in the Western Mediterranean. In October, it hosted a meeting on the 20th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Mediterranean Dialogue to discuss security challenges in the region. Algeria is a delegate for the African region on the Interpol Executive Board and in February, agreed to host the headquarters of AFRIPOL, a pan-African organization that fosters police training and cooperation in response to security threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and cybercrime.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Algeria underscored the value of state oversight for religious education, including the training of imams, the content of prayers, and credentialing imams in a way that promotes tolerance and sensitizes the religious leaders to the risks of using religion for political objectives. The Algerian government appointed, trained, and paid the salaries of imams. The penal code outlined punishments, including fines and prison sentences, for anyone other than a government-designated imam who preaches in a mosque. The Algerian government monitored mosques for possible security-related offenses and prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places.
outside of regular prayer hours. The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) warned Algerians against foreign extremist trends (e.g. ISIL, Wahhabism) and heeding to fatwas (judicial rulings) that originate outside Algeria. The Religious Affairs Minister submitted a proposal to the Presidency for the creation of an Academy of fatwa in Algeria to include university teachers and Ulema in different fields. Official press noted this religious institution will have the authority to take legal action against unfounded fatwa promulgation and the Academy’s religious scholars will inform society on the criteria for issuing fatwa.

Under the 2006 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, Algeria offers amnesty to former terrorists who laid down their weapons, and disavowed violence, exceptions being perpetrators of particularly egregious acts, such as rape, murder, and bombings. The Charter works through offices located nation-wide that extend judicial assistance and social and job reintegration measures to repentant terrorists, victims of terrorism, and families of terrorists. The President of the Judicial Unit confirmed a total of 9,000 terrorists – repentant prisoners and members of terrorist support networks – were pardoned under the Charter since its inception.

BAHRAIN

Overview: The Bahraini government continued to increase efforts to detect, neutralize, and contain terrorist threats in 2014. Some groups’ use of real and fake improvised explosive devices remained a threat to security services, resulting in the death of at least five police officers. The Government of Bahrain also began to implement tougher counterterrorism laws that the legislature approved during the first half of the year. Peaceful opposition groups and some international observers expressed their concern at the scope of the new laws, which they say could easily be used to hinder peaceful opposition activity as well as terrorism. The inability of the government and political opposition to reach an agreement on political reforms threatened to fuel further domestic unrest, upon which violent opposition groups could seek to capitalize.

The Government of Bahrain has supported the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and on November 9 hosted an international conference on countering ISIL’s financing. The Bahraini government welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178. Bahraini leaders have publicly condemned ISIL’s activities, ideology, and recruitment, while the government has worked to detect, counter, and discourage domestic ISIL recruitment and extremist messaging. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) has arrested and charged, or stripped the citizenship of some Bahrainis suspected of supporting ISIL, and in March it called on all Bahrainis fighting in Iraq and Syria to return to Bahrain or face prosecution.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Notable incidents included:
- On February 15, a policeman was killed and three others were injured after a homemade bomb detonated in Al-Dair.
- On March 2, a policeman was injured after a homemade bomb detonated in East Eker.
- On March 3, a homemade bomb exploded in al-Daih, killing two local policemen and one officer from the United Arab Emirates.
- On March 22, a policeman was injured after a homemade bomb detonated in Sitra.
- On July 4, a homemade bomb detonated in East Eker, killing a police officer.
- On July 27, three policemen were injured when a homemade bomb exploded in Al-Dair.
On December 9, a homemade bomb exploded on December 9 in Dumistan, killing a policeman.

On December 10, a civilian was killed by a homemade bomb that exploded in Karzakan.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Throughout 2014 Bahrain bolstered existing counterterrorism laws and criminal penalties. Bahrain’s legislature approved and the government promulgated a series of royal decrees issued during the second half of 2013 increasing penalties for terrorism-related crimes and expanding counterterrorism finance regulations. Terrorism-related acts, a broadly-defined category, are treated as criminal cases, with prescribed penalties spelled out in the Anti-Terrorism Law of 2006 and Articles 155 and 168 of the Penal Code. There were concerns that the government used counterterrorism laws to prosecute or harass individuals for their criticism of the government.

The MOI is the lead government agency regarding the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism and the arrest of suspects in terrorist-related acts, with the Bahrain National Security Agency providing support. The Bahraini Coast Guard also contributed to the counterterrorism mission by monitoring and interdicting the seaborne movement of weapons and terrorists into and out of the country. The major deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security remained the lack of interagency coordination and limited training opportunities to develop requisite law enforcement skills.

Bahrain has participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program since 1987, and assistance in 2014 focused on developing the capacity to investigate and respond to terrorists’ use of explosives. Leahy vetting challenges, however, prompted the cancellation of nearly all planned ATA courses in 2014. The U.S. Embassy was able to assist with the delivery of an ATA K9 Train the Trainer course that graduated two trainers and eight trainees, but as a result of a general lack of training and antiquated investigative methods and technologies, the MOI Police Force’s progress in areas of counterterrorism and criminal investigation has slowed.

On January 4, an MOI explosives team defused a bomb placed on a busy commercial street in central Manama. On March 16, an MOI explosives team defused a gas cylinder bomb located in a vehicle along a busy public road in central Manama.

Notable prosecutions included:

- On April 28, a court handed down life sentences to eight individuals convicted of killing a police officer (and injuring five others) in a September 2013 bomb attack on a police patrol.
- On May 11, a court sentenced six Bahraini to life in prison for planting an explosive device that killed a civilian in 2013.
- On July 17, a court sentenced three men to prison terms ranging from five years to life for forming a terrorist cell and detonating a bomb in 2013 in Budaiya.
- On August 6, a court sentenced nine Bahrainis to up to 15 years in prison and stripped their citizenship for establishing a terrorist cell, possessing unlicensed firearms and ammunition, receiving militia training, and smuggling weapons.
• On August 13, a court sentenced fourteen individuals to a range of prison terms for their involvement in an explosion in July 2013 that killed a policeman.
• On September 29, a court sentenced nine individuals to life imprisonment and stripped their citizenship for smuggling weapons and explosives into Bahrain.
• On November 21, a court sentenced three men to 10 years in prison and stripped them of their Bahraini citizenship for their involvement in an August 2013 explosion in Eker.
• On December 30, two individuals were sentenced to death for their role in an explosion on February 14 that killed a policeman.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bahrain is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Bahrain is an important regional financial hub, which makes it vulnerable to the large amounts of money flowing through the Gulf region to support various terrorist and violent extremist groups. The Bahraini government did not provide information on prosecutions. In November, Bahrain hosted an international seminar on countering the financing of terrorism. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Bahrain worked closely and cooperatively with international partners throughout the region. Since formally endorsing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in March 2008, Bahrain has proactively worked to expand air, sea, and causeway border control points.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) heads Bahrain’s efforts to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism, in part by organizing regular workshops for clerics and speakers from both the Sunni and Shia sects. The MOJIA also undertakes an annual review of schools’ Islamic Studies curricula to evaluate interpretations of religious texts.

**EGYPT**

**Overview:** In 2014, the Egyptian government continued to confront active terrorist groups, which conducted deadly attacks on government and military targets throughout the country. The two primary terrorist groups operating in Egypt are Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) and Ajnad Misr. ABM, a Sinai-based group, swore allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on November 3. While ABM is most active in the Sinai, it has demonstrated a capability to conduct attacks throughout Egypt, including in Cairo. Ajnad Misr is a Cairo-based terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in downtown Cairo and focuses primarily on government and security targets.

In June, former head of the Egyptian Armed Forces ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi was elected president, replacing an interim government that had taken over following the removal of former President Mohamed Morsi from office in July 2013. President al-Sisi has focused intently on counterterrorism in Egypt, and he made counterterrorism issues one of the pillars of his first
speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2014. Under President al-Sisi’s authority, the Egyptian military and security forces continued to aggressively pursue counterterrorism initiatives, particularly in the Sinai. Some political opposition groups claim that the Egyptian government’s counterterrorism initiatives, while intended to target terrorist groups, have also had the effect of constraining their activities.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the MB-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and NGOs affiliated with the MB were outlawed in 2014. The Egyptian government designated the MB as a terrorist organization in December 2013 and the High Administrative Court dissolved the FJP on August 9, 2014. On October 30, the government also declared illegal the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy, which is an informal political advocacy coalition led primarily by MB supporters. These designations have enabled widespread crackdown on MB and its affiliated organizations, including mass arrests by the government and often severe sentences from the judiciary in mass trials.

Egypt joined the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, provided it with logistical and political support, and backed its line-of-effort to “expose ISIL’s true nature.” Egypt acknowledges the threat of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to fight with ISIL in Syria and returning to Egypt. Throughout the year, authorities required citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 to obtain permission to travel to Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. Additionally, on December 6, authorities began requiring official permission for travel to Qatar and Turkey. The government stated that these regulations are intended to make it more difficult for citizens to join terrorist groups, such as ISIL, in Iraq and Syria.

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and prominent Egyptian religious leaders, such as al-Azhar Grand Imam Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb and Grand Mufti of Egypt Shawki Allam, have repeatedly publicly condemned ISIL and its actions, while also making unhelpful remarks about the origins of ISIL. In early December, as part of Egypt’s contribution to counter-ISIL messaging, al-Tayyeb hosted a two-day conference with dozens of Egyptian and international religious scholars, aiming to discredit the theological basis of ISIL’s use of “jihad,” “caliphate,” and “kufr (infidelity to Islam),” and to promote coexistence between Muslims and Christians.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Noteworthy incidents included:

- On January 24, a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) detonated at the Cairo Security Directorate building in Cairo, killing five people and injuring dozens of others. The VBIED ripped the façade off of the building, and partially destroyed the nearby Islamic Museum. ABM issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.
- On January 25, assailants shot down an Egyptian military helicopter near Shaykh Zuwayd, killing all five soldiers on board. ABM released a video on YouTube several days later showing the attack.
- On February 16, a suicide bomber detonated a suicide belt on a tourist bus in Taba, killing three South Korean tourists and the Egyptian bus driver, and wounding several others. ABM issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.
• On April 2, two improvised explosive devices concealed in a tree detonated near Cairo University in Giza, killing a police brigadier general and wounding five other police officers. Ajnad Misr released a statement claiming responsibility for the attack.
• On July 14, assailants on Egyptian territory fired a salvo of rockets at Éilat, Israel; which wounded multiple Israelis. ABM publicly claimed responsibility for the attack.
• On July 19, assailants used rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and machine guns to attack an Egyptian military checkpoint near the al-Farafra Oasis in Egypt’s Western Desert. The attack killed 22 Egyptian border guard personnel and wounded several others.
• On August 6, assailants carjacked and killed a U.S. citizen oil worker on the road to the al-Karama Petroleum Field in the Western Desert. On November 30, ABM claimed responsibility for the attack via a statement on Twitter.
• On August 18, assailants kidnapped and beheaded four civilians in Shaykh Zuwayd. ABM released a video showing the four hostages allegedly confessing to spying for Israel.
• On October 24, assailants attacked a military checkpoint near Shaykh Zuwayd in a two-phased attack involving a suicide VBIED followed by RPGs and small arms fire. The assailants killed 30 Egyptian troops and wounded dozens more. ABM released a video of the attack and claimed responsibility for it.
• On November 12, assailants hijacked an Egyptian Navy guided missile craft in Damietta. Egyptian military aircraft engaged the attackers, destroying the boat and killing the crew.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The new Egyptian Constitution passed following a public referendum in January 2014. Article 237 specifically addresses terrorism, stating that Egypt “commits to fighting all types and forms of terrorism and tracking its sources of funding within a specific time frame…” Egypt’s penal code includes an extensive counterterrorism legal framework, primarily under Part 2, Section 1, Article 86, which defines terrorism in expansive terms that include peaceful protests. Additionally, subsequent sections define a variety of offenses and penalties for those who engage in terrorist activities and provide incentives for cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of terrorist organizations. Despite having counterterrorism as its stated primary purpose, Egyptian counterterrorism legislation has had an intimidating effect on NGO operations.

The November 2014 draft of the Terrorist Entities Law also defines a “terrorist entity” in broad terms that human rights groups are concerned could be applied to civil society. However, it does give designated groups the right to appeal their designation through judicial review. The draft law also gives Egyptian authorities the power to freeze a designated group’s assets and to arrest its members.

The Ministry of Interior’s National Security Sector (NSS) is primarily responsible for counterterrorism functions in Egypt, but it also works with other elements of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the Egyptian General Intelligence Service, and the Egyptian armed forces. There is adequate interagency cooperation and information sharing among the various counterterrorism elements within the Egyptian government.

Egypt continues to take actions to improve its border security measures. At border crossings and airports, Egyptian authorities check for the presence of known security features within travel
documents, such as micro-printing, UV features, and digit schemes. They also scan and cross reference documents with criminal databases that alert them when there is derogatory information present. Egypt maintains a terrorist watch list with a simple listing provided to Egyptian immigration officials at the ports of entry and detailed information maintained within the NSS.

Egypt’s primary physical border security concerns are along the borders with Gaza and Libya. Following a series of terrorist attacks in northern Sinai, Egypt destroyed underground tunnels that connected Gaza and Sinai and is in the process of building an up-to-five kilometer buffer zone along the border with Gaza. Egypt also increased its military presence along the Libya border, but continues to face challenges with policing the 715 miles.

Egyptian law enforcement and security personnel achieved some limited successes in battling terrorists in its territory in 2014. In April, Egyptian authorities arrested Thirwat Salah Shihata, one of al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s top deputies, in a Cairo suburb. In September, the MOI killed seven ABM terrorists in Ain Sukhna, who were accused of assassinating 44 civilian, security, and armed forces personnel, including an American citizen. On December 21, government entities raided a farm located in Husainiya Sharqia, killing one security official and five ABM members. In this operation, security officials confiscated weapons, explosives, and explosive materials, including a VBIED, which was later control-detoned by security forces. Additionally, the MOI killed the alleged leader of ABM’s Cairo Branch, Mohamed Rabie Mohamed Younis.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Egypt is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. On May 15, the Government of Egypt issued an amendment (Presidential Decree Law no. 36) to Law no. 80 of 2002, which modernized Egypt’s Anti-Money Laundering-Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) Law and provided the necessary legal framework for Egypt to implement key FATF standards. Among other improvements, the law criminalizes the willful collection and provision of funds for terrorist purposes and addresses previous deficiencies with regard to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373. To reflect Egypt’s increased emphasis on CFT, this law changed the name of Egypt’s Financial Intelligence Unit from the Money Laundering Combating Unit to the Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Combating Unit. Additionally, a statute proposed in November 2014 gives the government clear legal authority to designate groups as terrorist organizations, and allows the government to freeze their assets and money. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Within the UN, Egypt participated in a Sixth Committee (Legal) session in October that sought to draft a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. Speaking on behalf of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Egypt representative denounced terrorist atrocities, condemned attempts to link terrorism with Islam, and advocated a coordinated approach by the international community to combat terrorism. Egypt is also an active participant in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), co-chairing (along with the U.S.) the Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Working Group. In June,
Egypt was re-instated into the AU, following an almost one-year suspension after the removal of former President Mohamed Morsi. In his speech at the AU’s Heads of State meeting in June, President Sisi reinforced the need for cooperation among AU members to combat terrorism.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Ministry of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) is legally responsible for issuing guidance to which all imams throughout Egypt are required to adhere, including weekly instructions on a provided theme that aims to prevent extremist language in sermons. Al-Azhar University cooperated with international programs to help train imams to promote tolerance and non-violence, interfaith cooperation, and human rights. The Ministry of Islamic Endowments is also required to license all mosques in Egypt; however, many continued to operate without licenses. The government has the authority to appoint and monitor the imams who lead prayers in licensed mosques, and the government pays their salaries.

IRAQ

Overview: Iraq witnessed a significant surge of terrorist activity in 2014, primarily as a result of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s (ISIL) seizure of large areas of the country. The resulting security vacuum and humanitarian crisis presented new challenges to the Iraqi government and exacerbated existing ethno-sectarian grievances. Building on military victories in Syria, in January 2014 ISIL captured the city of Fallujah in Anbar Province. On June 7, fighting erupted between ISIL, allied groups, and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Mosul, the capital of Ninewa Province and Iraq’s second largest city. Within a week, ISIL had seized control of the city and began using its significant business, industrial, and energy resources to fund its operations. ISIL formations moved south from Mosul through the Tigris Valley in June, seizing multiple cities and putting to flight several Iraqi Army divisions. Outside Tikrit, ISIL terrorists captured nearly 1,700 Iraqi Air Force recruits and executed many of the captives, posting the slaughter on YouTube. Nearby, ISIL surrounded the Bayji refinery – beginning a siege that would last five months. On August 2, ISIL invaded the Sinjar district causing hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee, tens of thousands of whom were forced to seek refuge and became trapped on Mt. Sinjar when they were unable to reach safety ahead of ISIL’s advance. In response, President Obama ordered four initiatives to gather information and help the Iraqis counter the ISIL threat, and on August 8, U.S. airstrikes against ISIL targets began in response to the group’s advance toward Erbil. In mid-September, the United States took the lead in forming the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, uniting over 60 countries in the effort.

After a general election on April 30, Iraq began a four-month government formation process, resulting in the August 11 selection of Haider al-Abadi as the next Iraqi prime minister. Prime Minister Abadi assumed office on September 8, and in October, Abadi secured the appointment of a full cabinet for the first time since 2010, including Defense and Interior Ministers. Throughout the latter part of 2014, the Iraqi government worked to implement its National Program, which includes a number of initiatives to ease ethno-sectarian tensions. It engaged with tribes fighting against ISIL and began to recruit a force composed of Sunni tribal units that could eventually be subsumed into the proposed National Guard. In addition, the Abadi administration reached an agreement in December with the Kurds on oil exports and revenue sharing. Looking forward to the needs of areas liberated from ISIL control, PM Abadi called for
international assistance during the Global Coalition’s first ministerial in Brussels on December 3, as well as in the January meeting of the Small Group in London.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist groups significantly increased the number of attacks throughout the country in 2014. Most notably, ISIL’s rapid acquisition of abandoned ISF military equipment in the course of fighting from January onward gave ISIL greater capabilities in line with a more conventional military force, including the reported use of tanks, artillery, and unmanned aerial drones. According to estimates from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), acts of terrorism and violence killed more than 10,000 civilians and injured more than 17,000 in 2014. ISIL’s unsparing brutality affected many lives. Following is an illustrative sample that highlights only a small number of the most egregious practices:

- On January 15, an improvised explosive device explosion at a funeral in Diyala province killed thirteen civilians and wounded eighteen.
- In February, ISIL militants surrounded a police encampment near a stadium construction site in the town of Tuz Khurmatu. ISIL gathered six policemen, asked if they were Shia or Sunni, and then shot and killed the men after their prayer ritual indicated they were not Sunni.
- In June, ISIL attacked an Iraqi military base, formerly known as Camp Speicher, in Salah ad Din, killing as many as 1,700 cadets and soldiers.
- On July 27, ISIL destroyed the tombs of Sufi sheikhs in the al-Rawtha al-Muhamadiya Mosque in Muthanna District in eastern Mosul.
- On August 2-3, ISIL forces invaded Sinjar district. Hundreds of Yezidis (predominantly men) were killed and thousands fled to Mt Sinjar or the Iraqi Kurdish Region. In the course of the fighting and in subsequent days, an estimated 5,000 Yezidis (including approximately 4,000 women and children) were taken captive.
- On August 15, in Kocho (var. Kojo), media and eyewitnesses reported that as many as several hundred Yezidi male captives were killed.
- On August 31, ISIL executed 19 Sunnis in Saadiya for not pledging allegiance to ISIL.
- On September 3, ISIL abducted two former Iraqi Army officers and four civilians from Gheda village in Daquq area, Kirkuk.
- On October 13, approximately 33 people were killed in three attacks in Baghdad as Shia Muslims celebrated Eid al-Ghadir.
- On November 3, media reports indicated ISIL forces had massacred more than 300 members of the Abu Nimr tribe in Iraq’s western province of al Anbar.
- On December 10, there were reports in Mosul that ISIL had punished a homosexual man by throwing him from a rooftop and stoning him to death.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2014, ISIL’s existential threat to Iraq forced the central government to focus entirely on the campaign to defeat it. ISIL offensives significantly degraded Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capability, manpower, and equipment. The Government of Iraq suffered attrition across its national security apparatus, especially in the Iraqi Army and Federal and local police, and worked with the Coalition to address training and equipping shortfalls. In addition, Prime Minister Abadi’s National Plan specifically pledged to strengthen border security and improve law enforcement, among other areas.
Iraq adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. The Government of Iraq has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land and air ports of entry. Iraq also continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and ATA training for the Emergency Response Brigades contributed to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.

Before ISIL’s dramatic advance into northern Iraq in June, there was already significant population displacement as a result of its attacks in Anbar. These attacks, dating back to January, resulted in the displacement of some 474,000 people from Fallujah, Ramadi, and the surrounding areas. ISIL’s takeover of Mosul in June and its subsequent advances on the Ninewa plain resulted in massive additional displacements, of minority populations in particular, primarily into the Iraqi Kurdistan Region and the Kerbala and Najaf governorates. The UN estimates that over 2.1 million Iraqis were displaced in 2014 alone, adding to the estimated one million Iraqis who were displaced prior to 2014.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Since 2005, Iraq has been a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Iraq held the presidency of MENAFATF from November 2013 to November 2014. In November 2012, MENAFATF adopted Iraq’s mutual evaluation to review compliance with international anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The report identified significant and serious risks, and Iraq agreed on an action plan to address its vulnerabilities. In November 2014, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) provided an update to the MENAFATF Plenary. In addition, Iraq is also reviewed three times a year under the FATF International Cooperation Review Group process, which includes a negotiated action plan with timelines to address specific identified deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime. The international community, including the United States, provided subject matter expertise to assist Iraq and seeks to develop capacity building as the situation improves.

In 2014, ISIL derived income from a range of sources, such as oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, looting, extortion, illegal “taxation,” antiquities theft and smuggling, and foreign donations. Together with Global Coalition partners, the United States took a holistic approach to combating ISIL’s ability to generate revenues and sustain itself, including through direct military action. Global coalition airstrikes targeted ISIL’s energy infrastructure – modular refineries, petroleum storage tanks, and crude oil collection points – and these airstrikes significantly degraded ISIL’s ability to generate revenue from its control of energy assets. Additionally, the United States used sanctions to ensure that banks, companies, and citizens across the world did not engage in financial transactions with ISIL. Partner nations actively implemented sanctions against ISIL pursuant to the UN Security Council 1267/1989 al-Qa’ida Sanctions regime, which obligates all member states to freeze assets, ban travel, and embargo arms from al-Qa’ida-associated individuals and entities, including ISIL. Each of the over 60 Global Coalition countries reaffirmed their commitment to countering ISIL’s financing in the joint statement at the Global Coalition Ministerial in Brussels on December 3.
Regional and International Cooperation: As a result of ISIL’s rapid territorial gains in Iraq in the first half of 2014, in September, the United States led the creation of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The Coalition focused on training, equipping, advising, and assisting the ISF, including Kurdish forces. Along with Coalition partners, the United States stood up multiple training sites across Iraq to focus on improving ISF capabilities in command and control, intelligence, logistics, fire support, and other combat-enabling roles. On December 3, the Secretary chaired a Global Coalition ministerial conference in Brussels, at which all partners unanimously endorsed a detailed communiqué to guide and coordinate global efforts going forward, including a commitment to five lines of effort designed to guide the ongoing action against ISIL. These five lines of effort include: supporting military operations, capacity building, and training; disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; cutting off ISIL’s access to financing and funding; addressing the humanitarian crises; and exposing ISIL’s true nature (ideological de-legitimization).

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: On October 27 the United States participated in the conference of Global Coalition partners focused on countering ISIL’s messaging and countering violent extremism. Bahrain, Egypt, France, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UK, and the UAE joined the conference. In addition, Iraq has taken several significant steps towards diminishing the pull of ISIL’s propaganda on potential recruits. On April 10, then Minister of Higher Education Ali al-Adeeb opened a one-day conference on Countering Violent Extremism and appealed for scientific research focused identifying what motivates suicide attackers. The conference received significant national press coverage and included several high profile speakers.

ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND JERUSALEM

Overview: Israel was a committed counterterrorism partner in 2014. Israel again faced terrorist threats from Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and other violent extremists, particularly from Gaza but also from the West Bank; from Hizballah in Lebanon and Syria; and from Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula.

Gaza-based Palestinian terrorist organizations continued rocket and mortar attacks into Israeli territory, and multiple terrorist attacks were launched along Israel’s security barrier with Gaza. Israel was hit by a record volume of rocket and mortar fire from Gaza and the Sinai in 2014, according to the Israeli government, with more than 4,660 projectiles launched, most during the July-August conflict, at Israeli territory compared to 74 launchings in 2013 and 2,557 in 2012. Militants from Gaza also infiltrated Israeli territory using tunnels in six separate attacks and, for the first time, by a sea-borne operation. The Government of Israel reported that it responded to these threats with operations directed at terrorist leaders; infrastructure (including tunnels, weapons production and storage facilities; command and control centers; terrorist training sites; and safe havens), and activities such as rocket and mortar launching; most notably in Operation Protective Edge (OPE) during the July 7 to August 26 Gaza conflict. The
Government of Israel reported that during OPE it conducted over 5,240 airstrikes in Gaza and carried out a 20-day military ground operation within Gaza. According to publicly available data, the conflict led to the deaths of 2,205 Palestinians and 74 persons in Israel, among them 67 soldiers, six Israeli civilians, and one Thai civilian. The Israeli government estimated that half of those killed in Gaza were civilians and half were combatants, while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) recorded 1,483 civilian Palestinian deaths – more than two-thirds of those killed – including 521 children and 283 women.

Militants continued efforts to smuggle arms and dual-use materials through the Sinai into Gaza via tunnels. Israeli officials welcomed significant efforts by the Government of Egypt to prevent such smuggling from occurring. In March, the Israeli government interdicted a weapons shipment containing 40 M-302 rockets, 181 mortars, and hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition from Iran believed to be destined for militants in Gaza. Israeli officials continued to be concerned about efforts to smuggle weapons from Libya, Iran, and via Sudan into Gaza.

Israeli counterterrorism officials said Gaza militants continued to make significant quantitative and qualitative advances in capabilities, as demonstrated during the 51-day conflict in the summer, with rockets reaching as far north as 74.56 miles from Gaza, frequently targeting the Tel Aviv area, and reaching as far east as the Jerusalem mountains. However, following the conflict, Israel estimated that the Hamas and PIJ weapons arsenal decreased by 60-70% due to Israeli strikes and militant use during the operation. These groups also continued to improve their tunnel construction capabilities, reaching depths of approximately 80 feet and extending more than a mile. Israeli forces destroyed more than 30 tunnels during OPE, including 14 that crossed into Israeli territory. Hamas has also announced its interest in acquiring new capabilities, such as UAVs to launch attacks. The Government of Israel continued to hold Hamas, as the dominant organization in effective control of Gaza, responsible for attacks emanating from Gaza, and Israeli officials pointed to these attacks as proof that Hamas has not abandoned terrorism.

Since the conclusion of OPE, Iranian governmental officials have publicly stated a willingness to resume Iran's military support of Hamas, including arming Hamas in the West Bank with the same weapons as in Gaza, but it remains unclear whether efforts have resumed.

Israeli security officials and politicians remained concerned about the terrorist threat posed to Israel from Hizballah and its Iranian patron, highlighting that Iran, primarily through the efforts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), continued to transfer arms to Hizballah. Israeli experts believe that Iran is trying to arm Hizballah with advanced weapons systems such as anti-air and anti-ship cruise missile systems, as well as continuing to transfer long-range rockets into Lebanon. Also, Israeli officials were concerned about the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons from Syria to terrorist organizations. According to the Government of Israel, Hizballah has stockpiled approximately 100,000 missiles in Lebanon since the 2006 Lebanon War, some of which are capable of striking anywhere in Israel, including population centers.

Iran has admitted publicly that it armed Hizballah (in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1701 and 1747) with advanced long-range Iranian manufactured "Fateh"
missiles. In late November, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the head of the IRGC Aerospace Division admitted that "The IRGC and Hizballah are a single apparatus jointed together" (Fars news agency, 29 November).

While Israel is not involved in Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) efforts, it shares information to help track and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters through information exchanges on counterterrorism issues with numerous governments. In support of UNSCRs 2170 and 2178, Israel regularly updates the list of foreign terrorist organizations and individuals involved in terrorism in order to better align with UNSC sanctions lists. Additionally, in November the Israeli government approved the work of an interagency team that will examine the need and methods of requiring and collecting advance passenger information and passenger name record data from airlines operating in its territory, to achieve better safety measures and as part of Israel’s implementation of UNSCR 2178.

Attacks by violent extremists – both Israelis against a joint Arab-Israeli school and Palestinian residents, property, and places of worship, and Palestinians against Israelis – in Israel, Jerusalem, and the West Bank continued.

Israeli President Reuven Rivlin spoke out against extremist violence and “price tag” attacks (property crimes and violent acts by extremist Jewish individuals and groups in retaliation for activity they deemed to be anti-settlement) on multiple occasions, as did Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Notable terrorist attacks included:

- On January 31, Sinai-based terrorist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis took credit for launching two rockets on the southern resort city of Eilat. There were no reported injuries or property damage from the attack.
- On multiple occasions in March and again in October, Hizballah allegedly planted IEDs along the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria borders. Hizballah claimed responsibility for the October attack. A total of six soldiers were injured in IED explosions along these borders while on patrol.
- On June 22, a teenager was killed and three others were wounded when hit by an anti-tank rocket along the separation fence with Syria.
- From July 11 to August 26, a total of 18 rockets were launched from southern Lebanon towards Israel, with nine rockets hitting Israel on six occasions and injuring two civilians.
- In July and August, Gaza-based terrorist organizations and militants engaged in a 51-day conflict with Israel. Gaza-based groups fired 4,435 rockets at Israel; Israel conducted over 5,240 airstrikes in Gaza and carried out a 20-day military ground operation within Gaza. Additionally, Sinai-based terrorist organizations launched a total of 30 rockets from the Sinai during OPE resulting in minor injuries and property damage. During the military operation, many international airlines suspended air service to Ben Gurion Airport for 36 hours due to safety concerns after a rocket landed in close proximity to the airport.
- On November 10, a Palestinian stabbed an IDF soldier and wounded another at the Hagana train station in Tel Aviv. The suspect was later apprehended by the INP.
On multiple occasions, violent extremists undertook “price tag” attacks. (In March, the tires of 19 vehicles were slashed and acid poured on in the Arab-Israeli town of Jaljulia. Homes in the town were sprayed with graffiti stating “Every Arab is a Criminal.” Additional cases of “price tag” attacks took place in Acre in May and in Haifa against an Arab-Israeli school in June. An Eilat sports complex was also vandalized with “Death to Arabs” and “Lehava” (the name of an extremist anti-assimilation group) in December.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and promote international legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists.

In September, Israel declared al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization on the basis of the U.S. designation of this organization. This was executed according to Israel’s Prohibition of Terror Financing Law (2005), which allows the Israeli Security Cabinet to declare a foreign association to be an FTO on the basis of the relevant determination by a foreign country or by the UNSC. It is the first time that Israel has adopted a designation on the basis of a determination made by another country. Israeli officials have stated they will similarly pursue other designations.

Over the course of 2014, the Minister of Defense approved the designation of several terror organizations as “unlawful associations.” These designations include: Islamic Relief World Wide, Imarat Al-Aqsa wal-Muqadasat, the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (Lebanon), the Islamic State / ISIS (Iraq, Syria, and others), al-Nusra Front (Syria), the Salafiya-Jihadiya (Network of networks), Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Egypt), and Muassasat Alquds Litanmiya.

On the law enforcement front, the ISA and INP continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies on cases involving U.S. citizens killed in terrorist attacks, as well as other counterterrorism initiatives of mutual interest.

The Israeli Ministry of Interior maintains a voluntary biometric passport control system at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport, which is available for Israeli passport holders over the age of 18. The system facilitates both entry into and exit from Israel via an automatic kiosk for Israeli citizens who successfully pass a background check and provide a scan of the back of their hand. Israel maintained a border fence along the length of its border with the Sinai Peninsula to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into Israel, augmented by cameras and sensors to similarly reduce the threat of terrorism. Israel does not collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights.

In November, the Israeli government approved the work of an interagency team that will examine the need and methods of requiring and collecting API and PNR data from airlines operating in its territory, to achieve better safety measures and as part of Israel’s implementation of UNSCR 2178.

Additionally, legal cases against violent extremists responsible for “price tag” attacks began making their way through the Israeli judicial system, although investigations by the Israeli
authorities in the majority of such attacks did not result in prosecutions. Three illustrative cases are as follows:

- In February, in the first indictment for a “price tag” attack that was not a response to a settlement evacuation, three settlers were indicted for torching two vehicles and vandalizing buildings in the village of Farata. Two of the three were sentenced to 30 months imprisonment, an additional 12-month suspended sentence if they commit a similar offense within three years of release, and 15,000 NIS (approximately US $4,000) each in compensatory damages.
- In May, two teenagers from a settlement were arrested for the June 2013 “price tag” attack in the Arab-Israeli village of Abu Gosh, vandalizing 28 vehicles and buildings with graffiti. Both suspects remained in police custody since their arrest and were indicted in August. They will be charged as minors for incitement, damage to property, and intent to cause damage to property.
- In December, three settlers connected to the Jewish extremist group “Lehava” were arrested and indicted for the November arson and vandalization of the bilingual Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand School in Jerusalem. The three were charged with arson, breaking and entering, and destroying property.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Israel is a member of the Council of Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The FATF decided in June 2014 to expand its membership and identified Israel as a potential candidate for FATF membership. In September, Israel’s Ministers of Justice and Finance endorsed the FATF recommendations and processes and have committed to undergo a mutual evaluation. The second step of the process is an evaluation of the country’s commitment and compliance with the FATF standards. Timing had not been set at year’s end.

The Israeli financial intelligence unit, known as the Israeli Money Laundering and Terror Finance Prohibition Authority, is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Israel’s counterterrorist finance regime continued to be enhanced through enforcement operations and the inclusion of new groups under national terrorist finance laws. The well-regulated Israeli banking industry worked to address suspected terrorist activity. Israeli experts and officials raised concerns about the issue of state-sponsored funding of Hamas. Israelis claim there are indications that money transferred from countries to Hamas is being used by the organization for terrorist activity and military buildup. Financing of Hamas through charitable organizations remained a concern for Israeli authorities, as did the funding of Hizballah through charities and criminal organizations.

Israel regularly updates the list of foreign terrorist organizations and individuals involved in terrorism, in order to align with the UNSC sanctions lists. The UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities are registered in the formal government registry. Every designation is published in three languages (Hebrew, Arabic, English), and in three different newspapers, as required by law. Designations are also published on the website of the Israel Money Laundering and Terror Financing Prohibition Authority, and are also distributed by email to a mailing list of the IMPA, which includes banks, lawyers, and finance professionals.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Israel continued its counterterrorism cooperation with a range of regional and international institutions, including the UN, the OAS, and the OSCE. On November 10-12, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted an international conference on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism with delegates from 28 countries and international organizations. The conference was hosted in partnership with the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the OSCE, and in consultation with the UNSC Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate. It is the first time that such a conference was hosted by Israel. The conference examined critical issues and challenges faced by many governments when dealing with legal frameworks in the fight against terrorism, such as maintaining the balance between human rights and security while trying to prevent acts of terrorism. In this context, the representatives of the Israeli Ministry of Justice presented the outlines of the new Israeli national counterterrorism legislation which aims to maintain such a balance. Other issues included in the discussions were methods of handling classified intelligence derived evidence in the court systems when dealing with cases of terrorism in a way which will not jeopardize its source; the use of universal instruments against terrorist financing; and how to ensure judicial independence and the integrity of the legal process while handling terrorism cases of high public interest.

Israel continued to cooperate with numerous countries regarding efforts to thwart terrorist attacks and plots against Israelis or Israeli interests abroad. In April, Thai police arrested two Lebanese citizens under suspicion of planning a terrorist attack against tourist targets known as a center for Israeli tourists. In May, a French foreign terrorist fighter who had returned from fighting with ISIL opened fire at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, killing four individuals including two Israeli citizens. In October, a Hizballah operative was arrested in a suburb of Lima, Peru, for planning attacks on Israeli targets in Lima.

In June, Israel and the United States held an interagency counterterrorism dialogue to discuss the broad range of threats in the region and to determine areas of collaboration to address these challenges. Additionally, during 2014 Israel conducted talks on counterterrorism issues with several countries, including Canada, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the EU; and engaged with Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Thailand.

**West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem**

The Palestinian Authority (PA) continued its counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank where Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP remained present. The PASF constrained those organizations’ ability to conduct attacks. The PA exercised varying degrees of authority over the West Bank due to the continuing Israeli military presence in the majority of the West Bank. The IDF and ISA (“Shin Bet”) arrested suspected members of terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank, including a purported Hamas cell that was planning to carry out attacks against Jerusalem’s Light Rail and soccer stadium. During searches for three Israeli teenagers abducted in the West Bank...
in June and subsequent military raids and searches throughout the West Bank, Israeli security forces also announced that they uncovered Hamas networks in Jerusalem, and in the West Bank, uncovered efforts to build up military infrastructure and capacity.

Extremist Palestinians and Israeli settlers continued to conduct acts of violence in the West Bank. For the first time since 2008, Palestinians kidnapped and killed Israeli citizens in the West Bank. The UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs reported 330 attacks by extremist Israeli settlers that resulted in Palestinian injuries or property damage. In Jerusalem, there was an uptick in violence relative to 2013, including two vehicular attacks against crowds of civilians. Extremist Israeli settlers abducted and murdered a Palestinian teenager in June. A Palestinian stabbed and injured an Israeli in the back in November. In May, in an apparent “price tag” attack, Israeli extremists vandalized the Vatican-owned Notre Dame Center, where they daubed “Death to Arabs and Christians and all those who hate Israel.”

Despite Fatah and Hamas signing a reconciliation agreement in April, and the PA forming an interim government of technocratic ministers in June, the PA has exercised little control over Gaza, and Hamas continued to maintain control of security forces there. Hamas, PIJ, and other Gaza-based terrorist and militant groups continued to launch attacks against Israel from Gaza. In the wake of two militant attacks in North Sinai, which the Government of Egypt alleged were carried out in part by Palestinian factions, the Egyptian government closed the Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza and cleared a buffer zone on the Egyptian side of the border to eliminate smuggling tunnels into and out of Gaza. The Government of Egypt’s actions and the Israeli military’s bombings of tunnels during Operation Protective Edge hampered Hamas’s and other armed groups’ ability to smuggle weapons, cash, and other contraband into Gaza.

Gaza remained a base of operations for several Salafist splinter groups, such as the Mujahideen Shura Council; and clan-based terrorist groups that engaged in or facilitated terrorist attacks. In November, Palestinian violent extremists detonated explosives in front of seven homes belonging to Fatah officials and in front of a stage set-up for a Fatah rally in Gaza. There were no reports of injuries. Despite claims of responsibility from individuals purporting affiliation with ISIL, there is no definitive link confirming this.

Additional 2014 incidents in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem included:

- In January, violent extremist Israeli settlers spray painted “revenge by blood” on and set fire to a mosque in the West Bank.
- In January, ISA arrested a group of al-Qa’ida (AQ) sympathizers in East Jerusalem which was allegedly planning several attacks.
- In May, St. George Romanian Orthodox Church in Jerusalem was defaced with the expressions “Jesus is Garbage” and “King David for the Jews.” On another street in Jerusalem, authorities found graffiti stating “Death to Arabs.”
- In June, two Palestinians kidnapped and killed three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. During an attempt to apprehend the suspected perpetrators, the IDF shot and killed them. An Israeli court indicted a third individual suspected of planning the attack.
- In July, three Israelis kidnapped and killed a Palestinian teenager in Jerusalem. An Israeli court indicted three individuals who confessed to carrying out the attack.
• In July, an Israeli settler drove by and fired a gun into a protest near Nablus, killing one Palestinian.
• In October, a Palestinian crashed his vehicle into a crowd of people and into a Jerusalem Light Rail train as it was passing a light rail stop, killing an American-citizen infant, a foreign national, and injuring approximately nine others, according to media. The driver, who Israeli authorities suspected of being Hamas-affiliated, died from wounds sustained during Israeli National Police’s (INP) attempt to apprehend him.
• In October, a Palestinian critically injured an Israeli-American in Jerusalem while attempting to assassinate him. The INP shot and killed the suspected shooter, a known PIJ associate, during a raid to apprehend him.
• In October and December, violent extremists bombed the French Cultural Center in Gaza. There were no reports of injuries in October and there was one injury in December.
• In October and November, Israeli security forces arrested five residents of Tulkarem for planning to execute a suicide bombing in the Tel Aviv area as well as several other terror attacks, such as shootings, detonating a bomb in a bus crowded with soldiers, and abducting a soldier.
• In November, two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with the PFLP entered a synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing five people, including three American citizens, and injuring over a dozen. INP shot and killed the perpetrators while the attack was ongoing.
• In November, Israeli extremists vandalized and set fire to the Max Rayne Hand-in-Hand School, a bilingual center for Jewish-Arab education. ISA arrested three suspects, who were indicted by Israeli courts in December.
• In November, a Palestinian stabbed and killed an Israeli and injured two others near the West Bank settlement of Alon Shvut.
• Israeli security agencies reportedly thwarted several additional planned terrorist attacks in the West Bank, including a Hamas plan to launch a rocket-propelled grenade at the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs’ vehicle. Security services also prevented Hamas plans to attack Israeli towns and settlements, and to launch an attack on a stadium in Jerusalem.
• In December, a Palestinian threw acid at an Israeli family and another Israeli, injuring six, near a checkpoint between Bethlehem and Jerusalem. The IDF arrested the attacker.

The United States continued to assist the PA’s counterterrorism efforts through programs that further strengthened the capacity of the PASF, primarily through training, equipping, and the provision of infrastructure to PA personnel in the West Bank. U.S.-funded training of PASF primarily took place at the Jordan International Police Training Center, and the PA’s Central Training Institute in Jericho. Concurrently, the United States continued to assist the larger PA criminal justice system to conduct more thorough investigations and prosecutions of terrorist related activity, among other criminal acts, and to ensure safe incarceration of those held for trial or after conviction of such crimes.

PA President Mahmoud Abbas consistently reiterated his commitment to nonviolence and recognition of the State of Israel. He condemned acts of violence, including the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank in June, and the attacks on civilians at a West Jerusalem synagogue in November in which five people died, including three American
citizens. Abbas continued to support a security program involving disarmament of fugitive militants, arresting members of terrorist organizations, and gradually dismantling armed groups in the West Bank. The PASF arrested members of Hamas, PIJ, and PFLP when it suspected them of involvement in terrorist or criminal acts. For example, the PASF arrested approximately 30 suspects in November who were planning terrorist attacks primarily against Israeli settlers, per media. The PASF spokesperson publicly announced in October that the PA trained special units and officers to monitor and track internet activity affiliated with Salafist jihadist movements and AQ. Also in October, PA security personnel arrested 10 individuals for promoting the ideology of ISIL.

Israeli authorities, among others, continued to note improvements in the capacity and performance of PASF as a leading contributor to the improved security environment in the West Bank. Most notable was the relative lack of organized or large-scale disturbances in the West Bank following the kidnapping and killing of a Palestinian teenager and during hostilities in Gaza during the summer.

The PA continued to lack legislation specifically tailored to counterterrorism, although existing Palestinian laws criminalize actions that constitute terrorist acts. Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1998, titled “Enhancement of National Unity and Prohibition of Incitement,” prohibits incitement to violence, illegal associations, and acts against Palestine Liberation Organization agreements with other states (an indirect reference to the Oslo Accords with Israel). PA officials frequently enforce Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2007, which criminalizes armed militias and any assistance to such militias, as well as carrying unlicensed weapons and explosives. Presidential Decision No. 257 of 2007 bans “all Hamas militias” and states that any affiliation therewith will be punished in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect. The PA’s parliament, the Palestinian Legislative Council, has not met since 2007, due to the Hamas-Fatah rift, and was therefore unable to pass new legislation.

The PA continued to detain terrorists in the West Bank, and the PASF and public prosecutors received training to enable better investigations of terrorism-related crimes. Despite on-again, off-again factional reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah, PASF personnel continued to conduct operations against and detain Hamas elements, which Hamas officials protested. The PA continued to develop its civilian justice institutions (e.g. judiciary, police, prosecutors) to improve both investigative and prosecutorial functions. The United States and other donors provided material and developmental assistance to enable the PA to reduce case backlogs, improve warrant executions, and upgrade forensic services.

After 2007, the Palestinian military (security) court system processed many terrorism and security-related cases. Following numerous objections by civil society groups, the PA decided in 2011 to prosecute all cases involving civilian suspects in the civilian court system. In 2013, a PA committee drafted legislation to govern the military court system which, in part, confirms that its jurisdiction is limited to members of the security services. The committee completed a revision of the draft in December 2014, which awaits submission to the Council of Ministers for consideration.
The key PA institution by mandate and law that works to prevent internal terrorist events and investigates security-related criminal conduct is the Preventive Security Organization (PSO). During 2014, the United States expanded assistance to the PSO as well as the Security Justice Commission to help the PA move the prosecution of all civilian cases, including those involving terrorism and security-related offenses, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the civilian courts, and enhance cooperation between security service investigators and civilian prosecutors. PA security forces have a mixed although steadily improving record of accountability and respect for human rights. International donors, primarily the United States and the EU, continued to provide assistance to the PA to improve its capacity in this field.

Per the Oslo-era Accords, Israel controls border security in the West Bank.

The primary limitation on PA counterterrorism efforts in Gaza remained Hamas’s control of the area and the resulting inability of PASF to operate there. Limitations on PA counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank included restrictions on the movement and activities of PASF in and through areas of the West Bank for which the Israeli government retained responsibility for security under the terms of Oslo-era agreements.

While the PA continued to lack modern forensic capability, the multi-year assistance efforts that the Canadian International Development Agency started through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in late 2012 continued. The forensic science laboratory is nearly fully equipped and training in firearm and tool mark evidence, document examination, and drug analysis continued. The PA already has a basic ability to examine and compare unknown prints to known prints.

PA justice and security leaders continued to participate in regional conferences and meetings to combat terrorism. PASF personnel attended a variety of international training courses related to counterterrorism at training facilities in Jordan, Europe, and the United States.

The PA is an observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force. In part due to the patchwork of legal frameworks that the PA is subject to, terrorist financing is not specifically addressed in current law as required by international standards. However, the PA Ministry of Justice was working on modifying the anti-money laundering (AML) law to incorporate articles that address terrorist finance. The Palestinian Financial Follow-Up Unit (FFU), the PA’s financial intelligence unit, has 12 employees and a computer system linked with all 17 banks licensed to operate in the West Bank. Although the FFU has adequate staffing, authority, and equipment, it has been unable to realize its full operational effectiveness due, in part, to restrictions in the law. Article 31 of AML Law No. 7 of 2007 restricts information sharing between the FFU and any law enforcement agency, with the exception of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO). Prosecutors within the AGO are the chief investigators in the PA, with all the powers of an investigative judge.

The PA has taken significant steps to ensure that official institutions in the West Bank that fall under its control do not create content that leads to incitement to violence. According to the Palestinian Broadcasting Company’s code of conduct, no programming is allowed that encourages “violence against any person or institution on the basis of race, religion, political
beliefs, or sex.” In practice, this code of conduct is not always observed, with some instances of inciting taking place via official media. In July, Fatah included on one of its official Facebook pages: “Sons of Zion, this is an oath to the Lord of the Heavens: Prepare all the bags you can for your body parts.” The official Palestinian news agency, WAFA, included on its site in October Fatah’s call to its “fighters” and Palestinian people to “aid the Al-Aqsa Mosque and occupied Jerusalem.” In November, political cartoons glorifying vehicular terrorist attacks were posted on one of the official Fatah Facebook pages.

The PA maintains control over the content of Friday sermons delivered in over 1800 West Bank mosques to ensure that they do not endorse incitement to violence. Weekly, the PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributes approved themes; the guidance is that no sermon can discuss politics or lead to incitement to violence. The PA’s ability to enforce these guidelines varies depending upon location, and it has limited authority to control the context of sermons in Israeli-controlled Area C.

As part of a policy codified in 2003, the PA provided significant financial packages to Palestinian security prisoners released from Israeli prisons in 2014 in an effort to reintegrate them into society.

JORDAN

Overview: Jordan remained a key ally and a model partner in combating terrorism and extremist ideology. Jordan’s geographic location leaves it vulnerable to a variety of regional threats, while also facilitating its regional leadership in confronting them. During 2014, the emergence and rapid growth of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other extremist organizations in Syria and Iraq further entrenched terrorism as a top concern for Jordanian security services. Jordan actively participated in Global Coalition to Counter ISIL military efforts, and amended key counterterrorism legislation. Jordan continued to provide diplomatic and political support to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in addition to its support for a political resolution to conflicts in Syria and Iraq.

Jordan demonstrated regional leadership in the fight against ISIL, joined the Global Coalition from the outset, and participated fully on the diplomatic, political, financial, and military fronts. King Abdullah II, in a November address to the Jordanian parliament, declared, “the war on these terrorist organizations and their radical ideology is [Jordan’s] war because we are targeted and we must defend ourselves, Islam, and the values of tolerance and moderation by fighting extremism and terrorists.” The Royal Jordanian Air Force participated in Global Coalition military operations against ISIL, humanitarian operations in support of communities targeted by ISIL, and the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) bolstered defenses against terrorist incursions in the northern and eastern border regions.

On December 24, ISIL captured, and ultimately killed, a Jordanian pilot in Syria who was participating in counter-ISIL operations. The JAF in 2014 continued to host United States military units, as well as other Global Coalition partners, for various joint counterterrorism exercises and training on Jordanian territory. Jordan actively worked to prevent flows of foreign fighters to extremist groups in Syria and Iraq, and took steps to restrict terrorism financing.
2014 Terrorist Incidents: In April, during a period of civil unrest in the southern city of Ma’an, armed civilians raked several buildings with gunfire, including an Islamic bank, a school for girls, and a local headquarters for the General Intelligence Directorate (GID). They also reportedly used hand grenades. Additionally, a series of low-yield improvised explosive device attacks against Interior Ministry police forces occurred at major traffic circles in the affected area. No deaths or casualties were reported, and no suspects were arrested in connection with these incidents.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The State Security Court (SSC) is the primary legal apparatus for trying and convicting alleged terrorists. The SSC oversees the prosecution of civilians charged with crimes affecting national security. In April, the parliament passed amendments to the SSC Law, limiting the court’s jurisdiction to five crimes: treason, espionage, terrorism, drug-related offenses, and currency forgery.

The parliament amended the 2006 Anti-Terrorism Law in April. The amendments broadened the definition of terrorism to include forming a group with the intention of committing terrorist acts, harming relations with a foreign state, using the internet to facilitate terrorist acts or promote terrorist ideas, and attacks on the life or liberty of members of the royal family. The penal code provides an even broader definition of terrorism to include acts intended to “contravene the public order.” Civil society organizations have criticized the amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law, saying that by broadening the definition of terrorism, the law expands the SSC’s jurisdiction over speech-related offenses.

Jordan has advanced capabilities to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism within its territory. Comprehensive training programs, detailed planning, and recurring surveys of key facilities have enabled Jordan to engineer a coordinated national response to crises. GID has authority to investigate acts of terrorism. The Public Security Directorate (PSD) has authority over non-terrorism related crimes but frequently supports GID counterterrorism activities through PSD Special Branch, which includes a criminal intelligence function. The GID also coordinates with the JAF and its intelligence branch, particular on cases involving border security, which the JAF oversees. Prosecutors typically are not consulted until the later stages of investigations, when terrorism cases are referred to the SSC.

Jordan also remained a critical partner for the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Jordan continued to host the training and development of other ATA partner nations at its various academies and training facilities.

Jordan remained committed to securing its borders and denying safe haven to terrorists. Jordan continued to develop its border security infrastructure, largely through the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), which began in 2009. JBSP consists of a sophisticated package of sensors to help improve situational awareness along the border and prevent infiltrations into Jordan or unauthorized departures. Phase II neared completion at the end of 2014. Jordan actively monitors airports and border crossings for potential foreign fighters. Jordan maintains a terrorist watchlist, uses biographic and biometric screening, and actively engages in passenger information sharing.
During 2014, Jordanian authorities took legal action against numerous individuals deemed to be terrorists under local law. Jordanian authorities also arrested and began prosecuting men accused of seeking to join al-Nusrah Front and ISIL; recruiting for or otherwise supporting ISIL, especially on the internet; attempting to travel to – or return from – Syria to fight with extremist groups; and individuals affiliated with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood accused of providing weapons to Hamas. Legal actions included:

- Abu Qatada: The public trial of Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric who was deported from the UK in July 2013, concluded in September with an acquittal on all charges. The SSC had previously convicted Qatada in absentia for his involvement in conspiring to carry out acts of terrorism in 1998 and another foiled attempt in 2000 against Western and Israeli targets during Millennium celebrations.
- Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: Jordan released Maqdisi, a Salafist leader who was convicted of providing support for al-Qa’ida in 2010, in June. Jordan briefly detained Maqdisi in September, and arrested him again in October, formally charging him with “using the internet to promote and incite views of jihadi terrorist organizations.”
- Beginning in August, security officials arrested over 100 ISIL supporters, many for posting pro-ISIL videos or statements on social media sites. The government began charging them before the State Security Court in October for using the internet to propagate terrorist ideology.
- Security forces regularly arrested departing or returning Jordanian foreign fighters, charging them with joining armed groups, including al-Nusrah Front or ISIL in Syria.
- In late 2014, security officials arrested several members of the Engineers Association, a group with strong ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, and charged them under the Counterterrorism Law with possessing weapons and explosives, undermining public order, and carrying out illegal activities that could expose the kingdom to hostile acts.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body; its financial intelligence unit has been a part of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units since 2012. The Jordanian parliament introduced proposed amendments to the 2007 Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorist Financing Law, which would bring Jordan more in line with international standards. As of December, the legal committee had endorsed the amendments, but no vote to adopt the changes had taken place. No known prosecution of terrorist financing cases occurred in 2014. Jordan faces significant challenges in monitoring financial flows for extensive refugee camps on its territory but seems to be managing these risks well.

Although the Associations Law requires non-profit organizations to apply for Cabinet approval before receiving foreign funds, Jordan’s Anti-Money Laundering Law does not oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports.

Regional and International Cooperation: Jordan is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2014, Jordan was a member of the UN Security Council and also a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

Jordan continued to assist Palestinian Authority law enforcement institutions through training at the Jordan International Police Training Center. In 2014 both advanced-level and refresher courses were offered to Palestinian security services, in addition to basic-level courses. Jordan also provided anti-terrorism training for Iraqi Security Forces at the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Jordan has sought to confront and weaken the violent ideology that underpins ISIL and other radical organizations. Jordan is examining ways to better counter radicalization in schools and mosques. The Prime Minister announced the formation of an interagency anti-extremist task force in October. The task force issued a wide-ranging set of recommendations to various line ministries, but it had not received authorities, resources, or staff as of the end of the year.

The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Thought, under the patronage of Prince Ghazi bin Mohammad, promotes religious tolerance and coexistence. This institute continued its sponsorship of a series of ecumenical events promoting interfaith dialogue. Jordan hosted events geared toward rejecting terrorism and sectarianism. King Abdullah II continued to promote his “Amman Declaration” of 2005, calling for tolerance and peace within the Islamic community, and rejecting “wanton aggression and terrorism.” The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs conducted outreach to imams across the country, encouraging them to refute radical extremist ideology in their sermons.

Jordanian prisons have a religiously based de-radicalization program that seeks to re-engage violent extremist inmates into the non-violent mainstream of their faith.

KUWAIT

Overview: Kuwait is an important ally located in the critical Arabian Gulf region and a valued partner in promoting policies that strengthen regional security and stability. Kuwait is a key partner in the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Kuwait hosted the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL’s Communications Conference on October 27, attended by delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states and other partner countries. Discussions centered on how to combat ISIL and violent extremism in the region, degrade and defeat ISIL’s messaging, and confront and contest its presence in the information space. Over the reporting period, Kuwait showed a full commitment to countering the ISIL threat through its humanitarian and logistic contributions to coalition efforts. This included taking steps to reduce ISIL’s access to financing, cracking down on suspected ISIL supporters, and providing humanitarian assistance to displaced persons primarily from Syria, but also to displaced people in Iraq.
According to media reports, Kuwait implemented new security measures to prevent possible terrorist attacks on its soil. Deputy PM and Interior Minister Sheikh Mohammed al-Khalid Al-Sabah announced a new security team of 80 officers to counter violent extremist threats. On December 5, media reported that state security forces had foiled a terrorist attack planned by an ISIL-affiliated terrorist cell of 12 persons, two of whom were former police officers. The Jahra-based cell had allegedly planned to carry out a number of bombings at civilian and government sites.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** On December 14, a draft law was introduced in parliament criminalizing terrorism and stipulating harsh punishments for it. The legislator who introduced the bill explained that regional circumstances and terrorist threats to Kuwait necessitated a law specifically criminalizing terrorism. Terrorist acts are currently prosecuted under general provisions of the penal code.

In 2014, Kuwait security forces arrested several suspected members and sympathizers of ISIL. The Kuwait State Security (KSS) service reported it had received information that some of the defendants had gone to Syria and Iraq and had fought with, or contributed financially to, violent extremists. KSS also handed over an unidentified number of Saudi nationals, suspected of ISIL links, to the Saudi authorities. In December, media reports quoted a source within the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) as saying that approximately 10 employees were terminated when it was discovered they had travelled to either Iraq or Syria to participate in fighting.

On December 18, a criminal court jailed three Arab (non-Kuwaiti) supporters of ISIL. The court also sentenced a Kuwaiti to 10 years in jail for urging support of the terrorist group and also for insulting Kuwait’s ruler in public. An Egyptian and a Jordanian were handed four-year sentences for helping the Kuwaiti distribute pro-ISIL leaflets. It was the first such court ruling against supporters of ISIL. The courts were examining several similar cases at year’s end.

Law enforcement units had the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents, but were often hindered by internal stove-piping. Kuwait’s primary counterterrorism organizations, the MOI and Kuwait National Guard (KNG), are well-resourced and have plentiful training opportunities. Under the auspices of the Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program, the Embassy’s Office of Military Cooperation has heavily and consistently engaged with local counterterrorism units for both training and bilateral exercises in an effort to match capabilities with resources. Because MOI also includes the country’s criminal investigative apparatus and border protection mission, it has broad latitude with respect to investigations and border security. MOI is also generally considered to be the single point of contact for incident response; some terrorism-related matters fall under the prerogative of its semi-autonomous arm, KSS. Law enforcement units generally have a record of accountability.

On June 29, media reported that MOI had instructed its forces at border crossings to remain on high alert in anticipation of possible attacks by ISIL militants. The ministry instructed officers to intensify their security procedures at all borders after it received “confirmed information” that ISIL might try to enter Kuwait via land or sea ports.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. It took initial steps in 2014 to implement bylaws to Law 106 of 2013, which govern the criminalization of terrorist financing – including a requirement to report suspected terrorist financing that creates the legal basis to freeze terrorist assets without delay. In April, the Cabinet issued Ministerial Resolutions 4 and 5, mandating the establishment of a ministerial-level counterterrorism committee (CTC) and stipulating the creation of mechanisms to implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, including the freezing of assets. Kuwait froze accounts and banned travel for the five Kuwaiti individuals added to the UN al-Qa’ida Sanctions Committee list in 2014. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established and chaired the CTC, on which 11 governmental bodies were represented. The CTC met regularly to execute Kuwait’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML)/Counterterrorism Financing (CFT) obligations under UNSCRs and domestic regulations.

Additionally, Kuwait established the Kuwaiti Financial Intelligence Unit (KFIU) in 2013. It named its first president in February and opened a temporary office and started to process limited types of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) in June. By November, the KFIU was working and improving its capacity to receive and analyze STRs. It is not publicly known if any have resulted in investigations or criminal proceedings.

In July, Kuwait re-established a working-level National Committee for Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. Chaired by the president of the KFIU, it consists of the 11 governmental bodies represented on the CTC.

Despite progress, vulnerabilities remain in Kuwait’s CFT regime. Though Kuwait regulates donations to and spending by licensed charities, unlicensed fundraisers are able to operate on social media and raise and send funds through other unofficial channels. The KFIU does not oversee many sectors of the economy, such as money transfer businesses, according to international standards.

The CTC currently disseminates additions to the lists via facsimile, as well as by note. Financial institutions electronically monitor the UN lists directly. The CTC plans to set up a website that will post both UN and domestic designations. Financial institutions will be required by regulators to check the online list for updates on a regular basis.


Regional and International Cooperation: As in previous years, the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, KNG, and MOI conducted a number of exercises aimed at responding to terrorist attacks, including joint exercises with regional and international partners. Kuwait also cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism, for example, conducting joint training programs with the United States and working with governments to conduct missions and exchange information.
Kuwait held the GCC’s and Arab League’s rotating presidencies in 2014. During the reporting period, Kuwaiti officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League members. Kuwait was the only GCC member not to ratify the Gulf Security Pact.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In 2014, Kuwait began issuing weekly circulars to all mosques with approved language for Friday sermons and instructions to avoid extremist or sectarian language. It began broadcasts of “Kuwait Youth Radio,” which included public service announcements promoting social cohesion and religious tolerance, and also announced formation of the Higher Commission for the Promotion of Moderation, the main goal of which was to counter violent extremist ideology through education.

Media reported that an agreement was reached in September between the MOI and the Ministry of Awqaf (Islamic endowments) and Islamic Affairs to form a joint committee to monitor Friday sermons to ensure imams were not addressing any political or sectarian issues. Over the reporting period, the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs referred 16 imams for investigation and deported one Egyptian imam under the Mosques Charter, which prohibits promoting sectarianism, radicalization, and incitement.

**LEBANON**

**Overview:** Lebanon’s security situation deteriorated in 2014 as a result of worsening spillover from the violence in Syria and the involvement of Lebanese fighters in the conflict, including Hizballah, which had fully mobilized in support of the Asad regime, and to a lesser extent individual Lebanese who supported various anti-regime forces. Incursions by Syria-based Sunni extremists into Lebanon in 2014 underscored both the centrality of border security to Lebanon’s stability and importance of enabling the Lebanese government to exercise its full sovereignty, as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701. Various branches of the Lebanese state, including the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Internal Security Forces (ISF), and Central Bank continued to cooperate with international partners in countering terrorism and have scored some notable successes in the disruption of terrorist networks and combating militant forces. U.S. programs are meant to enhance the Lebanese state’s capacity to exercise sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, including its borders.

Border security and spillover from the Syrian conflict remained an immediate, pressing terrorism problem. In retaliation for Hizballah’s actions supporting the Asad regime, Sunni militant groups have carried out more than two dozen suicide attacks against Shia population centers and LAF targets from June 2013 through the end of 2014. Although these attacks declined in the second half of 2014 due to the Lebanese security services’ success at disrupting terrorist networks, Syria-based Sunni extremist groups infiltrated and sought to control Lebanese territory. Al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) battled the LAF for control of the Lebanese border town of Arsal in August, before retreating into the nearby hills with more than 30 captured LAF and ISF personnel, four of whom were subsequently killed. The army faced additional attacks in late October in Tripoli by al-Nusrah Front and ISIL-inspired Sunni militants, some of whom professed a desire to establish an ISIL principality in northern Lebanon.
Lebanon’s security institutions, including the LAF and ISF, came under considerable pressure to end these attacks, a daunting task made all the more difficult by the country’s political and sectarian divisions and its refugee crisis. Lebanon, a country of approximately four million, hosted more than 1.1 million refugees from Syria at the end of 2014. Lebanese authorities were challenged not only by the significant burden the refugees place on its financial and natural resources, infrastructure, and host communities, but also by fears of potential militant recruiting among the refugee population. Al-Nusrah Front and ISIL’s use of informal refugee settlements during the Arsal attacks further hardened Lebanese attitudes towards Syrian refugees.

Despite these challenges, the Lebanese security institutions improved their capacity to detect and intercept terrorist attacks, resulting in the disruption of at least three major terrorist networks and more than a dozen high-profile arrests in 2014. Furthermore, the successful implementation of the Tripoli security plan gave the LAF complete control over the city for the first time since the early 1970s. The United States remains Lebanon’s closest counterterrorism partner, and the bilateral relationship is robust and growing. The focus of U.S. assistance was to strengthen Lebanon’s security institutions so they can better exert sovereign authority and maintain border security in accordance with UNSCR 1701 and counter both domestic and foreign terrorist threats.

Hizballah, with considerable support from Iran, remains the most capable and prominent terrorist group in Lebanon, enjoying popular support among Lebanese Shia and some Christians. Hizballah continued to operate as an armed militia beyond the control of the state and as a powerful political actor that can hobble or topple the government as it sees fit. The government was not able to take significant action to disarm Hizballah or eliminate its safe havens in Lebanon. Despite Lebanon’s official dissociation policy regarding the Syrian conflict, Hizballah accelerated its military role in support of the Syrian regime in 2014 and has proved to be a decisive force in the Syrian regime’s ability to retake major swaths of territory from Syrian opposition forces.

Hizballah’s actions in Syria have exacerbated the already tenuous security situation inside Lebanon. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has had a presence in Lebanon since the early 1980s and coordinates closely with Hizballah on military operations and training. Hizballah engaged in terrorist activity against Israel in violation of UNSCR 1701 on October 7, when it detonated a roadside bomb in the Shebaa Farms area south of the Blue Line, injuring two Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. It was the first time since 2006 Hizballah claimed responsibility for an attack against the IDF.

Other designated terrorist groups, including Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Asbat al-Ansar, Fatah al-Islam, Fatah al-Intifada, Jund al-Sham, Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB), and several other groups, continued to operate within Lebanon’s borders, including within Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps. The LAF did not maintain a presence in the camps, but it conducted limited operations and patrols near the camps to counter terrorist threats, including attempts to launch rockets against Israel from southern Lebanon. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported that a total of 18 rockets were launched from southern Lebanon towards Israel over nine different occasions in July and August, with a total of
nine rockets hitting Israel and, in one case, injuring two Israeli civilians. UNIFIL concluded that the attacks were the work of “amateur operators” and were likely aimed at expressing solidarity with Gaza during Israel’s “Protective Edge” military operation from July 8 to August 26.

Lebanon is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The Lebanese security forces seek to limit ISIL’s threat at home, including the flow of foreign fighters both to and from Syria, by working to secure the porous, ungoverned border with Syria and conducting counterterrorism operations within Lebanon. The LAF and other security services were actively engaged in monitoring potential ISIL and al-Nusra Front elements in Lebanon, disrupting their activities and networks, and arresting those suspected of plotting terrorist attacks. The government is expanding its efforts to counter ISIL messaging. The Lebanese government supports UNSCRs 2170 and 2178 and has increased security measures at airports and border crossings to prevent the flow of ISIL and al-Nusra Front fighters to Syria and Iraq. The government was not in full compliance with UNSCR 2178 at year’s end, however, since it has not taken significant action to prevent Hizballah from sending its fighters to Syria and Iraq.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Representative terrorist incidents in Lebanon included:

- On January 2, a suicide car bombing in the Hizballah-dominated Beirut suburb of Haret Hreik killed four people and injured 77. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On January 6, a suicide car bombing killed five people and wounded 42 others in the northeastern border town of Hermel. Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On January 21, a suicide car bombing just 50 meters from the January 2 suicide bombing killed four people and wounded 46 others. Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for this attack.
- On February 22, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a LAF checkpoint in Hermel, killing three people, including two soldiers, and injuring more than 10 others. Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for the bombing.
- On February 19, at least 19 people were killed and dozens injured after two vehicle-borne suicide bombs exploded near an Iranian cultural center in the Beirut suburb of Beir Hassan, an area closely associated with Hizballah. A Twitter account linked to the AAB claimed responsibility for the bombings.
- On March 29, three LAF soldiers were killed and four others wounded by a car bomb targeting an army checkpoint near Arsal. An obscure militant group calling itself the Free Sunnis of Baalbek claimed responsibility for the attack on its Twitter account.
- On June 20, a suicide bomber targeted an ISF checkpoint in the Bekaa area of Dahr al-Baydar, killing one ISF member and injured 32 people.
- On August 2-7, al-Nusra Front and ISIL militants attacked LAF positions near Arsal and briefly gained control of the town, following the arrest of ISIL leader Imad Ahmed Joumaa. After several days of heavy fighting, the LAF repelled the militants, who retreated into the nearby hills with more than 30 captured LAF and ISF personnel. The clashes left 17 soldiers dead and nearly 200 wounded, along with approximately 40 civilians killed and 400 wounded.
• On August 28 and September 6, ISIL beheaded two LAF soldiers taken hostage in Arsal. Al-Nusrah Front also killed two Lebanese servicemen hostages, a LAF soldier on September 19 and an ISF policeman on December 5.
• On October 7, Hizballah detonated a roadside bomb in the Shebaa Farms area south of the Blue Line, injuring two IDF soldiers.
• On October 26-27, Sunni militants attacked LAF positions in Tripoli following the arrest of Ahmed Salim Mikati, a local terrorist suspect with ties to ISIL, resulting in the deaths of 11 soldiers, eight civilians, and 22 terrorists.
• On December 2, armed militants killed six LAF soldiers and wounded another in an ambush near Ras Baalbek.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Lebanon does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism law, but several articles of Lebanon’s criminal code (1943) are used to prosecute acts of terrorism. Implementation of these articles has at times been hindered by Lebanon’s complex political and confessional system, however, and also by Hizballah restricting access to attack sites that were within areas under its control. The cabinet did not consider legislative initiatives that could potentially threaten Hizballah’s operations, as the presence of Hizballah and its political allies in the government make the requisite consensus on such actions impossible.

Several agencies focused on combating terrorism, although cooperation among the services was inconsistent. Lebanon has been a participant in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program since 2006; this assistance has focused on border security as well as on building law enforcement’s investigative and leadership capabilities. The Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has also provided assistance to improve the capabilities of the ISF through a multi-year program that includes construction of training facilities and establishment of a secure radio communications system; provision of vehicles, protective gear, and other types of equipment; and a wide range of training and mentoring activities. INL also provides corrections training to bolster the ISF’s limited capacity to manage its overcrowded prisons. The ISF has worked to prevent terrorist recruitment and the direction of terrorist activities by prison inmates who, in many cases, have complete control of certain cell blocks, and access to cell phones and the internet.

INL and the FBI conducted a biometric assessment for the ISF in March and at year’s end were reviewing the findings and considering potential projects with the ISF to enhance its biometric capabilities. Lebanon did not have biometric systems in place at the official points of entry into the country. Lebanese passports were machine readable, and the government was considering the adoption of biometric passports. The DGS, under the Interior Ministry, controls immigration and passport services, and it uses an electronic database to collect biographic data for travelers at all points of entry.

The Lebanese security services disrupted multiple terrorist networks and made several high-profile arrests in 2014. On February 12, the LAF arrested Naim Abbas, an AAB commander with ties to al-Nusrah Front, who was alleged to be behind the January 2 and January 21 bombings in Haret Hreik. On June 20 and 25, Lebanese security forces raided two Beirut hotels and detained at least a dozen terrorism suspects, including foreign nationals from Pakistan,
France, and Saudi Arabia. During the June 25 raid at the Duroy Hotel, a Saudi suicide bomber blew himself up in his room to avoid arrest. The Lebanese Military Court issued a November 7 indictment against the suspects in the hotel arrests, stating that they planned to carry out attacks against Shia targets in Lebanon.

On December 5, the Lebanese Military Court postponed trial proceedings until June 2015 in the case against Michel Samaha, a former Lebanese Information Minister arrested on terrorism charges in 2012. The delay came after General Ali Mamlouk, the head of the Syrian National Security Bureau, failed to report to the court in accordance with a 2013 arrest warrant. Samaha and Mamlouk face charges of “transporting explosives from Syria to Lebanon in an attempt to assassinate Lebanese political and religious leaders.” If convicted, they face the death penalty.

The United States maintains close ties with the Lebanese security services and could expect significant investigative and legal support in any terrorism case affecting U.S. citizens or interests. Lebanese authorities maintained that amnesty for Lebanese involved in acts of violence during the 1975-90 civil wars prevented terrorism prosecutions of concern to the United States.

The LAF partnered with several friendly nations on a bilateral basis to receive training programs that focused on strengthening its counterterrorism capabilities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Lebanon’s Central Bank, the Banque du Liban, issued two circulars in 2014 to improve its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime:

- Intermediate Circular No. 371 dated September 11, amending Basic Circular No. 83 dated May 18, 2005, required banks to establish an AML/CFT Branch officer in each branch and to set up additional compliance units within individual banks.
- Special Investigation Commission (SIC) Circular No. 17 dated September 16, requested banks to report suspicious transactions electronically to the SIC.

In 2014, the ISF received one request for assistance with a terrorism case from Interpol and had begun an investigation. The SIC, Lebanon’s financial intelligence unit, is an independent legal entity empowered to investigate suspicious financial transactions and to freeze assets, and is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The SIC reported that it had received three cases in 2014, two from the Directorate of General Security (DGS) and one from a local bank, regarding individuals with alleged terrorism ties. The SIC froze the individuals’ financial assets (amounts undisclosed) in Lebanon’s banking sector and forwarded the cases to the public prosecutor for further investigation. Neither the SIC nor the ISF received any allegations of suspicious financial transactions that led to terrorist financing cases in 2014.

Hizballah continued to work internationally to further its agenda. Lebanese nationals in Latin America and Africa continued to provide financial support to Hizballah, including through the laundering of criminal proceeds using Lebanese financial institutions. Requests for designation or asset freezes regarding Hizballah and affiliated groups are sent to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, but the Lebanese government does not require banks to freeze these assets, because it does not consider Hizballah a terrorist organization. However, following the U.S. Treasury designation in July of Stars Group Holding for ties to Hizballah, several Lebanese banks, of their own accord, closed the bank accounts of this group and related parties.

NGOs are required by law to submit a yearly financial statement to the government, but are not obliged to file suspicious transaction reports to prevent terrorist financing. However, the banking sector subjects NGOs to enhanced due diligence and reports suspicious transactions to the SIC. Monitoring the finances and management of all registered NGOs is the responsibility of the Interior Ministry, but it was inconsistent in applying these controls.


Regional and International Cooperation: Lebanon is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and attended Global Counterterrorism Forum meetings. Although Lebanon was a co-sponsor of UNSCR 2178 regarding foreign terrorist fighters, the government is not in full compliance since it did not take significant action to prevent Hizballah from sending its fighters to Syria. Lebanon continued to voice its commitment to fulfilling other relevant UNSCRs, including 1559, 1680, and 1701. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an international body investigating the 2005 assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri, received Lebanon’s annual contribution of approximately US $37.5 million on November 5.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Several government institutions have programs that seek to counter violent extremism (CVE), but there is no overall national strategy in place. The Interior Ministry, primarily through the ISF, has the most robust CVE programs and is partnering with the LAF and DGS to develop a social media strategy that would specifically target Sunni youth who are vulnerable to extremist recruitment. The ISF cybersecurity chief and a representative from the Foreign Affairs Ministry attended the October 27 sub-ministerial conference on counter-ISIL strategic communications in Kuwait.

LIBYA

Overview: In 2014, Libya’s democratic transition was disrupted by the outbreak of violence between armed factions affiliated with rival tribes, cities, and political actors. The resulting collapse of government authority and fragmentation of the country’s security forces greatly impeded Libya’s ability to counter violent extremist groups active in its territory. Although all sides in the conflict claimed to reject terrorism, there were signs that violent extremist groups in the region sought to take advantage of the security vacuum to expand their foothold in Libya. Libya’s porous borders, vast uncontrolled weapons stockpiles, and critically weak law enforcement institutions continued to make it a permissive environment for terrorist groups, including Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS) in Benghazi and in Darnah as well as elements of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Murabitun. In November, Darnah-based extremist groups pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), although the extent of operational and tactical linkages to ISIL’s leadership in Iraq and Syria was unclear. There were
reports of infighting between ISIL and other Libyan violent extremist groups. Libya continued to serve as a key source and transit hub for foreign fighters traveling to Syria and Iraq.

The Libyan government’s inability to prevent or punish terrorist violence, including a campaign of assassinations targeting activists and security officials in Benghazi, prompted others to take action outside of the state’s writ. In May, retired General Khalifa Heftar launched “Operation Dignity” against violent extremist groups in Benghazi as well as political rivals in other parts of the country. Following the outbreak of nation-wide violence in July, the internationally recognized government in Tobruk endorsed Heftar’s campaign and took some steps to bring it under the authority of the state. However, Heftar’s role within the Libyan military was unclear and he remained a controversial actor for many Libyans. Ansar al-Shari’a elements joined other militias in opposing Operation Dignity in the east of the country. Fighting in Benghazi continued throughout the year, with a spike in violence late in the year.

Violent Islamist extremists remained in control of the eastern city of Darnah, which has lacked virtually any state presence since the 2011 revolution. In 2014, violent extremist groups in Darnah reportedly employed summary executions and public floggings to enforce a strict form of sharia law, and carried out assassinations and beheadings of civil society activists, judges, and security officials.

In May, Ahmed Abu Khattalah, a senior leader within Ansar al-Shari’a-Benghazi, was captured by U.S. forces and was facing trial in the United States at year’s end. Abdal Basset Azzouz, a Libyan al-Qaeda leader, was reportedly arrested in Turkey in December.

2014 Terrorist incidents: The following list of terrorist incidents is designed to highlight major attacks believed to be perpetrated by violent extremist groups against western, diplomatic, Libyan government, and civil society targets. It is not exhaustive and does not encompass the numerous acts of violence perpetrated by the parties to the current political conflict, who have each accused their opponents of conducting terrorist acts including kidnappings, assassinations, and attacks on civilian infrastructure such as airports and seaports. The list of incidents in Benghazi and Darnah also should not be considered comprehensive; according to Human Rights Watch, more than 250 politically motivated killings occurred in these cities in 2014. Frequently, there were no claims of responsibility for assassinations or other attacks.

- On January 2, two British and New Zealand nationals were murdered by unknown assailants near the coastal city of Sabratha.
- On February 24, seven Egyptian Coptic Christians were killed near Benghazi, apparently because of their faith.
- On March 2, a French engineer working in Benghazi was killed by unknown assailants.
- On March 17, a car bombing targeted a graduation ceremony for military academy cadets in Benghazi, killing 11 and injuring 20.
- On March 21 and April 17, in separate incidents, two Tunisian diplomats were abducted in Tripoli.
- On April 15, the Jordanian ambassador to Libya was kidnapped in Tripoli. He was released in May, reportedly in exchange for the release of Mohamed Dersi, a Libyan national who was serving a life sentence in Jordan for his role in an airport bomb plot.
On June 4, a Swiss staff member of the International Committee of the Red Cross was assassinated in Sirte.

On June 25, civil society activist Salwa Bugaighis was murdered in Benghazi by unknown assailants.

On August 12, Tripoli’s police chief was assassinated in the capital by unknown gunmen.

From September 18-20, fourteen people, including a cleric and two teenage activists, were assassinated by unknown gunmen in Benghazi, in an event that became known as “Black Friday.”

On November 9, a car bomb was detonated in the eastern city of Shahat near a location where Prime Minister al-Thinni was meeting with UN officials, following an earlier explosion that appeared to target al-Thinni’s government offices in Beyda.

On November 11, three Libyan youth activists were beheaded in Darnah; they had been kidnapped after posting anti-extremist comments on social media. A fourth individual, a member of the Libyan security forces, was beheaded several days later. The killings were filmed and posted on social media.

On November 12, more than 20 people were wounded in separate car bombings in the eastern cities of Tobruk and Beyda. Both attacks, in cities that previously experienced few security incidents, appeared to target the internationally recognized government and parliament.

On November 13, car bombs detonated near the UAE and Egyptian embassies in Tripoli. The embassies were unoccupied and no one was injured.

On December 27, a car bomb targeted Libya’s diplomatic security headquarters in Tripoli. No casualties were reported. An online outlet associated with ISIL’s Libya branch claimed responsibility.

On December 30, parliamentary offices in Tobruk were targeted in a car bombing.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Libya lacks a comprehensive counterterrorism law, although the Libyan penal code (under Title 2, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 170 and Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 207) criminalizes offenses prejudicial to state security, including terrorism, the promotion of terrorist acts, and the handling of money in support of such acts. In 2013, the General National Congress (GNC) adopted laws no. 27 and 53 outlining a plan to disband non-state militias and integrate them into state security forces; however, neither law has been implemented. Libya has ratified the AU’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which requires states to criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws.

In March, the interim government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni released a statement, known as the Ghat Declaration, pledging government, military, and security action against terrorism and requesting international counterterrorism assistance. The statement marked a significant escalation in the government’s counterterrorism rhetoric, asserting that there would be “no place for terrorism in Libya” and pledging the government to do “whatever is required to restore security and peace.” It placed particular emphasis on ongoing violence in Benghazi, Darnah, and Sirte. A number of GNC members affiliated with Islamist-leaning parties, who were reportedly not consulted on the content of the declaration, opposed the characterization of the security crisis in eastern Libya as terrorism.
Even prior to the outbreak of large-scale violence in July, Libyan law enforcement personnel lacked the capacity to detect, deter, respond to, or investigate terrorist incidents. There were no reported terrorism-related prosecutions in 2014. In many parts of Libya, security and law enforcement functions are provided by armed militias rather than state institutions. National police and security forces are fragmented, inadequately trained and equipped, and lack clear reporting chains and coordination mechanisms. Dozens of security and law enforcement officials, including prosecutors and judges, have been targeted in kidnappings and assassinations, resulting in the suspension of court operations in Benghazi and Derna. There has been no police presence in Darnah since 2011. Libya’s military is similarly weak, with units often breaking down along local, tribal, or factional lines. Formal security structures are often overmatched by non-state armed groups. Counterterrorism operations conducted by Libyan Special Operations Forces have so far failed to significantly reduce the level of terrorist violence, bombings, assassinations, or kidnappings in Benghazi.

The Libyan government lacks a comprehensive border management strategy and has struggled to secure the country’s thousands of miles of land and maritime borders, enabling the illicit flow of goods, weapons, migrants, and foreign fighters that pose serious security challenges to the region. Libyan border security forces were generally poorly trained and underequipped, and frequently participated in illicit cross-border trade. Border security infrastructure that was damaged and looted during the 2011 revolution had not been repaired or replaced, and the recent conflict has affected border security infrastructure along Libya’s border with Tunisia. Security at Libya’s airports is minimal, with limited document screening and no utilization of passenger name record systems or biometric technology. Libya also lacks the resources, manpower, and training to conduct sufficient maritime patrols to interdict or dissuade illicit maritime trafficking and irregular migration. According to Italian officials, more than 50,000 migrants arrived in Italy in the first half of 2014, many from Libyan ports. Existing legislation outlining the responsibilities of various government agencies in the area of border management is vague and often contradictory, resulting in ad hoc and poorly coordinated efforts.

At the March 2014 Rome Conference, the United States and other international partners committed to help Libya address its border challenges through the coordinated provision of expertise, training, and equipment. Libya has also sought to engage its neighbors and regional partners on border security issues. In 2013, Libya signed the Rabat Declaration, which foresees expanded cooperation, training, and information exchanges with countries in the region as well as the establishment of a regional secretariat in Tripoli. Under former Prime Minister Zeidan, the Libyan government also established a Border Management Working Group (BMWG) comprised of seven ministries involved in border security, including Defense, Interior, Finance (which oversees the Customs Authority), and Transportation. Envisioned as the government’s lead body for coordinating border security policy and assistance, the BMWG suffered from leadership turnover, poor internal communications, and weak capacity. Border security efforts led by the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya (EUBAM) faced repeated delays and were largely placed on hold following the outbreak of fighting in Tripoli in July, which forced the evacuation of EUBAM staff from Libya to Tunisia and a considerable reduction in personnel.

Libya has cooperated in the investigation of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and interests, including the September 2012 killing of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other
Americans at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. However, Libyan support to these investigations has been limited given overall weak capacity in Libya’s law enforcement institutions. Although its political leadership has pledged to do everything possible to arrest and bring to justice the perpetrators of terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, Libyan officials publicly condemned the capture by U.S. forces of Abu Anas al-Libi and Ahmed Abu Khattalah, both of whom have been charged under U.S. terrorism laws. In 2013, the Libyan Ministry of Justice signed a Declaration of Intent to facilitate law enforcement cooperation with the United States on investigations, including that of the 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 bombing.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and has taken steps to implement a national identification database system to improve transparency in government salary payments. Although there is little reliable data on Libya’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counterterrorist financing efforts, Libyan government and financial institutions generally lacked the ability to identify and interdict illicit financial flows. The Libyan Central Bank has requested IMF technical and capacity building assistance in AML and other areas. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Libya has participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum and supported counterterrorism initiatives by the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the AU. In 2014, Libya participated in three foreign minister-level meetings with neighboring countries, hosted respectively by Tunisia, Egypt, and Spain, aimed at addressing Libya’s security challenges. Although the Libyan interim government under Prime Ministers Ali Zeidan and Abdullah al-Thinni has expressed interest in international counterterrorism cooperation, most efforts have failed to gain traction given the challenging security and political environment. Since 2011, the United States, UN, and a number of European countries have developed programs to help rebuild Libya’s law enforcement, security, and defense institutions through technical assistance and training. At the Libyan government’s request, the United States, UK, Turkey, and Italy committed to train a General Purpose Force (GPF) to help protect government institutions and maintain law and order. However, the GPF training program, as well as EU-led efforts to build Libyan border security capacity faced repeated delays in implementation. A number of these programs have been on hold since the outbreak of large-scale violence in July.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Libyan government has not adopted a comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism. Under the previous interim government, the Ministries of Interior, Culture, and Youth and Sports launched educational and public messaging campaigns to counter extremist ideology. Like many other government programs, these efforts are on hold in light of the current political and security situation. Libya has participated in the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute regional workshops on the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders. While many Libyan political and religious leaders condemn terrorism, others have implicitly endorsed extremist views. In November, Omar al-Hassi, the then-nominal prime minister of the unrecognized Tripoli-based administration, called Ansar al-Shari’a a “beautiful idea” and advocated engaging
the group in dialogue. While disparate civic groups have carried out campaigns, including via social media, to speak out against extremism, the increase in online threats, kidnappings, and assassinations of activists who speak out against extremists contributes to a culture of intimidation and self-censorship.

MOROCCO

Overview: Morocco has a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies. The government has treated counterterrorism as a top policy priority since the country experienced suicide bombing attacks in Casablanca in 2003, and that focus has been reinforced by further attacks in 2007 and 2011. Additionally, Moroccan nationals were implicated in the 2004 attacks in Madrid. In 2014, Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts effectively mitigated the risk of terrorism, although the country continued to face threats, largely from numerous small, independent violent extremist cells. Those groups and individuals, referred to collectively as adherents of the so-called Salafiyya Jihadiyya ideology, remained isolated from one another, small in size, and limited in capabilities.

During the year, authorities reported the disruption of multiple groups with ties to international networks that included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). AQIM and ISIL continued efforts to recruit Moroccans for combat in other countries, and there were reports of Moroccans attempting to join AQIM, ISIL, and other violent extremists in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) estimated that between 1,000 and 1,500 Moroccans were fighting in the Syrian conflict, making them one of the largest foreign contingents in the conflict. The government was increasingly concerned about the potential return of veteran Moroccan foreign terrorist fighters from those conflict zones to conduct possible terrorist attacks at home, and Moroccans resident abroad becoming radicalized during their stays in Western Europe. AQIM and ISIL continued to call for attacks against the Moroccan monarchy and prominent Moroccan institutions and individuals. In July, ISIL published a video online in which it promised to bring “jihad” to install the caliphate system in Morocco, and in October, the group published a video calling for attacks against U.S. persons and interests in Morocco and the region.

Morocco is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL and has made contributions and commitments to the effort. In addition, the government was increasingly proactive in 2014 to both stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and to counter ISIL propaganda. In July, the MOI claimed to have arrested over 120 foreign terrorist fighters who had returned from Syria since the start of the Syrian conflict. As of December, the parliament was reviewing draft amendments to the criminal procedural codes to comply with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178. The amendments would criminalize support to terrorist groups, travel to fight or train in conflict areas, and recruitment of others for such acts, creating greater latitude for the government to prosecute Moroccans engaged in terrorist activity abroad. Finally, in December, Morocco co-chaired the inaugural plenary session of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The government continued to enforce the 2003 counterterrorism law, which supplements the criminal code. That law defines terrorism to include incitement to terrorism but does not penalize participation in terrorist training, communication with a terrorist group, or intimidation of foreign governments or populations. The law also sets strict penalties for active participation in terrorism. During the year, the 2003 counterterrorism law and the criminal code were used in several convictions in terrorism-related cases. Morocco has been working to improve its legal system through an ongoing comprehensive reform of the justice system; for example, in November, the parliament approved a law eliminating the use of military tribunals for civilian cases.

Moroccan law enforcement units aggressively targeted and effectively dismantled terrorist cells within the country by leveraging intelligence collection, police work, and collaboration with regional and international partners. The National Brigade of the Judiciary Police (BNPJ) – a specialized entity within the investigative arm of the national police force, the General Direction of National Security (DGSN) – is the primary law enforcement entity responsible for counterterrorism law enforcement. It works closely with and uses intelligence from the internal security service, the General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DGST). In October, the MOI launched a security initiative to improve coordination among the Royal Armed Forces, the Royal Gendarmerie, and MOI auxiliary forces to better protect the public against terrorist threats in urban areas. The government has publicly committed itself not to use the struggle against terrorism to deprive individuals of their rights. It has emphasized adherence to human rights standards and the increased transparency of law enforcement procedures as part of its approach. However, in August, the UN Human Rights Council working group on arbitrary detention released a report based on a review of cases from 2009 through 2013 that claimed they had found “a pattern of torture and ill-treatment by police officers” in national security and counterterrorism cases; separately, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Juan Mendez had reported in 2013 that while he found evidence of torture in Moroccan detention facilities, it was “not systematic.”

The DGSN is the body primarily responsible for border security, handling border inspections at established ports of entry such as Casablanca’s Mohammed V Airport, where most border crossings occur. Law enforcement officials and private carriers have worked regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempting to transit illegally. Government authorities worked directly with U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Regional Carrier Liaison Group and the DHS Homeland Security Investigations Attaché office at the U.S. Consulate in Casablanca to address watchlisted or mala fide travelers. Government airport authorities have excellent capabilities in detecting fraudulent documents but currently lack biometric screening capabilities.

Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts led to numerous disruptions of alleged terrorist cells and prosecutions of associated individuals, including these cases:

- In August, the MOI announced that a joint BNPJ-DGST operation had led to the arrest of nine individuals for recruiting volunteers for ISIL. The network was operating out of the northern cities of Fes, Fnideq, Tetouan, and Ceuta, the Spanish enclave in Morocco, raising funds and exporting people to conflict zones. The arrests reportedly resulted from
a joint Moroccan-Spanish investigation. According to the Moroccan MOI, some of the recruits were planning to return to Morocco to use their training to conduct attacks against senior civilian and military officials. Press reports indicated that by late August, the nine individuals had been charged in the Salé Court of Appeals with forming a criminal gang to prepare and carry out terrorist attacks within the framework of a collective plot to undermine public order by intimidation, violence, and terrorism; funding terrorism; and holding unauthorized public meetings.

- In October, a joint BNPJ-DGST operation in Fes led to the arrest of two individuals – a French national and a Moroccan with French nationality – who were reportedly preparing to join ISIL in Syria. The two individuals had previously been in France supporting ISIL through the translation of propaganda and posting it online along with videos that included calls for expanding the caliphate to Morocco.
- In December, the Salé Court of Appeals sentenced seven people to three years in prison, without remission, on terrorism charges based on testimonies during the preliminary investigation that these individuals had traveled to Syria to join terrorist organizations and receive military training.

Morocco continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided DGSN and the Royal Gendarmerie with training in cyber forensics, crime scene forensics, and executive leadership. In August, Morocco and the United States signed an ATA agreement to partner in the development of CT capacity and cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel regions. Morocco also continued to partner with the United States to improve the police criminal investigation process through the development and implementation of chain of custody and evidence management procedures; forensic evidence collection and analysis, including DNA; and mentoring and training. Morocco participated in Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Department of Justice programs to improve technical investigative training for police and prosecutors. DGSN, Moroccan Customs, and the Royal Gendarmerie were active partners and participants in DHS-sponsored training events on border security, financial investigation, and counter-proliferation topics. Finally, government officials participated in several U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation-led courses to improve capacity in intelligence analysis, facial recognition, and leadership and management.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Morocco is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Morocco was removed from the FATF compliance monitoring follow-up process in 2013 and continued to make legal progress in the counterterrorist finance (CFT) domain in 2014. In July, the parliament’s chamber of representatives (lower house) voted to adopt the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, and the convention was under parliamentary review at year’s end.

In March, a joint BNPJ-DGST operation arrested four individuals in the Fes region for terrorist financing and the recruitment of youth to travel to Syria to fight. According to the MOI, the group’s leader, Ahmed Zahrouni Kouis, previously detained on terrorism charges, reportedly
scammed banks and financial institutions into granting loans to front companies with forged documents.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Morocco is a founding member of the GCTF and a member of the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). In April, Morocco hosted the Fifth GCTF Coordinating Committee meeting. During the year, Morocco pledged contributions to the GCTF-inspired Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) to address countering violent extremism goals and volunteered to serve as a pilot country. It also was a founding member of the Malta-based International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law launched in June. In December, it hosted and co-chaired the inaugural plenary session of the GCTF Foreign Terrorist Fighters Working Group.

Morocco is a major non-NATO Ally and a Mediterranean Dialogue (5+5) partner in the EU’s Barcelona Process; within that process, Morocco participates in the 5+5 Defense Initiative, which brings together five European and five North African countries to address security issues in the Western Mediterranean. Morocco also participates in multilateral peacekeeping operations in Africa as well as in training exercises such as maritime-focused PHOENIX EXPRESS and the FLINTLOCK regional security operations exercise, and hosts the annual AFRICAN LION regional exercise. These engagements have enhanced border security and improved capabilities to counter illicit traffic and terrorism.

Both Morocco and Algeria participate in 5+5, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and the GCTF; however, political disagreement over the status of Western Sahara remained an impediment to bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation in 2014.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Morocco has a comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE) that prioritizes economic and human development goals in addition to tight control of the religious sphere and messaging. Morocco has accelerated its rollout of education and employment initiatives for youth – the population identified as most vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment – and has expanded the legal rights and political and social empowerment of women. To counter what the government perceives as the dangerous importation of violent Islamist extremist ideologies, Morocco has developed a national strategy to affirm and further institutionalize Morocco’s widespread adherence to the Maliki-Ashari school of Sunni Islam. In the past decade, Morocco has focused on upgrading mosques, promoting the teaching of relatively moderate Islam, and strengthening the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA). The MEIA has developed an educational curriculum for Morocco’s nearly 50,000 imams in its version of relatively moderate Sunni Islam. The MEIA-affiliated Mohammedan League of Ulema (Rabita Mohammedia) produces scholarly research on the nation’s Islamic values, ensures conformity in educational curricula, and conducts outreach to youth on religious and social topics. To counter the radicalization of Moroccans living abroad, the Moroccan Council of Ulema for Europe and the Minister Delegate for Moroccans Living Abroad also undertook similar programs to promote
religious moderation within Moroccan expatriate communities in Europe. Throughout 2014, Morocco expanded the regional counter-radicalization efforts to train Malian imams announced in 2013 to include imams from France, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funded a program to improve the overall management of Morocco’s corrections system, which might help deter potential radicalism and the recruitment of prisoners to terrorist ideology. USAID’s Favorable Opportunities to Reinforce Self-Advancement in Today’s Youth (FORSATY, which loosely translates to “my opportunity” in Arabic) project addressed youth marginalization in areas known for recruitment by extremist organizations, helping them stay in school, develop skills, and become active in the community.

**OMAN**

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism partner and worked actively to prevent terrorists from conducting attacks within Oman, or using its territory for safe haven or to transport terrorists, weapons, and materiel. The Government of Oman actively sought training and equipment from U.S. government and commercial entities as well as from other countries to support its efforts to control its land and maritime borders. Oman used U.S. security assistance to improve counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. Omani officials engaged regularly with U.S. officials on the need to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

Oman participated in Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) meetings and signed the September 11 Jeddah Communiqué to express support for combating the spread of ISIL’s extremism. After the Jeddah meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement noting that regional cooperation was needed to end the threat posed by ISIL as quickly as possible. Omani officials also participated in the October Coalition Partners Communications Conference in Kuwait to develop a counter-narrative to ISIL messaging, and the December Counter-ISIL plenary meeting in Brussels. In his remarks to the UN Security Council (UNSC) September 19, Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi, disparaged ISIL as the “un-Islamic” state.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Royal Decree 8/2007 outlines specific penalties, including the death penalty and life imprisonment, for various terrorist acts, including establishment or leadership of a terrorist group, attempts to join or recruit for a terrorist group, development of an explosive or weapon, or takeover of any mode of transportation for purposes of terrorism. Royal Decree 55/1999, ratified the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, and Royal Decree 22/2002, ratified the Organization of Islamic Cooperation Convention on Combating International Terrorism. Royal Decree 105/2005 ratifies the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Convention to Counter Terrorism. Oman’s criminal procedure law permits those suspected of posing a threat to national security to be held for 30 days without a charge.

A widespread corruption crackdown started in 2013 continued into 2104, with guilty verdicts and lengthy prison terms – up to 23 years in prison – issued to well-placed government officials, influential business persons, and senior leadership of state-owned corporations.
Counterterrorism investigation, crisis response, and border security capabilities were limited by local capacity and a challenging operating environment due to Oman’s long and remote borders with Yemen and Saudi Arabia. There was little coordination among the many agencies with jurisdiction over counterterrorism. Roles and responsibilities between law enforcement and the armed forces were not clearly delineated.

In 2014, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security engaged with the Royal Oman Police Coast Guard, the Directorate General of Customs, and the Royal Army of Oman to deliver numerous training programs designed to assist Omani personnel in enhancing interdiction capabilities at official Ports of Entry on land and at sea ports, and along land and maritime borders.

Oman participated in the U.S. Department of Energy’s week-long Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Commodity Identification Course, which included training on identifying and interdicting dual-use material that may be used in a WMD terrorist attack.

Oman also participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided training on maritime border security, cyber investigations, and critical incident management for Omani security officials representing a number of government agencies.

Omani authorities made significant progress on construction of a fence along Oman’s long and remote border with Yemen to deter entry into its territory.

The major deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security are the lack of interagency coordination and lack of training to develop requisite law enforcement skills. Oman’s border with Yemen also features extremely rugged, mountainous terrain which challenges border security efforts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Oman is a member of the Middle East-North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012), the Government of Oman banned in January the import of Somali charcoal - a measure aimed to deny revenue from charcoal sales to the al-Shabaab terrorist group. The Switzerland-based Basel Institute assessed Oman in September 2014 as having the lowest risk among GCC states for money laundering and terrorist financing, according to its Anti-Money Laundering Index, which ranks Oman as 29th globally with a score of 4.76 on a scale from 0 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). **Hawala** are not permitted to operate in Oman. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol2/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Oman participates in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum. During the September 25 forum, Oman’s Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf bin Alawi, joined other GCC foreign ministers in reaffirming the rejection of terrorism, violent extremism, and sectarianism in all their forms, condemning the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and the recruitment of children to carry out
attacks, and emphasized that ISIL poses a direct threat to shared peace and security. The foreign ministers agreed to follow up the Strategic Cooperation Forum discussion with concrete steps to destroy and ultimately defeat ISIL, and establish security and stability, including by cutting the group’s sources of revenue, blocking travel of foreign fighters, and sharing information on ISIL activities.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Grand Mufti of Oman, Sheikh Ahmed al-Khalili, published an essay in October calling on all Muslims to reject extremism and promote tolerance, themes he again amplified in his popular and widely broadcast weekly television program.

**QATAR**

**Overview:** In 2014, Qatar restructured its national counterterrorism committee to improve interagency coordination on counterterrorism efforts, including counterterrorist financing, cybersecurity, threats to civil aviation, and internal security threats. The Qatari government is concerned by the threat of foreign terrorist fighters transiting through Doha’s new international airport hub to or from Syria to receive training and provide support to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as well as the possibility that violent extremists could seek to commit terrorist acts in or from Qatar using Qatar’s internet or financial systems. In 2014, the Qatari government implemented new tools to enhance monitoring and enforcement against persons using charities and the internet for terrorist purposes or in support of terrorism, including fundraising.

Qatar is a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. In addition to hosting two U.S. military installations important to Coalition efforts, Qatar has offered to host a train-and-equip program for moderate Syrian opposition forces and provided operational and logistical support for Coalition activities. Qatari aircraft have participated in Coalition airstrikes against ISIL in Syria. Qatar has contributed humanitarian aid to the effort, and sent six planes full of humanitarian assistance to Iraq in September.

U.S. agencies had an active and productive dialogue with their Qatari counterparts and worked closely for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information. Qatar was generally responsive to U.S. requests and coordination efforts although limited in capacity and indigenous manpower. The United States and Qatar collaborated in fostering closer regional and international cooperation on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and rule of law activities.

Qatar has a strong legal framework to combat terrorist financing, and sought to strengthen it in 2014. Qatari officials recognized there were gaps in the law and acknowledged a critical need for improvement in implementation. Capacity to address this issue remained an obstacle during the year. As a result of information sharing and engagement on specific designated individuals, Qatari officials took enforcement steps against private financiers of terrorism and shared limited information on others with the United States.
Terrorist activity historically has been low in Qatar. Restrictive immigration policies and security services capable of monitoring and disrupting violent extremist activities helped to mitigate the terrorist threat.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In addition to existing laws which prohibit terrorist activities, in 2014 the Amir approved Law Number 14, the Cybercrime Prevention Law, which criminalizes terrorism-linked cyber offenses. The new cybercrime law clarifies that it is unlawful to establish or manage a terrorist organization on any information network (including a website) or information technology device, or to use an information network to establish contact with leaders or members of terrorist organizations, promote or finance terrorism, or instruct on methods to assist in terrorist activity. Specifically, the law prohibits use of an “information network or information technology technique” to set up or run a website for a terrorist group or organization, facilitate communication with leaders and members of such a group or organization, promote its thoughts, secure financing thereto, or publish information relating to manufacturing explosives or incendiary devices of any device that can be used in a terrorist act.

The new cybercrime law grants law enforcement and prosecutors additional investigative tools, such as monitoring internet traffic and electronic data, to combat terrorism and terrorist finance in the information age. Qatar can also deport individuals for violation of the cybercrime law. A professional organization (such as a law firm), unless specifically exempted by law, must comply with court orders and investigations under the Cybercrime Law, and may not withhold information on the basis of professional confidentiality. The law also provides mechanisms and details for Qatar to comply with requests for information made by other countries under mutual legal assistance treaties, thereby expanding enforcement capabilities outside of Qatar.

The State Security Bureau, also known as the Qatar State Security, maintains an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal extremist or terrorism-related activities. The internal security-focused Ministry of Interior is well-positioned to respond to incidents with rapid reaction forces and trained internal security forces that routinely pursue and engage in structured counterterrorism training and exercises. Qatar’s Office of Public Prosecution is tasked with prosecuting all crimes, including any related to terrorism, and plays a significant role in terrorism investigations as the prosecutors conduct investigative interviews.

Qatar also maintains an interagency National Anti-Terrorism Committee (NATC) within the Ministry of Interior, which is composed of representatives from more than 10 government ministries and official institutions. The NATC is tasked with formulating Qatar’s counterterrorism policy, ensuring thorough and transparent interagency coordination within the government, fulfilling Qatar’s obligations to combat terrorism under international conventions, and participating in international or UN conferences on terrorism. During 2014, Qatar took steps to improve interagency coordination on terrorism-related security matters, by consolidating a restructured NATC, with a new Chairman. As of December 31, the NATC’s restructuring was ongoing, with pending law changes to formalize consolidation of interagency coordination on critical infrastructure and industrial security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism including counterterrorism financing and border security measures.
Qatar maintains its own watchlist of suspected terrorists that it uses to screen passengers on international flights. Qatar also conducts extensive vetting and background checks on all applicants for work visas. The Qatari government uses biometric scans for arrivals at the Doha International Airport. Through its state-owned airline Qatar Airways, Qatar signed an agreement in November with Interpol to check the validity of passports of travelers against the Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents databases, a new initiative with only two airlines worldwide to help stem the flow of foreign fighters and enhance border security.

Overall, Qatar’s security services workforce is limited in scope and bandwidth, and in most agencies, is reliant on manpower from third countries to fill rank-and-file law enforcement positions. This limitation applies across the board with all Qatari government institutions (except for the Qatar State Security and elite units of the Ministry of Interior’s internal security force) and is commensurate with the demographics of the nation. Lack of capacity and to some extent the lack of advanced training of these non-Qatars does contribute to a lack of effectiveness in basic police operations. However, Qatar’s reliance on technology has provided state-of-the-art electronic surveillance capacity, which enhances Qatari security services’ effectiveness in the detection and monitoring of terrorist suspects.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Qatar is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Qatar’s Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law of 2010 requires Qatar’s Public Prosecutor to freeze the funds of UNSC-designated terrorist organizations. Qatar Central Bank works with financial institutions to confirm compliance of UN designations of terrorist entities and individuals, including Qatari citizens.

In September, the Amir of Qatar issued a new law regulating the work of charities oversight based on FATF standards. Law Number 15 of 2014 established an independent Charities Commission composed of an interagency board (headed by the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs and including officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, the Central Bank, and Qatar State Security). It amended Law Number 4 of 2010 which previously charged the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs with the sole responsibility for regulating charities. According to the new law, local charities must obtain authorization from the Commission prior to any dealings with foreign entities. The Qatar Central Bank scrutinizes charities’ overseas transactions to ensure compliance.

The Amir also issued Law Number 14 of 2014 in September on cybercrime prevention, which penalizes the use of the internet for unauthorized fundraising in support of terrorism.

The Qatari government in 2014 took steps to stem the flow of funds from Qatar to violent extremist groups and individuals. Qatari authorities shut down the Madad Ahl al-Sham online fundraising campaign that was suspected of sending funds to violent extremist elements in Syria. Qatari authorities deported a Jordanian terrorist financier resident in Doha who had been employed by a Qatari charity. To further protect the State of Qatar from foreign terrorist financiers attempting to raise funds in Doha, the government barred the entry of multiple individuals of concern. The government also issued directives to local charities prohibiting them from transferring funds to several overseas charities suspected of engaging in illicit activities.
In June, Qatar sent fourteen interagency officials to a U.S.-hosted anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism training in Washington. Participants discussed with U.S. interagency experts the need to tackle the use of charities and misuse of the internet for illicit finance, and the relationship with funding foreign fighters and violent extremist groups overseas.

Qatari law authorizes the NATC to designate by resolution those who finance terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist organizations, independently of lists pursuant to UNSCR 1267. No designations were made in 2014.

Non-profit organizations are not obliged to file suspicious transaction reports, but the government has reportedly increased its regulation and monitoring of charities with the implementation of a new regulation of charities law issued in September.


Regional and International Cooperation: Qatar is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and actively participated in GCTF coordination activities. Qatar participated in and was active in counterterrorism issues at the UN, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Qatar hosted the March GCTF workshop on developing a plan of action for community-oriented policing as a tool for Countering Violent Extremism. Qatar also participated in the Global Countering Violent Extremism Expo hosted by the Hedayah Center in Abu Dhabi, UAE, in December.

Qatari officials and Qatari media work together on strategic communications to counter violent extremism; the Prime Minister has a senior aide responsible for overseeing strategic communications and senior Qatari officials oversee state media and sit on the Board of Directors of the Al-Jazeera network. An Assistant Foreign Minister attended the Global Coalition Communication Conference in Kuwait in October. Qatari officials also participated in a Global Coalition Communications Working Group in Abu Dhabi in December.

SAUDI ARABIA

Overview: For the first time in several years, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), based in Yemen, was able to conduct a successful attack on Saudi soil with a July raid on the Wudayah Border Crossing and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) General Investigation Directorate (Mabahith) office in Sharurah (near the Saudi-Yemeni border), which resulted in the death of four Saudi security officers. AQAP continued efforts to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom.
In addition to facing the enduring threat from AQAP, Saudi counterterrorism efforts were increasingly focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as Saudi citizens returning from fighting in Syria. The Saudi government continued domestic and bilateral efforts to build, augment, and refine its capacity to counter terrorism and extremist ideologies in the Kingdom while increasing participation in international counterterrorism conferences and engagements. Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a robust counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of both U.S. and Saudi citizens within Saudi territories and abroad. Saudi Arabia stood as a member of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, taking military action in support of coalition efforts.

The Saudi government took a zero-tolerance stance on ISIL by condemning the organization’s activities and participating in Global Coalition military action to counter the group in Syria and Iraq. Its external action against ISIL was complemented by an aggressive campaign by both official clerics and Saudi King Abdullah to discredit the group and condemn their activities as acts of terrorism. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, expanding existing counterterrorism programs and rhetoric to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, and leveraged terrorist finance provisions of its Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist Financing (CT Law) to combat funding of violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** Several attacks on both Saudi nationals and Westerners occurred, despite Saudi efforts to detect and disrupt terrorist activity.

- On July 4, the most organized of the incidents, carried out by AQAP, targeted a Saudi border checkpoint in Sharurah near the Yemeni border, which resulted in the death of four Saudi security officers and five AQAP assailants.
- On October 14, there were two shooting events involving Western targets, including one targeting two American contractors working in Saudi Arabia who were shot at a gas station in Riyadh by a dual Saudi/U.S. national. There were indications that extremist propaganda influenced the attacker, a former employee of the victim’s organization.
- On November 3, a group of gunmen killed five Saudi nationals and wounded nine others in the town of al-Dalwah in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. The Saudi government has alleged that the gunmen had ties to ISIL.
- On November 22, a Danish national survived being shot three times by three assailants who were arrested by Saudi authorities on December 11. Initial Saudi investigations determined that the three Saudi attackers had unspecified links to ISIL.

In all cases, the Saudi government worked closely with the United States to clarify the circumstances regarding these attacks and responded quickly to ensure proper security measures were in place to better secure U.S. installations and interests.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In February, Saudi Arabia’s robust legal counterterrorism apparatus was bolstered by the introduction of a new counterterrorism law containing 41 articles that further refined existing counterterrorism laws. Human rights activists have criticized the counterterrorism law, claiming that an overly-broad definition of terrorism
greatly inhibits freedom of expression and association. Saudi Arabia has a specialized criminal court for handling counterterrorism cases; it was also used in 2014 to try human rights defenders.

Throughout 2014, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in the Kingdom by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. The Saudi General Investigations Directorate, also known as the Mabahith, is responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations in the Kingdom and, upon its discretion, will cooperate with other elements of the Saudi government to further investigations into specific cases. Once the investigation is complete, the case is transferred to the Special Investigations and Public Prosecutions Office in the Saudi Ministry of Justice for the duration of the trial. The Saudi government continued its programs to improve physical border security through the employment of biometric systems, aerial reconnaissance, thermal imaging, and remote unattended sensors along the border region, especially considering the deteriorating security situation with neighbors Yemen and Iraq. Saudi Arabia’s MOI hosted the 17th Annual International Conference and Exhibition for Industrial Security, Fire, and Occupational Safety and Health in Riyadh in early November, which focused on strengthening industrial security practices and coordination between the government and private sectors to protect key infrastructure from terrorist attacks.

Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about suspected terrorist activity. The government offered rewards for information on terrorists, and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of AQAP militants and supporters, as well as the successful disruption of a more than 70-member ISIL cell active in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism both through engagement in bilateral programs and through information exchange agreements with the United States. Despite the absence of a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty, Post’s Legal Attaché office brokered and enhanced direct engagement between Department of Justice Office of International Affairs and MOI’s Department of Legal Affairs and International Cooperation. This year witnessed the first case in which Saudi Arabia produced certified bank records in response to a mutual legal assistance request.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The Saudi government affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts in the Kingdom. It continued to provide specialized training programs for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies as part of its efforts to maintain financial programs designed to combat terror financing. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) has standing requirements to all Saudi financial institutions to implement all the FATF Recommendations regarding money laundering and terrorist finance. The February 2014 counterterrorism law further outlined the Saudi government’s ability to combat terrorist financing. Despite these efforts, however, foreign
Charities with suspected links to terrorist groups continued to leverage social media to solicit funds from Saudi donors, a trend the Saudi government worked to combat. In 2014, the FATF decided to enable a small expansion of membership, and the Kingdom was selected as a candidate for potential membership. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Saudi Arabia cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues, including by participating in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative since 2008; Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which itself is a member of the FATF. Saudi officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the Saudi government hosted international counterterrorism conferences on subjects including countering violent extremist ideology and combating terrorist financing. In April 2014, the Saudi government participated in the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum Task Force on Counterterrorism and Border Security.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** As part of its strategy to counter violent extremism, the Saudi government focused on increasing public awareness campaigns and conducting outreach, counter-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs. Some of these efforts involved seminars that refuted radical Islamic interpretation and ideology. Public awareness campaigns aimed at reinforcing the values of the Islamic faith and educating Saudi citizens about the dangers of extremism and terrorism. Methods used included advertisements and programs on television, in schools and mosques, and at sporting events. The Saudi government expanded these programs to address the rising threat to youth from recruitment efforts from groups like ISIL and to dissuade its citizens from engaging as foreign fighters in Syria.

The Ministry of Interior continued to operate its flagship de-radicalization program (the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue), as well as its extensive prison rehabilitation program to reduce recidivism among former inmates. The Saudi government also continued its ongoing program to modernize the educational curriculum, including textbooks used in religious training criticized for intolerance of other religious traditions. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to re-educate imams, prohibiting them from incitement of violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education.

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**TUNISIA**

**Overview:** Over the past year, the Tunisian government increased its counterterrorism efforts and cooperation with the United States, with positive results. Former Prime Minister Joma’a’s government, which assumed power in January 2014, made fighting terrorism a top priority and the government took increasingly bold steps to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The government led a sustained campaign to take tough action on terrorists and began a major effort to build the counterterrorism capabilities of its security forces. The security forces showcased their capabilities during the parliamentary and presidential elections in the last quarter of the
The elections proceeded smoothly and without any major incident, despite terrorist vows to disrupt the process. The Tunisian security forces dismantled several terrorist cells and disrupted a number of plots before they could be executed.

Nevertheless, terrorism remained a serious challenge for Tunisia’s nascent democracy. The rise of violent extremist organizations in Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution – including Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – posed serious security challenges to a post-revolutionary government. The government continued its efforts to reorient the focus of the security forces toward a counterterrorism mission, but these reforms need time and international support to succeed. Tunisia continued to face challenges that included the potential for terrorist attacks, the influx of arms and violent extremists from across the Algerian and Libyan borders, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The disproportionate numbers of Tunisians traveling to fight in Iraq and Syria – and the potential for the return of these fighters – was another cause for concern. Some independent sources estimate that up to 3,000 Tunisians have left their country for Syria and Iraq to join militant groups, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Tunisia has been active in countering terrorist threats to Tunisia’s security. The government has put considerable efforts into stemming the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq. Minister of Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou told the media in June that the Tunisian government detained “hundreds of returning foreign fighters.” His announcement is consistent with his previous statement in February, estimating 400 Tunisian fighters had returned to the country. The government also estimates that approximately 9,000 Tunisians have been prevented from leaving Tunisia for Syria to join the conflict, although there is no independent confirmation of this number. Existing legislation enables the Tunisian government to detain returning fighters, although it has been difficult to meet the evidentiary requirements needed to prosecute them. A counterterrorism bill, which would modernize the legislative framework for dealing with terrorism, is currently before the legislature. An interagency team within the Tunisian Government was reviewing the bill at year’s end to prepare amendments that would bring the bill’s provisions in line with UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178.

Tunisia is one of six countries participating in the President’s Security Governance Initiative (SGI) announced at the U.S.-Africa Leaders’ Summit. SGI focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: The list of incidents below highlights some of the most significant clashes between security forces and terrorist elements that occurred during the year.

- On February 16, a group of terrorists wearing military uniforms killed three members of the security forces and one civilian in an ambush at a false check point in Ouled Manaa, Jendouba.
- On April 11, approximately five soldiers and one civilian were injured in an IED explosion on Mount Chaambi.
- On May 27, the Minister of Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou’s house in Kasserine was attacked. Approximately four policemen were killed and one was injured. AQIM took responsibility for the attack.
• On June 30, the explosion of an IED during a sweeping operation in the mountains of Ouergha, Le Kef, caused the death of approximately four soldiers. Officials reported a fifth soldier also died the same day after a clash with gunmen.
• On July 16, in an attack on Mount Chaambi, 15 soldiers were reportedly killed and another 22 injured in a military camp a few minutes before they were to break their fast during the month of Ramadan.
• On November 5, a group of suspected terrorists attacked a bus transporting soldiers in Neber, Kef. Five soldiers were reportedly killed and 10 injured.
• On November 30, a National Guard member was abducted and later decapitated by violent extremists in the Mount Chaambi region.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The 2003 counterterrorism law remains the primary legal framework for dealing with terrorism offenses, although lesser offenses can still be charged under the penal code. A new bill that was designed to address concerns raised by human rights groups and modernizing the legislation was before the legislature at year’s end.

The Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense share responsibility for detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in Tunisia. In particular, the Antiterrorism Brigade (BAT) and the National Guard Special Unit – elite units under the Ministry of Interior’s National Police and National Guard, respectively – take the lead for counterterrorism operations outside the military exclusion zones. The National Unit for the Investigation of Terrorist Crimes leads investigations and liaises with the judicial system to encourage successful prosecutions. The military’s role in counterterrorism has gradually increased, especially in the military exclusion zones and mountainous areas close to the Algerian border, where the Ministry of Defense has the lead in counterterrorism operations. The government was at the last stages in December 2014 of establishing an interagency Counterterrorism Fusion Center that would act as a clearing house for information among security ministries to enable them to better communicate and coordinate their counterterrorism efforts.

Security forces were inexperienced in tackling terrorist threats and lacked appropriate equipment and training. In the past year, the government’s efforts have intensified, with successes including the seizure of weapons, arrests, and operations against armed groups throughout the country. At the tactical level, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces reportedly work well together, coordinating their efforts within Counterterrorism Task Forces that were established in the military exclusion zones.

Tunisia has an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and maintains fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints. Tunisia currently has only one AFIS system and it is not known if the records can be shared with other government agencies via automated responses. Tunisia also maintains a DNA data base and has expressed an interest in becoming a Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) member. Tunisia does not currently share its biometric data with any countries. The Government has undertaken a sweeping study of its options to modernize and strengthen its border security capabilities.

Instability in Libya presents an additional challenge and continues to preoccupy Tunisian security officials and political leaders. Border security remained a priority in 2014 and Tunisian
authorities collaborated with their Algerian counterparts to stem the flow of weapons and insurgents across their common borders and across their borders with Libya. Tunisia repeatedly expressed satisfaction with its cooperation with Algeria. Efforts to root out militants in the Mount Chaambi region and western borders with Algeria continued at year’s end. While the operation has achieved some success, it has been hampered by Tunisian military’s inexperience in this type of engagement.

The year saw a significant number of arrests and raids by security forces. The Government of Tunisia claimed to have arrested and detained 2,700 terrorists by the end of November 2014, double the number of arrests in all of 2013. On December 2, the government began the prosecution of 75 suspected terrorists for the killing of Anis Jelassi, the first member of the Tunisian security forces killed in a terrorist attack since the revolution.

Significant law enforcement and proactive disruptions arrests related to counterterrorism activities included:

- On February 4, the police killed Kamel Gadhdgadhi, alleged murderer of politician Chokri Belaid, and six other suspected terrorists in a house raid in Raoued, a northern suburb of Tunis. Clashes between suspected terrorists and security forces lasted nearly 20 hours and resulted in the death of a National Guard member. The police and the army seized weapons, ammunition, a large quantity of explosives, and mobile phones and military uniforms.
- On February 9-10, the BAT raided a house and dismantled a terrorist cell in Cité Ennasim, Ariana, near Tunis. Four suspected terrorists were arrested, including Ahmed Melki, suspected of being involved in the assassination of politician Mohamed Brahmi.
- On March 15, Abou Ayoub, one of the leaders of AAS-T was arrested in Gabes following his illegal entry into Tunisia from Libya.
- On May 21, counterterrorist units arrested eight individuals on charges of planning terrorist attacks. They entered Tunisia from Libya, where they had been reportedly trained in the use of weapons and building bombs.
- On July 10, clashes between the police forces and AAS-T members led to the arrest of eight suspected terrorists and confiscation of cash. AAS-T sympathizers organized a protest against the operations, which turned violent, and led to the use of tear gas by the police.
- On October 9, Hafedh Ben Hassine, the brother of Seif Allah Ben Hassine, an AAS-T founder, was arrested on charges of financing Salafist groups and recruiting terrorists.
- On October 22, security forces launched an assault in Oued Ellil, Manouba and surrounded a house harboring suspected terrorists. The operations continued for two days and finally led to the death of six suspected terrorists, including five women, and a National Guard member. The police seized light weapons and grenades. Information that the security forces had collected from a terrorist suspect in the early hours of that day in the south reportedly triggered the operations.

Tunisians voted in parliamentary elections on October 26 and in two rounds of presidential elections on November 23 and December 21. Despite terrorists’ vows to disrupt the electoral process, the security forces could guarantee the safety of citizens during the vote. Sporadic
violence in protest of the results occurred after the second round of the presidential elections, but it did not appear that terrorist groups had organized the protests.

The appeal of the court ruling to release the individuals who allegedly took part in the September 14, 2012 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and American Cooperative School of Tunis continued in 2014, but were continually delayed due to the suspects not showing up in court. The Minister of Interior confirmed in October that the security forces had arrested terrorists suspected of plotting an assassination attempt targeting the U.S. Ambassador.

Tunisia continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Tunisian Ministry of Interior officials received ATA training in the areas of tactical crisis response, counterterrorism investigations, and command and control. Tactical units were granted specific tactical and enabling equipment. Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs supported leadership development, police reform, prison reform, hostage rescue, and crowd control management for the Justice and Interior ministries, and provided vehicles, body armor, computers, and other equipment to enhance internal and border security. Leadership development included travel for Tunisian police and corrections professionals to the United States to meet U.S. law enforcement counterparts. The Tunisian Armed Forces consider counterterrorism and border security their principal mission. The armed forces have successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, equipment, and training in border security and counterterrorism operations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Since Tunisia has strict currency controls, it is likely that remittance systems such as *hawala* are operating. Trade-based money laundering is also a concern. Throughout the region, invoice manipulation and customs fraud were often involved in the process of *hawala* financial reconciliations. Tunisia’s financial intelligence unit, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Commission, is headed by the governor of the Central Bank and includes representatives from a range of other agencies. It has worked effectively over the last year to gather important regulatory information to improve its efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The Tunisian penal code provides for the seizure of assets and property tied to narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. Tunisia freezes and confiscates assets, but the timeframe for taking action varies depending on the case. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the *2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Tunisia participates in multinational efforts to counter terrorism, such as those at the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and the AU. Tunisia is an active member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, a U.S. multi-year interagency regional program aimed at building the capacity of governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to confront the threats posed by violent extremists. Tunisian authorities intensified their coordination on border security with Algerian counterparts over this past year, although cooperation with Libya diminished due to the absence of an effective Libyan central government. Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia on counterterrorism is particularly robust: an agreement between the two countries established military-to-military communications and a
coordination committee in order to improve information sharing related to counterterrorism activities.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Tunisia is making concerted efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions in the country through economic development and education programs in order to counter radicalization and violence. The government has also attempted to prevent the radicalization of Tunisians by minimizing their exposure to inflammatory rhetoric in the mosques. Article Six of the Constitution, adopted in January, defines the state as “the guardian of religion” with the duty to guarantee “the neutrality of the mosques and of the places of worship from all partisan instrumentalization.” It also commits the state to “the dissemination of the values of moderation and tolerance,” as well as “the prohibition of, and the fight against, appeals to excommunication and incitement to violence and hatred.” Several hundred imams, reportedly with extremist agendas, took over mosques in the months following the 2011 revolution, accusing their predecessors of collaborating with the previous regime. The Ministry of Religious Affairs acknowledged in October 2011 that these imams controlled 400 mosques in Tunisia. The ministry declared in December 2014 that it had regained control of all mosques throughout Tunisia, and that it had replaced all self-appointed imams with government-sanctioned imams.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

**Overview:** The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to build its counterterrorism capacity and strengthened its international counterterrorism cooperation. Over the course of the year, the UAE government improved its border security measures and renewed its efforts to counter terrorist financing. The UAE government was dedicated to providing strong support for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The pre-clearance facility for travelers boarding direct flights to the United States at the Abu Dhabi International Airport continued to operate and expand its services. Prominent officials and religious leaders continued to publicly criticize violent extremist ideology.

The UAE government leaders and senior Emirati officials publicly highlighted the dangers of ISIL and violent extremism, using media to counter ISIL messaging. Apart from the United States, the UAE has conducted more air operations against ISIL than any other Coalition member. The UAE government has openly advocated fighting violent extremism not only militarily, but holistically, including by stopping violent extremist funding, disrupting the recruitment of foreign fighters, securing borders, preventing the exploitation of the web and social media, and by contesting the use of religious centers to promote hatred and violence. To this end, the government restricts violent extremist messaging on the internet.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** On December 1, an American teacher was stabbed to death in a mall restroom by a 38 year-old Emirati woman. The alleged perpetrator then went to the home of an American doctor and planted a primitive bomb outside his apartment. The explosive was discovered by one of the doctor’s children; the Abu Dhabi police were able to evacuate the area and defuse the device. Authorities identified the suspect, tracked her to her home, and arrested her in less than 48 hours. Security sources told the media that the crime committed was a
“personal terrorist act” and said the accused did not have links to terrorist organizations although she had allegedly visited violent extremist websites.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The UAE government passed Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on combating terrorism offenses, which replaced Federal Law No. 1 of 2004. The new law strengthened existing legislation by criminalizing additional conduct and imposing stricter punishments, including fines and forfeitures, to deter terrorism and dissident activities.

In November, the government designated 85 groups as terrorist organizations in line with the new law. In conjunction with the new counterterrorism law, the designation of terrorist organizations laid the groundwork for prosecuting a greater number of individuals for a broader range of activities. However, the criteria used for designations, and procedures for organizations to appeal designations, were opaque. The list included Muslim affinity groups in several Western countries, alongside internationally recognized terrorist organizations such as al-Qa’ida and ISIL. The U.S. government requested additional information about the designation by the UAE of two American Muslim affinity groups, which the United States does not consider to be terrorist organizations, and which operate openly in the United States.

The State Security Directorate in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai State Security are the principal security services responsible for counterterrorism functions. These services have demonstrated capability in investigations, crisis response, and border security, and are trained and equipped to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The State Security Court, a branch of the Federal Supreme Court, has developed capacity for handling security cases.

In June, the Federal Supreme Court issued sentences for seven of nine alleged members of an al-Qa’ida (AQ) cell who were arrested in April 2013. The seven individuals were convicted on charges of running or belonging to an AQ terrorist cell; recruiting and promoting the actions of AQ (including possible terrorist attacks within the UAE); and illegally collecting money to finance a terrorist organization. The group was reportedly recruiting and fundraising for al-Nusrah Front.

In a separate trial in December, the Federal Supreme Court convicted 11 of 15 individuals who were variously charged with joining, supporting, and collecting funds for, and transferring funds to al-Nusrah Front and Ahrar Al Sham; making unauthorized explosives; possessing unlicensed firearms; and polluting the environment through dangerous and banned materials. This is believed to be the first case involving provisions of the new counterterrorism law, and the mixed verdict of convictions and acquittals shows discernment in the way that the laws were applied. The sentences included incarceration, fines, forfeitures, and the closing down of a website. Four Emirati nationals who were tried in absentia were each sentenced to life imprisonment. The case shows the ability of the UAE government to focus its investigative resources on rooting out networks, and to use conspiracy and aiding and abetting as prosecution theories in terrorism cases.

The government continued to cooperate with the United States by hosting a preclearance facility in Abu Dhabi International Airport. The preclearance facility expanded to cover additional
direct flights to the U.S. through an increase in the number of deployed Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers.

The UAE participated in the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives (CSI). The CSI, which became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port in the emirate of Dubai in 2005, collocates two U.S. CBP officers with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid. On average, CSI reviewed approximately 250 bills of lading each week, resulting in about 25 non-intrusive inspections per month of U.S.-bound containers. Examinations were conducted jointly with Dubai Customs officers, who shared information on transshipments from high risk areas, including those originating in Iran.

In 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) signed two Memoranda of Cooperation (MOCs) to support the respective training academies of the UAE Ministry of Interior’s (federal) Immigration Authority and the Abu Dhabi (emirate-level) Customs Authority (ADCA) and to enhance capacity building of its police and customs authorities. The aforementioned MOCs remained in effect.

A critical challenge to the effectiveness of the UAE’s law enforcement, border security, and judicial systems is the country’s limited human capacity. These sectors are generally reserved for Emirati citizens, who compose only 11 percent of the country’s total population, making it structurally difficult to develop the country’s human resources to counter the full range of terrorist activities. Despite this, the UAE government remained vigilant in its overall counterterrorism pursuits.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UAE is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and chairs the Task Force’s Training and Typologies Working Group. The UAE’s financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit, is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. The UAE continued efforts to strengthen its institutional capabilities to combat terrorist financing. In October, the government adopted Federal Law No. 9 of 2014, amending Law No. 2 of 2002 Regarding Combating Money Laundering. The new law is intended to address deficiencies identified in the UAE’s 2008 FATF Mutual Evaluation and bring the UAE into compliance with the FATF Recommendations issued in February 2012. Notably, the amendments codified in law the obligation of all covered entities to report suspicious transactions related to terrorism financing.

The Central Bank conducted Anti-Money Laundering (AML) training both locally and regionally, and expanded its cooperation with foreign FIUs. Exploitation by illicit actors of money transmitters including licensed exchange houses, hawalas, and trading firms acting as money transmitters, remained significant concerns.

The UAE is a regional and global financial and transportation hub. Terrorist organizations have used the UAE to send and receive financial support. Operational capability constraints and political considerations sometimes prevented the UAE government from immediately freezing and confiscating terrorist assets absent multilateral assistance. In November, the UAE reported
to the MENAFATF that Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on Terrorist Crimes addressed outstanding deficiencies related to implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373.

Both the Governor of the Central Bank and the Public Prosecutor may freeze funds based on suspicion of terrorist financing. The Central Bank may only freeze funds for a period of seven days, during which the Public Prosecutor must be informed. The Public Prosecutor may extend the freeze, pending investigation. Federal Law No. 7 stipulates that the Cabinet issue a list of designated terrorist organizations or persons, and that funds and other items owned by listed organizations may be seized by the court.

The UAE requires licensing and registration of exchange houses and hawalas. Federal Law No. 9 of 2014 extends due diligence, reporting, and record keeping requirements to Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Persons, such as real estate brokers, precious metals dealers, lawyers, etc.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** The UAE is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and chaired the Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism with the UK. The International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, known as Hedayah, was formally launched in Abu Dhabi in December, 2012. The UAE is Hedayah’s permanent host, pursuant to federal Law No. 7 of 2013. The government continued to support the center, which hosted the Global CVE Expo 2014 from December 9-11, bringing together more than 200 government officials, industry partners, technology specialists, academic experts, and civil society actors to generate new ideas and programs, and to leverage new technologies for countering violent extremist narratives.

The government cooperated with other states to build counterterrorism capacity and routinely invited participation from GCC countries at counterterrorism-related training sessions conducted by the FBI in the UAE. In December at the 35th GCC Summit, GCC leaders announced the creation of a regional police force to be headquartered in Abu Dhabi.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** To prevent violent extremist preaching in UAE mosques, the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments provided guidelines for all Friday sermons and monitored mosques’ compliance. Abroad, the General Authority has since 2010 trained cohorts of Afghan imams on preaching messages of non-violence and tolerance. During key periods of Muslim religious observance, especially the fasting month of Ramadan, the UAE government aired commercials on television warning Muslim citizens and residents to refrain from donating money at mosques, as the funds could unknowingly go to support terrorist causes. The UAE worked to keep its education system free of violent extremist influences, and it emphasized social tolerance. Under its cybercrime law, the UAE criminalizes the use of the internet by terrorist groups to “promote their ideologies and finance their activities.”
**YEMEN**

**Overview:** The Government of Yemen took steps to combat al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2014, despite significant challenges posed by elements of the former regime, heavily-armed Houthi forces, militant elements of the Hirak movement, and tribal adversaries. Yemeni security forces undertook two offensives against AQAP – one in the governorates of Shabwah and Abyan and one in Hadramawt – which temporarily reduced AQAP-controlled territory and safe havens. Gains in Hadramawt were hindered in the wake of advances by armed Houthi militia into Sana’a. As of the end of 2014, major counterterrorism operations and offensives by Yemen’s armed forces were indefinitely paused.

AQAP’s continued use of asymmetric tactics such as ambush-style attacks and assassinations took a heavy toll on military and security forces. AQAP also continued to conduct attacks against pro-government tribes, civilians, and international targets, such as the group’s car bomb attack against the Iranian Ambassador’s residence in Sana’a and AQAP’s murder of two Western civilian hostages (American and South African nationals) during a December rescue attempt. Counterterrorism efforts also suffered from the continued delay in the military and security restructuring process mandated by the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the National Dialogue Conference outcomes, which left many units plagued by divided loyalties and unreliable command structures.

The National Dialogue Conference, which convened in 2013 to lay the groundwork for a political transition, concluded in January 2014. However, political maneuvering by elements of the former regime and other spoilers derailed the peaceful transition process. Most notably, the militant elements of the Zaydi Shiite movement known as Ansar Allah or the Houthis, aggressively expanded from their northwestern stronghold of Sa’ada in 2014. Events dramatically changed with the Houthi takeover of the capital Sana’a in September 2014, followed by the signing of the UN-mediated Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) which granted the Houthis significant political concessions. Despite the PNPA’s call for Houthi withdrawal from the capital and disarmament, the Houthis forcibly inserted themselves into numerous government offices and ministries and expanded further south from the capital. The political instability resulting from the Houthi crisis diverted key resources from official Yemeni counterterrorism operations, which were at a near standstill at the end of 2014. Additionally, Houthi expansion in governorates such as Ibb and al-Baydha, including clashes with AQAP, spurred a significant increase in AQAP attacks in these areas, heightening sectarian sentiments and causing formerly neutral or anti-AQAP Sunni tribes to side with AQAP against the Houthis to defend their historic geographic and tribal locations.

Despite these challenges, Yemen, under the leadership of President Hadi, remained a willing U.S. counterterrorism partner. In 2014, Hadi supported U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen and encouraged cooperation between the U.S. military and Yemen’s security forces. This report solely focuses on 2014 and does not address the dynamics that have unfolded in Yemen in 2015.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** AQAP militants carried out hundreds of attacks throughout Yemen in 2014. Methods included suicide bombers, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices
(VBIEDs), ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations. The following list details only a small fraction of the incidents that occurred:

- On January 16, AQAP launched simultaneous attacks on three military installations, including a checkpoint and a military camp, near the Rada district in al-Bayda Governorate. The coordinated assault, which included an attempted suicide bombing, killed at least six Yemeni soldiers, five militants, and wounded a number of others.
- On February 14, AQAP militants conducted a complex attack targeting the Sana’a Central Prison, facilitating the escape of 29 prisoners, including 19 AQAP operatives. A VBIED exploded outside the gate and was followed by a gun battle between security guards and the militants. Yemeni authorities report at least seven guards and three militants were killed in the fighting.
- On April 15, suspected AQAP militants assassinated the deputy governor of al-Bayda Governorate, Hussein Dayyan, near his home, fleeing the scene on motorcycles.
- On April 29, AQAP militants ambushed a Yemeni military convoy in Shabwah Governorate using machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades. At least 15 Yemeni soldiers and 12 militants were killed, with more wounded. Militants also captured a troop transport vehicle and took at least 15 Yemeni soldiers hostage. Two of these hostages were released soon thereafter, with reports indicating that they had been “severely beaten.” On April 30, three of the remaining hostages were executed and their bodies left on the roadside, reportedly bearing signs of torture.
- On July 4, six AQAP militants attacked the Wudayah Border Crossing at the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border in Hadramawt, killing at least one Yemeni soldier and several Saudi security officers. Several militants also died, two of them by detonating suicide bombs inside a Saudi government building after being trapped by Saudi security forces.
- On August 8, AQAP militants kidnapped 14 Yemeni soldiers traveling on a bus from Shibam, Hadramawt to Sana’a, executed them, some via beheading, in a market in Shibam, and left their bodies by a road near Sayun, Hadramawt.
- On October 9, an AQAP suicide bomber detonated his vest during a Houthi rally in Tahrir Square, Sana’a, killing at least 45 people and injuring at least 75 more.
- On December 6, AQAP militants shot and killed American journalist Luke Somers, who had been held hostage since 2013, during a joint U.S.-Yemeni rescue attempt. A video released by AQAP on December 3 had stated that Somers would be executed by the end of the week if the United States did not meet AQAP’s demands. A South African hostage, Pierre Korkie, was also killed by AQAP during this rescue effort.
- On December 16, AQAP militants in Rada, al-Baidha detonated two VBIEDs near a Houthi checkpoint, killing at least 10 Houthis and an estimated 20 children passing by in a school bus, and wounding many more. Possibly due to popular backlash, AQAP denied responsibility publicly for the attack.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Yemen does not have comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. Cases were prosecuted under a number of sections of criminal law, most with light maximum sentences. Draft counterterrorism legislation has been pending in the parliament since 2008. International experts provided technical advice in 2014 on the revised
draft law introduced in September 2013. Prior to the political instability in the capital, the current draft was under review by the three parliamentary subcommittees responsible for counterterrorism law issues (Legal and Constitutional Affairs; Security and Defense; and Codification of Sharia Law). This law would facilitate the detention of suspects and include mandatory sentencing for a number of terrorism-related crimes.

Although Yemeni courts tried dozens of suspected terrorists in 2014, many received light sentences due to the lack of counterterrorism legislation or remained in detention while their cases were pending. A number of government organizations were involved in countering acts of terrorism, including the National Security Bureau, the Political Security Organization, the Special Security Forces, and the Yemeni military. However, cooperation and information-sharing between these organizations was sporadic and limited. The takeover of security institutions towards the end of 2014 has impeded information sharing. The weakness of the law enforcement system with respect to terrorism-related crimes discouraged law enforcement officials working these cases. Officials also noted pervasive problems with a lack of proper case development and a failure to meet the requirements of the criminal prosecutions process.

In 2014, Yemen joined the Regional Criminal Justice Sector Reform Series, a State Department program that brings together government officials and civil society from states beginning or undergoing political transitions in Africa and the Middle East to share information, best practices, and implementation strategies on civilian security and justice sector reform. Members include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia, and Yemen.

Yemen participated in several U.S. civilian capacity building programs to improve counterterrorism law enforcement capacity within the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The State Department, in partnership with the UN Development Programme, provided strategic leadership support to the MOI during the ongoing political transition, including capacity development assistance for the new Inspector General’s department, courses on strategic planning and leadership for several newly established central command units, and capacity development and support for senior female police officers within the MOI. Additional State Department programming assisted the Yemeni government in improving its capacity to respond to civil disturbances, improve criminal investigations, process and analyze physical evidence, operate and manage correctional facilities in an effective and accountable manner, and professionalize the justice sector in the area of criminal investigative and forensics. Yemen also continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. However, political instability and the integration of Houthi personnel into many government organizations limited U.S. ability to effectively engage with the MOI and other Yemeni law enforcement agencies in 2014.

Yemen adopted the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) in 2002 in an effort to secure borders and identify fraudulent travel documents. Yemen has the capability to conduct biographic screening at multiple land, sea, and air ports of entry.
Yemen has more than 2,400 kilometers of coastline vulnerable to penetration by militants and maritime smuggling of weapons, materials, and goods used to finance AQAP and other terrorist activities, so the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG) plays a key function in border security. In past years, YCG forces have played a critical role in key interdictions of weapons and other illegal materials destined for Yemen-based terrorist groups. However, despite the strong focus the YCG places on counterterrorism efforts, Yemen’s maritime borders remained extremely porous due to a lack of capacity. In 2014, Yemen continued its participation in the Yemen Quadrilateral Border Talks, a multilateral forum that brings together officials from Yemen, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to discuss opportunities for cooperation and assistance in securing the Yemen/Oman/Saudi Arabia border region.

The Yemeni government cooperated with the United States in the ongoing investigations of several murders of U.S. citizens in Yemen, including a civilian who was targeted and killed by AQAP gunmen. Yemen also cooperated in investigations into AQAP kidnapping for ransom activities.

The justice and law enforcement sectors in Yemen continued to face significant challenges in overcoming more than 30 years of neglect by the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Law enforcement entities were frequently plagued by ineffectiveness and mistrust from civil society, and in worst cases, an unwillingness to perform their assigned task. Corrections institutions, while suffering from severe resource constraints, lacked fundamental skills to manage and operate safe and secure facilities. Meanwhile, Yemeni courts have become a victim of political, economic, and security instability – poor facilities, limited or poorly trained staff, forced closures, and absenteeism all exponentially increased the case backlog and therefore denied access to justice. In many cases, suspected terrorists wait years for the conclusion of their trials. Yemeni prison institutions are commonly targeted by violent extremist groups for the ‘rescue’ of terrorist inmates, which later serves as propaganda to recruit others. Criminal justice institutions and services continued to be identified by Yemenis through the National Dialogue Conference as one of their primary concerns.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Yemen belongs to the Middle East/North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June 2014, the FATF upgraded Yemen from its October 18, 2013 Public Statement to its list of countries with strategic deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/countering terrorist finance (AML/CFT) safeguards, in recognition of the significant steps Yemen has taken toward improving its AML/CFT regime and implementing its action plan. The FATF planned to visit Yemen in June, but this visit was prevented due to the security situation in the country. MENAFATF also upgraded Yemen, which is now required to submit follow-up reports every two years rather than every six months. Despite this progress, Yemen faced many challenges implementing AML/CFT safeguards due to ongoing political and economic turmoil.

Yemen’s Financial Information Unit (FIU), which operates out of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), received 192 suspicious transaction reports as of November 26, in comparison with 166 at this time in 2013. These reports were on a wide range of individuals, including government officials, military commanders, Houthi figures, and AQAP elements. The FIU requested
international assistance in developing a national strategic plan to assess the risks of AML/CFT and prioritize additional needs, such as financial analysis training. In 2014, the FIU identified a need to work more closely with the Customs Authority on the risks posed by money laundering, and expressed appreciation for an ongoing World Bank program aiming to improve networking between the CBY and other Yemeni banks and increase monitoring of banks’ transactions.

In October 2014, following the September incursion of Houthi forces into Sana’a, the FIU reported that Houthis posted at the CBY briefly interfered with FIU operations despite a law guaranteeing the unit’s independence. The Houthis reportedly used the FIU to target the assets of enemies decried by the Houthis as corrupt, initiating proceedings via the FIU to freeze the assets of a number of these individuals.


Regional and International Cooperation: Yemen continued to cooperate with and be advised by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the United States, and other donor countries with respect to its military restructuring plan, in accordance with NDC outcomes. It participated in several Global Counterterrorism Forum workshops. Yemen participated in the second annual Gulf of Aden Regional Counterterrorism Forum in February to support counterterrorism capacity and partnership building in Yemen, Djibouti, and Somalia. Yemeni military, police, security, and maritime units cooperated with U.S., European and regional partners on counterterrorism and related security issues.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Throughout 2014, President Hadi and other senior officials stressed the importance of countering terrorism and violent extremism by attempting to address the conditions that terrorists exploit, such as a weak economy and low levels of education. Many political leaders and groups also publicly condemned terrorism and violent attacks. The Yemeni government expressed support for a rehabilitation/reintegration program for violent extremists, similar to the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care in Saudi Arabia, although the effort was on hold at year’s end.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

South Asia remained a front line in the battle against terrorism. Although al-Qaeda’s (AQ) core in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been seriously degraded, AQ’s global leadership continued to operate from remote locations in the region that the group has historically exploited for safe haven. AQ’s presence in the region continued to face pressure from international, Afghan, and Pakistani forces, and Pakistan’s ongoing offensive in North Waziristan Agency, launched in June 2014, further degraded the group’s freedom to operate. Pressure on AQ’s traditional safe haven has constrained the leadership’s capability to communicate effectively with affiliate groups outside of South Asia.

Afghanistan, in particular, continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network (HQN), and other insurgent and terrorist groups. A
number of these attacks were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) provided security throughout most of Afghanistan as the transition to full Afghan leadership on security continued and U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF) continued to draw down during 2014. The ANSF and CF, in partnership, took aggressive action against terrorist elements in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul, and in many of the eastern and northern provinces.

Pakistan continued to experience significant terrorist violence, including sectarian attacks. The Pakistani military undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as TTP, but did not take action against other groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba, which continued to operate, train, rally, propagandize, and fundraise in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban and HQN leadership continued to find safe haven in Pakistan, and although Pakistan military operations disrupted the actions of these groups, it did not directly target them.

India remained a target of terrorist attacks, including operations launched by Maoist insurgents and domestic and transnational groups. The level of terrorist violence was substantially unchanged from 2013. Indian authorities continued to blame Pakistan for supporting terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir. On September 3, AQ announced the establishment of a new branch in the Indian subcontinent. The Government of India deepened counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, highlighted by a September 30 Summit between President Obama and Prime Minister Modi where both sides pledged greater cooperation in countering terrorist networks and in information sharing. Even though only a small number of Indian nationals are believed to have joined the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Indian government closely monitored the domestic threat it and other terrorist organizations posed.

Bangladesh made counterterrorism progress in 2014, with the government demonstrating a commitment to counter both domestic and transnational terrorist groups. No major terrorist incidents took place in 2014, and the government’s counterterrorism efforts have made it more difficult for transnational terrorists to operate in or use Bangladeshi territory.

Central Asian leaders have expressed concern about the potential terrorist threat posed by the return of foreign terrorist fighters to the region in the wake of ISIL’s growth in the Middle East and the drawdown of U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Overview: Although responsibility for security in Afghanistan transitioned from U.S. and international forces to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) on January 1, 2015, the United States remains committed to sustained political, diplomatic, and economic engagement in Afghanistan. U.S. forces will continue to have the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, but the majority of these operations were being carried out in conjunction with, or solely by, Afghan units at year’s end. The United States supports Afghan efforts to professionalize and modernize their security forces. The military component of U.S. assistance to the ANSF transitioned to the Resolute Support Mission (RSM) on January 1, 2015. RSM primarily focuses on train, advise, and assist functions, but will retain some U.S.
counterterrorism functions as outlined in the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).

Insider attacks and force protection challenges remained problematic throughout 2014. During the 2014 spring to fall fighting season, the Taliban sought unsuccessfully to disrupt the two rounds of national elections that occurred in April and June, and attempted to expand their territorial control in western Kandahar, northern Helmand, and Kunduz Province, among other areas. Insurgents increased attacks on government forces and installations during the three-month long stalemate that followed the elections as the two presidential candidates contested the results, placing greater pressure on the Afghan police and army as they closed out the fighting season. The Taliban and other insurgent groups focused on high-profile terrorist attacks as well as attacks on government officials, particularly in Kabul, to maintain their profile and undermine the central government.

The Government of Afghanistan takes the threat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seriously. There were some reports of ISIL engaging Afghan insurgent groups to obtain allegiance in exchange for resources. In the following instances of ISIL-affiliated activity, the Afghan government responded with police and intelligence services investigations:

- In September, an ISIL newspaper in Dari and Pashto was reportedly distributed in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces promoting extremist ideology.
- In late October, pro-ISIL graffiti was discovered at Kabul University, sparking fear that extremist youth groups may latch onto ISIL messaging.
- On November 15, a suspected ISIL agent who had allegedly posted pamphlets at the Blue Mosque in Herat City was detained in Herat.

ISIL ideology may resonate with fringe elements of insurgent/terrorist groups in Afghanistan, but for the most part Afghanistan-based militants were resistant to fully aligning themselves with the group. ISIL will likely continue to engage Afghan insurgent and terrorist groups. Small numbers of independent actors that are loosely-affiliated with ISIL may continue to use ISIL’s name to gain public and media attention in Afghanistan.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: In 2014, insurgents across Afghanistan used a variety of tactics against ANSF personnel and Coalition Forces (CF). They aimed to expand their territorial influence, disrupt civil governance, and create a public perception of instability, as CF transitioned to RSM and Afghan forces fully engaged in the security of their country. Attacks followed a seasonal pattern, shifting from more guerilla military-style engagements in the spring and summer to high profile and harassing attacks during the fall and winter. In Kabul, there was a significant increase in attacks against Western and U.S. interests over the same time period in 2013.

Insurgents continued to use large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and complex attacks involving multiple attackers laden with suicide vests working in teams. These incidents increasingly targeted ANSF, Afghan government buildings, soft foreign civilian targets, and Western interests in Kabul, as the overall number of potential targets, particularly in the provinces, decreased due to a shrinking international military footprint. Terrorist activity
expanded from historically high level areas in the south and east of Afghanistan to include some areas further north; Kabul was an insurgent focus at the end of the year. Helmand, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Ghazni, Herat, Kunar, and Kunduz were the most violent provinces for attacks against ANSF, CF, and civilians.

Afghanistan remained an area of armed hostilities in 2014 and a variety of insurgent groups used terrorist tactics to pursue their goals. A sampling of high-profile incidents include:

- On January 17, three Taliban insurgents launched a complex attack on a restaurant frequented by foreigners in Kabul. One wore a suicide vest and detonated at the restaurant’s gate, allowing the other two to enter the establishment. They killed 21 people, including 13 foreigners and high-level officials from the UN and the International Monetary Fund. The gunmen were later killed in a standoff with the Afghan police.
- On March 20, four terrorists smuggled pistols past the heavy security of the Serena Hotel in Kabul, opening fire on foreign and Afghan guests dining for the Persian New Year. They killed nine people, including two children, before being gunned down by the ANSF. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On July 15, a VBIED detonated in a public market in Paktika Province, killing 89 civilians and wounding 42 others. No group claimed responsibility and the Taliban issued a statement disavowing any connection with the attack.
- On August 5, in an insider attack, a lone gunman opened fire upon a high-level CF delegation visiting the Marshal Fahim National Defense University, killing U.S. Major General Harold Greene and wounding 15 others according to media accounts. Major General Greene was the highest level U.S. military official killed by hostile action since September 11, 2001.
- On September 4, Taliban attackers detonated two significant VBIEDs outside the National Directorate of Security (NDS) Headquarters in Ghazni Province. Following the explosion, an armed assault team engaged the compound. In the final assessment of the attack, 14 security personnel and 19 Taliban were killed, with 154 others wounded.
- On November 9, a lone suicide bomber infiltrated Kabul Police Headquarters in an attempt to kill the Chief of Police. Instead, the suicide vest explosion killed the Chief of Staff and wounded six others. The Taliban later claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On November 16, a suicide bomber in southern Kabul killed three civilians, and wounded approximately 10 others, including a pro-BSA Member of Parliament. The Parliamentary member was believed to be the target as a warning against voting to approve the agreement with the United States.
- On November 23, a suicide bomber exploded his vest in a crowd of spectators at a volleyball match in Paktika Province, leaving 45 civilians dead and 50 wounded. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On November 29, three attackers with suicide vests and automatic weapons attacked a Kabul guest house for South African NGO workers, killing three foreigners and one Afghan staff member. One insurgent died when he detonated his vest. The other two were killed by police during the rescue of six Afghan hostages. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.
On December 17, a teenager entered an auditorium at the French Cultural Center in Kabul where a play was taking place and detonated his suicide vest. He killed one German man and wounded 16 others. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Afghan Attorney General’s Office (AGO) investigates and prosecutes violations of the laws on Crimes against the Internal and External Security of the State (1976 and 1987), the Law on Combat Against Terrorist Offences (2008), and the Law of Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives (2005), including laws that prohibit membership in terrorist or insurgent groups as well as laws that forbid violent acts committed against the state, hostage taking, murder, and the use of explosives against military forces and state infrastructure. The Law on the Structure and Jurisdiction of the Attorney General’s Office was enacted in October 2013. It codifies the structure and funding of the existing Anti-Terrorism Protection Directorate (ATPD) in the AGO and permits the investigation and prosecution of terrorist and national security cases using internationally accepted methods and evidentiary rules. The ATPD handled a total of 8,619 cases in 2014, an average of 2,500 cases per quarter on the primary and appellate levels.

In early 2014, the Justice Center in Parwan (JCIP) at Bagram Air Field began adjudicating cases of individuals detained by Afghan security forces and never held in Coalition Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) detention. Originally established by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to try the cases of former CF LOAC detainees and staffed with Afghan public security judges and ATPD prosecutors, the JCIP is the only counterterrorism court in Afghanistan that has, in effect, nationwide jurisdiction. Its docket regularly includes cases against those implicated in terrorist attacks on U.S. military personnel and U.S. military and civilian installations in Afghanistan. Through early December, the JCIP had adjudicated 533 primary court trials in 2014, and 1,153 appellate court trials (to include appellate trials of primary court cases that had been adjudicated in 2013). Among notable cases tried at the JCIP during 2014 were:

- Aynuddin, perpetrator of an August 2012 insider attack that killed three Marines and ultimately determined by the JCIP primary court to be a juvenile, was sentenced to seven-and-one-half years (the maximum sentence authorized under Afghan law for a juvenile convicted of any crime).
- Mohammad Nazeer, the lone surviving attacker from a September 2012 assault on Camp Bastion, was sentenced to death.

The Governments of Afghanistan and the United States investigated a variety of criminal acts, including kidnappings and conspiracies to commit terrorist acts. On several occasions, U.S. law enforcement bodies assisted the Ministry of Interior, the NDS, and other Afghan authorities to take action to disrupt and dismantle terrorist operations and prosecute terrorist suspects.

Afghanistan continued to process traveler arrivals and departures at major points of entry using the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). In addition, Afghan security forces continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, receiving training and equipment in counterterrorism-related crisis response and dignitary and infrastructure protection. ATA assistance also included an intensive instructor development component to build Afghan security force capacity to institutionalize
counterterrorism skill sets and regenerate training within Afghanistan’s law enforcement structure.

Despite advances in capability, the ANSF faces large challenges in successfully protecting the country’s land borders, particularly those with Pakistan and Iran. The ABP, which is part of the policing wing of the ANSF, has over 23,000 officers and has the lead on border security. Its leaders openly say their numbers and weaponry are insufficient to successfully execute their mission, particularly in the aforementioned border areas where they face difficult terrain, resupply, and coordination problems with the military, and a heavily-armed, determined insurgency that attacks them in force.

After decades of war and poor or fragmented governance in many rural areas, the ANSF is focused on working with international actors to rebuild its capacity. While the Afghan government has progressed substantially since 2001, complex organizational structures, weak inter-ministerial coordination, corruption, lack of full control over territory (particularly in the border regions with Pakistan), and safe havens for terrorist groups operating on its soil all remain ongoing challenges.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Afghanistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In 2014, the Afghan government took initial steps to address deficiencies in its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. In June, FATF strongly warned Afghanistan to comply with the government’s June 2012 commitment to implement an action plan agreed upon with FATF to address the deficiencies by October 2014, or run the risk of being placed on the list of “High-Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions” (the blacklist). The FATF action plan outlined a number of areas that the government needed to address to bring Afghanistan into compliance with international standards, including enactment of amended AML/CFT legislation. Afghanistan amended its AML and CFT laws in June. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense, and Afghanistan is now able to immediately freeze assets identified by UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 and 1373. Under the updated process, the Afghan National Security Council, following notification of a UNSCR designation, immediately notifies the AGO, which in turn identifies and freezes related assets. As of the end of 2014, FATF was assessing whether the new regulations were fully FATF-compliant.

Terrorist finance investigations in Afghanistan continued to be hampered by a weak legal and regulatory regime, coupled with a lack of capacity. The new administration under President Ashraf Ghani expressed its intent to fulfill the FATF action plan milestones. Afghan officials indicated that because al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and terrorist organizations from the Central Asian republics transfer their assets from person to person or through informal banking system mechanisms, it is very difficult to track, freeze, and confiscate their assets. However, on those occasions when transactions have come to the Afghan government’s attention, either via the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) or reports from the Afghan security agencies, it has acted promptly not to just freeze but also confiscate those assets. In 2014, officials reported some asset seizures, but said it is often difficult to quantify seizures in dollar...
terms because they confiscate vehicles or other equipment suspected of being used by terrorist organizations.

Money Service Providers in Afghanistan are required to register with and provide currency transaction reports to the FIU at the Central Bank. These reports include monthly data on volumes and numbers of transactions, detailing whether transactions are inbound or outbound, foreign or domestic, and in local or foreign currency. Supervision is weak but improving, with 2014 seeing an increase in the number of on-site inspections of money service providers.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Afghanistan consistently emphasized the need to strengthen joint cooperation to fight terrorism and violent extremism in a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. Notable among such meetings were the Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process, the UN Regional Center for Preventative Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Afghanistan shares the lead on the Counterterrorism Confidence Building Measure (CBM) of the Istanbul Process, working closely with Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Under the Counterterrorism CBM framework, Afghanistan hosted an international meeting on terrorist financing in Kabul in February, and also hosted an international workshop on countering improvised explosive devices in March.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Afghanistan continued to support activities designed to prevent radicalization. Through increased engagement with religious communities, Afghan government officials promoted religious moderation, encouraged tolerance, and condemned violence. There are approximately 120,000 mosques in Afghanistan, of which 3,600 are registered with the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA) and the Ministry of Education. Registration is not compulsory, and unregistered mosques, many of which have associated madrassas, operate independent of government oversight. Some religious leaders at these unregistered mosques promote violent extremism. The National Ulema Council is a quasi-governmental body of religious scholars established by former President Karzai in 2002 to counter radicalization and violent extremism. Since taking office on September 29, President Ghani has engaged actively on countering violent extremism efforts, requesting that the Ulema Council both condemn insurgent attacks and issue a call for peace in mosques throughout the country.

President Ghani and Chief Executive Officer, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, purposefully reached out early in their tenure to civil society groups to understand the challenges they face and seek ways to address them. In an effort to stem discontent and prevent possible radicalization, Ghani also visited a number of prisons and detention facilities to address rising inmate complaints about poor prison conditions and inequitable clemency programs. Afghan religious leaders and government officials attended conferences at the Hedayah Center, an International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, where they received training on tolerance programming.
President Ghani has identified the peace process as the priority of his administration, and is actively pursuing engagement with the Taliban. The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) pays for, and provides the institutional mechanism to implement, the full range of the Afghan government’s peace activities, which include the reintegration of foot soldiers in the provinces and provincial-level peace outreach, Ulema engagement on countering violent extremism, and national-level reconciliation initiatives with senior Taliban leadership. Individual fighters who join the program make the commitment to renounce violence and sever all ties with the insurgency, and to abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan. Many go on to become peace advocates, conducting outreach on behalf of the Afghan government through the APRP. Since its inception, the APRP has successfully reintegrated over 9,200 former combatants across Afghanistan.

BANGLADESH

Overview: The Government of Bangladesh has demonstrated political will and firm commitment to combating domestic and transnational terrorist groups, and its counterterrorism efforts made it harder for transnational terrorists to operate in or establish safe havens in its territory. Terrorist organizations used social media to spread their radical ideologies and solicit foreign fighters from Bangladesh. In a September 2014 audio message, al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri included Bangladesh as one of the countries in which the newly-established al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent would seek to operate. Expatriate Bangladeshis have been arrested for attempting to recruit Bangladeshis to join the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). While Bangladesh is not part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, it is taking steps to address the threat. On September 29, police in Bangladesh arrested Samiun Rahman for allegedly recruiting militants for both ISIL and al-Nusrah Front.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Bangladesh’s criminal justice system is in the process of fully implementing the Antiterrorism Act of 2009 (ATA) as amended in 2012 and 2013. Although Bangladesh’s ATA does not outlaw recruitment and travel in furtherance of terrorism, the broad language of the ATA provides several mechanisms by which Bangladesh can implement UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178, which requires nations to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat.

According to media reports, government forces arrested several members of domestic terrorist groups Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Harkatul Jihad al Islami-Bangladesh, and Ansarullah Bangla Team. Bangladesh cooperated with the United States to further strengthen control of its borders and land, sea, and air ports of entry. Bangladesh continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program and received counterterrorism-focused training for law enforcement officers. Bangladesh also cooperated with the Department of Justice’s efforts to provide prosecutorial skills training, and to institute community policing in targeted areas of the country. U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific continued counterterrorism training with a number of Bangladesh security forces – including the Bangladesh Coast Guard, Bangladesh Navy Special Warfare and Diving Salvage unit, and the Bangladesh Army 1st Para Commando Battalion.
Counteracting the Financing of Terrorism: Bangladesh is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) and its financial intelligence unit/anti-money laundering section lead the government’s effort to comply with the international sanctions regime. The Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. In 2014, Bangladesh graduated out of the FATF’s grey list.

The terrorist finance provisions of the ATA outlaw the provision, receipt, and collection of money, service, and material support where “there are reasonable grounds to believe that … the same has been used or may be used for any purpose by a terrorist entity.” The Act prohibits membership and support of prohibited organizations, i.e., organizations engaged or involved in terrorist activities, including the terrorist organizations listed under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. The ATA includes a broad provision providing mutual legal cooperation on terrorism matters with other nations and a comprehensive forfeiture provision for assets involved in terrorism activities. However, implementation of existing laws remains a significant issue as demonstrated by the absence of money laundering convictions.


Regional and International Cooperation: Bangladesh is active in the full range of international fora. Bangladesh is party to various counterterrorism protocols under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and is bringing the country’s counterterrorism efforts in line with the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The current government has demonstrated its strong interest in cooperating with India on counterterrorism. It has signed memoranda of understanding with a number of countries to share evidence regarding criminal investigations, including investigations related to financial crimes and terrorist financing.

Counteracting Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: In 2014, Bangladesh became a board member and pilot country for the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience, a public-private global fund to support local, grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism. Bangladesh uses strategic communication to counter violent extremism, especially among youth. The Ministry of Education provides oversight for madrassas and is developing a standard national curriculum that includes language, math, and science; and minimum standards of secular subjects to be taught in all primary schools, up to the eighth grade. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention work with imams and religious scholars to build public awareness against terrorism.

INDIA

Overview: According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, approximately 400 people were killed as a result of terrorist attacks in India in 2014. The number of fatalities from terrorist attacks did not change significantly from the previous year, demonstrating that India remains one of the most
persistently targeted countries by insurgents and transnational and domestic terrorist groups. Included in the total number of fatalities were more than 160 deaths attributed to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or other Maoist groups. To date, these groups have not specifically targeted U.S. or other international interests. In 2014, Indian sources continued to attribute attacks and fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir and against Indian facilities in Afghanistan, to transnational terrorist groups, such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), which continued to operate, train, rally, propagandize, and fundraise in Pakistan.

U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation continued to increase in 2014. Prime Minister Modi’s government has stated that it intends to prioritize its response to terrorism as a serious national security threat. During the September 30 Summit meeting, President Obama and Prime Minister Modi pledged to enhance U.S.-India “law enforcement, security, and military information exchanges, and strengthen cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance.” The President and Prime Minister stressed the need for joint and concerted efforts against networks such as al-Qa’ida, LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Haqqani Network, and reiterated their call to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai to justice. The Prime Minister also joined President Obama in reaffirming “deep concern over the continued threat posed by terrorism, most recently highlighted by the dangers presented by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”

In May, four individuals from India traveled to Iraq to support ISIL. Only one of them returned to India and at year’s end was in custody. In September, four students from Hyderabad attempted to travel to Iraq to support ISIL but were detained in West Bengal and returned to their places of residence. In October, Anees Ansari was detained by Mumbai police for allegedly planning ISIL-inspired attacks on westerners and western schools in Mumbai. On December 13, Mehdi Biswas, a 24-year-old office executive from Bangalore, was arrested in connection with pro-ISIL messaging on Twitter. Biswas’ Twitter account had approximately 17,000 followers. India also remains deeply concerned about Indian nationals taken hostage by ISIL in Iraq.

Indian officials have emphasized the government takes threats posed by ISIL seriously, even though only a small number of Indians are believed to have been recruited into the organization. Given India’s large Muslim population, potential socio-religious marginalization, and active ISIL online propaganda efforts, there remains a risk of increased ISIL recruitment of Indian nationals. On December 16, India banned ISIL under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Representative incidents included:

- On April 12, two bombs planted by suspected Maoist rebels killed approximately 12 people in the eastern Indian state of Chhattisgarh while voting was underway in India’s general election. The first blast targeted a bus carrying election officials in Bijapur district, killing at least seven. The second attack, which took place half-an-hour later, killed five police officers in an ambulance in the Bastar district.
- On May 11, Maoist insurgents killed seven police commandos and injured two others in a landmine blast in the Gadricholi district of Chhattisgarh state.
- On May 26, LeT carried out an attack against the Indian Consulate in Herat, Afghanistan. Security forces killed the attackers.
On October 2, an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion killed two men, alleged to be terrorist conspirators in the process of handling the device, in the town of Burdwan in West Bengal, about 70 miles northwest of Kolkata. Subsequent investigations by the Indian and Bangladeshi governments alleged the involvement in the blast of an interstate terrorist network believed to have been run by Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). Police arrested two females and a male from the blast site who were found destroying evidence, and seized IED components and violent extremist literature.

On November 27, 10 people were killed when terrorists wearing army uniforms attacked an Indian army base in Kashmir.

On December 28, an IED exploded outside a busy restaurant in Bangalore on Sunday night, killing one woman and injuring one other in the central business district of Bengaluru.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: India continued to address terrorism-related activities through existing statutes, including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) (1967), the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Act (1993), and various state-level laws. The UAPA presumes the accused to be guilty if the prosecution can produce certain incriminating evidence indicating the possession of arms or explosives or the presence of fingerprints at a crime scene, regardless of whether criminal intent is demonstrated. State governments held persons without bail for extended periods before filing formal charges under the UAPA. Other state-level counterterrorism laws reduce evidentiary standards for certain charges and increase police powers to detain a person and his or her associates without charges and without bail for extended periods.

Since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, India has attempted to enhance the counterterrorism capabilities of the Central Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Guard, and the National Investigation Agency. India’s efforts to counter terrorism were hampered by poor interagency coordination and information sharing, however. In addition, local police forces, led at the state level, have limited command and control capacity and suffer from poor training and equipment. India has launched initiatives to address some of these challenges, including through a Multi-Agency Centre for enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing. It also plans to implement the National Intelligence Grid, a system for linking databases in different government departments and ministries for use by intelligence agencies. The Indian government has proposed the creation of a National Counter Terrorism Centre, but state-level officials have opposed this initiative and it has not been implemented.

Indian officials participated in courses provided through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and through other regional capacity building programs. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security, through the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché office, and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, conducted training programs and exchanges with Indian law enforcement personnel.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: India is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and two FATF-style regional bodies, the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. India’s Financial Intelligence Unit is also a member of the Egmont Group of Financial
Intelligence Units. Indian officials monitor and regulate money transfers, require the collection of data for wire transfers, oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, and regulate and monitor these entities to prevent misuse and terrorist financing.

In November 2012, the Government of India brought its domestic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing (AML/CFT) laws into alignment with international standards by passing amendments to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. The Indian government has yet to implement the legislation effectively, however, especially with regard to criminal convictions. Law enforcement agencies typically open criminal investigations reactively and seldom initiate proactive analysis and long-term investigations. While the Indian government has taken action against certain hawala financing activities, prosecutions have generally focused on non-financial businesses that conduct hawala transactions as a secondary activity. Additionally, the government has not taken adequate steps to ensure all relevant industries are complying with AML/CFT regulations. The reporting of suspicious transactions relating specifically to terrorist financing is increasing significantly, however, especially with respect to transactions not involving sanctions lists.

The degree of training and expertise in financial investigations involving transnational crime or terrorist-affiliated groups varies widely among the federal, state, and local levels and depends on the financial resources and individual policies of differing jurisdictions. U.S. investigators have had limited success in coordinating the seizure of illicit proceeds with their Indian counterparts. While intelligence and investigative information supplied by U.S. law enforcement authorities have led to numerous seizures of terrorism-related funds, a lack of follow-through on investigational leads has prevented a more comprehensive approach.

The Government of India is taking steps to increase financial inclusion through expanding access to the banking sector and issuing biometric-enabled universal identification numbers.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** India is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and participated in GCTF and other UN forums on counterterrorism in 2014. Events related to the October 2 blasts in the Burdwan district of West Bengal cast a spotlight on India’s counterterrorism cooperation with its neighbors. The blasts resulted in counterterrorism cooperation between India and Bangladesh, including visits by Indian officials to Dhaka, travel by a Bangladeshi intelligence team to West Bengal, and parallel raids along the Indo-Bangla border. During 2014, the Indian and Bangladeshi governments continued their cooperation under their bilateral Coordinated Border Management Plan to control illegal cross-border activities and announced the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in the field of security and border management through additional cooperation agreements. Also during 2014, India and Nepal continued cooperation along their shared border. India is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
On August 18, the Border Security Force (BSF) provided Bangladeshi counterparts a list of 66 camps located in Bangladesh used by insurgents to launch militant activities into northeast India.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** India’s efforts to counter radicalization and violent extremism were generally directed by state and local authorities. While there was no comprehensive national policy for counteracting radicalization or violent extremism, the government has implemented some initiatives to counter violent extremism such as initiatives to provide “quality and modern education” in madrassas. In addition, the government operates programs to rehabilitate and reintegrate former militants and insurgents into mainstream society. These programs target disaffected sectors of Indian society that have been sources of separatism and violent insurgency.

Indian government officials have raised concerns over the use of social media and the internet to recruit, radicalize, and foment inter-religious tensions. In particular, officials expressed concern about the ability of ISIL to recruit online, following prominent incidents in which Indians were attracted to join or support the group. On December 16, India banned ISIL under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, a step that may deter public declarations of support for ISIL and facilitate prosecutions of individuals who assist the group.

**KAZAKHSTAN**

**Overview:** The Government of Kazakhstan continued to express its willingness to increase counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, particularly in the areas of information sharing and law enforcement, as well as in the development of its ability to conduct special counterterrorism operations. The Ministry of Defense has expressed interest in playing a greater role in counterterrorism operations in Kazakhstan, and has sought U.S. assistance to build its capacity. Kazakhstan is emphasizing improving the capability of its existing counterterrorism units rather than developing new ones.

The Government of Kazakhstan views the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a dangerous terrorist organization and publicly condemned the group. Kazakhstani law enforcement officials have inquired about best practices to counter ISIL propaganda, and in December banned dissemination of ISIL propaganda in Kazakhstan. The head of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee (KNB) said publicly in November that approximately 300 Kazakhstani citizens are members of ISIL, and that law enforcement officials are working to identify these individuals.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Kazakhstan has a comprehensive legal counterterrorism framework, which includes laws on countering extremism and terrorism, and relevant bylaws and chapters in the Criminal Code, Procedural Code, and the Law on National security. The new Criminal Code toughens penalties for crimes the government deems to be terrorist and extremist crimes. It also introduced a number of new offences related to terrorist/extremist crimes, such as “creation of bases for preparing mercenaries,” “participation in terrorist or extremist training,” and “participation in foreign conflicts.” It is illegal for Kazakhstani citizens to fight in foreign wars.
The Government of Kazakhstan passed amendments to its counterterrorism legislation in 2014, aiming to bring the country’s laws in line with the State Program on Combating Extremism and Terrorism 2013-2017. The amendments allow for expediting cooperation and removing bureaucratic barriers among government bodies engaged in combating extremism and terrorism. The legislation permits the government to shut down any communication network used for spreading terrorism and extremism, the immediate closure of any organization after a court recognizes it as an extremist or terrorist group, and for law enforcement to preemptively issue warnings to persons or organizations engaged in activities that may lead to committing crimes involving terrorism or extremism. The new legislation also allows law enforcement to monitor people released from jail after serving sentences for crimes involving terrorism or extremism. Kazakhstani security services and law enforcement organizations may now deny foreign nationals, including missionaries, who may be involved in extremist or terrorist activities entry into the country; previously foreign nationals could only be denied entry if they had been convicted of such crimes.

Kazakhstan is rapidly increasing its counterterrorism capacity, and government officials actively pursued a program of training and professionalization that appeared to enjoy political support at the highest levels. Kazakhstan remained a partner nation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. The government’s counterterrorism plan provides for enhanced interagency cooperation, coordination, and information sharing, but the extent to which this is actually occurring remains unknown. In the past, law enforcement bodies were criticized for killing rather than capturing members of suspected terrorist groups, but over the past several years have shown a greater tendency to arrest, detain, and question suspects. Security forces, including military and law enforcement, are undergoing a process of professionalization and reform with the goal of more effectively discharging their duties. There are four special counterterrorism detachments under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and one under the KNB.

Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Service (BGS), which is part of the KNB, uses specialized passport control equipment at each passport control station, allowing officers to check for fraudulent documents. Every officer working at border crossing points must be a graduate of the BGS Academy’s four-year program, where they study passport control using passport samples from many different countries. BGS officers receive regular instructions and refresher training. The BGS uses the Single Information System “Berkut” database, managed by the KNB. The United States has been unable to verify the database’s contents but it is likely persons on terrorist watch lists are included. Kazakhstan’s BGS officers photograph all foreign visitors arriving in Kazakhstan on international flights.

In recent years Kazakhstan has strengthened security on its southern border by adding radar systems, inspection equipment and vehicles, and specialized mobile inspection groups. Kazakhstani courts convicted 29 people for terrorist offenses in 2014. Law enforcement bodies interdicted nine terrorist plots and arrested several recruiters for attempting to persuade Kazakhstani to join ISIL. The government registered 52 terrorism and extremism-related crimes.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kazakhstan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style
regional body. In 2014, Kazakhstan clarified the definitions for what constitutes terrorist financing in the Criminal Code to meet international standards. Engaging in any transfer or exchange of funds, barter, or gift giving conducted knowingly with a terrorist or terrorist group is criminal under Kazakhstani law. Kazakhstan’s unregulated financial sector is relatively small.

There was no specific requirement for NGOs to file suspicious transaction reports. The Financial Intelligence Unit under the Ministry of Finance requires banks and other covered institutions to report suspicious financial activity by NGOs, however.


Regional and International Cooperation: Kazakhstan participates in counterterrorism and countering violent extremism activities within the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which has established a joint task force for preventing the propagation of terrorist and extremist ideas via the internet. The Kazakhstani Procurator General’s Office cooperates with the OSCE on countering violent extremism and terrorism through joint workshops. Kazakhstan has pledged financial support to the Afghan National Security Forces, including US $2 million in 2014, and is discussing the potential provision of other types of support to the ANSF. Kazakhstan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has a limited counterterrorism role. Kazakhstan co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2178 on preventing travel and support for foreign terrorist fighters.

Counteracting Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Kazakhstan’s counterterrorism efforts focus heavily on preventing radicalization, with particular efforts to educate and provide positive alternatives to youth through social programs and economic opportunities, but the results of these nascent programs are unclear. Critics say Kazakhstan’s anti-radicalization efforts are unnecessarily heavy-handed, and could actually encourage radicalization of members of otherwise peaceful religious groups.

Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Culture and Sport conducts outreach to youth who left Kazakhstan to study abroad at religious schools suspected of indoctrinating youth in extremist ideology. According to the ministry, 41 students returned to Kazakhstan in 2014 due to outreach efforts. Religious experts from the Committee for Religious Affairs reach out to at-risk youth via websites such as E-Islam, which was created to increase religious literacy and to counter radical ideas. Religious experts create groups on social networks such as Facebook and VKontakte, where they post information and answer users’ questions about religious extremism. In 2014, the Republican Rehabilitation Center was opened for prisoners convicted of terrorism or extremism, where representatives from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan regularly meet prisoners to discuss religious extremism. The government also set up 28 regional rehabilitation centers.

KYRGYZSTAN
Overview: There were no reported terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan in 2014, however, security forces arrested several individuals suspected of affiliation with terrorist organizations and terrorist activities abroad. Security forces became more aware of increased recruitment of citizens for terrorist acts in Syria. The State Committee for National Security (GKNB) leads the country’s Counterterrorism Center, which is composed of representatives at the deputy minister level of relevant government ministries.

Government agencies reported varying numbers of Kyrgyzstanis fighting in Syria; numbers ranged from 200 to 500. Parliament proposed legislation that would assist the Prosecutor General’s office in its prosecution of recruiters and its ability to charge Kyrgyzstanis for terrorist acts committed abroad.

The government is committed to preventing terrorist attacks and reached out to international organizations and foreign governments that could provide training and technical assistance. The country remained vulnerable to transnational threats, especially in the south where border issues with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and weak government capacity to control borders could facilitate the establishment of terrorist safe havens. Media reported several cases of Kyrgyzstanis being drawn by promises of work in Turkey and then recruited into or trafficked into Syria. The government was also concerned about the potential for an influx of terrorist elements from Afghanistan.

Kyrgyzstan’s anti-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) efforts were limited to domestic programs to prevent the flow of fighters to Syria and the prosecution of those who return. The Counterterrorism Center partnered with an international NGO to create community leadership groups in each region of Kyrgyzstan, led by local religious leaders trained in methods to prevent violent extremism, to deter potential fighters from traveling to Syria. Parliament worked with the OSCE to host public hearings in the southern provinces of Osh and Jalalabad (from where most fighters originate) to increase local awareness of ISIL recruitment methods. In November, the Counterterrorism Center agreed to a 2015 training plan developed and funded by the OSCE to increase its capacity to share information on terrorist threats between law enforcement agencies at all levels of government.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The GKNB remained the main government organization tasked with combating terrorism. It investigated and arrested several individuals based on their alleged connections to terrorist organizations, including those linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The government designated Hizb-ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization in 2003, although the group’s philosophy professes nonviolence and its members committed no violent acts. It also arrested several individuals charged with recruiting citizens to fight with ISIL.

The Prosecutor General’s office reported using existing counterterrorism laws enacted in 2005 (counter-extremism) and 2006 (counterterrorism and money laundering) to charge repatriated fighters. It explained that new legislation proposed by Parliament in 2014, if passed, will make it easier to prosecute crimes such as recruitment of fighters and participation in terrorist acts abroad.
Although the GKNB’s Counterterrorism Center has demonstrated the capacity to quickly react to bomb scares or other potential terrorist threat, it lacks both specialized training and equipment. Interagency cooperation and coordination is sporadic. For example, the Prosecutor General’s office receives results of GKNB and Ministry of Interior (MVD) investigations to use in its prosecutions, but has no mechanism to ask for more details or for follow-up information after the investigation is complete. In a meeting with U.S. officials, members of the Prosecutor General’s anti-terrorism division indicated that the GKNB does not provide specific information on the origin of the evidence that it collects or how it was obtained. Prosecutors are never consulted before the GKNB considers an investigation to be complete.

There is political will to increase capacity and obtain equipment, and all law enforcement entities demonstrate a desire for cooperation with international organizations. Kyrgyzstan continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, and Kyrgyz security forces received training focused on improving law enforcement capacity to secure the country’s borders from terrorist transit. The border guards and customs service also cooperate closely with the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) office. EXBS is funding construction of additional border towers and providing renovations and enhancements to existing border towers along the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Following ethnic clashes in 2010 in the southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, the OSCE, through its Community Security Initiative, embedded an international police advisor with law enforcement agencies in each region of Kyrgyzstan. Along with community policing, the advisors train local law enforcement officials on how to identify potential terrorist attacks.

The government does not maintain a terrorist screening watch list. It also does not have biographic or biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Internal information sharing needs improvement. Information sharing with other countries happens rarely and usually only by request in the context of human trafficking or organized crime investigations. Information sharing and cooperation with counterterrorism officials in Turkey is increasing. The MVD reported that Turkey provides information on the travel of Kyrgyzstanis to Turkey to assist in MVD investigations. The government does not collect advance passenger records on commercial flights.

Impediments to more effective host government law enforcement activity against terrorism include interagency rivalries, a lack of coordination between the GKNB and MVD, and budgetary constraints. Inefficient Soviet-era bureaucratic structures, corruption, low salaries, and frequent personnel turnover hampered law enforcement efforts. Counterterrorist units are still largely untested in real-life situations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kyrgyzstan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Kyrgyzstan did not pursue any terrorist finance cases and did not identify or freeze any terrorist assets. Kyrgyzstan has made substantial progress in addressing concerns of the international community on money laundering and terrorist financing, and, in July, was removed from FATF’s grey list and, in November, from the EAG monitoring list. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International
Regional and International Cooperation: In 2014, Kyrgyzstan participated in counterterrorism activities organized by the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States Antiterrorism Center, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: In 2014, Kyrgyzstan worked in conjunction with the OSCE and other international organizations to facilitate countering violent extremism programs. The government, specifically the GKNB, launched a public awareness campaign in the Kyrgyz language press to discredit the efforts of ISIL recruiters. The campaign also warned potential labor migrants to Turkey of the risk of being trafficked, not being paid for their work, and the possibility of prosecution for their actions in Syria should they return to Kyrgyzstan.

MALDIVES

Overview: Maldives, an archipelago consisting of nearly 1,200 coral islands grouped into 26 atolls with a population of just over 393,000, is strategically located in the heart of the Indian Ocean, close to international sea lanes. Press reports in 2014 indicated up to 200 Maldivians had traveled to Syria or Iraq and at least six had been killed in action.

Since 2010, concerns about the activities of a small number of local extremists who support violence and have involvement with transnational terrorist groups have been mounting. Young Maldivians, especially those within the penal system and otherwise marginalized members of society, are at risk of becoming radicalized and some have already joined violent extremist groups. According to reporting in the Maldivian media, radical Maldivians have made connections to violent extremist affiliates throughout the world and a small but steady stream of Maldivians leave the country to train and fight with these groups.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Maldivian Parliament (Majlis) passed a new penal code in April 2014, which, once implemented, should improve the government’s ability to prosecute individuals for recruiting, financing, or otherwise supporting terrorism. However, the government was still drafting criminal procedure codes and evidence bills needed to help enforce the new penal code at year’s end. Neither Maldivian law nor the new penal code permit restrictions on travel of would-be foreign terrorist fighters or detention of those who have been turned back on suspicion they were headed to a war zone.

Responsibility for Maldivian counterterrorism efforts is divided among the Maldivian Police Service (MPS) and National Defense Force (MNDF), the latter of which has Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard branches. The MPS has the greatest capacity among these entities; cooperation and information sharing among the agencies is very limited. The Maldivian government worked with the United States to install the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) at Maldives’ main international airport and at Malé seaport in August 2013.
The Maldivian government arrested several people possibly associated with violent extremism in 2014, but did not arrest Maldivians who were returned to the country on suspicion they intended to fight in Syria or Iraq. Existing law severely limits the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute such cases.

Maldives continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided training to the MPS, Maldivian Coast Guard, prosecutors, and port and border control officers. In 2014, ATA provided training and assistance in such fields as vital infrastructure security, maritime port and harbor security management, countering domestic and transnational terrorism, first response to terrorist incidents, interdicting terrorist activities, soft target protection, and interviewing terrorist suspects.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Maldives is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Maldivian authorities believe funds are currently being raised in Maldives to support terrorism abroad; however, they do not have reliable information regarding the amounts involved. While no official studies have yet been conducted, the Maldivian Central Bank believes criminal proceeds mainly come from domestic sources; a large percentage of Suspicious Transaction Reports the Central Bank receives are related to Maldivians. The Maldives Monetary Authority reports informal money transfer networks (*hawala*) are used to transfer funds between the islands, although the extent to which these systems are employed to launder money is unclear.

The Maldivian government monitors banks, the insurance sector, money remittance institutions and finance companies, and requires the collection of data for wire transfers. Financial institutions other than banks and intermediaries in the securities sector, however, are not subject to current anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations. Insurance companies and intermediaries, finance companies, money remittance service providers, foreign exchange businesses, and credit card companies therefore operate outside the AML/CFT framework.

The Maldivian government implements UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and its follow-on resolutions and 1373 (2001), and monitors and regulates alternative remittance services, despite the fact that they lie outside the AML/CFT framework. The Maldivian government did not report any efforts to seize terrorist assets in 2014.

According to the Maldivian government, capacity building of relevant supervisory and regulatory authorities such as the Maldives Monetary Authority and the Capital Market Development Authority, law enforcement authorities (the Anti-Corruption Commission, Department of Immigration and Emigration, Maldives Customs Service, and MPS), and the judiciary is needed to properly counter money laundering and terrorist financing. Government of Maldives officials attended the Department of State-sponsored “Good Giving” conference at Embassy Dhaka in December 2014 on Countering Terrorist Finance and Violent Extremism.

Regional and International Cooperation: The U.S. Special Operations Command encouraged MNDF participation as a member of the Global Special Operations Force network that collaborates on common security challenges and actively supports multilateral and regional security cooperation efforts, such as global programs that focus on de-radicalization and counterterrorism issues. Maldives is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Maldives participated, along with India and Sri Lanka, in the network’s third biannual security consultation in March 2014. Topics discussed included security force capacity building and increasing cooperation in maritime domain awareness. In accordance with Global Counterterrorism Forum Good Practices, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs convened a forum of Islamic scholars to examine the concept of jihad, with the objective of preventing Maldivian citizens from becoming foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Maldivian government continued to recognize that counter-radicalization efforts are a critical component to long-term success against violent extremism. Since 2011, the government has sought to counter the influence of extremist ideology by actively intervening in religious life. These interventions take the form of mandating persons wanting to serve as imams to undergo a six-month state-approved training, as well as disseminating approved sermons for Friday prayers. The government is also in the process of building an Islamic university in the capital city of Malé that will offer courses in comparative religion in addition to Islamic studies. The university’s key objective will be to expose Maldivian students to the academic study of religion as a counterweight to extremist discourses and messaging.

NEPAL

Overview: Nepal experienced no significant acts of international terrorism in 2014, although its open border with India and weak controls at Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport raised concerns that international terrorist groups could use Nepal as a transit point.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Nepali law criminalizes activities related to terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. While Nepal has specialized units to respond to terrorist incidents, law enforcement units lack the capacity to effectively detect, deter, and identify terrorist suspects. An open border with India and relatively weak airport security hamper efforts to implement effective counterterrorism policing.

Nepali police officers continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 2014, the ATA program funded nine training courses to improve counterterrorism capabilities within Nepali law enforcement agencies. ATA training focused on building Nepali law enforcement capacity to secure the country’s borders from potential terrorist transiting and preventing terrorists from establishing safe havens within Nepal. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) trained the Nepal Police in Polygraph Examination to improve criminal investigations, including investigations of potential terrorist activities.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Nepal belongs to the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In 2014, Nepal enacted the appropriate implementing regulations to address key anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies, including the seizing, freezing, and confiscation of terrorist assets to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 and other provisions established by FATF. Nepal is no longer subject to FATF’s monitoring process under its ongoing global AML/CFT compliance process.

Nepali law allows the government to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; however, coordination among different institutions remained slow. There were no instances of assets being frozen in 2014. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is currently working to analyze a backlog of several hundred Suspicious Transaction Reports spanning several years, which delay investigations.

Transactions by unauthorized banks and financial institutions to transfer or receive money (such as hundi and hawala) are considered criminal money laundering offenses. However, it is difficult for the Nepali government to investigate informal money transfer systems.

Nepal’s central bank, the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), licenses and monitors business services that receive remittances. Only banks can legally transfer money out of Nepal. Money transfer services in Nepal may receive inbound remittances, but funds must be distributed to recipients through banks, which are required to collect data on the originator.

The NRB issues directives to banks and financial institutions. In 2014, the Parliament passed a statute that obligates banks and financial institutions, as well as individuals, to view the website of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The websites of the Ministries and NRB are linked to the UN website and auto-updated.

The NRB’s FIU directives do not cover non-profit organizations, unless there is specific information that they are involved in money laundering and terrorist financing.


Regional and International Cooperation: Nepal is a signatory of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism. Nepal reaffirmed its commitment to the Convention during the 2014 SAARC summit held in Kathmandu.

PAKISTAN

Overview: Pakistan remains a critical counterterrorism partner that is plagued with numerous violent extremist groups, many of which target Pakistani government or members of other religious sects. Counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan during 2014 was mixed, and Pakistan continued to deny visas for trainers focused on law enforcement and civilian counterterrorism assistance. In 2014, Pakistan launched a military operation in North Waziristan.
(later expanded to Khyber Agency) aimed at eliminating terrorist safe havens. The government’s counterterrorism efforts included providing support to the military operation and countering terrorist retaliation in urban areas. Pakistan also confronted terrorist groups that attacked Pakistani civilians, law enforcement agencies, and military and paramilitary troops. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility for a December 16 attack on an Army-run school in Peshawar, one of the country’s deadliest acts of terrorism, which it termed as retaliation for the North Waziristan military operation.

In 2014, terrorists used remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in bicycles, motorcycles, cars, and rickshaws; suicide bombers; targeted assassinations; rocket-propelled grenades; and other combat tactics to attack schools, markets, government institutions, mosques, and other places of worship. Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) and its alias organizations continued to operate freely in Pakistan, and there were no indications that Pakistan took significant enforcement actions against the group. Attacks by sectarian groups against minorities continued. However, the Shia commemoration of Ashura, which was a focal point of violence in 2013, passed without major attacks or rioting.

Karachi, in particular, continued to suffer from political and ethnic violence by different groups, including militant organizations, fundamentalist religious groups, and the militant wings of political parties. Some militant groups worked to assert control over political parties and criminal gangs operating in the city and surrounding areas of southern Sindh. The security situation in Karachi remained a priority concern for Pakistan’s leadership, which launched an operation against terrorists and criminals operating in the city.

In February, Pakistan promulgated a National Internal Security Plan (NISP) aimed at combating terrorism and addressing the drivers of violent extremism. By December, most of the policies laid out in the NISP had not been implemented. For example, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which was to be the centerpiece of the plan focused on coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the government, remained ineffectual due to lack of a budget and bureaucratic disputes over personnel and chain of command. After the Peshawar school attack, the government formed a committee of political party, military, and intelligence representatives to produce a national plan of action against terrorism.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Representative terrorist attacks in Pakistan included:

- On January 21, a bomb attack on a bus of pilgrims killed at least 24 Hazara and injured 40 others in Mastung District, Balochistan.
- On February 13, a suicide bomber targeted a bus of police officers, killing at least 13 and injuring 58 others near Razzakabad Police Training Center in Shah Latif Town, Karachi.
- On March 3, two suicide bombers and armed terrorists killed 11 people and injured 25 at the district court in Islamabad’s F-8 sector.
- On April 9, a bomb at an Islamabad vegetable market killed 24 people and injured 116.
- On May 25, a bomb attack on a security convoy in the Pindiylali tehsil of Mohmand Agency killed six security personnel and injured three others.
On May 25, armed men attacked a check-post along the Quetta-Karachi Highway in Wadh tehsil of Khuzdar District, Balochistan, killing at least eight Balochistan law enforcement officials and injuring three others.

On June 8, armed men attacked Karachi airport, killing 13 people. An Army spokesman said security forces killed all 10 of the gunmen.

On September 6, naval security thwarted a terrorist attack on Karachi Naval Dockyard. One sailor and two attackers died in a firefight, while security forces captured four attackers. The terrorists reportedly planned to hijack a naval frigate.

On November 2, a suicide bomber killed at least 60 people at the Wagah border crossing with India. TTP splinter group Jamaat-ul-Ahraar claimed responsibility.

On December 16, armed militants wearing paramilitary uniforms and suicide vests attacked an Army-run school in Peshawar, killing at least 144, mostly children. TTP claimed responsibility for what local media termed the deadliest attack in Pakistan’s history.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Pakistan enacted additional amendments to supplement the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997, and promulgated the Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA), empowering the government to counter terrorism with enhanced law-enforcement and prosecutorial powers. The country is in various stages of implementing the National Counterterrorism Authority Act, the Fair Trial Act, amendments to the ATA, and the 2014 PPA, although some of these acts may be considered lower priorities in the upcoming year following the implementation of the 21st Amendment to the Constitution, the Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act, and the National Action Plan. The government continued to make use of reinforced counterterrorism legislation; however, the judiciary moved slowly in processing terrorism and other criminal cases.

Pakistan promulgated new legislation in 2014 that supported the investigation and prosecution of terrorism offenses. The PPA augmented the ATA and established a federally empowered infrastructure with special federal courts, prosecutors, police stations, and investigation teams for the enforcement of 20 specially delineated categories of offenses. The 2014 amendments to the ATA placed additional limitations on the use of lethal force, and attempted to increase the efficiency of terrorism courts and improve court security.

Pakistan’s law enforcement and national security structure needs improvement. Although the various security agencies attempt to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents, the government’s institutional framework is not conducive to interagency cooperation and coordination. There is only sporadic interagency information sharing, no comprehensive integrated database capability, and specialized law enforcement units lack the technical equipment and training needed to implement the enhanced investigative powers provided in the 2012 Fair Trial Act. Prosecutors have a limited or inadequate role during the investigation phases of terrorism cases. Jurisdictional divisions among and between military and civilian security agencies continued to hamper effective investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. Intimidation by terrorists against witnesses, police, victims, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges contributed both to the slow progress of cases in Anti-Terrorism Courts, and a high acquittal rate.
Pakistan continued to work toward structural reforms on counterterrorism designed to centralize coordination and information sharing. Due to constitutional requirements on the devolution of law and order responsibilities to provincial levels, counterterrorism command and control at the national level had been ad hoc and limited until the 2012-2014 legislative changes to empower federal entities. NACTA has been incorporated into the Ministry of Interior and remains in the process of establishing its mission, staffing, and responsibilities. The Intelligence Bureau has nationwide jurisdiction as a civilian agency, is fully empowered under the PPA to coordinate with provincial and territorial counterterrorism units, and is taking more of an active role in counterterrorism. The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate has broad intelligence powers and fulfills a de facto border security role along with tribal militias, provincial police, and the Frontier Corps. The Ministry of Interior has over 20 law enforcement-related entities under its control.

Pakistan is implementing biometric collection in national databases and screening at border land crossings with the International Border Management Security system. The National Automated Database Registration Authority maintains a national biometric database of citizens, residents, and overseas Pakistanis, and is continually subject to upgrades. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan’s customs and tax authority, continues to maintain currency-detection units at 12 international airports to counter bulk cash smuggling. The FBR has improved information-sharing protocols on arrests and seizures to overcome bureaucratic hurdles. Information on arrests and seizures is now sent to a central intelligence and investigations directorate, which then disseminates the information throughout the country so customs agents have current information on trends, patterns, methods of operation, entities, and individuals. Pakistan collects advance passenger name records on commercial flights. In November, Pakistan Customs launched the End Use Verification (EUV) project, which will facilitate the entry of dual-use chemicals for legitimate purposes, while also investigating and preventing the entry of chemicals intended for use in IEDs. The EUV project consists of 80 Pakistani teams that will conduct countrywide verification checks.

The military conducted significant counterterrorism operations in North Waziristan and Khyber agencies in the tribal areas, and civilian forces conducted operations in Sindh, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Punjab. In Karachi, security forces continued an operation against organized crime and terrorist groups. Security forces intercepted large stockpiles of weapons and explosives, and discovered bomb-making facilities and sophisticated telecommunication networks. Pakistan continued to arrest terrorists and initiate prosecutions throughout 2014. However, the enhanced tools provided by the Fair Trial Act of 2012 and the NACTA law are still in the process of being implemented by the government. These laws are designed to equip intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors with the necessary legal tools to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist activities and organizations. If fully activated, NACTA could facilitate increased coordination and collection of counterterrorism intelligence among security agencies and provincial police, and provide a vehicle for national policy and strategy formulation for all aspects of counterterrorism.

Anti-Terrorism Courts have limited procedures for the admission of foreign evidence. The trial of seven suspects accused in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack was ongoing at year’s end, with prosecution witnesses recording statements before the court. Security concerns and procedural
issues resulted in a slow pace of trial proceedings. On December 18, the court granted bail to the lead defendant, alleged Mumbai attack planner and LeT operational commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. On December 19, the government detained Lakhvi for at least four months under the Maintenance of Public Order Act.

Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States on information sharing and law enforcement continues, but needs improvement with respect to kidnapped U.S. citizens. Law enforcement cooperation continued with respect to terrorist attacks and plots against U.S. personnel, and the Embassy and Consulates General in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. Pakistani law-enforcement officials have pledged to assist in the apprehension of U.S. citizen fugitives in Pakistan. Practical implementation of this pledge has been lacking, however.

Delays in obtaining Pakistani visas for training personnel have been an obstacle to counterterrorism assistance for security forces and prosecutors, including assistance planned through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, most of which was redirected to other regional partners.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Pakistan is an active member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with FATF and the APG in 2010 to address its strategic anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies. In June, Pakistan approved and enacted amendments to the ATA to rectify deficiencies identified by the FATF in its authority for freezing terrorist assets in accordance with international standards and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373. Since then, the government has had the ability to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets. However, Pakistan had not yet implemented that legislation at year’s end.

UN-designated terrorist organizations continued to skirt sanctions by reconstituting themselves under different names, often with little effort to hide their connections to previously banned groups, and the government does not prosecute CFT cases. Although Pakistan added some named groups to its proscribed organizations list, implementation of UNSCRs 1267 and 1988 remained weak. Pakistan issued a UNSC Enforcement Order in 2012 setting out a range of sanctions for non-compliance in the implementation of UNSCR 1267, but has not used this authority. The FATF has determined that Pakistan needs to increase the administrative monetary penalty available or legislate for additional criminal sanctions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Pakistan participated in counterterrorism efforts in both regional and international forums. As a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Pakistan attended GCTF meetings and supported GCTF initiatives. Pakistan is a partner in the UK’s Counterterrorism Prosecution Reform Initiative, and provincial governments contributed to related rule-of-law programs in Malakand and Punjab. Pakistan participated in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation meetings on counterterrorism; is a member of
Interpol; and participated in multilateral groups where counterterrorism cooperation was discussed, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (as an observer) and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. Pakistan participated in UNSC meetings on sanctions and counterterrorism, and in a UN Counterterrorism Committee’s Executive Directorate regional workshop for South Asian judges, prosecutors, and investigators in the Maldives in November.

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States held high-level meetings to discuss regional security, including efforts to counter extremism and violence in the border region, and reconciliation efforts. Pakistan also held bilateral and multilateral meetings on security cooperation and counterterrorism with other countries, including Afghanistan, China, Germany, India, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and the UK.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the military’s Inter-Services Public Relations employed strategic communications strategies to counter radicalism and build support for counterterrorism initiatives. However, overall policy coordination had yet to be implemented under NACTA. Integration of reformed militants into society remains a major priority for the government; to that end, the military joined civil-society leaders to operate the Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center, a de-radicalization program that attempts to rehabilitate youth exposed to militancy through education and counseling.

**SRI LANKA**

**Overview:** The 2009 military defeat of the terrorist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) marked the beginning of what many hoped was a new era for the country. The Sri Lankan government maintained a strong military presence in post-conflict areas and continued to voice concern about the possible reemergence of pro-LTTE sympathizers. Although the Sri Lankan government maintains a comprehensive counterterrorism stance, counterterrorism cooperation and training with the United States in 2014 was limited.

Sri Lankan police apprehended a small number of Maldivian nationals attempting to transit through Sri Lanka to Syria allegedly to become foreign terrorist fighters.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Counterterrorism legislation in Sri Lanka has historically focused on eliminating the LTTE. In 2014, the Government of Sri Lanka continued to implement the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), enacted in 1982 as a wartime measure, which gives security forces sweeping powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals. Embassy Colombo had significant concerns regarding use of the PTA by the previous government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa to harass and detain public actors under the guise of seeking to revive the LTTE. The new government has pledged to end the broad application of the PTA, and has also taken steps to reduce the military’s role in civil society and its control of land in security zones in the north.

Although U.S. counterterrorism assistance to Sri Lanka has generally been limited, the Sri Lankan government maintained its partnership with the U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy on securing its maritime border. The U.S. Coast Guard, under the
Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, continued to train Sri Lankan Coast Guard and Navy personnel on border and export control matters, and the Government of Sri Lanka continued to cooperate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection through the Container Security Initiative.

Border security remained a significant issue for the Sri Lankan government. In 2014, the International Organization for Migration trained 54 newly-recruited Sri Lankan Department of Immigration and Emigration officers in techniques to improve border surveillance and combat human trafficking.

The government continued to collaborate with the EU Immigration Department on an Advanced Passenger Information system, which transmits passenger information to Sri Lankan immigration officials upon arrival. Collaboration with the Australian government continued on the development of a passport fingerprinting program that was originally scheduled to go online in 2014. The data generated from these collection systems will be significant assets to the Sri Lankan government in its efforts to control and combat illegal migration.

In March 2014, the government announced it had designated 16 organizations and 422 individuals as terrorist entities and/or facilitating terrorist financing designed to help revive the LTTE. The Sri Lankan government did not provide information regarding criteria for designation or any supporting evidence. A team from the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Director’s office, which visited Sri Lanka in October 2014, expressed concerns the designation process may not have met UN standards.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sri Lanka belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. While neither an important regional financial center nor a preferred center for money laundering, several factors make the country vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance. These include a lack of transparent tender mechanisms in government projects, past experience with terrorism, tax evasion, and a large informal economy. Legal remittance flows through the formal banking system have increased sharply in recent years, and will surpass US $7 billion in 2014. Remittances originate from Sri Lanka’s substantial overseas workforce, primarily in the Middle East. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Sri Lanka continued to cooperate with a number of donor countries, including the United States, to improve its land and maritime border security. These efforts also enhanced the government’s capacity to interdict potential foreign terrorist fighters attempting to transit through the country. Sri Lanka is one of 85 partner nations in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and in 2014 served as GICNT co-chair.

In November, representatives from Sri Lankan law enforcement and judicial personnel attended the three-day Ninth Regional Workshop for Judges, Prosecutors, and Police Officers on effectively Countering Terrorism in South Asia in the Maldives. In December, the Sri Lankan government held the Galle Dialogue, which featured multilateral discussion by international
security force representatives on issues of regional security in South Asia, including maritime terrorism.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Sri Lanka continued to operate a rehabilitation program for former alleged LTTE combatants, although limited access by independent bodies to known rehabilitation camps precluded reliable evaluations of the government’s efforts.

**TAJIKISTAN**

**Overview:** In 2014, Tajikistan continued to address weaknesses in its counterterrorism strategy. Marginalizing violent Islamist extremist groups in Tajik society was the main focus of the Tajik government’s counterterrorism policies. Tajikistan sought to increase military and law enforcement capacity to conduct tactical operations through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, including with the United States. The United States, Russia, Japan, and the EU provided funding for border security programs.

The biggest change in Tajikistan’s security environment has been the acknowledgment that roughly 300 Tajik citizens are allegedly fighting against government forces in Syria and Iraq, and of the threat they could pose if and when they return. The Tajik government reported the threat of militants returning from foreign conflict zones increased in 2014, due to the drawdown of international troops in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’s success in attracting recruits from Tajikistan’s Sughd and Khatlon regions, as well as among the migrant laborer population in Russia. Tajik government reporting indicated many Tajik militants brought their families with them to Syria.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Tajik government prosecutes terrorists under the Laws on Combating Terrorism, Anti-Money Laundering, Currency Regulation, and Notary; and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. Resource constraints, corruption, lack of training for law enforcement and border security officials, and general capacity issues continued to plague the Tajik government’s ability to interdict possible terrorists. Tajik law enforcement bodies lacked sufficient interagency cooperation and information sharing capabilities.

Tajikistan continued to make progress in improving border security with bilateral and multilateral assistance, although effectively policing the Tajikistan/Afghanistan border was a difficult task requiring more resources and capabilities than were available to the Tajik government. The interagency Secretariat, established by the Tajik government in 2013, met regularly throughout the year to coordinate implementation of Tajikistan’s 2010 National Border Management Strategy. The International Organization for Migration and the OSCE worked to improve travel document security. The OSCE also provided funding to link Tajikistan’s existing passport data scanners at airports and land ports of entry to the Interpol database. Tajikistan continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and Tajik security forces received training related to border security practices and counterterrorism investigations. In addition, the Border Management Program in Central Asia
and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime worked to improve border infrastructure, promote inter-agency cooperation, provide direct training, and expand training capacity in Tajikistan.

In the first 11 months of 2014, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported opening 12 cases against individuals charged with terrorism, 181 cases against individuals charged with supporting or promoting terrorism, 109 cases against individuals supporting or promoting extremism, and 46 cases against individuals charged with extremism. The Ministry of Internal Affairs also reported the successful prosecution of six Jamaat Ansarullah members for participating in a 2010 police station bombing. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported having disrupted seven planned attacks in 2014. In July, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported the arrest of a group which allegedly planned to bomb the Tajik Aluminum Company’s refinery, as well as the city hall, prosecutor’s office, and police headquarters in the nearby city of Tursunzoda. On October 18, the Ministry of Internal Affairs told media outlets it had arrested 20 militants in the northern Spitamen region planning to attack a police station, seize weapons, and blow up the Shahriston and Istiqlol tunnels connecting Dushanbe and Khujand.

Corruption in the judicial system and misuse of counterterrorism statutes to suppress political opposition hampered the effectiveness of the government’s counterterrorism efforts.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In May, FATF reported Tajikistan had amended portions of its legislation pertaining to money laundering and financial crimes, bringing its laws closer to compliance with international recommendations. At its June plenary session in Moscow, the EAG removed Tajikistan from the enhanced follow-up process and placed it under regular follow-up, meaning the group saw sufficient progress in the country’s amendments to its criminal code regarding anti-money laundering. The EAG took an additional step at its November meeting to further upgrade Tajikistan’s status by placing it on the common monitoring list.

Similarly, the FATF recognized Tajikistan, along with several other nations, during its October meeting in Paris “...for the significant progress made in addressing the strategic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) deficiencies earlier identified by the FATF...” Due to this progress, FATF removed Tajikistan from its monitoring process, although Tajikistan will continue to work with the organization to further strengthen its AML/CFT structures.

In 2014, Tajik courts sentenced seven people on charges of money laundering and sentenced one person on charges of terrorist financing. Law enforcement officials seized US $20,400 in a money laundering case.

There is no publicly available information with regard to length of time to freeze or any estimates of the amount of assets frozen or seized, but FATF has declared Tajikistan is in compliance with its definition of “Ability to Freeze Terrorist Assets without Delay.”

Regional and International Cooperation: Tajikistan is an active member of the OSCE, where it focuses on border security issues, and is also a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In August, Tajikistan participated with SCO partner nations in the Peace Mission 2014 counterterrorism-focused military exercises held in China.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Stemming violent extremism and radicalization in Tajikistan is a top priority for the Tajik government. The Tajik government seeks primarily to control radical messaging by selectively blocking social media sites, rather than issuing a counter-narrative. Many of the government’s measures, however, have had a negative impact on religious freedoms, including prohibiting children under 18 from attending mosque or other public religious services and banning women from worshiping in mosques. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

TURKMENISTAN

Overview: The Government of Turkmenistan continued efforts to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, ensure border security, and detect terrorist financing. Turkmenistan cooperated with international organizations and participated in trainings on preventing terrorist financing and strengthening border security. The government did not report any terrorist incidents, and authorities continued to maintain close surveillance of the population.

Although the government did not report any terrorist incidents in 2014, there were two incidents along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan border on February 25 and May 24. In each incident, unknown persons from Afghanistan killed three Turkmen border guards on the Turkmen side of the border. The Government of Turkmenistan has blamed the incidents on misunderstandings over the use of common resources such as grazing land, but other reports attribute the incidents to narcotics-related activities or other criminal or insurgent activity.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The country’s legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism centers on the 2003 counterterrorism law that defines which crimes are considered terrorist in nature. This law is supplemented by articles 271-273 of the criminal code, which pertain to terrorist acts and terrorist financing and are used to prosecute terrorism-related offenses.

The Ministries of National Security, Internal Affairs, and Defense, and the State Border, Customs, and Migration Services perform counterterrorism functions and share information through an interagency commission. The country’s law enforcement capacity needs improvement, as law enforcement units do not proactively conduct investigations and have a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. Prosecutors, however, do play a
significant role in the investigation phase of a case, and specialized law enforcement units exist to conduct investigations. These units possess specialized equipment but usually only use the equipment for official ceremonies and demonstrations as opposed to daily operations.

Turkmenistan participated in training programs sponsored by the United States and international organizations, including a program on border security organized by the OSCE, a program on strategic export control regimes organized by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and U.S. government-provided training on combating transnational threats.

The State Border Service continued to operate frontier garrisons on Turkmenistan’s borders with Iran and Afghanistan and managed eight radiation portal monitors along its borders provided by the Department of Energy through its Second Line of Defense program. The monitors can be used to help detect, deter, and prevent the dissemination of explosives and radioactive materials. The State Migration Service maintains a terrorist screening watchlist and possesses biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry.

There is significant political will in Turkmenistan to combat terrorism and ensure border security. Corruption, however, sometimes hampered effective law enforcement. Additionally, international cooperation with the government is often hampered by a bureaucracy that operates according to opaque rules and that frequently deems public information to be “state secrets.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Turkmenistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Government officials participated in OSCE trainings on anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). Turkmenistan continued to express interest in gaining admission to the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, and reiterated this interest at a September workshop organized by the UNODC. The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) has a December 2011 bilateral agreement with the Ministry of Finance pertaining to AML/CFT. However, the OTA did not provide technical assistance to Turkmenistan in 2014. There were no reported prosecutions of terrorist financing cases during the year. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Turkmenistan supports regional and international efforts to fight terrorism. Law enforcement officials participated in OSCE and UN Office of Drugs and Crime trainings on border security. Turkmenistan continued to participate in the Central Asia Regional Information and Coordination Center.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Turkmenistan’s law enforcement and security agencies exercise strict control over the population. The Turkmen government reportedly views conservative Islam with suspicion. Since the country’s independence, mosques and Muslim clergy have been state-sponsored and financed. This level of government surveillance suggests that any violent extremist groups existing in Turkmenistan would be small, underground, and disparate. The severe curtailment of basic freedoms, growing economic inequality, an ideological void among young people, and the perception of corruption
could cause people to be attracted to violent extremist ideologies, however. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

UZBEKISTAN

Overview: In 2014, the Government of Uzbekistan continued to rank counterterrorism within its borders as one of its top three security priorities, together with counternarcotics and countering extremism. There were no reported significant terrorist incidents on Uzbek soil in 2014, which the government attributes to its success in ongoing efforts to counter terrorism and extremism. The government restricts information on internal matters, making it difficult to analyze the extent of the terrorist threat and the effectiveness of Uzbek law enforcement’s efforts to combat it.

The government continued to express concern about the potential for a spillover effect of terrorism across Uzbekistan’s land borders with Afghanistan and other Central Asian states, especially with the drawdown of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s government remained confident that it can control its border with Afghanistan but was less sure about its neighbors’ ability to do so and was particularly concerned with the infiltration of extremists through Uzbekistan’s long borders with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

The government remained concerned about the recruitment of ethnic Uzbek fighters to fight in the Middle East and the threat from returning foreign terrorist fighters and possible collaboration between Central Asian extremists operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). On October 31, the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers issued a public statement condemning ISIL as un-Islamic and urging citizens to resist its virulent propaganda. Uzbekistan President Karimov has also spoken out publicly against ISIL.

Uzbekistani law enforcement authorities frequently use the terms “terrorism” or “extremism” interchangeably and view alleged ties to what the government considers extremist organizations as grounds for the arrest, prosecution, and convictions of many people who would not be considered terrorists outside of Uzbekistan. “Religious extremism” is the primary justification for Uzbekistan’s seemingly indiscriminate police actions against religious adherents, especially Muslims. The security sector in Uzbekistan, under the control of the National Security Service (NSS), prioritizes regime stability over domestic freedom of expression, including political dissent, and uses law enforcement to maintain internal security at the expense of some fundamental freedoms. The government brands some Islamic groups it broadly determines to deviate from the state-sponsored version of Islam as “extremist” and criminalizes membership in such groups, even when the groups clearly espouse non-violent ideology, such as the followers of Turkish cleric Said Nursi.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The government investigated and prosecuted terrorist-related acts under its Law on Combating Terrorism, which was passed in 2000 and revised in 2004. The Law on Combating Terrorism identifies the National Security Service (NSS), the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Border Guards Committee (operating within the NSS command structure), the State Customs Committee, the Ministry of Defense, and
the Ministry of Emergency Situations as the government entities responsible for countering and responding to terrorism. The NSS is the lead counterterrorist law enforcement agency, with primary responsibility for the coordination and supervision of interagency efforts.

Law enforcement agencies in Uzbekistan continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict an unreported number of people under extremism-related charges in 2014. It is possible that the Uzbek security forces have neutralized legitimate threats in the course of conducting indiscriminate and broadly targeted anti-extremist or politically motivated operations. A lack of reliable information, however, makes it difficult to differentiate between legitimate counterterrorist law enforcement actions and politically-motivated arrests aimed at religious dissidents or opponents of the government.

In 2013, the government began issuing biometric passports for travel outside of Uzbekistan. The biometric data includes a digital photo, fingerprints, and biographical data.

Below are reported examples from 2014 in which Uzbekistan’s law enforcement authorities arrested and prosecuted suspects under charges of extremism or terrorism. As with many cases like this, it is difficult to determine if the arrests and convictions were terrorist- or extremist-related or if those charges were used to suppress expressions of political or religious beliefs.

- In March, the nongovernmental organization “Forum 18” reported that the government sentenced Tajik citizen Zuboyd Mirzorakhimov to five years imprisonment for sermons found on his mobile phone.
- On May 8, six women from the Yangiyul district of the Tashkent region were sentenced under a law prohibiting materials deemed to threaten security and order.
- Lawyers for Mirsobir Hamidkariev, who left Uzbekistan to escape accusations of association with banned religious organizations, reported to independent press that on June 9, three days before a Russian court decision granting him asylum took effect, he was kidnapped from a taxi in Moscow and forcibly returned to Uzbekistan by its security services, reportedly with the acquiescence of Russian authorities. The government stated that Hamidkariev voluntarily turned himself in to the police on June 17, following an in absentia charge of participation in an extremist organization. On November 18, according to Uzbekistani press reports, the Tashkent City Criminal Court sentenced Hamidkariev to eight years in prison upon conviction of organizing and participating in the banned religious extremist organization “Islom Jihochilari.” According to the government, as of December 29, his case was still with the Tashkent City Criminal Court.
- In July, the human rights organization “Ezgulik” reported that three men, Otabek Ochilov, Zafar Pulaatov, and Bakhtiyor Bozorov, and three women, Lolakhon Qudratova, Nigora Ernazarova, and Aziza Mukhitdinova, were sentenced to terms ranging from nine to 15 years, for being members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Their cases were part of a larger trial that involved 66 suspects accused of terrorism in Kashkadaryo region.

In September 2014, the State Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance program re-launched in Uzbekistan after an eight year hiatus with two courses aimed at improving civil aviation security.

Regional and International Cooperation: Although the government prefers bilateral engagement in its security-related cooperation, it is currently a member of several regional organizations that address terrorism, including the EAG and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with its Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) headquartered in Tashkent. In November, SCO RATS member states agreed to exchange information on citizens who have participated in armed conflicts in the Middle East. The government also continued to work with the OSCE, the EU, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on general security issues, including border control. In 2014, within the framework of an UNODC project and funded by the Government of Norway, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan opened joint border liaison offices at two Uzbekistani-Tajik border crossings to allow for direct communication between the law enforcement agencies involved in border control.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Official government media continued to produce documentaries, news articles, and full-length books about the dangers of Islamist religious extremism and joining terrorist organizations. The message is generally targeted to the 15 to 40 year old male demographic, which the government considers the most susceptible to recruitment by Islamic extremist groups. In December, a monthly magazine of the government-controlled Uzbekistan Muslim Board printed an article emphasizing the un-Islamic nature of ISIL. However, some non-governmental religious experts continued to suggest that greater freedom to circulate mainstream, non-extremist Islamic and other religious materials could be more effective in countering extremism than government-produced material.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Almost all governments in the region recognized the potential threat that terrorism represents to their domestic and hemispheric interests. At the same time there was an informed understanding that terrorist groups do not currently menace the region in the way in which they can and do in other parts of the world. Despite a genuine recognition of the importance of exercising constant unilateral and multilateral vigilance to ensure this situation continues, corruption, weak government institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and a lack of resources remained the primary causes for the lack of significant progress on countering terrorism in some countries in the Western Hemisphere. Transnational criminal
organizations continued to pose for more significant threats to the region than terrorism, and most countries made efforts to investigate possible connections with terrorist organizations. The primary terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere come from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army, which continued to commit the majority of terrorist attacks in the region. Peace negotiations between the FARC and the Government of Colombia continued throughout the year in Cuba. The ability of the Shining Path to conduct coordinated attacks and its membership both continued to decline with successful Peruvian military operations.

Operational cells of either al-Qa’ida or Hizballah in the hemisphere were not confirmed, but ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia. In Peru, police arrested Muhammad Amadar, a suspected member of Hizballah, who had allegedly engaged in surveillance of Israeli and Jewish targets, and was found to have traces of explosives on his body and in his home. The investigation is ongoing. The Tri-Border areas of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay remained an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human smuggling, counterfeiting, pirated goods, and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations. The United States remained vigilant in its efforts to monitor Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The United States collaborated extensively with both Canada and Mexico to protect our shared borders through regular exchanges of intelligence and other information.

On December 17, 2014, the President announced sweeping changes to U.S. policy on Cuba, which included a review of the status of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.

ARGENTINA

Overview: Argentina maintained capabilities for confronting terrorism at the federal level, and directed increased effort to addressing policing challenges along its remote northern and northeastern borders, which include the Tri-Border Area where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet. Limited U.S. law enforcement and security cooperation with Argentina focused on information sharing.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Argentina’s Antiterrorism Law of 2007, modified in 2011, serves as a supplement to the criminal code for the prosecution of terrorism cases. The Argentine government took steps that it maintained would help determine culpability for the 1994 terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 and injured more than 150 people. In March, President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner confirmed to the Argentine Congress and at the September UNGA that she would continue to seek to implement a “truth commission,” agreed between Argentina and Iran in January 2013. The proposed talks were intended to clarify Iran’s alleged role in the bombing, for which several former Iranian cabinet-level officials have outstanding Interpol Red Notices. In May, an Argentine court declared the agreement between the two governments unconstitutional. The Argentine-Jewish community and the U.S. government expressed
skepticism regarding the Argentina-Iran dialogue, and indeed it has failed to advance the investigation.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Argentina is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a FATF-style regional body. In October, the FATF found that Argentina was making sufficient progress on implementing anti-money laundering action plans and removed Argentina from the FATF’s monitoring process, where it had been placed since 2011. Argentina closed several loopholes in previous legislation; gave the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) the power to freeze assets; and criminalized the financing of terrorist organizations, individuals, and terrorist acts. Argentina is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

Not all NGOs are required to report. Only legal entities receiving more than US $5,700 in donations or third party support must file. The UIF has used its counterterrorism authority mainly to pursue cases against members of the country’s former military dictatorship.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Argentina participated in the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism and the Southern Common Market Special Forum on Terrorism. Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay coordinated law enforcement efforts in the Tri-Border Area via their Trilateral Tri-Border Area Command.

**BRAZIL**

**Overview:** The Brazilian government continued to support counterterrorism activities, which included third-country technical assistance for controlling sensitive technologies, assessing and mitigating potential terrorist threats in advance of major sporting events like the FIFA World Cup, and investigating fraudulent travel documents. Operationally, Brazilian security forces worked with U.S. officials to pursue investigative leads provided by the United States and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects.

The Brazilian Federal Police (DPF) worked closely with the U.S. government and other nations’ law enforcement entities to assess and mitigate potential terrorist threats, especially leading up to and during the 2014 FIFA World Cup. Cooperation was strong and continuous, particularly dealing with crisis management, emergency response, and planning exercises to build response capability.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Brazil’s 1980 National Security Law is the only legislation that mentions terrorism. Brazilian law lacks clarity on the definition of terrorist acts, which hinders prosecutions of potential terrorists.

Four pieces of terrorism legislation were under consideration in the Brazilian Congress: one would deny visas to persons and/or expel foreigners convicted or accused of a terrorist act in
another country (introduced in 2011); another would define terrorism in the Brazilian Constitution (introduced in 2013); a third would update the Brazilian penal code to include sentencing guidelines for terrorism crimes (introduced in 2012); and the fourth would define a number of crimes, among them terrorism and terrorist financing, and was intended to enter into force in advance of the FIFA 2014 World Cup (introduced in 2011).

Brazil has three law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, ranging from the investigation of terrorism to interdiction and response. The lead counterterrorism agency, with responsibility for investigating any terrorist-related threats or groups, is the DPF Anti-Terrorism Division, working with the DPF’s Tactical Operations Command. In addition, the state-level Military Police Departments, through their respective Police Special Operations Battalions; and the state-level Civil Police Departments, through their respective Divisions of Special Operations; also work on counterterrorism issues.

All of Brazil’s federal law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities have benefitted from U.S. capacity building training. The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program delivered courses to security and law enforcement personnel, covering topics such as tactical command, vital infrastructure security, crisis incident management, digital network security, and bus and rail security – all with the goal of enhancing investigative capabilities, building border security capabilities, and supporting the Government of Brazil’s efforts to prevent terrorist attacks at the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. The ATA training courses had the added benefit of bringing together disparate agencies, which enhanced Brazilian interagency communication.

The U.S. Department of State funded professional development courses for police and justice officials both in Brazil and through the International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Salvador. In 2014, Homeland Security Investigations provided cross-border financial investigations training to help combat terrorist financing. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation offered courses ranging from interview and interrogation techniques, terrorist financing and money laundering investigations, and Hostage Rescue Team technical assistance exchanges. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provided training to Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) airport security managers and to the DPF’s Bureau of Airport Security Services on airport security checkpoint optimization, explosive threat mitigation, and the implementation of an airport security testing program. The TSA also initiated an expert exchange with the DPF’s canine group (SECAN) to assist in the development of its explosive detection canine program. SECAN requested that its canine program be evaluated by TSA for possible recognition of commensurability with TSA’s canine program.

Brazilian authorities continued to work with other concerned nations – particularly the United States – in combating document fraud. Since 2009, multiple regional and international joint operations successfully disrupted a number of document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-smuggling networks. Since 2008, DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have trained Brazilian airline employees on identifying fraudulent documents. The U.S. government provides comprehensive and ongoing anti-fraud training to airline and border police units through its Investigations Program.
The U.S.-Brazil Container Security Initiative in Santos, which began in 2005, continued to operate throughout 2014. Brazil continued to reach out to CBP’s International Affairs and Field Operations Offices to learn best practices and conduct joint workshops to bolster supply chain security and port security. Similarly, the Brazilian ANAC, DPF, and Brazilian Customs continued to work with TSA to make modifications to Brazil’s National Cargo Security Program to gain TSA recognition of commensurability for cargo security procedures, training, and operations at Brazil’s international airports.

Brazil shares vast international borders with 10 different countries, and many of these borders are porous – especially those with Colombia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina. Travel document security is a highly specialized skill. The Brazilian states maintain individual criminal records databases, and information sharing is unwieldy. Biometric information is not collected from visitors. A 2013 law requires the collection of passenger name record data, and it is being gradually implemented. Brazil does not maintain its own terrorist watch list, although it collaborates with other nations.

In 2014, the Brazilian Army inaugurated the initial section of a border-monitoring system that integrates a combination of soldiers, cameras, sensors, and satellites. The initial section was implemented in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul on the Paraguay border. The system will eventually cover the entire Brazilian land border.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Brazil is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a FATF-style regional body. Brazil prioritizes FATF recommendations and created a working group chaired by the Ministry of Justice to incorporate these recommendations into legislation and regulation. Brazil updated its money laundering legislation in 2012, establishing stricter penalties, but it did not criminalize terrorist financing as a stand-alone criminal offense. Brazil is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

Through Brazil’s Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), which is a largely independent entity within the Finance Ministry, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities on the UNSCR 1267/1989 (al-Qaeda sanctions) and 1988 (Taliban sanction) terrorist finance lists, but it has not reported any assets, accounts, or property in the names of persons or entities on the UN lists. The Government of Brazil has generally responded to U.S. efforts to identify and block terrorist-related funds.

COAF does not have the authority to unilaterally freeze assets without a court order. The FATF has recommended that COAF create a standard operating procedure for freezing funds, which COAF has prioritized as a project but had not yet completed by year’s end.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Brazil participates in regional counterterrorism fora, including the OAS and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, the Union of South
American Nations, and the working group on terrorism and sub-working group on financial issues in the Southern Common Market.

Brazil is an active participant in the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) Working Group on Security. Additionally, in 2014, the Director-President of ANAC held the Presidency of the Latin American Civil Aviation Commission.

The Brazilian government continued to invest in border and law enforcement infrastructure, and has undertaken initiatives with its neighboring countries to control the flow of goods – legal and illegal – through the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Brazil’s DPF Anti-Terrorism Division was created specifically to address threats of radicalization and to counter violent extremism.

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**CANADA**

**Overview:** Canada plays a vital role in international efforts to detect, disrupt, prevent, and punish acts of terrorism. Canada and the United States maintained a close, cooperative counterterrorism partnership, working together on key bilateral homeland security programs such as the Beyond the Border initiative and the Cross Border Crime Forum. Canadian diplomacy supported global efforts to prevent radicalization, counter violent extremism, and promote the rule of law overseas.

Canada has made significant contributions to the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. In addition to providing military forces to coalition air and ground operations in Iraq, Canadian law enforcement and security services are working to prevent the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from Iraq and Syria. Traveling abroad to commit acts of terrorism is a violation of Canadian federal law. Measures include denial of passport applications (or revocation of valid passports) of Canadian citizens suspected of traveling abroad (or aspiring to travel abroad) to commit acts of terrorism, and maintenance of a watchlist of individuals (both citizens and non-citizen residents) flagged for potential involvement with violent extremist organizations.

**2014 Terrorist Incidents:** On October 20 and 22, two Canadian Forces soldiers were murdered in separate terrorist attacks that took place outside Montreal and in downtown Ottawa, respectively. On October 20, Martin Couture-Rouleau, a Canadian national, killed one uniformed Canadian soldier with his car and injured a second in a hit-and-run ambush outside a government office in Quebec that provided services to military personnel. Police fatally shot Couture-Rouleau following a car chase. Authorities said that he had become radicalized and motivated by violent extremist ideology.

On October 22, Canadian national Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot one military honor guard and fired at a second guard at the National War Memorial in Ottawa before forcing entry into the federal Parliament, where he was shot and killed by security officials. Authorities said that he had become radicalized by violent extremist ideology.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Canada’s legal framework includes significant penalties for committing terrorist acts, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, financing terrorism, and traveling abroad to engage in terrorism. In June, the government passed C-24, Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, which provided for the collection, retention, use, disclosure, and disposal of information on Canadian citizens – including disclosure for the purposes of national security, the defense of Canada, the conduct of international affairs; or verification of citizenship status or identity of any person for the purpose of administering the law of another country. C-24, which came into effect August 1, further granted the Canadian government authority for the first time to strip Canadian citizenship from Canadian dual nationals convicted of treason, terrorism, and espionage offenses, or who served as a member of an armed force or organized armed group engaged in an armed conflict with Canada. It also barred individuals convicted of these offenses, or who had engaged in armed conflict with Canada, from acquiring Canadian citizenship.

At year’s end, the passing of C-44, Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act, was still pending in Parliament. C-44 would amend the Canadian Security Intelligence (CSIS) Act to confirm CSIS’s authority to conduct investigations abroad and obtain federal court warrants to carry out those investigations; protect the identity of CSIS human sources from disclosure; and protect the identity of CSIS employees engaging in covert activities. The bill would expedite implementation of the citizenship revocation measures in C-24 Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act passed in June.

On December 11, C-13, Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, received Royal Assent. The bill permits a combination of new online lawful access investigative tools to intercept, track, and preserve (with judicial production orders or warrants) private electronic communications on “reasonable grounds for suspicion” of committing an offense. The bill shields internet providers from lawsuits for voluntary disclosure of private data to law enforcement without a warrant. The bill also amends the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to promote cooperation among specific states by establishing a system for exchanging information and evidence relating to the gathering of evidence in Canada on behalf of a foreign state for use in a criminal investigation and prosecution conducted by that state.

Canadian law enforcement and homeland security entities shared information with their U.S. and other investigative counterparts in a timely, proactive fashion. Prosecutors worked in close cooperation with specialized law enforcement units that maintain advanced investigative techniques, crisis response capabilities, and border security capacity. Canadian law enforcement entities, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), have clearly demarcated counterterrorism missions, as well as effective working relationships with provincial and municipal law enforcement and other elements of the Canadian Forces that have counterterrorism roles.

Canada has an extensive border security network and makes excellent use of travel document security technology, biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry, information sharing with host governments and other countries, and collection of advance passenger name record information on commercial flights. Canada and the United States
continued their extensive border security collaboration under the auspices of the Beyond the Border initiative, as well as the Cross Border Crime Forum and other ongoing law enforcement exchanges. Canadian security forces are very capable of effectively patrolling and controlling land and maritime borders.

Notable terrorism-related cases in 2014 included:

- One man pled guilty to avoid trial, courts found a second guilty, and acquitted a third man in a 2010 conspiracy to bomb targets in Ottawa and participate in and facilitate terrorist activity. In September, Hiva Alizadeh received a 24-year sentence with no eligibility for parole for nine years in exchange for a guilty plea on a charge of possessing an explosive device for terrorist activity. The government withdrew lesser charges of participating in and facilitating terrorist activity. With credit for time in pre-trial custody, Alizadeh faced a maximum 18-year-sentence. In July, a court found Pakistan-born Misbahuddin Ahmed guilty in the same plot of conspiring to facilitate a terrorist activity and participating in a terrorist activity, but acquitted him of possessing an explosive device. In October, he received a 12-year prison sentence, reduced to 11 years with credit for time served in custody, with eligibility for parole after three years. In November, authorities appealed the sentence. The appeal remained pending as of December 2014. In August, courts acquitted Khurram Sher on one count of conspiring to commit terrorism.

- On May 14, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld a national security certificate against Ottawa resident Mohamed Harkat, and reinstated a lower court decision that had found him guilty of being a sleeper agent of the al-Qaeda network. Harkat, who arrived in Canada in 1995 and was arrested in 2002, appealed the constitutionality of his certificate. The Supreme Court had struck down the original certificate system in 2007 as unconstitutional because it did not allow defendants to know and challenge confidential evidence against them.

- On July 17, Canadian authorities handed down the country’s first charge under a 2013 law that criminalizes travel for the purposes of terrorism. Police charged Hasibullah Yusufzai, a Canadian national, in absentia for murder “in association with a terrorist group.” Yusufzai reportedly left the country in January for Syria.

- On July 25, an Ontario court sentenced Somali-born Canadian citizen Mohamed Hersi to a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment on one count each of attempting to participate in a terrorist activity and of counselling another person to participate in a terrorist activity. The case was the first in which authorities laid charges of attempted terrorist activity. Authorities had arrested Hersi in March 2011 at an airport in Toronto where authorities alleged he intended to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.

- On August 11, the provincial Alberta Court of Appeal denied an appeal by Iraqi-born Canadian citizen Sayfildin Tahir Sharif (also known as Faruq Khalil Muhammad Isa) challenging his extradition to the United States, and ordered him to be extradited to face charges of complicity in terrorist bombings in Iraq that killed five American soldiers and seven civilians in 2009, and of aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. nationals abroad. [Sharif was extradited to the United States in January 2015.]

- On November 13, the Supreme Court denied an appeal by Lebanese-born Canadian citizen Hassan Diab of his deportation order to France to face charges in the 1980
bombing of a Paris synagogue by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Four passersby were killed, and forty others were injured in the bombing. Authorities extradited Diab on November 14.

Chiheb Esseghaier, a Tunisian national, and Raed Jaser, a Palestinian national, remained in custody awaiting trial on charges of conspiring to derail a VIA Rail passenger train between Toronto and New York City for terrorism purposes. Neither are Canadian citizens. Police charged the pair in April 2013. At year’s end, courts had not set a date to try the cases.

On December 11, Canada’s Supreme Court ruled that police may search a suspect’s cellphone without a warrant under specific conditions that safeguard the broader constitutional right to privacy. In one case, for example, an individual was arrested after an armed robbery. His cellular phone, which was not password protected, was searched and found to contain a picture of the handgun used in the robbery and a draft text message that said "We did it."

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Canada is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Canada is also an observer in the Council of Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures; the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force; and the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America. Canada is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units, and plays an active role in developing training to combat terrorist financing.

Canada has a rigorous detection and monitoring process in place to identify money-laundering and terrorist financing activities. FINTRAC is Canada’s Financial Intelligence Unit and is responsible for detecting, preventing, and deterring money laundering and financing of terrorist activities.

In June, the Canadian government passed C-31, Economic Action Plan 2014, which amended the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to enhance record keeping and registration requirements for financial institutions and intermediaries, and expand the circumstances in which FINTRAC or the Canada Border Services Agency can disclose information. C-31 also updated the review and appeal provisions related to cross-border currency reporting. C-31 came into effect on June 19.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Canada prioritizes collaboration with international partners to counter terrorism and regularly seeks opportunities to lead. Canada is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and was also active in other fora dealing with counterterrorism, including: the OSCE, the UN, G-7, APEC, ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum, Commonwealth, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism, and the
Canada makes major contributions to the GCTF, including as co-chair of the Sahel Working Group.

Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development maintains a counterterrorism capacity building program, and provides training, funding, equipment, technical, and legal assistance to states to enable them to prevent and respond to a broad spectrum of terrorist activity. Examples of Canadian counterterrorism assistance include: border security; transportation security; legislative, regulatory, and legal policy development; human rights training; law enforcement, security, military, and intelligence training; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives terrorism prevention; mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; detecting and preventing terrorist financing; cybersecurity; and protection of critical infrastructure.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach program continued to promote interaction and relationship building with at-risk communities. The Department of Public Safety’s Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security fosters dialogue on national security issues between the government and community leaders, including diaspora groups. Both of these initiatives are part of Canada’s Counterterrorism Strategy, which seeks specifically to reduce the risk of individuals succumbing to violent extremism and radicalization. The government continued to work with non-governmental partners and concerned communities to deter violent extremism through preventative programming and community outreach.

**COLOMBIA**

**Overview:** In 2014, Colombia experienced a year of overall decreased terrorist activity according to Ministry of Defense statistics, thanks in part to successes in its military campaign against Colombia’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although the government and the FARC reached tentative, partial agreements on land reform, political participation, and drug trafficking, no overall bilateral peace agreement had been concluded by the end of the year. On June 10, the government announced that in January, it had begun exploratory talks with the other major terrorist organization in Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN), although formal peace negotiations had not started by year’s end.

The Colombian government continued its military pressure against insurgents in 2014. The number of members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations – including the FARC and ELN – and several minor guerrilla groups killed in combat in 2014 decreased to some degree, while the number of members of such organizations that were captured increased slightly. At the same time, the total number of insurgents who demobilized in the same period rose by a small amount. Both the FARC and ELN observed a ceasefire for the first round of the presidential elections on May 25, and the FARC again observed a ceasefire June 9 through 30 during the presidential runoff elections that confirmed President Santos’ second term. On November 17, President Santos suspended peace negotiations with the FARC after the group kidnapped Brigadier General Ruben Alzate Mora and four other hostages. The FARC released all five
hostages by November 30, and peace talks resumed December 10. The FARC declared an indefinite, unilateral ceasefire on December 20.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: The FARC focused on low-cost, high-impact asymmetric attacks, as it did in 2013. The most common forms of terrorist activity were the launching of mortars at police stations or the military, explosive devices placed near roads or paths, sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes. In 2014, Colombian government statistics showed a decrease in attacks from 2013. Terrorist attacks on infrastructure – particularly on oil pipelines and energy towers, primarily by the FARC and the ELN – also decreased in 2014 compared to 2013 according to Ministry of Defense statistics. Security forces and government buildings were the most common terrorist targets, although civilian casualties occurred throughout the year. Attacks were most common along the Venezuelan border in the departments of Arauca, Norte de Santander, and La Guajira; in the southwestern departments of Nariño and Cauca; and in the northwestern department of Antioquia.

Among the terrorist attacks recorded in 2014, several were notable for their severity or significant press coverage:

- On March 22, the Daniel Aldana Mobile Column of the FARC admitted killing two policemen they had kidnapped and tortured on March 15 in the city of Tumaco, Nariño department.
- In the weeks following the June 10 announcement of exploratory talks with the government, the ELN launched several attacks, including the June 20 bombing of a police station in the capital city of Bogota that injured three people, and a June 29 attack on the Caño Limon-Coveñas oil pipeline in Arauca department that injured 13 people and resulted in suspended production at Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s oil fields.
- On July 29, in advance of the August presidential inauguration, the ELN, in a demonstration of their ability to attack the capital city, placed five leaflet bombs in Bogota, with several exploding prior to detection.
- In the run up to the August presidential inauguration, the FARC increased terrorist attacks throughout the country. On July 28, a FARC attack on a transmission tower in the port city of Buenaventura left 400,000 people without power. On July 30, three soldiers died after land mines laid by FARC guerrillas detonated in Norte de Santander department. In late July, a FARC attempt to attack a military base in the town of Miranda in Cauca department with grenades killed a four-year-old girl and wounded two others. The FARC also blew up a road linking three southern jungle departments with the rest of the country, leaving a 10-meter-deep crater in the road. FARC attacks in Meta department left 70 oil wells without power and approximately 16,000 people without potable water. On July 1, thousands of barrels of oil were spilled from tanker trucks in a FARC attack on Putumayo department, causing environmental damage.
- On September 14, ELN snipers shot dead two workers sent to repair a damaged section of the Caño Limon-Coveñas pipeline that had been bombed by the group near the town of Teorama in Norte de Santander department.
- On September 16, the FARC – reportedly in alliance with the Usuga Clan criminal gang – attacked a police patrol in Tierradentro in Cordoba department, killing seven policemen and injuring five others.
On November 5, FARC Sixth Front insurgents killed two indigenous leaders near the southwestern municipality of Toribío for taking down a sign honoring late FARC leader Alfonso Cano. An indigenous court convicted and sentenced seven FARC guerillas to between 40 and 60 years in jail and 20 lashes for the murders.

On November 16, the FARC kidnapped Brigadier General Ruben Alzate Mora and two companions near Quibdo in Choco department. Several days earlier, the FARC kidnapped two soldiers in Arauca department. Following the President’s cessation of the peace negotiations and widespread condemnation, the FARC released all five hostages by November 30.

On November 22, FARC guerillas launched an amphibious attack on Gorgona Island (the site of a national park) located 35 kilometers from the Colombian mainland off the Pacific coast, killing the island’s police commander and injuring six police officers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The legal regime governing the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases in Colombia is governed by Section 906 of Colombia’s Criminal Code, which phased in an accusatory system for the country’s criminal justice system. The purpose of Section 906 is to develop an evidence-based system of justice where cases are tried before a judge based on testimonial, physical, or documentary evidence with a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof. Most terrorism cases are prosecuted under traditional legal statutes that are used for narcotics trafficking and organized crime, such as conspiracy and illegal possession of firearms authorized for exclusive use of the security forces. There are some specialized statutes that the Attorney General Office’s specialized Counterterrorism Unit uses, such as “rebellion” under Section 467 of Colombia’s Criminal Code. Colombia’s rebellion statute criminalizes “those who, through armed conflict, seek to overthrow the Constitutionally-enacted government of Colombia.”

The Attorney General Office’s specialized Counterterrorism Unit has prosecutors assigned at the national level in Bogota, and in regions of conflict throughout the country. The unit has developed a great deal of expertise in investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism and insurgency with the Attorney General’s own Technical Criminal Investigative Body, Colombia’s National Police (CNP), and the country’s military forces. In 2014, the Attorney General’s Office also reestablished the National Judicial Police Council – presided over by the Attorney General and including members of the CNP and other agencies with investigative authority – to develop minimum standards for investigations and forensics, and to better standardize investigative basic training. Colombia also worked on securing international accreditation for its forensic laboratories.

The CNP has specialized counterterrorism units in the Intelligence, Anti-Kidnapping, and Judicial Police Directorates, all with advanced investigation techniques and crisis response capabilities. Law enforcement units display clear and effective command and control within each organization. These specialized law enforcement units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training. Counterterrorism missions are demarcated to a limited extent between law enforcement and military units. Colombia’s contemporary military and law enforcement units have an improved record of accountability and respect for human rights. There is room for improvement in interagency cooperation and sharing of terrorism-related information. No single
agency has jurisdiction over all terrorism-related investigations and post-incident response, sometimes resulting in poor information sharing and cooperation.

In 2014, Colombian authorities launched the operations of several new military task forces to enhance coordination in combating terrorism. The CNP managed fusion centers to ensure all operational missions coordinate intelligence, investigations, and operations under the command of regional police commanders. Additionally, the National Police Intelligence Directorate continued to operate a 24-hour Citizen Security Center tasked with detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorist attacks, among other crimes.

Colombian border security remained an area of vulnerability. Law enforcement officers faced the challenge of working in areas with porous borders and difficult topography plagued by the presence of illegally armed groups and illicit drug cultivation and trafficking. The CNP lacked the manpower to enforce uniform policies for vehicle or passenger inspections at land border crossings. Biometric and biographic screening was conducted only at international airports. Of a total force of 180,000 officers, the CNP has only 1,500 officers assigned to Customs Enforcement (air, land, and sea ports and borders) duties. The CNP’s Customs Police are granted authorities for customs enforcement by Colombia’s Revenue and Customs authority and do not have authority to conduct primary inspections at air, land, or sea ports.

Improved relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela have led to some increased cooperation from those countries on law enforcement issues. Colombia also continued cooperation and information sharing with the Panamanian National Border Service. The Colombian government does not use advance passenger name records.

Colombia remained a key transit point for the smuggling of third-country nationals who may raise terrorism concerns seeking to enter the United States illegally through the border with Mexico. Porous borders with Ecuador and Venezuela facilitate the movements of third-country nationals who may raise terrorism concerns through Colombia, and existing maritime narcotics smuggling routes facilitate their onward movement to Central America. Colombian Immigration lacks the personnel and enforcement authority to adequately respond to this growing threat, and the ability to repatriate citizens to their home countries via air.

In August, Colombian police arrested Duverney Ospina, a suspected FARC rebel accused of participating in the kidnapping of three U.S. citizens held hostage from 2003 to 2008 after their plane crash-landed in the jungle in Caqueta department.

In October, ex-FARC Commander Alexander Beltran Herrera was sentenced by a U.S. federal judge to 27 years in prison for hostage taking and aiding and abetting, two and a half years after Colombia extradited him to the United States for holding the three U.S. citizens hostage.

In November, FARC member Diego Alfonso Navarrete-Beltran was also extradited to the United States to face kidnapping charges of the same three U.S. citizens.

From January through October 2014, Colombia saw a 65 percent reduction in kidnappings from the same period in 2005. While kidnappings as a whole have declined in recent years,
they continued to pose a real threat, especially in rural and insurgent-influenced portions of Colombia. Organized extortion networks inhibit economic growth and subvert the rule of law where they are active, and the alleged failure of victims to accede to extortion demands is regularly cited as the cause for terrorist attacks. The CNP Anti-Kidnapping and Anti-Extortion Directorate have an international kidnapping unit to address kidnappings involving foreign nationals.

Law enforcement cooperation between Colombia and the United States remained strong. Evidence sharing and joint law-enforcement operations occurred in a fluid and efficient manner, with information gathered in Colombia contributing to hundreds of prosecutions of U.S.-based criminals and organizations. The Attorney General Office’s Counterterrorism Unit reported no investigations and prosecutions of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens during the year.

Colombia continued to participate in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program. The program provided instruction and resources to assist Colombia in building advanced, self-sustaining CNP capabilities to secure borders from terrorist transit, to investigate terrorists and terrorist incidents, and to protect critical infrastructure. Colombia continued to establish itself as a regional provider of counterterrorism training, particularly with regard to anti-kidnapping efforts and dignitary protection.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Colombia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a FATF-style regional body. Colombia stands out as a regional leader in the fight against terrorist financing, and has become a key part of a regional financial intelligence unit initiative aimed at strengthening information sharing among Latin American countries. Colombia is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

Asset forfeiture cases developed by the Attorney General Office’s Counterterrorism Unit were referred to the Attorney General Office’s National Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Unit. Given the volume of case referrals from virtually all units in the Attorney General’s Office, however, asset forfeiture prosecutors, who were generally very experienced, often found themselves overextended.

The Attorney General’s Office used the same legal asset forfeiture tools for seizing assets in all criminal cases, including organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. The government passed a new asset forfeiture law on January 20 that established a technical legal regime to streamline the manner in which such cases are processed. The Attorney General’s Office also continued a process of restructuring that includes the creation of more specialized police units with expertise in asset forfeiture and organized crime, especially financial crime.

Regional and International Cooperation: Colombia is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and is actively involved in the UN, OAS and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, the Pacific Alliance, and the Union of South American Nations. The CNP operates an Interpol office of approximately 70 analysts, agents, and support staff. Colombia also led the creation of the American Police Community (Ameripol) in 2007, and helped found the Latin American and Caribbean Community of Police Intelligence in 2005, whose Technical Secretariat is based in Bogota.

Colombia is becoming a leader in providing security training and assistance to other countries in the region. In 2014, Colombia conducted security training for over 700 non-Colombian individuals – including individuals from Central America and the Caribbean – in citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, and military and police capacity building. Colombia also provided anti-kidnapping, anti-extortion, hostage negotiation, and cyber training to international partners in 2014. The CNP and military continued to operate schools that train security personnel from around the region. Colombia provided judicial training to regional judges and prosecutors in handling drug trafficking and terrorism cases, offered basic and advanced helicopter training to pilots from countries throughout Latin America, and maintained its elite Lancero and Jungla special forces courses open to students from other countries. Colombia’s Congress approved and President Santos subsequently signed an information sharing agreement with NATO, which at year’s end was under consideration in the Colombian Constitutional Court.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Colombia employed a robust and modern multi-agency approach to countering radicalization and violent extremism, with a focus on encouraging individual members and entire units of the FARC and ELN to demobilize and reintegrate into society. In 2014, the number of FARC and ELN members who demobilized increased slightly over 2013. The demobilization and reintegration programs provide medical care, psychological counseling, education benefits, technical training, and job placement assistance for demobilized combatants. In order to receive benefits, demobilized combatants must check in monthly with program managers. Recidivism rates were estimated at between 10 and 20 percent by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration.

The Colombian armed forces and police employed a number of fixed and mobile radio transmitters to broadcast strategic messaging to individuals considering leaving the FARC or ELN. Such messaging was also seen in print, television, and alternative media. The Colombian military and police employed the same media forms to counter FARC and ELN recruitment efforts. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense organized highly publicized festivals and social events with celebrity participation to discourage the recruitment of vulnerable youth. Moreover, with international community support, the government’s Inter-Institutional Committee for the Prevention of Recruitment of Children supported numerous recruitment prevention initiatives all over the country reaching more than 500,000 children at high risk. The Committee also worked with mayors to include prevention of recruitment activities in their development plans.

MEXICO
Overview: The Mexican government remained vigilant against domestic and international terrorist threats in 2014. There were no known international terrorist organizations operating in Mexico, despite several erroneous press reports to the contrary during 2014. There was no evidence that any terrorist group has targeted U.S. citizens in Mexican territory. The Government of Mexico passed amendments to its Federal Penal Code that strengthened the country’s legal framework to address acts of terrorism, including terrorist financing. Mexican authorities cooperated well with relevant U.S. government agencies on third-country nationals who may raise terrorism concerns.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On February 11, the Senate approved amendments to the Federal Penal Code, the Federal Criminal Procedure Code, the Organized Crime Law, the Federal Fiscal Code, the Asset Forfeiture Law, and Constitutional implementing legislation. These amendments strengthened Mexico’s legal framework to address acts of terrorism, terrorist financing and third-party assistance to terrorist financing, attacks against internationally protected persons, the conspiracy to commit terrorism, theft of radioactive or nuclear materials, and the sanctioning of the freezing or forfeiture of terrorist assets based on domestic and international intelligence sources. The amendments also increase the minimum sentences for acts of terrorism from six to 40 years to a minimum of 15 to 40 years, strengthened the penalties for crimes committed using illicit resources, and created an exception to rules governing the dissemination of third-party fiscal data in order to comply with new terrorist financing laws.

These amendments also sought to more closely align Mexico’s federal legislation with several of the international instruments related to countering terrorism, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. On February 5, Mexico passed a national code of criminal procedure that aimed to harmonize the criminal justice systems of Mexico’s 31 states and Federal District, and increase justice sector transparency, efficiency, and impartiality.

The U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Border Security program (EXBS) funded training on identification and interdiction of dual-use items and materials that included participants from Mexican law enforcement agencies (Federal Police, Customs), Defense, the Office of the Prosecutor General, Migration, Committee for Nuclear Security and Safety, and others. EXBS also donated equipment for use at borders, airports, and major seaports to enhance Mexico’s capacity and readiness to identify and interdict dual-use materials of interest. The U.S. Department of State also provided the Government of Mexico with fixed and mobile non-intrusive inspection equipment and related detection devices for use at Mexico’s points of entry, border crossings, and internal checkpoints to increase border security and capabilities to interdict the illicit movement of narcotics, currency, weapons, goods, and migrants.

Mexico continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and Mexican law enforcement received a range of ATA training in border security measures, investigative techniques, and dignitary and infrastructure protection operations.
**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mexico belongs to the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, both Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies. Mexico is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

In January, the Head of the Mexican financial intelligence unit publicly disseminated rules outlining its power to order financial institutions to freeze the assets of designated persons and entities, namely those involved in illicit proceeds.

In August, rules limiting what individuals and businesses could deposit in banks were changed. Previously, banks could not accept more than US $4,000 per month from an individual account holder, or more than US $14,000 from business entities operating in the U.S. border region or defined tourist areas. The changes allow border- and tourist-area businesses to exceed the US $14,000 per month cash deposit limit provided that they: 1) have been operating for at least three years; 2) provide additional information to financial institutions justifying the need to conduct transactions in U.S. dollars cash; and 3) provide two years of financial statements and tax returns. The limit on individual account holders remained unchanged.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Mexico continued to work with the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to implement a joint counterterrorism work plan, which includes nonproliferation and WMD interdiction. OAS/CICTE collaborated closely with the Export Control and Related Border Security Program on this initiative, and the Committee funded multiple CICTE workshops in Mexico City focused on building awareness and best practices. In May, Mexico hosted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism plenary in Mexico City.

Mexico has supported counterterrorism capacity building and cooperation with other states by hosting a first-ever Regional Advanced Commodity Identification Workshop in July. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the course took place at the headquarters of Mexico’s customs agency and featured Mexican and Panamanian instructors, and included participants from Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama.

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**PANAMA**

**Overview:** In recent years, the most direct terrorism threats to Panama have been posed by the 57th Front of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has long operated illegally in the Darien region of Panama. Panama’s successes at confronting the FARC’s presence with patrols and raids against FARC camps, as well as working closely with Colombia to secure its border, has all but eliminated the direct security threat posed by FARC within Panamanian territory, although lingering threats from the FARC remnants and narco-trafficking groups remain. Additionally, the Panama Canal Authority’s vigilance, along with international support, contributed to the maintenance of a secure Panama Canal.
Panama’s strategic location as a gateway between Central and South America, the large volume of cargo transiting the Canal and its free trade zones make the country vulnerable to illicit practices such as the diversion of strategic items to unauthorized users. Additionally, expansion in the banking and finance sectors, the establishment of a new diamond exchange, offshore banking facilities, tax shelters, and free trade zones leave Panama vulnerable to illicit arms and narcotics trade along with other associated forms of money laundering.

Panama’s Darien region remained a significant and growing pathway for human smuggling with counterterrorism implications. In 2014, more than 7,000 migrants were stopped attempting to illegally cross into Panama. Representatives of the Department of Homeland Security-Homeland Security Investigations and the Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with Panamanian authorities to identify smuggled aliens with potential terrorism ties.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Panama has not passed a comprehensive counterterrorism legal framework; however, a 2013 law modified language in the existing Penal Code to criminalize certain terrorism-related crimes for periods of time ranging from six months to six years imprisonment.

Panama continued to lack a National Control List and a Strategic Trade Control law. Initial efforts to publish a National Control List in 2013 suffered a setback early in 2014, and a change in government removed from office many of the individuals involved in the process of pursuing the publishing of a National Control List.

The Panamanian government continued its efforts to exert sovereignty in the underserved Darien region through the use of security forces. The government’s primary security force for the Darien region is the National Border Service (SENAFRONT). SENAFRONT’s successes over previous years have degraded the capabilities of FARC to the point that they can no longer maintain a permanent militarized presence within Panamanian territory; they and smaller narco-trafficking organizations and criminal gangs from Colombia continued to cause instability within the territory. In addition to units within SENAFRONT, the Panamanian government also maintains counterterrorism units within the National Air-Naval Service, the Panamanian National Police, and the Institutional Protection Service.

Panama received significant international praise for its 2013 actions to search and detain the North Korean-flagged merchant vessel “Chong Chon Gang” for transiting the Canal with illicit cargo. The search of the vessel found arms and related materiel that violated UN Security Council Resolutions prohibiting transfer of such items to North Korea. In February 2014, North Korea paid a US $693,333 fine to the Panama Canal Authority, and the ship left Panama with most of the crewmembers. Panama initially detained all 33 members of the crew and charged the Captain, First Officer, and Political Officer of the vessel. After reviewing the evidence, the judge assigned to the case dismissed the charges against the three officers and they were released from custody. At year’s end, the vessel’s cargo remained in Panamanian custody pending the results of an appeal filed by the Public Ministry.
A key focus of counterterrorism efforts in Panama was securing the borders as well as the airports and seaports throughout the country. Panama continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided instruction and resources to assist Panama to build its capacity to achieve these objectives and prevent use of Panama as a terrorist safe haven. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continued to assist Panamanian authorities in their efforts to improve airline screening at Tocumen International Airport. Both CBP and the U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Border Security Program (EXBS) continued to work with the Government of Panama to refine risk analysis and targeting models to identify and segment high risk travelers and cargo. Mobile security teams continued operations throughout Tocumen International Airport, identifying and intercepting fugitives, persons associated with organized crime, and individuals known or suspected of association with terrorist networks.

EXBS’s engagement with the Panamanian government increased in 2014 as a result of the opening of a regional office in the U.S. Embassy in Panama City. EXBS coordinated and sponsored a wide array of training activities designed to develop and enhance the Government of Panama’s ability to detect, identify, and interdict shipments of strategic goods, WMD and WMD precursor materials, and other items of interest.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Panama is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. As of December, Panama was also a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Panama’s anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime is in a state of significant evolution. In February, the IMF published an assessment report which found that Panama failed to attain an adequate level of compliance on nearly all of the FATF recommendations. As a result, Panama was immediately placed on the FATF public statement in June. Panama was referred to the FATF review process, which resulted in the development of an action plan designed to address Panama’s AML/CFT deficiencies. President Juan Carlos Varela’s government, which took office in July, offered high-level political commitment to implement the actions required by the FATF action plan. Panama continued working with the Inter-American Development Bank to draft new laws that adequately criminalize money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as establishing the legal framework necessary to freeze terrorist assets. In 2014, DOJ’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) also began working with the Panamanian government to enhance the capacity of institutions to prosecute financial crimes involving money laundering and terrorism financing.

Panama’s financial intelligence unit, the Financial Analysis Unit, bears responsibility for analyzing all suspect financial transactions. This unit, however, has been widely considered ineffective due to the lack of resources and political intervention. The result has been uneven enforcement of existing AML/CFT legislation. The Colon Free Zone, a port outside of the Panama Canal that is outside of Panama’s normal customs and financial regulation, remains vulnerable to exploitation for illicit financial activities due to its lax customs, trade, and transaction oversight.
The legal framework in Panama permits the freezing, seizure, and confiscation of the instruments and proceeds of criminal enterprises, including money laundering and terrorist financing; however, it does not provide for the confiscation of property of corresponding value and the application of other measures. Panama monitors and regulates money/value transfer and other remittance services for real estate agents, exchange houses, and transfer services.

While there is no obligation for non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, the Panamanian government monitors non-profit organizations for suspicious transactions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Panama became the first Latin American nation to join the Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Panama participates in UN and regional security initiatives such as the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism. Panama maintained a well-established border commission with Colombia, and continued to cooperate on training with partners in the region. The Colombian Army, Navy, and the National Police provided operational training in Panama for members of the Panamanian Public Forces through the U.S.-Colombia High-Level Strategic Security Dialogue. Panama hosted personnel from Belize, Colombia, and Costa Rica at its training facilities. EXBS sponsored a regional WMD Commodity Identification Training course in Panama City, which included instructors from Panama and Mexico and students from Panama, Costa Rica, and Colombia. EXBS also collaborated with U.S. Customs Border Protection to assess border security measures along the Panama-Costa Rica border region.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The United States and Panama continued to work together to create opportunities for the residents of the Darien region to deter possible efforts at local recruitment by the FARC, transnational criminal organizations, and narco-trafficking organizations. Through the Central American Regional Security Initiative programs, local youth received vocational and technical training to better prepare them to find jobs or start their own businesses, and indigenous entrepreneurs obtained assistance with the marketing of their local crafts for sale both domestically and internationally.

The addition of a temporary Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) Air Wing (AW) program supported the presence and objectives of SENAFRONT, the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Government, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Social Development, the National Secretariat for Higher Education, Science, Innovation, and Technology, and the Secretariat for the Sustainable Development of the Province of the Darien and the Annex Comarcas. The INL AW-facilitated travel allowed Panamanian officials to reaffirm for local populations, particularly local youth populations, the presence of the state in a remote region, and supported the Panamanian government’s effort to ensure not just security but social development in the underserved Darien region.
Overview: In 2014, the Government of Paraguay continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism matters, and the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program contributed to building Paraguay’s counterterrorism law enforcement capacity. Paraguay continued to face challenges of ineffective immigration, customs, and law enforcement controls along its porous borders, particularly the Tri-Border Area (TBA) with Argentina and Brazil. Illicit activities within the TBA remained potential funding sources for terrorist organizations, most notably Hizballah.

Since 2008, persons claiming to be part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) – an internal criminal group dedicated to a socialist revolution in Paraguay – have been active in the northern departments of Concepcion and San Pedro. The group has been involved in violence designed to intimidate the population and government. The Government of Paraguay believes the EPP to be a small, decentralized group of 20 to 100 members. In September, former EPP members – reportedly expelled from the group over disciplinary issues – created the Armed Peasant Association (ACA). The ACA has similar leftist pursuits and is believed to consist of 13 members. EPP/ACA activity consisted largely of isolated attacks occurring on remote police and army posts, or against ranchers and peasants accused of collaborating with Paraguayan security services.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: The EPP conducted two high profile kidnappings, which received significant press coverage:

- In April, EPP members kidnapped a Paraguayan teenager who was released after 267 days in captivity on December 25, after his family reportedly paid a US $500,000 ransom.
- In July, EPP members kidnapped a police official who was believed to still be held by the EPP at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Paraguay pursued individuals suspected of terrorist crimes under laws passed in 2010 and 2011. The Paraguayan government continued to make use of a 2013 counterterrorism law that allows for the domestic deployment of the Paraguayan military to counter internal or external threats. Counterterrorism functions are handled by the Paraguayan National Police Secretariat for the Prevention and Investigation of Terrorism. Military forces and police officials operated jointly in 2014 in the San Pedro, Concepcion, and Amambay departments, with limited success.

Few steps were taken to address security issues at land border crossings, particularly with respect to the large and generally unprotected borders with Argentina and Brazil. The minimal police and military presence along these borders allowed for a largely unregulated flow of people, contraband, and money. Paraguay’s efforts to provide more effective law enforcement and border security were hampered by a lack of interagency cooperation and information sharing, as well as pervasive corruption within security, border control, and judicial institutions.
Paraguay continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided instruction and resources to assist Paraguay to build its capacity to secure borders and ports of entry to prevent the transit of terrorists and material.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Paraguay is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and is a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units. Paraguay has both counterterrorist financing legislation and the ability to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets without delay, although there were no terrorist financing convictions or actions to freeze in 2014.

Paraguay requires the collection of data for wire transfers. Paraguay has porous borders that have facilitated a wide variety of illicit activities, however. There is a lack of concerted law enforcement efforts to implement their laws. Significant quantities of money are laundered through businesses or moved in cash. Paraguay does not monitor non-profit organizations to prevent criminal misuse or terrorist financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Paraguay collaborated with Brazil and Argentina in border protection initiatives, regional exchanges, and discussions on counterterrorism and law enforcement projects. In February, Paraguay was named Vice-President of the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism.

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**Peru**

**Overview:** The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) remained a threat to Peru’s internal security, although the terrorist organization was relatively quiet in 2014 in comparison to previous years. SL’s membership numbers continued to dwindle, and it consisted of one single active faction by the end of 2014. Its area of activity and influence was confined to the special military emergency zone known as the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM), a remote and rugged region slightly larger than Switzerland which accounts for over half of the cocaine produced in Peru. SL sustained itself through its involvement in drug production, narcotics trafficking, and by extorting “revolutionary taxes” from others involved in the drug trade. It continued to use Maoist philosophy to justify its illegal activities.

SL was weakened as a consequence of an August 2013 operation conducted by Peruvian security forces that resulted in the deaths of two of the terrorist organization’s top four commanders, Orlando Borda (Comrade Alipio) and Martin Quispe Palomino (Comrade Gabriel). In March, the then-chief of the VRAEM Special Command, Army General Leonardo Longa, claimed that the Shining Path only had around 100 armed fighters left in the emergency zone, concentrating more on criminal activities, primarily drug-related.

According to Peruvian government statistics, the SL committed 20 terrorist acts in 2014, in comparison to 49 terrorist acts recorded in 2013 and 87 acts in 2012. The SL’s reduced activity
and relatively low profile in comparison to previous years suggests that it has struggled to reconsolidate in the wake of the deaths of Alipio and Gabriel. Over the course of the year, the terrorist organization pursued a more selective strategy of “shoot-and-run” attacks. In 2014, SL attacks resulted in the deaths of two soldiers and the wounding of six soldiers, two police officers, and seven civilians. In 2013, three soldiers were killed in the VRAEM while 19 members of the security forces lost their lives in armed confrontations with the SL in 2012.

Security forces took limited actions to counter the SL during 2014, reflecting President Humala’s strategy, announced in July 2013, of gaining control of territory in the VRAEM at the lowest cost in human lives. Security forces carried out various operations that freed at least 20 women and children held against their will by SL, as well as arresting or killing several SL members in the VRAEM’s Junín Region.

SL founder and leader Abimael Guzmán and key accomplices remained in prison serving life sentences stemming from numerous crimes committed in the 1980s and 1990s.

On October 28 in Lima, Peruvian police arrested Muhammad Ghaleb Hamdar, a 28-year old Lebanese national, for suspected links to Hizballah. According to reports, officers at the scene found residue and traces of military grade explosives in Hamdar’s apartment, as well as TNT, gunpowder, and detonators in the outdoor trash can assigned to the unit. The National Police announced that Hamdar had confessed to being a member of Hizballah but Hamdar denied this on November 13, saying through a lawyer that the confession had been coerced. In November, a court ordered that Hamdar be detained for up to 18 months in pre-trial detention while prosecutors carry out an investigation and prepare charges.

2014 Terrorist Incidents: Notable SL activity included:

- On February 17, a group of approximately 30 SL fighters attacked a camp that was housing workers expanding the Camisea gas pipeline in Cusco’s Echarate district. The attack left one pipeline worker injured with a gunshot wound to the abdomen.
- On October 13, SL snipers opened fire on soldiers providing protection for a construction company working on a road in Ayacucho’s Huanta province. One soldier was killed and four others were wounded.
- On October 28, a SL attack in the Junín province of Satipo left two soldiers wounded.
- On November 18, a SL sniper wounded a soldier in Cusco’s Echarate district.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In the past three decades, Peru has passed a variety of laws specifically designed to combat terrorism. Despite high-level political will to counter terrorism, implementation and interagency coordination remained problematic. Communication gaps between senior-level policy planners and operators on the ground persisted, compounded by the high turnover rate among senior security leaders. In general, relations between the military and the Peruvian National Police were characterized by competition and mistrust. However, cooperation between the specialized counterterrorism police and military units improved.
The government remained hampered by excessive bureaucracy, resource constraints, corruption, and a lack of training. New recruits to the security forces were often sent to emergency zones with inadequate training and were poorly equipped to fight battles in a dense, jungle environment. Corruption was widespread within both the judiciary and security forces.

President Humala continued reauthorizing 60-day states of emergency in the VRAEM and the Upper Huallaga Valley emergency zones, giving the armed forces and police additional authority to maintain public order. The following civil liberties were suspended in emergency zones: freedom from search or arrest without warrant, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and inviolability of citizens’ homes.

Peru steadily improved its ability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents in the 22 years since police captured the SL’s founder and chief ideologue, Abimael Guzman. Improved cooperation and information sharing between specialized police and military counterterrorism units helped make possible the capture of Artemio in February 2012, and played a major role in the August 2013 military operation that resulted in the deaths of Alipio and Gabriel.

Immigration authorities collected no biometrics information from visitors. Citizens of neighboring countries were allowed to travel to Peru by land using only national identification cards. There was no visa requirement for citizens of most countries in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, as well as Mexico. Peruvian immigration used a database called “Movimiento Migratorio” at 18 points of entry to track entries and exits of travelers, but the database is only a local database that tracks outstanding warrants.

The most significant Peruvian government actions against SL this year included:

- On April 9, Peruvian police arrested 28 leaders of the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights – a front organization that advocates for the release of imprisoned SL founder Abimael Guzman. Those arrested included two of Guzman’s long-time lawyers, Alfredo Crespo and Manuel Fajardo. The 28 were charged with terrorism and terrorist financing using narcotics revenue. On August 4, the National Anti-Terrorism Court, citing lack of evidence, ordered that the 28 be released from pre-trail detention. Although the court ordered the detainees released, it did keep the charges intact so the trial can move forward.

- A May 16 clash between security forces and the SL in the Junin region left one SL guerilla dead and another wounded. The rest of the column was able to escape, but soldiers recovered weapons, ammunition, and communication equipment.

- On June 17, a combined Peruvian military and police force killed three SL terrorists in the VRAEM emergency zone. The joint patrol recovered a number of weapons, including a heavy machine gun that SL fighters reportedly stripped from a Russian-made Mi-17 helicopter they shot down in a 2009 attack that killed three soldiers.

- In August, security forces rescued six adults and three children from a work camp in the VRAEM used by SL to provide food and logistic support for its members.

- In August, police officers in the UHV arrested Oscar Silva, who is believed to have been the second-in-command to “Comrade Artemio,” who was captured in February 2012.
In September, soldiers rescued 11 people, including six children, who were being forced to work for SL in Junin’s Satipo district.

On November 2, security forces announced the arrest of Filemon Huillcayaure, considered one of the top financiers of SL in the VRAEM.

On October 28, 2014, Peruvian police arrested Muhammad Amadar, a suspected member of Hizballah, for allegedly plotting attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets.

Peru continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which provided instruction and resources to assist the country in building its capacity to secure borders and ports of entry to prevent the transit of terrorist and material and to prevent the use of terrorist safe havens.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Peru is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Peru is also a member of the Egmont Group, a global association of financial intelligence units.

In 2014, the Government of Peru made progress in implementing its National Plan to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The most notable advancement was the Public Ministry’s creation of a dedicated Specialized Office of Prosecutors on Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture (ML/AF) in January. The Special Office is led by the National Superior Prosecutor and Coordinator for ML/AF, a new position empowered to facilitate interagency coordination and information sharing.

Under Decree Law 25475, any form of collaboration with terrorism, including economic collaboration, is criminalized. The Peruvian MFA registers non-profit organizations that receive international development assistance and monitors them for general misuse, but does not specifically monitor terrorist financing.


**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Peru has publicly noted the importance of heavily investing in the VRAEM as a means of breaking the symbiotic relationship that has existed for years between the VRAEM’s residents and SL. Since 2007, the Peruvian government has provided approximately US $5.4 billion to districts and regions in the VRAEM. The funds have been used to pave roads, provide basic health and education services, and establish a greater state presence. In May, the Agriculture Ministry announced that it would invest US $586 million in the VRAEM in 2014 in alternative crops to coca – primarily cacao, coffee, and oil palms. In December, the head of VRAEM Coordinating Office announced that the government would dedicate US $586 million on development projects in the VRAEM in 2015.
The official position of the Peruvian National Penitentiary Institute is that prison is meant to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, especially terrorists. A psychological evaluation is required of incarcerated terrorists before parole can be granted.

VENEZUELA

Overview: In May, for the ninth consecutive year, the U.S. Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating fully with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Venezuelan government took no action against senior Venezuelan government officials who have been designated as Foreign Narcotics Kingpins by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for directly supporting the narcotics and arms trafficking activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).


There were credible reports that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for support of activities that benefited known terrorist groups. Individuals linked to FARC, National Liberation Army, and Basque Fatherland and Liberty were present in Venezuela, as well as Hizballah supporters and sympathizers.


Venezuelan military and civilian agencies perform counterterrorism functions. Within the Venezuelan armed forces, the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence and the Command Actions Group of the National Guard have primary counterterrorism duty. The Bolivarian National Intelligence Service and the Division of Counterterrorism Investigations in the Bureau of Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Corps within the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace have primary civilian counterterrorism responsibilities. The degree of interagency cooperation and information sharing among agencies is unknown due to a lack of government transparency.

Border security at ports of entry is vulnerable and susceptible to corruption. The Venezuelan government did not perform biographic and biometric screening at ports of entry or exit. There was no automated system to collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights or to cross-check flight manifests with passenger disembarkation data.

In November, the Venezuelan government charged eight individuals, including five Trinidad and Tobago nationals, with terrorism and criminal conspiracy. The Venezuelan Attorney-General reported that the men were arrested in March when Venezuelan security forces raided a Caracas
hotel and found them in possession of computers, sophisticated communications gear, and military apparel to allegedly carry out “pre-jihad training.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body; the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Anti-Money Laundering Group; and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. In July, the CFATF determined that Venezuela had made sufficient progress on the recommendations in Venezuela’s FATF action plan to warrant moving the country from periodic review once every six months to periodic review once every two years. CFATF determined Venezuela was “compliant,” “largely compliant,” or “partially compliant” with the recommendations. CFATF noted Venezuela still needed to improve its compliance with several recommendations as well as its implementation of various anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing (AML-CFT) laws and regulations. Venezuela’s existing AML-CFT legal and regulatory framework criminalizes the financing of terrorism. There was no publicly available information regarding the confiscation of terrorist assets. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Venezuela participated as an official observer in ongoing peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. Venezuelan and Colombian foreign ministers met several times throughout the year to address the reduction of smuggling of illegal goods, narcotics trafficking, and the activity of illegally armed groups.
CHAPTER 3
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria. A wide range of sanctions are imposed as a result of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including:

- A ban on arms-related exports and sales;
- Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism;
- Prohibitions on economic assistance; and
- Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

State Sponsor of Terrorism designations can be rescinded pursuant to two alternative paths. One path requires that the President submit a report to Congress before the proposed rescission would take effect certifying that:

--There has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned,
--The government is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and
--The government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

The other path requires that the President submit a report to Congress, at least 45 days before the proposed rescission would take effect, justifying the rescission and certifying that:

--The government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period, and
--The government concerned has provided assurances that that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2014 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism; it does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations. More information on State Sponsor of Terrorism designations may be found online at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm.

CUBA

Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982. Though not within the timeframe covered by this report, on April 14, 2015, President Obama submitted to Congress the statutorily
required report and certifications indicating the Administration’s intent to rescind Cuba’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the certification that Cuba has not provided any support for international terrorism during the previous six-months; and that Cuba has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. The required 45-day Congressional pre-notification period expired, and the Secretary of State made the final decision to rescind Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, effective on May 29, 2015.

In recent years, Cuba has taken a number of steps to fully distance itself from international terrorism and has taken steps to strengthen its counterterrorism laws. In 2013, Cuba made a commitment to work with the Financial Action Task Force to address its anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance (AML/CFT) deficiencies. Since that time, Cuba has made significant progress in establishing the framework necessary to meet international AML/CFT standards by, for example, adequately criminalizing money laundering and terrorist finance and establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets, among other legal and regulatory actions.

Throughout 2014, Cuba supported and hosted internationally recognized negotiations between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Government of Colombia aimed at garnering a peace agreement. Safe passage of FARC members provided in the context of these talks has been coordinated with representative of the governments of Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, and Norway, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross. There is no credible evidence that the Government of Cuba has provided specific material support, services, or resources, to members of the FARC, or the National Liberation Army (ELN), outside of facilitating the internationally recognized peace process between those organizations and the Government of Colombia.

The Government of Cuba does continue to allow approximately two dozen members of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization (ETA) to remain in the country. The Cuban government provided assurances that it would never permit the ETA members living in Cuba to use Cuban territory for that organization’s activities against Spain or any other country. There is no available information that the Government of Cuba allowed any of these ETA members to plan, finance, lead, or commit acts of international terrorism while residing in Cuba.

The Government of Cuba does continue to harbor fugitives wanted to stand trial or to serve sentences in the United States for committing serious violations of U.S. criminal laws, and provides some of these individuals limited support such as housing, food ration books, and medical care. Although Cuba continues to refuse to return certain individuals that fled to Cuba in the past, it has been more cooperative with the United States in recent years. In 2014, the Government of Cuba engaged in talks with U.S. officials in reference to some of these fugitives still residing in Cuba.

IRAN

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its terrorist-related activity in 2014, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Lebanese Hizballah, and various
groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. This year, Iran increased its assistance to Iraqi Shia militias, one of which is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), in response to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) incursion into Iraq, and has continued to support other militia groups in the region. Iran also attempted to smuggle weapons to Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza. While its main effort focused on supporting goals in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, Iran and its proxies also continued subtle efforts at growing influence elsewhere including in Africa, Asia, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.

Iran views Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Lebanese Hizballah, its primary beneficiary, and as a key pillar in its “resistance” front. In 2014, Iran continued to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of primarily Iraqi Shia and Afghan fighters to support the Asad regime’s brutal crackdown that has resulted in the deaths of at least 191,000 people in Syria, according to August UN estimates. Iran publicly admits to sending members of the IRGC to Syria in an advisory role. There is consistent media reporting that some of these troops are IRGC-QF members and that they have taken part in direct combat operations. While Tehran has denied that IRGC-QF personnel participate in combat operations, in 2014 it acknowledged the deaths in Syria of two senior officers (Brigadier Generals Abdullah Eskandari and Jamar Dariswali). Tehran claimed they were volunteers who lost their lives while protecting holy shrines near Damascus.

Likewise in Iraq, despite its pledge to support Iraq’s stabilization, Iran increased training and funding to Iraqi Shia militia groups in response to ISIL’s advance into Iraq. Many of these groups, such as Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), have exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq and have committed serious human rights abuses against primarily Sunni civilians. The IRGC-QF, in concert with Lebanese Hizballah, provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device (IED) technology and other advanced weaponry. Similar to Hizballah fighters, many of these trained Shia militants have used these skills to fight for the Asad regime in Syria or against ISIL in Iraq.

Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). These Palestinian terrorist groups have been behind a number of deaths from attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank. Although Hamas’s ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war, in a November 25 speech, Supreme Leader Khamenei highlighted Iran’s military support to “Palestinian brothers” in Gaza and called for the West Bank to be similarly armed. In December, Hamas Deputy Leader Moussa Abu Marzouk announced bilateral relations with Iran and Hamas were “back on track.”

In March, Israeli naval forces boarded the Klos C cargo ship in the Red Sea off the coast of Sudan. On board, they found 40 M-302 rockets, 180 mortars, and approximately 400,000 rounds of ammunition hidden within crates of cement labeled “Made in Iran” and believed to be destined to militants in the region.
Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Lebanese Hizballah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701. General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force stated in November that "The IRGC and Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together," and Lebanese Hizballah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem boasted that Iran had provided his organization with missiles that had "pinpoint accuracy" in separate November public remarks. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Lebanese Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. These trained fighters have used these skills in direct support of the Asad regime in Syria and, to a lesser extent, in support of operations against ISIL in Iraq. They have also continued to carry out attacks along the Lebanese border with Israel.

Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran previously allowed AQ facilitators to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran since at least 2009, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and Syria.

Iran remains a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple UNSCRs requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran continued to be in noncompliance with its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. Implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) between the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, coordinated by the EU), and Iran began on January 20, 2014. Iran has fulfilled the commitments that it made under the JPOA. The parties negotiated during 2014 to pursue a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to achieve a long-term comprehensive solution to restore confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is and will remain exclusively peaceful.

SUDAN

Sudan was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993 due to concerns about support to international terrorist groups. Sudan remained a generally cooperative partner of the United States on counterterrorism. During the past year, the Government of Sudan continued to support counterterrorism operations to counter threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan.

Elements of al-Qa’ida-inspired terrorist groups remained in Sudan. The Government of Sudan has taken steps to limit the activities of these elements and has worked to disrupt foreign fighters’ use of Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for terrorists going to Syria and Iraq. However, groups continued to operate in Sudan in 2014 and there continued to be reports of Sudanese nationals participating in terrorist organizations.

In 2014, Sudan continued to allow members of Hamas to travel, fundraise, and live in Sudan.

In June 2010, four Sudanese men sentenced to death for the January 1, 2008 killing of two U.S. Embassy staff members escaped from Khartoum’s maximum security Kober prison. That same month Sudanese authorities confirmed that they recaptured one of the four convicts and a second escapee was reported killed in Somalia in May 2011. The recaptured murderer is being held in Kober Prison, and as of December 2014, appeals of his pending death sentence were still ongoing. The whereabouts of the other two convicts are unknown.
In February 2013, one of five men convicted of aiding the 2010 escape attempt by the four convicted killers received a presidential commutation of his remaining sentence. Sudanese authorities explained his release was part of a broad administrative parole affecting 200 other prisoners who had served some portion of their sentences with good behavior. U.S. government officials protested the commutation and urged Sudanese authorities to imprison the convicted accomplice for the full 12 years of his sentence. The individual remained free on parole at year’s end.

Sudanese authorities this year released most of the 25 individuals detained in a December 2012 raid on what the Government of Sudan described as a terrorist training camp operating in Dinder National Park. Members of the so-called “Dinder cell” were charged with terrorism and murder stemming from the deaths of several police involved in the December 2012 raid. One trial judge from the country’s terrorism court remanded several cases back to the attorney general for additional interrogations and those accused continued to be held in prison. The remaining Dinder detainees have had sessions with Dr. Essam Ahmed al-Basher, who helps lead the Government of Sudan’s “extremist rehabilitation program.”

In general, the Government of Sudan appeared to oppose the financing of extremist elements. Sudanese officials have welcomed Hamas members to Khartoum, however, and its members are permitted to conduct fundraising in Sudan. The Central Bank of Sudan and its financial intelligence unit, renamed the Financial Information Unit in late 2014, circulated to financial institutions a list of individuals and entities that have been included on the UN 1267 sanctions committee’s consolidated list, as well as the U.S. government’s lists of terrorist organizations/financiers. The financing of terrorism per UN Resolution 1373 was criminalized in Sudan pursuant to Sudan’s Money Laundering Act of 2003.

The Government of Sudan continued to cooperate with the Financial Action Task Force and took steps to meet international standards in combating money laundering and terrorist financing. In 2014, Sudan adopted a new Anti-Money Laundering and Combating Terrorism Finance Act and ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption. Sudan’s Central Bank officials did not freeze, seize and/or forfeit assets in 2014. Sudan continued to cooperate with the United States in investigating financial crimes related to terrorism. The Sudanese government’s ability to monitor illicit finance flows is increasingly hampered by the Sudanese banking sector’s difficulty finding correspondent banks to process international transactions, leading most Sudanese to instead move money in cash.

Additionally, Sudan has yet to take concrete steps to resolve the crisis in the Two Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, to include ending aerial bombardments, allowing sufficient and sustained humanitarian access, and resuming political dialogue to resolve the conflicts.

SYRIA

Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Asad regime continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, even amid significant internal unrest. The regime continued to provide political and weapons support to
Lebanese Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm the terrorist organization. The Asad regime’s relationship with Hizballah and Iran continued to grow stronger in 2014 as the conflict in Syria continued. President Bashar al-Asad remained a staunch defender of Iran’s policies, while Iran has exhibited equally energetic support for Syrian regime efforts to defeat the Syrian opposition. Statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, were often in Syrian government speeches and press statements.

The Syrian government had an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the permissive attitude the Asad regime took towards al-Qa’ida’s foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict. Syrian government awareness and encouragement for many years of violent extremists’ transit through Syria to enter Iraq, for the purpose of fighting Coalition Troops, is well documented. Syria was a key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq. Those very networks were the seedbed for the violent extremist elements, including ISIL, which terrorized the Syrian and Iraqi population in 2014 and – in addition to other terrorist organizations within Syria – continued to attract thousands of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria in 2014.

As part of a broader strategy during the year, the regime still attempted to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all of its armed opponents as “terrorists.”

Asad’s government has continued to generate significant concern regarding the role it plays in terrorist financing. Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not use formal banking services. Despite Syrian legislation that required money changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many continued to operate illegally in Syria’s vast black market, estimated to be as large as Syria’s formal economy. Regional hawala networks (an informal value transfer system based on the performance and honor of a large network of money brokers operating outside traditional western financial systems) remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering, and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials. This raised significant concerns that some members of the Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist finance schemes conducted through these institutions.

Despite the progress made through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon’s Executive Council and UNSCR 2118 (2013) to dismantle and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons program, there continued to be significant concern, given ongoing instability in Syria, that these materials could find their way to terrorist organizations. Additionally, Syria continued to use toxic chemicals, including chlorine, as a weapon against its citizens. Syria’s behavior raises serious questions about the regime’s willingness to comply with its Chemical Weapons Convention and UNSCR 2118 obligations.
CHAPTER 4

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, OR NUCLEAR (CBRN) TERRORISM

Preventing proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons has been a top U.S. national security priority for decades. The past decade has seen a growing recognition that we must also be vigilant in preventing terrorist groups from obtaining the means and methods to develop and/or deploy CBRN weapons. Thus, our strategic counterterrorism posture is strengthened by counter- and nonproliferation programs that aim to reduce or eliminate CBRN material produced and stored by states; restrict the diversion of materials and expertise for illicit use; and prevent the trafficking of CBRN weapons and related material.

While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely successful, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists. CBRN materials and expertise remain a terrorist threat as demonstrated by terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use these materials; the nature of injury and damage these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics now flows; and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and material.

A number of international partnerships have either the explicit or the implicit purpose of countering the CBRN threat from terrorists and other non-state actors. Organizations and initiatives concerned with chemical and biological weapons use international conventions and regulations to reduce or eliminate stockpiles of material, regulate the acquisition of dual-use technology, and regulate trade of specific goods. International nuclear and radiological initiatives and programs focus on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear material and technology, safeguarding materials and expertise against diversion, and countering the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear material. The United States routinely provides technical and financial assistance and training to partner nations to help strengthen their abilities to adequately protect and secure CBRN-applicable expertise, technologies, and material. U.S. participation within, and contribution to these groups, is vital to ensuring our continued safety from the CBRN threat.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Launched in 2003, the PSI has increased international capability to address the challenges associated with stopping the trafficking of WMD, WMD-related components, and their means of delivery. The PSI remains an important tool in the global effort to combat CBRN material transfers to both state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. As of December 31, 2014, 104 states have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, by which states commit to take specific actions, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, to support efforts to halt the trafficking of WMD and related materials.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The GICNT, which is co-chaired by the United States and Russia, is an international partnership of 85 nations and four official observers dedicated to strengthening individual and collective capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to a nuclear terrorist event. Partners engage in multilateral activities and exercises designed to share best practices and lessons learned on a wide range of nuclear security and terrorism issues. To date, partners have conducted over 70 multilateral activities and eight
senior-level plenary meetings in support of these nuclear security goals. In 2014, there were nine multilateral activities to promote the sharing of best practices on the topics of nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, and emergency preparedness and response.

**Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG):** The NTRG is an interagency group focused on coordinating the U.S. government response to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials, including radiation alarms that occur in foreign countries. The NTRG works with foreign governments to secure smuggled nuclear material, prosecute those involved, and develop information on smuggling-related threats – including potential links between smugglers and terrorists. The U.S. Department of State chairs the NTRG, which includes representatives from the U.S. government’s nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.

**Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program (CNSP):** Securing dangerous radioactive and nuclear materials in illegal circulation before they reach the hands of terrorists or other malicious actors is critical to U.S. national security and that of U.S. allies. Using CNSP funds, the U.S. Department of State conducts outreach and programmatic activities with key governments to enhance their counter nuclear smuggling capabilities. Bilateral “Joint Action Plan” agreements developed and implemented with 13 partner governments identify strategies to improve the partners’ abilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear and radiological smuggling attempts. As part of these agreements, the United States commits to seek U.S. and foreign donor assistance to address needs outside the capacity of the partner nation. More than US $75 million in foreign donations have enabled implementation of Joint Action Plan-identified actions. Remaining needs may be addressed by specific CNSP-developed and -funded programs. The U.S. Department of State uses CNSP funds to facilitate, through workshops and engagement activities, integrating law enforcement, intelligence, and technical reach-back capabilities to counter nuclear smuggling. More broadly, WMDT’s CNSP programmatic support has enabled 17 partner nations to address goals that include enhancing nuclear smuggling response procedures, improving nuclear forensics capabilities, and enabling the successful prosecution of smugglers, while helping partners build cross-border and regional cooperation to counter nuclear smuggling.

**Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program:** Through the EXBS Program, the U.S. Department of State leads the interagency effort to strengthen export control systems by helping to build effective national strategic trade control and border security systems in countries that produce or supply strategic items as well as in key transit and transshipment hubs. EXBS works in over 65 partner countries to improve national capabilities to regulate trade in sensitive items and prevent irresponsible transfers that may contribute to proliferation; detect and interdict illicit trafficking in proliferation-sensitive items at and between ports of entry by targeting high-risk shipments; investigate and prosecute violations of strategic trade control laws and regulations; and build and sustain a community of policymakers and technical experts committed to meeting international nonproliferation obligations and implementing effective strategic trade controls.

In 2014, the EXBS Program oversaw over 260 bilateral, regional, and international activities, involving more than 80 countries to promote the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of
comprehensive strategic trade controls. These activities improve the capability of partner countries to prevent the transfers of dual-use items and conventional weapons that contribute to proliferation, terrorism, or regional instability. EXBS is also actively involved in efforts to combat WMD smuggling through enhanced border security, and in 2014, provided 23 countries with state-of-the-art detection, inspection, and interdiction equipment and training to enhance the ability to detect, deter, and interdict illicit smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials, WMD components, and other weapons-related items at air, land, sea, and rail borders.

EXBS works with and complements the DoD’s International Counter-Proliferation Program and Cooperative Threat Reduction Program; DHS’s Container Security Initiative, the Department of Energy’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP) and the Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) Program (formerly the Second Line of Defense Program); and the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement assistance programs, as well as other international donor assistance programs. The EXBS Program fulfills important U.S. and international commitments, helping partner countries fulfill their international obligations and commitments – including those related to UNSCR 1540 (2004) and adherence to the guidelines of multilateral export control regimes.

**Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD):** The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence Program (formerly known as Second Line of Defense) collaborates with partner countries to provide radiation detection systems, associated training and sustainability assistance to enhance their capacity to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and other radioactive materials out of regulatory control. The NSDD Program assistance to partner countries’ national nuclear detection architecture is commensurate with the regional threat and country-specific infrastructure and, accordingly, can include deployments of fixed, mobile, and hand-held radiation detection technologies at land border crossings, airports, seaports, and tactical interior locations. NSDD coordinates its capacity building activities with other international nuclear security assistance entities such as the European Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

**Global Threat Reduction (GTR):** GTR program activities aim to prevent terrorists from acquiring CBRN expertise, materials, and technology, focusing primarily in countries where there is a high threat of CBRN proliferation or WMD terrorism. By engaging scientists, technicians, and engineers with CBRN expertise and securing related material and infrastructure, GTR seeks to deny terrorist access to the knowledge, materials, and technologies that could be used in a CBRN attack against the U.S. homeland and assets abroad. In 2014, GTR was actively engaged in countries and regions at high risk of proliferation and terrorism, adapting as necessary to meet emerging CBRN threats.

**Biological Weapons Convention Inter-Sessional Work Program (BWC):** The December 2011 BWC Review Conference adopted a program of work aimed at strengthening international capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to the proliferation or use of biological weapons, whether by state or non-state actors. In 2014, the United States continued efforts in this forum to: acquire better information about BWC states’ implementing measures, and enhance such
measures, which criminalize and help deter malicious use of biological agents; promote sustainable, effective approaches to laboratory biosecurity; raise international awareness of the need for appropriate, balanced oversight of dual-use life science research with significant potential for harm; and identify and address impediments to international coordination and response in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a significant disease outbreak of unknown origin.
Chapter 5  
Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 7120 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the term “terrorist sanctuary” or “sanctuary” excludes the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a determination under section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to Title 50; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22— the state sponsors of terrorism. Accordingly, information regarding Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria can be found in Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism.

TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

AFRICA

Somalia. In 2014, terrorists continued to use safe havens in Somalia to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate due to inadequate security, justice, and governance capacity at all levels. African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) operations in southern Somalia forced al-Shabaab operatives and fighters to flee former strongholds in the port city of Barawe, Buulo Mareer, and other towns in Lower Shabelle, often in advance of troop movements into these areas. These territorial losses limited al-Shabaab’s ability to raise funds from the illicit charcoal trade based out of the port cities in Lower Shabelle. Still, many sections of Somalia’s interior, particularly in rural areas of Middle and Lower Juba, Gedo, Bay, and Bakol regions, have remained safe havens for fleeing al-Shabaab fighters since 2012. These hard-to-reach areas provided the group both relative freedom of movement and concealment from AMISOM forces stretched thin by territorial gains. Permissive environments in southern Somalia, many devoid of adequate and consistent security, governance, and services, allowed al-Shabaab the time and space to regroup and launch attacks against harder targets and government facilities in Mogadishu and softer targets across the border in Kenya.

In northern Somalia, Puntland Security Forces continued to conduct raids against al-Shabaab camps in the Buraha Cal Madow Mountains to force the group out of longstanding strongholds near Galgala. These remote areas in Puntland offered al-Shabaab access to undeveloped ports located along miles of unguarded coastline abutting the Gulf of Aden, which is still frequently used by terrorists and smugglers to move weapons, materiel, and fighters back and forth from the Arabian Peninsula. Porous borders and ungoverned spaces remained a significant challenge for the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM, although both remained committed to countering terrorism in collaboration with international partners, including the United States. These efforts placed al-Shabaab in a significantly weaker financial and operational position as 2014 came to an end. Still, al-Shabaab continued to raise funds in areas still within its control by extorting local populations and raiding livestock and other livelihood commodities.
According to independent sources and NGOs engaged in demining activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern for the presence of WMD in Somalia.

**The Trans-Sahara:** The terrorist safe haven in northern Mali has been reduced, and terrorists no longer control population centers in northern Mali, as they did in 2012. Ongoing peacekeeping operations, continued peace talks with rebel factions, and, active French and African partner counterterrorism operations have contained, degraded, disrupted, and marginalized the ability of violent extremist remnants still located there, although violent extremists, including al-Murabitoun and AQIM, continued to conduct attacks. The majority of violent extremist groups have retreated into remote areas of northern Mali or southwest Libya. Asymetric attacks by remnant violent extremist groups are expected to take a toll on peacekeeping forces for the foreseeable future.

**Mali.** Ungoverned, under-governed, and ill-governed areas of northern Mali remain. The Malian government’s knowledge of violent extremist activities, particularly in the north, is limited and hampered by the lack of physical control of these areas, resources, and intelligence capabilities. The Malian military in conjunction with the French and UN forces are working to eliminate violent extremist remnants in Mali. The government has also reestablished its political presence in the cities of Timbuktu and Gao, with some local government officials returning to their posts in 2014.

**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral.** The number of islands in the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago make it a difficult region to secure. Cooperation by all states bordering this region remained strong with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries – including through U.S.-funded efforts to enhance domain awareness in the waters south and southwest of Mindanao – the expanse remained difficult to control. Surveillance improved but remained partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, including the movement of personnel, equipment, and funds.

Southeast Asia is vulnerable to exploitation by illicit traffickers and proliferators given the high volume of global trade that ships through the region as well as the existence of smuggling and proliferation networks. Weak strategic trade controls, legal and regulatory frameworks, inadequate maritime law enforcement and security capabilities, as well as emerging and re-emerging infectious disease and burgeoning bioscience capacity, make Southeast Asia an area of concern for WMD proliferation and transit. Other than Singapore and Malaysia, strategic trade control laws that include controls over dual-use and end-use or “catch-all” controls are lacking in Southeast Asia. Assisting these countries to develop strong laws that meet international standards and effective targeting and risk management systems are major goals of the Export Control and Related Border Security program over the next few years.

**The Southern Philippines.** The geographical composition of the Philippines, spread out over 7,107 islands, make it difficult for the central government to maintain a presence in all areas. Counterterrorism operations over the past 13 years, however, have been successful at isolating
the location and constraining the activities of transnational terrorists. U.S.-Philippines counterterrorism cooperation remained strong. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) members, numbering a few hundred, were known to be present in remote areas in Mindanao, especially the islands of Basilan and Sulu. Jemaah Islamiya members, of whom there are only a small number remaining, are in a few isolated pockets of Mindanao and the Sulu and Tawi-Tawi island groups. In these areas, local residents are either overtly supportive of the ASG or generally apathetic to its presence due to latent animosity toward the government, military, and police.

The United States began funding a law enforcement capacity building project for the Philippines through the Global Security Contingency Fund, which will increase the capacity of the Philippines to patrol its islands and coastline. Export Control and Related Border Security program efforts in recent years have been focused largely on working with the Philippines to pass a Strategic Trade Management Act. The emphasis on dual-use and end-use controls will help Philippine customs and other law enforcement interdict illicit items transiting and being trans-shipped through all ports in the Philippines.

The Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), if implemented successfully, may limit the size of safe havens within MILF-controlled areas in which terrorists could operate. The New People’s Army maintained a nearly national presence, with a focus on rural and mountainous areas. Continued pressure from Philippine security forces made it difficult, however, for terrorists to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate.

**THE MIDDLE EAST**

**Egypt:** Portions of Egypt’s Sinai region were a safe haven for terrorist organizations in 2014. The Egyptian government continued its extensive security campaign focused on the North Sinai region, which was launched in September 2013 with the aim of eliminating terrorists and securing the region. The North Sinai remained closed off to tourists, most journalists, and NGO workers, which limited independent means of verifying government-published information on the success of the military’s operations. In addition to reports in Egyptian press outlets, the Army spokesperson regularly published statements summarizing recent military operations and their results, including the number of terrorists killed, injured, or arrested, as well as the number of terrorist hideouts destroyed. In 2014, more than 500 militants were reportedly killed and at least 2,000 terrorist hideouts, shanties, and houses were destroyed, according to the Army spokesperson and Egyptian media reports. In addition, the military frequently seizes caches of weapons, explosives, drugs, and vehicles, and destroys tunnel openings along the border with Gaza.

Beginning in late October after coordinated attacks near El Arish that killed 30 Egyptian soldiers, the military evacuated more than 2,000 families living along the border with Gaza to create an up-to-five kilometer-wide buffer zone. The Egyptian military suspected that the attackers arrived in Egypt from Gaza via smuggling tunnels.

Through its Export Control and Related Border Security Program, the United States is working with the Government of Egypt to enhance Egypt’s border security capabilities through the
provision of land and maritime border enforcement and targeting and risk management training for Egyptian Customs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. In addition, since 2009, the State Department’s Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund has assisted Egypt with the provision of backscatter x-ray portal monitors, with the capability to inspect vehicular and truck traffic at fixed transportation checkpoints for WMD-related materials, conventional weapons, and other illicit items.

**Iraq.** By late 2013 and early 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) had a major presence in parts of majority Sunni Iraq, including Fallujah and Ramadi. In the summer of 2014, ISIL carried out a large-scale offensive in Iraq that included seizing the major city of Mosul and pushing south to threaten Baghdad. ISIL was able to support this offensive from its safe haven inside Syria, moving heavy equipment, arms, resources, and personnel across the Iraq/Syria border. On August 8, U.S. airstrikes against ISIL targets began in response to the group’s advance towards Erbil. In mid-September, the United States took the lead in forming an international Coalition to degrade and defeat ISIL, unifying over 60 countries in the effort. Coalition airstrikes stopped ISIL’s advance by late 2014 and supported Iraqi and Kurdish clearing operations in an effort to retake territory.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), in parallel with Iran-backed Shia militia groups, conducted air and ground operations to root out ISIL, but faced well-trained and heavily equipped ISIL fighters. The ISF continued to clash with ISIL by the end of 2014, but had not yet retaken Mosul and Anbar province. Along with Coalition partners, the United States is preparing to stand up multiple training sites across Iraq to focus on improving ISF capabilities in command and control, intelligence, logistics, fire support, and other combat-enabling roles.

Due to security conditions in Iraq, the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) program has had difficulty implementing outreach activities. EXBS priorities are to continue working with the Government of Iraq to develop and implement regulations and procedures related to The Act of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority on WMD Non-Proliferation No. 48 of 2012 (INMA Act), including for licensing and compliance, to adopt and implement a control list, and to enhance Iraq’s border security capabilities related to the inspection and detection of WMD-related goods and technologies.

The United States and Iraq strengthened their bilateral partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism in September 2014 by concluding the “Joint Action Plan between the Government of the Republic of Iraq and the Government of the United States of America on Combating Nuclear and Radioactive Materials Smuggling.” The agreement expresses the intention of the two governments to work together to enhance Iraq’s capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear smuggling incidents, and ultimately to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring nuclear and radiological materials.

Stakeholders across the Government of Iraq – including INMA staff, the Ministry of Interior Civil Defense, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Resources – participated in various border and WMD-related security trainings, workshops, working groups, and discussions.
**Lebanon:** The Lebanese government does not control all regions in the country or its borders with Syria and Israel. Hizballah controlled access to parts of the country, limiting access by Lebanon’s security services, which allowed it to conduct security operations with relative impunity. The Government of Lebanon took no action in 2014 to disarm Hizballah, to eliminate its safe havens in Lebanese territory, or to prevent the flow of Hizballah members to Syria and Iraq. Ungoverned areas along the Lebanese-Syrian border and in Tripoli and Akkar also have served as safe havens for al-Nusra Front, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, and other Sunni extremist groups in 2014. Many of these violent extremist groups operate in mountainous, mostly uninhabited zones where the government has limited reach. However, the government has the political will to eradicate these safe havens and has launched a sustained security campaign to rid Lebanon of these violent extremist groups. Palestinian refugee camps were also used as safe havens by Palestinian and other armed groups to house weapons and shelter wanted criminals.

The United States works closely with the Lebanese Air Force (LAF) and Internal Security Forces to combat terrorist threats along the Syrian border by providing military equipment, weaponry, and training. Lebanon is not a source country for WMD components. Lebanon’s proliferation risk derives from its status as both a transit and transshipment hub as well as a recipient state for arms and military equipment. With a porous and largely un-demarcated border with Syria to the north and east, Hizballah control in sizable portions of Lebanese territory, and the ongoing smuggling of weapons to extremist militias operating in Lebanon, the current conflict in Syria has only heightened concerns for the potential flow of dual-use items and munitions to militant groups in the region. The LAF Engineer Regiment partners with U.S. government to detect and prevent proliferation of and trafficking in WMD along the Syrian border. Hizballah’s continued ability to receive sophisticated munitions via Iran and Syria requires aggressive regular monitoring of this issue. The Export Control and Related Border Security program (EXBS) has conducted various enforcement training and procured basic inspection/detection equipment for Lebanese officials, and will continue to work with Lebanon to strengthen border security and interdict illicit trafficking of items of proliferation concern.

**Libya:** Libya’s porous borders, fragmented security forces, and vast ungoverned territory have made it a permissive environment for terrorist groups such as Ansar al-Shari’a Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a Darnah, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The outbreak of widespread violence in July and subsequent collapse of central government authority created further opportunities for violent extremist groups to exploit Libya’s territory to plan, finance, and stage operations. In October, Darnah-based violent extremist groups pledged allegiance to ISIL. Terrorist training camps and facilitation networks exist throughout Libya; local tribes and minority groups frequently serve as facilitators, although this appears largely due to economic rather than ideological motivations. Libya serves as a major source and transit country for foreign fighters en route to Syria and Iraq. There are indications that foreign fighters are beginning to return to Libya or choosing to stay in Libya to fight there, increasing concerns that Libya has become a battlefield for extremist groups such as ISIL.

In 2013, the United States signed an agreement with the Libyan government to cooperate on destroying Libya’s stockpile of legacy chemical weapons in accordance with its obligations as an
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member state. Libya successfully completed operations for the disposal of its remaining mustard gas filled in artillery projectile and aerial bombs in January 2014. Libya also previously completed the disposal of its remaining bulk mustard in 2013. In addition, Libya retains a stockpile of natural uranium ore concentrate (yellowcake), stored in a former military facility near Sebha in Libya’s south. This material represents a limited risk of trafficking and proliferation due to the bulk and weight of the storage containers, and the need for extensive additional processing before the material would be suitable for weapons purposes.

Yemen. In 2014, the Yemeni government pursued two military offensives aimed at eradicating al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) safe havens in southern and eastern Yemen, but Houthi expansion limited the government’s ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in late 2014. In April/May, the Yemeni military, in conjunction with local Popular Committees, launched an offensive against AQAP strongholds in the al-Mahfid region of the southern governorates of Shabwah and Abyan. This offensive was generally successful, pushing AQAP forces to withdraw to the remote and ill-governed Hadramawt region. A second offensive focusing on Hadramawt was planned for July/August, but this effort was significantly hindered by the Houthi incursion into the capital, which monopolized government focus. Local troops and Popular Committees led a series of operations against AQAP in the Hadramawt, but with little contribution or coordination by the central government in Sana’a. Success was more limited than the al-Mahfid offensive due to the lack of involvement from the central government, which was consumed by the growing Houthi challenge, and the logistical difficulties inherent in sustaining operations in the remote eastern governorate. AQAP was extremely active in its efforts to counter the operations that took place, particularly in al-Qatn and Sayun in the Wadi Hadramawt valley. This is a shift from AQAP’s historical activities in Hadramawt, which previously focused on the more populated coastal area. Houthi expansion into Sana’a diverted the government’s attention and security resources in late 2014, stalling most counterterrorism efforts.

While the 2014 offensives temporarily pushed AQAP from some of its safe havens, the group maintained strongholds and freedom in movement in key ungoverned areas of southern and eastern Yemen and continued to exert influence even in the regions it no longer fully controlled. AQAP used the political instability and growing sectarian violence of 2014 to its benefit.

Yemen’s political instability continued to hinder efforts to enact or enforce strategic trade controls, leaving the country vulnerable as a transit point for WMD-related materials.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan: The border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an under-governed area which hosts terrorist cells active in both countries. The Government of Afghanistan has struggled to assert control over this remote terrain where the population is largely detached from national institutions. Afghanistan generally cooperates with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Since President Ghani’s election, he has actively pursued cross-border security cooperation with the
Government of Pakistan, including the prospect of joint operations to reduce safe havens on both sides of the border.

Several terrorist networks active in Afghanistan, such as al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Haqqani Network, and others, operate largely out of Pakistan. AQ has some freedom of movement in Kunar and Nuristan provinces largely due to a lack of Afghan National Security Forces’ capacity to control certain border territories in north and east Afghanistan. During 2014, the Afghan government continued to counter the Afghan Taliban and Taliban-affiliated insurgent networks with AQ connections.

The potential for WMD trafficking and proliferation remained a concern in Afghanistan because of its porous borders and the presence of terrorist groups. The U.S. government worked with the Government of Afghanistan to implement comprehensive strategic trade controls and strengthen its border security system. The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program contributed to strengthening Afghanistan’s enforcement capacity through participation in a technical exchange conducted by the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection agency. To increase the Government of Afghanistan’s strategic trade control capacity, EXBS sponsored training for an Afghan delegation. Representatives from the Afghan Atomic Energy High Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended a course at the University of Georgia, Center for International Trade Security, covering a wide variety of nonproliferation topics and allowed for regional nonproliferation dialogue. The U.S. Border Management Task Force also worked closely with Afghan officials to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking of WMD in and through Afghanistan.

The United States continued to assist the Afghan government to build capacity needed to secure potentially dangerous biological materials and infrastructure housed at Afghan facilities, promote surveillance capabilities to detect and identify possibly catastrophic biological events, and productively engage Afghan scientists and engineers that have WMD or WMD-applicable expertise.

**Pakistan:** Portions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and Balochistan province remained a safe haven for terrorist groups seeking to conduct domestic, regional, and global attacks. Al-Qa’ida, the Haqqani Network (HQN), Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar i Jhangvi, and other terrorist groups, as well as the Afghan Taliban, took advantage of this safe haven to plan operations in Pakistan and throughout the region.

In 2014, Pakistan launched military operations in North Waziristan Agency and Khyber Agency to eliminate terrorist safe havens, destroy terrorist infrastructure, and disrupt terrorist communication networks. The military operations had a significant impact on TTP safe havens, but some terrorist organizations in the region continued to operate, primarily along the border with Afghanistan. Particularly since the start of comprehensive military operations in North Waziristan displaced militants into Afghanistan, Pakistan has sought improved coordination to address cross-border threats from TTP emanating from safe havens in Afghanistan.
The United States and Pakistan regularly discussed counterterrorism and border-control efforts to interdict terrorists. The 2013 trilateral border standard operating procedures between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and ISAF expired at the end of 2014. Pakistan and Afghanistan continued to negotiate a replacement bilateral agreement.

The potential for WMD trafficking, proliferation, and terrorism remained a concern in Pakistan. Pakistan is a constructive and active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and has worked to strengthen its strategic trade controls. The Export Control and Related Border Security Program increased the Government of Pakistan’s enforcement capacity by training Pakistani Customs officials on international border interdiction techniques. Trainings were implemented by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Customs and Border Protection Agency; and the U.S. Department of Energy.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Colombia. Rough terrain and dense forest cover, coupled with low population densities and historically weak government presence have defined Colombia’s borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and historically have allowed for safe havens for terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The Government of Colombia has maintained pressure on these groups and has continued to conduct operations to combat the FARC’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks. Coupled with ongoing peace negotiations with the FARC and two FARC temporary unilateral cease fire declarations, Colombia experienced an overall decline in the total number of terrorist incidents in 2014. Despite these successes, illegal armed groups, primarily known as “Bandas Criminales,” continued to use the porous border, remote mountain areas, and jungles to maneuver, train, cultivate and transport narcotics, operate illegal mines, “tax” the local populace, and engage in other illegal activities. Improved relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela have led to some increased cooperation from those countries on law enforcement issues. Colombia also continued to cooperate and share information with the Panamanian National Border Service. Additionally, Brazil began implementing its Integrated Border Monitoring System in an effort to monitor its entire border and along with continued cooperation with the Government of Colombia addressed potential safe haven areas along their shared borders.

Venezuela. Venezuela’s porous border with Colombia has made the country attractive to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army, who use it to cross in and out of its territory. Jose Ignacio De Juana Chaos, an ETA terrorist whom authorities lost track of in 2008 after he was sentenced to 3,000 years in prison in Spain for the murders of 25 people, reportedly resurfaced in Venezuela after being sighted in a Caracas shopping mall in May, according to media reports. In June, Maduro said the Venezuelan government did not have enough information to corroborate the reports.

COUNTERING TERRORISM ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

In 2014, the Department of State designated five new Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and amended three existing designations. In addition, the Department designated 37
organizations and individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 and amended three existing designations. The Department also revoked the designations of one organization and five individuals. The Department of the Treasury also designated organizations and individuals under E.O. 13224. For a full list of all U.S. designations, see the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control website at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.

2014 Foreign Terrorism Organization/Executive Order 13224 group designations:

- On January 10, the Department of State designated Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah, and Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia under E.O. 13224, and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 13. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on the three groups.)
- On April 9, the Department of State designated Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 10. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ABM.)
- On May 14, the Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) to add additional aliases, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and to make ISIL the organization’s primary name. On the same day, the Department of State further amended AQI/ISIL’s E.O. 13224 designation to revoke the aliases associated with the al-Nusrah Front (ANF) and separately designate ANF as an independent entity under E.O. 13224. On May 15, these amendments were made to AQI’s FTO designation and ANF was designated as an FTO. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on ISIL and ANF.)
- On June 25, the Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LET) to add the following aliases: Jama’at-ud-Dawa, Al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, and Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal; and amended the FTO designation on June 26. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on LET.)
- On July 15, the Department of State revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).
- On August 7, the Department of State amended the E.O. 13224 designation of Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) to include the alias Ansar ul-Ummah, and amended the FTO designation on August 8. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on HUM.)
- On August 19, the Department of State designated the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on August 20. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on MSC.)

2014 Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 designations:

- On January 7, the Department of State designated Qari Saifullah, the Taliban shadow deputy governor and an operational commander in Zabul Province, Afghanistan. Saifullah has used Taliban fighters to conduct terrorist activities, including improvised explosive device attacks, small arms fire attacks, and rocket attacks against the Government of Afghanistan and Coalition Forces.
On January 10, the Department of State designated Abu Khattalah, Sufian bin Qumu, and Seifallah Ben Hassine. Before his capture in July, Khattalah was a senior leader of Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi and Sufian bin Qumu is the founder of Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah. Seifallah Ben Hassine, also known as Abu Iyadh, is the founder of Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia.

On January 23, the Department of State designated Ziyad al-Nakhalah, who is the Deputy Secretary General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Ziyad has repeatedly taken credit for attacks against Israel, including PIJ’s indiscriminate missile attacks into Israel in 2008, 2009, and 2011.

On February 6, the Department of State designated Malik Ishaq. Ishaq is a founding member and the current leader of Lashkar I Jhangvi. In February 2013, Pakistani police arrested Ishaq in connection with attacks on January 10 and February 16, 2013 in the northwestern city of Quetta, Pakistan that killed nearly 200 Pakistani civilians.

On June 17, the State Department designated Shawki Ali Ahmed al-Badani, who is a leader and operative for al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Badani was connected to a suicide bomber who killed over 100 Yemeni soldiers in a May 2012 attack, and played a key role in a plan for a major attack in summer 2013 that led the United States to close 19 diplomatic posts across the Middle East and Africa.

On July 15, the Department of State designated Anders Cameroon Ostensvig Dale, a Norwegian citizen who traveled to Yemen to join AQAP. As part of AQAP, Dale has received terrorist training and was taught to make bomb-belts, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and larger explosives used in car bombs.

On August 18, the Department of State designated Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, who is the official spokesman for and a senior leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

On August 18, the Department of State designated Said Arif. In 2003, Arif was prosecuted in France with 25 others as part of the “Chechen Network” accused of plotting both to blow up the Eiffel Tower and to conduct chemical attacks and attacks on malls and police stations in France. Arif is connected to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and al-Nusrah Front (ANF).

On September 24, the Department of State designated 10 individuals and two groups connected to foreign terrorist fighters in Syria, Iraq, and Somalia:

- Harakat Sham al-Islam is a Moroccan-led organization operating in Syria that has carried out terrorist attacks and engaged in kidnappings against civilians with other violent extremist organizations in Syria, including ANF.
- Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar is a Chechen-led organization based in Syria that has cooperated with other violent extremist organizations in Syria, including ANF and ISIL, to launch deadly assaults against civilian communities, and has kidnapped civilians and other foreigners in Syria.
- Muhannad al-Najdi is a Syria-based AQ facilitator of Saudi nationality. Prior to traveling to Syria in 2013, al-Najdi was involved in facilitation and operational planning in support of attacks in Afghanistan. Since at least 2010, al-Najdi has also been involved in the development of IEDs for use in Afghanistan and Syria.
- Murad Margoshvili is a Chechen leader in Syria who built a terrorist combat training base in Syria near the Turkish border for newly arrived foreign terrorist fighters.
- Lavdrim Muhaxheri is a Kosovar Albanian foreign fighter for ISIL who operates in both Syria and Iraq. In July 2014, Muhaxheri posted graphic photos of himself online beheading a young man.
Nusret Imamovic is a Bosnian terrorist leader in Syria believed to be fighting with ANF.

Mohammed Abdel-Halim Hemaida Saleh was arrested in Egypt in 2013 for plotting to attack Western embassies in Cairo. As of mid-2013, Saleh had been recruiting suicide bombers to send to Syria and had been planning terrorist activities against unspecified targets in Europe.

Salim Benghalem is a Syria-based French violent extremist and ISIL member who has carried out executions on behalf of the group.

Amru al-Abi was selected in July 2014 as ISIL’s provincial leader for Homs, Syria. As a principal leader of ISIL in Syria, al-Abi has been in charge of kidnappings.

Abdessamad Fateh, also known as Abu Hamza, is a member of a Scandinavia-based network of violent extremists linked to AQ, and has traveled to Syria.

Abd al-Baset Azzouz is a senior member of AQ who was sent by AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Libya in 2011 to mobilize fighters there.

Maalim Salman is the head of African foreign fighters for al-Shabaab. He has trained foreign nationals who were seeking to join al-Shabaab, and has been involved in operations in Africa targeting tourists, western-oriented businesses, and churches.

On October 21, the Department of State designated Khan Said, former deputy leader of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who has maintained his commitment to terrorist activity despite officially splitting from TTP in May.

On October 21, the Department of State designated Ramzi Mawafi, an Egyptian national and long-time AQ member best known as the former doctor to Usama bin Laden. Mawafi is believed to be in the Sinai Peninsula coordinating among militant groups and helping to arrange money and weapons to support violent extremist activity.

On December 18, the Department of State designated Ajnad Misr, a splinter group of Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which announced its formation in January 2014. Ajnad Misr has claimed numerous attacks on Egyptian security forces at government buildings, public spaces and universities, often injuring or killing innocent bystanders.

On December 18, the Department of State designated Ibrahim al-Rubaysh. Al-Rubaysh is a senior leader of AQAP and a senior advisor for AQAP operational planning, who provides the justification for its attacks.

**MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM**

In 2014, the United States continued to work with key partners and allies to strengthen its diplomatic engagement through multilateral organizations. Deepening and broadening the international multilateral counterterrorism frameworks and capacities enhances the role of multilateral institutions at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels to counter the threat of violent extremists and also increases the counterterrorism capacities of countries around the world.

**The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).** Since its launch in September 2011, the GCTF has mobilized over US $300 million to support national and regional efforts to strengthen civilian institutions and counter violent extremism. This includes support for the implementation of GCTF framework documents at both the regional and country levels. The GCTF is working with partners around the globe to change how states – particularly those emerging from...
authoritarian rule – respond to the challenges of terrorism and the violent extremist ideologies
that underpin it. The GCTF, with its 30 founding members (29 countries and the EU), regularly
convenes counterterrorism policymakers and practitioners, as well as experts from the UN and
other multilateral bodies, to identify urgent needs, devise solutions, and mobilize resources for
addressing key counterterrorism challenges facing civilian institutions. With its primary focus on
countering violent extremism (CVE) and strengthening criminal justice and other rule of law
institutions that deal with terrorism, the GCTF aims to diminish terrorist recruitment and increase
countries’ capacity for dealing with terrorist threats within their borders and regions.

In the past year, the GCTF developed a number of new good practices documents that are
intended to both provide practical guidance for countries as they seek to enhance their
counterterrorism capacity and to bring greater strategic coherence to global counterterrorism
capacity building efforts:

- **The Hague—Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response
to the “Foreign Terrorist Fighters” (FTF) Phenomenon** is intended to inform and guide
governments as they develop comprehensive policies, programs, and approaches to
address the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon;

- **The Abu Dhabi Memorandum on Good Practices for Countering Violent Extremism
(CVE) and Education** focuses on the ways education can be used to prevent and counter
violent extremism by policymakers, teachers and educators, community-based
organizations, NGOs, and families;

- **The Hague Memorandum on Good Practices for the Judiciary in Adjudicating Terrorism
Offenses** articulates a set of good practices on the role of the judiciary in handling
counterterrorism cases within a rule of law framework, with a particular focus on
effective case and trial management; and

- **The Recommendations for Using and Protecting Intelligence Information in Rule of Law-
Based, Criminal Justice Sector-Led Investigations and Prosecutions** focuses on the
protection of sources and collection methods of intelligence information in terrorism
cases.

In addition, the GCTF has inspired the establishment of three independent institutions that
provide platforms for delivering sustainable training and resources in support of CVE and
strengthening rule of law.

- **Based in Abu Dhabi,** **Hedayah**, the first international center of excellence on CVE,
hosted a number of training and capacity building courses focusing on community
policing and community engagement, CVE and education, and CVE and
communications. In December, it hosted a CVE Communications Expo that brought
together approximately 200 CVE practitioners and communications professionals to
develop innovative CVE communications activities.

- **The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ)**, based in Malta, was
inaugurated in June as a center dedicated to providing police, prosecutors, judges,
corrections officials, lawmakers, and others with the training and tools required to
address terrorism and related transnational criminal activity. It will initially focus on countries in the Middle East and North, West, and East Africa, with a particular emphasis on countries in transition. The Institute is governed by a geographically diverse group of a dozen countries and is developing and delivering a series of core courses on what it means to counter terrorism within a rule of law framework; how to use intelligence as evidence in terrorism trials while protecting human rights; the role of parliamentarians in counterterrorism; a comprehensive program to counter foreign terrorists fighters; and how to interrogate suspected terrorists while upholding their human rights.

- In September 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that a core group of government and non-governmental partners from different regions will establish the first-ever public-private global fund to support local grass-roots efforts to counter violent extremism. In June 2014, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) became fully operational in Geneva as a foundation under Swiss law, with its first Board meeting held in November. Pilot countries include Bangladesh, Mali, Morocco, and Nigeria. Grants will be focused on programs that strengthen resilience against violent extremism. In addition, GCERF created an accelerated funding mechanism (AFM) that will make funds available within 90 days from receipt of program application. The AFM is targeted towards supporting local initiatives that stem radicalization and address the violent extremist agenda of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and other groups. NGOs from the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans will be eligible to receive grants via this mechanism, once it is funded.

The UN is a close partner of, and participant in, the GCTF and its activities. The GCTF serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, more broadly, to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the UN. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the AU, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

**The United Nations (UN).** Sustained and strategic engagement at the UN on counterterrorism issues is a priority for the United States. In September, President Obama presided over a UN Security Council (UNSC) session that approved UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2178, a binding resolution that requires all States to “prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting, or equipping” of foreign terrorist fighters as well as the financing of their travel and activities. This resolution was also the first time the UNSC called for action to prevent radicalization to violence. The UNSC also adopted other important counterterrorism UNSCRs during 2014, including UNSCR 2133 to counter terrorists benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or political concessions, and to secure the safe release of hostages; UNSCR 2170 to combat the gross, systematic, and widespread abuse of human rights by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and al-Nusra Front; and 2195 to further address the link between transnational organized crime and terrorism and build States’ and UN capacities to address the challenge. The United States engaged with a wide range of UN actors on counterterrorism, which included:
The Counter-Terrorism Committee Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). The United States supported CTED efforts to analyze capacity gaps and facilitate training and other technical assistance to UN member states, including on foreign terrorist fighters. This included participating in Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) thematic debates on a range of issues including kidnapping for ransom; counterterrorism financing; securing borders; and investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating terrorism cases within a rule of law framework.

The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The United States supported CTITF efforts to improve member states’ implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy, including by serving on the Advisory Board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre, which delivers training and other capacity building to help address identified needs. In 2014, the United States provided funding to support a range of CTITF activities including: capacity building for Mali’s security and justice sectors; a training initiative to secure open borders; capacity building for civil society in Nigeria to counter violent extremism; implementing good practices on addressing and preventing terrorist kidnapping for ransom; and supporting community engagement through human rights-led policing.

The UNSC 1267/1989 Committee. The United States worked closely with the UN 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee and its Monitoring Team by proposing listings and de-listings, providing amendments, engaging the Committee’s Ombudsperson in de-listings, and providing input to the Committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures. The United States also assisted the Monitoring Team with information for its research and reports. There are 231 individuals and 70 entities listed on the al-Qa’ida Sanctions List. In 2014, 23 individuals and seven entities were listed. The Committee also worked to ensure the integrity of the list by conducting regular reviews and by endeavoring to remove those individuals and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing. In 2014, 11 individuals and three entities were de-listed, of which five individuals and three entities were de-listed following the submission of a petition through the Office of the Ombudsperson.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC/TPB). The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), in conjunction with the UNODC’s Global Program against Money Laundering, continued to provide assistance to countries seeking to ratify and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism. In 2014, the United States supported a range of TPB programs aimed at strengthening the capacity of criminal justice officials to prevent and respond to terrorism within a rule of law framework, including in the Horn of Africa and Cameroon.

The UN Inter-Regional Crime Research Institute (UNICRI). The United States has provided financial support to a UNICRI-led global effort to strengthen the capacity of countries to implement the good practices contained in the GCTF’s *Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders*. 
The UNSC 1540 Committee. The Committee monitors and facilitates efforts to implement the obligations and recommendations of UNSCR 1540, addressing the nexus of proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and illicit activities by non-state actors, including terrorists. A May 2014 UNSC Presidential Statement marking the tenth anniversary of the resolution urged States to implement the resolution fully by 2021. The 1540 Committee’s program of work focuses on five main areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the UNSC committees established pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373; transparency and media outreach; and administration and resources. The Committee’s Group of Experts also participates as part of the CTITF.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO’s Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) continued to contribute directly to U.S. homeland security by ensuring that each of ICAO’s 191 member states conducts regular security audits that comply to aviation security standards. In 2014, ICAO continued to transition to the USAP-Continuous Monitoring Approach (USAP-CMA) which will enable greater focus of resources on states requiring more assistance in meeting the Standards. ICAO has begun to pilot the process and certify auditors accordingly. USAP conducted assistance missions to help states correct security problems revealed by surveys and audits. ICAO, in partnership with the UN’s CTED, has assisted member states in the implementation of UNSCRs on counterterrorism, including border control. The two entities have conducted assessment visits and organized workshops focused on countering terrorism and the use of fraudulent travel documents, and promoting good practices on border control and aviation security. Together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ICAO and CTED have encouraged member states to ratify and implement international counterterrorism treaties.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA continued to implement its Nuclear Security Plan (2010-2013) for countering the threat of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material. The United States was actively involved in IAEA efforts to enhance security for vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities, and to reduce the risk that terrorists could gain access to or use such materials or expertise.

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). INTERPOL’s secure, global communications system, criminal investigative tools, analytical databases, and framework for international police cooperation have been brought to bear in a coordinated effort to identify, locate, and apprehend individuals involved in terrorist activities. Following the example of INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau, a number of member countries are now integrating INTERPOL’s information-sharing resources and capabilities into their border security and law enforcement lookout systems to help monitor and interdict the international transit of foreign terrorist fighters. In addition, and with funding and staffing from U.S. law enforcement agencies, INTERPOL’s Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group is supporting a multinational fusion cell and analytical database containing identity particulars that can be used by law enforcement and border control authorities to help determine the terrorist threat posed by subjects located in, or attempting to enter, their respective jurisdictions.
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). The United States supported the FATF plenary activities on a number of combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) issues including guidance on, and vulnerabilities of, new payment methods, preventing terrorist financing abuse of the non-profit sector, and countering the financing of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant; and participated in the working groups on implementation and on strengthening the FATF network through the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs). The United States continued to stress the importance of targeted sanctions and Recommendation 6, a provision to freeze and confiscate assets.

African Union (AU). The United States supported the efforts of the AU to bolster the counterterrorism capacity of its members to implement the UN Strategy, particularly via the AU’s efforts to implement GCTF framework documents. For example, the United States provided assistance for AU-led workshops on implementing the GCTF’s Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices for Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom to Terrorists.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Under the leadership of the Swiss Chairman-in-Office, the OSCE addressed foreign terrorist fighter and kidnapping for ransom issues, culminating in the adoption of two timely and relevant declarations at the OSCE Basel Ministerial Council meeting in December 2014. U.S.-funded border security training in Central Asia, particularly through the OSCE’s Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, also contributed to the capabilities of border and customs officials to counter transnational threats. Through the OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit, the United States supported initiatives aimed at countering violent extremism (CVE); protecting critical energy infrastructure; addressing effective criminal justice system responses to terrorism, travel document security, cyber security, and nonproliferation; and promoting the vital CVE role women can play. In a joint effort with the GCTF, the OSCE helped develop a set of good practices for women fighting terrorism-related challenges to families, communities, and international security. The OSCE also published a comprehensive guidebook on community-policing CVE measures.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). At the Wales NATO Summit in September, allies decided to “enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.” To complement counter-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant coalition efforts, NATO also committed to help Iraq build more effective security forces. On December 31, NATO transitioned from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to RESOLUTE SUPPORT Mission, a non-combat train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan. In 2014, NATO adopted an Action Plan to accompany its Counterterrorism Policy Guidelines to identify initiatives to enhance the prevention of, and resilience to, acts of terrorism with a focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities, and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors in countering terrorism. NATO was also exploring opportunities for enhanced cooperation with the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

European Union (EU). In 2014, the EU’s work with the United States included efforts to curb terrorist financing, strengthen cooperation on countering violent extremism, shut down foreign terrorist fighter networks, and build counterterrorism capacity in third countries. Much of this
work is completed through regular senior-level and working-level consultation and collaboration including the U.S.-EU Consultation on Terrorism and the U.S.-EU Political Dialogue on Counterterrorist Financing.

**Group of Seven (G-7).** Within the context of the G-7 Roma-Lyon Group (RLG) meetings on counterterrorism and counter-crime, the United States worked to bolster cooperation on confronting the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, and on addressing border security capacity gaps in North and West Africa. The United States also sought to advance projects through the RLG’s expert groups on counterterrorism, transportation security, high-tech crime, migration, criminal legal affairs, and law enforcement.

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).** Counterterrorism activities of the 27-member ARF countries included the annual meeting on counterterrorism and transnational crime (CTTC) and supported capacity building through ARF institutions. The United States supported ARF efforts to address cybersecurity issues, including confidence-building measures in cyberspace, and promoted efforts that respect human rights such as freedom of expression and open access. The United States encouraged information sharing and supported the CTTC work plan, which focused on illicit drugs; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism; cybersecurity; counter-radicalization; the sponsorship of a regional transnational crime information sharing center; and a workshop on migration.

**Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).** In 2014, APEC continued to implement its comprehensive Consolidated Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy. The Strategy, adopted in 2011, endorsed the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience, and advocated for risk-based approaches to security challenges across its four cross-cutting areas of supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. The United States co-sponsored a workshop on Secure Infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific Region, which highlighted how APEC economies face varied challenges to building secure, efficient, and resilient infrastructure for regional commerce and transportation, and also demonstrated the importance of identifying gaps, sharing best practices, and developing a regional approach to critical infrastructure protection and resilience. The United States also sponsored APEC capacity building workshops on canine screening in aviation security and low cost/no cost checkpoint optimization, which helped further implement the APEC Counterterrorism and Secure Trade Strategy.

**Organization of American States’ Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE).** In 2014, the CICTE Secretariat conducted 59 activities, training courses, and technical assistance missions that benefited more than 2,704 participants in five thematic areas: border control; critical infrastructure protection; counterterrorism legislative assistance and terrorist financing; strengthening strategies on emerging terrorist threats (crisis management); and international cooperation and partnerships. The United States is a major contributor to CICTE’s training programs and has provided funding and expert trainers for capacity building programs focused on maritime security, aviation security, travel document security and fraud prevention, cybersecurity, counterterrorism legislation, and efforts to counter terrorist financing.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

A matrix of the ratification status of 18 of the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism can be found here:  https://www.unodc.org/tldb/universal_instruments_NEW.html

LONG-TERM PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO COUNTER TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE).  CVE is part of the strategic approach to counterterrorism that aims to deny terrorism new recruits by reducing sympathy and support for violent extremism.  Our CVE objectives are to (1) build resilience among communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence; (2) counter violent extremist narratives and messaging; and (3) build the capacity of partner nations and civil society to counter violent extremism.  Our counter-recruitment and counter-messaging efforts are focused on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qa’ida (AQ), its affiliates, adherents, and like-minded groups.

Diplomatically, we meet these objectives via bilateral and multilateral dialogue, emphasizing the need for countries to address the drivers of violent extremism.  Programmatically, we meet these objectives by identifying drivers of recruitment and radicalization to violence, and ways to counter the phenomena.  We identify key nodes and locales where radicalization is taking place, and focus our programming and activities in these areas.

The State Department emphasizes supporting local CVE efforts and building local CVE capacity.  The growing international focus on CVE has allowed the United States to develop a broader range of international partners to support our efforts, including other governments, multilateral organizations, and non-governmental actors.  Through these broad-based partnerships, we have been able to develop good practices, leverage others’ resources, and multiply results.

The State Department works with foreign partners and other U.S. government agencies, such as USAID and DoD to identify hotspots of radicalization and to design programming focused on those areas.  Key areas of programming include:

- **Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing.**  The Department of State has implemented projects that link marginalized groups in a community, such as at-risk youth or women, with responsible community leaders to build their resilience to violent extremism and improve their capacity to counter it.  These activities include: providing skills training to youth, their families, and their communities; leadership development; and promoting problem solving and conflict resolution skills.  Projects also include training law enforcement personnel in community engagement, facilitation, and relationship building; counter-messaging and narratives; and supporting law enforcement partnerships with non-law enforcement government and non-government actors.  Through increased cooperation among community leaders, law enforcement, and local
government, community-oriented policing builds community resilience to violent extremism by addressing factors of local instability, disenfranchisement, and marginalization.

- **CVE Advocacy: Women and Victims/Survivors of Terrorism.** Women can act as gatekeepers to their communities, and thus can provide a first line of defense against recruitment and radicalization to violence in their families and communities. Through CVE efforts in the East Africa and West Africa region, women are trained to recognize signs of radicalization, deploy prevention techniques, and are responsible for the local promotion of security and radicalization prevention. In partnership with local women’s networks, the Department of State supports training for women civil society leaders and law enforcement personnel to devise CVE-prevention strategies and pilot activities. In addition to women, victims and survivors of terrorism, by sharing their stories, offer a resonant counter-narrative that highlights the destruction and devastation of terrorist attacks. Workshops train victims to interact with conventional and social media, create public relations campaigns that amplify their messages, and seek out platforms that help them disseminate their message most broadly to at-risk audiences.

- **CVE Counter-messaging and Counter-narratives.** The Department of State supports country-based and regional trainings for local partners to develop and disseminate their own counter-narratives and build their capacity to do this work on their own. In South and Southeast Asia, for example, CVE projects – via training and regional and national media production competitions – support youth to create and show CVE films, and provide training on designing CVE counter-messaging campaigns with a particular focus on social media.

- **Diaspora Engagement.** The Department of State supports efforts to conduct outreach and training tours among diaspora communities who may be targeted for recruitment or susceptible to radicalization to violence. Efforts involve community roundtables to raise awareness and discuss ways to prevent recruitment and radicalization. These projects are especially effective in engaging Somali diaspora communities.

- **Prison Disengagement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration.** One area of potential radicalization to violence is prisons. If improperly managed, a prison can serve as both a safe haven for violent extremism and an incubator for new recruits. Recognizing that many such inmates will eventually be reintegrated back into society, the Department of State is working – primarily through partner organizations – to strengthen the capabilities of key countries to rehabilitate and reintegrate such offenders. Such partners include the UN’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the International Center for Counterterrorism, and DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)’s Rome Memorandum – a series of good practices in this area – is used to shape their efforts. More than 40 countries, multilateral organizations, and leading independent experts have participated in these efforts, providing policymakers, practitioners, and experts a chance to further develop these good practices. In late 2014, the GCTF and UNICRI jointly
launched an effort that attempts to address the challenge of returning foreign terrorist fighters with a focus on the knowledge learned through prison de-radicalization efforts.

- **The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).** CSCC, based at the Department of State, collaborates with U.S. embassies and consulates, interagency partners, and outside experts to counter terrorist narratives and misinformation. CSCC programs draw on a full range of intelligence information and analysis for context and feedback. CSCC counters terrorist propaganda on social media on a daily basis, contesting space where extremists and their supporters formerly had free reign. In 2014, CSCC produced over 13,000 postings and 645 banners and videos online. CSCC also engaged in a variety of projects directly supporting U.S. government communicators working with overseas audiences, as well as amplifying credible CVE voices and supporting local initiatives, primarily in the Middle East and Africa. The Information Coordination Cell, housed in the CSCC, was established in 2014 to coordinate the U.S. government’s counter-Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant messaging as part of the Global Coalition strategy.

**CVE Engagement through Multilateral Institutions:**

- **Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) CVE Working Group.** The GCTF’s CVE Working Group, one of five expert-driven groups, focuses on the following work streams: (a) the role institutions to counter violent extremism; (b) countering the violent extremist narrative; and c) measuring the impact of CVE programs. During 2014, the CVE Working Group led the successful development of good practices on the role of education in CVE, which GCTF member states approved in September 2014. The working group also supported the endorsement of an action plan on community-oriented policing and engagement, which builds on the 2013 good practices in these CVE areas.

- **Hedayah, the International CVE Center of Excellence:** With support from GCTF members and international partners, the United Arab Emirates launched the first international CVE Center of Excellence, Hedayah, in December 2012. As in 2013, the Department of State in 2014 continued to support Hedayah through funding for training for governmental and non-governmental CVE practitioners on such topics as community-oriented policing, education, community-based approaches and CVE communications and media. Major Hedayah activities in 2014 included an international education and CVE workshop in May, and a December CVE Communications Expo that brought together hundreds of government, civil society, and media practitioners.

- **Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF):** The objective of GCERF is to leverage public and private sector support for community-based projects aimed at addressing local drivers of radicalization by focusing on education, vocational training, civic engagement, media, youth, and women’s advocacy. Participating pilot countries include Bangladesh, Mali, Morocco, and Nigeria. Switzerland hosts the GCERF office in Geneva. In September, Secretary Kerry called for the establishment of a global funding window through GCERF for projects to counter ISIL recruitment and radicalization to violence.
• USAID Approach to CVE. USAID’s approaches to CVE run parallel to and are undertaken in coordination with Department of State CVE efforts. Unlike traditional development programming, USAID’s CVE programming addresses specific populations – particularly young men – and regions that are most at risk of radicalization and recruitment. Robust analysis, evidence-based programming, and partnership with host national and local governments, civil society, and the private sector are critical elements of USAID’s CVE approach.

  o Empowering Youth: vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, sports and cultural activity, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training to increase young men and women’s participation in local decision-making. In East Africa, for example, programming aims to promote a positive sense of identity for vulnerable youth through youth association activity, community participation, and vocational training.

  o Increasing Mainstream Voices: integrated radio, social media, and civic education activities, enhanced quality and credible information, and positive dialogue. In the Sahel, for example, USAID is providing technical and financial support for local radio stations and their production of mainstream, community-based content. Religious leaders are being engaged with training and dialogue to promote mainstream messaging, conflict prevention and resolution, and constructive community initiatives.

  o Increasing Civil Society Capacity: formal and informal training, strengthened advocacy skills, citizen-led accountability initiatives and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media and enhanced through civil society coalitions and networks. For example, USAID is providing capacity building grants to civil society organizations (CSOs) in Pakistan for rehabilitation projects and community initiatives.

  o Strengthening Local Government: organized and enhanced community entities and CSO capacity, greater citizen participation, particularly youth and women, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach. For example, in the Sahel, USAID is supporting the establishment of local community advisory councils composed of women, youth, religious, and other representatives to ensure local governance and activities are more responsive to community needs.

CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS. As the terrorist threat has evolved and grown more geographically diverse in recent years, it has become clear that our success depends in large part on the effectiveness and ability of our partners. To succeed over the long term, we must increase the number of countries capable of and willing to take on this challenge. Our counterterrorism capacity building programs – Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Counterterrorist Finance, Counterterrorism Engagement, the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, and transnational activities under the Regional Strategic
Initiatives – are all critically important and work on a daily basis to build capacity and improve political will. For further information on these programs, we refer you to the Annual Report on Assistance Related to International Terrorism, Fiscal Year 2014: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/rpt/221544.htm.

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE (RSI). Terrorist groups often take advantage of porous borders and ungoverned areas between countries. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism created RSI to enable flexible civilian responses to rapidly evolving threats, and to build the regional capacity, partnerships, and cooperation necessary to counter the most serious threats facing the United States. Current RSI efforts focus on stemming the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, countering terrorist safe havens, counter-ISIL messaging, and countering Hizballah’s activities. In 2014, RSI supported a wide variety of projects focused on regional law enforcement cooperation and effectiveness against transnational threats. Examples include establishing interagency counterterrorism centers for partner countries in Europe and North Africa, and associated training for center personnel; support to develop partner ability to manage sophisticated terrorism and transnational crime cases in Southeast Asia; and trainings that engaged key governments in multiple sectors (finance, security, rule of law) to ensure that al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb does not benefit from kidnapping-for-ransom. The State Department seeks to strengthen efforts by partner governments to address and mitigate threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including addressing critical gaps in the partner countries to prevent, interdict, prosecute, and rehabilitate foreign terrorist fighters traveling to Iraq and Syria. To that end, RSI supported DOJ advisors and other expert travel to key partner nations to provide critical and timely assistance in various technical areas, such as the investigation and prosecution of foreign terrorist fighter cases.
In 2014, the United States continued to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan, as we believe that a stable, secure, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan is in the long-term U.S. national security interest. To support this partnership, the United States has allocated civilian and security assistance totaling more than $9 billion since 2009. U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is designed to build Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity. In addition, since 2001, the Department of Defense has reimbursed over $13 billion in Coalition Support Funds for Pakistani expenditures in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Since the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (commonly referred to as Kerry-Lugar-Berman, or “KLB”) was enacted in October 2009, and with funding made available in annual appropriations legislation, the United States has committed over US $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, in addition to over US $1 billion for humanitarian assistance in that timeframe, addressing floods and conflict. We continue to focus on five sectors determined in consultation with the Pakistani government in 2011: energy; economic growth including agriculture, stabilization of areas vulnerable to violent extremism; education; and health. Emphasis on improving democracy, governance, and gender equity are integrated into programming across the five sectors.

Since the passage of this major authorization and annual appropriations legislation, U.S. assistance has added over 1,400 megawatts to Pakistan’s electricity grid and helped Pakistan take steps to reform the troubled sector; funded the refurbishment or construction of nearly 1,000 kilometers of roads, enabling trade, security, and mobility; trained over 5,600 police and 1,000 prosecutors across Pakistan; provided scholarships to approximately 12,000 Pakistanis to attend Pakistani universities; and supplied better access to comprehensive family planning services to over 100,000 women.

Energy: Chronic energy shortages severely limit Pakistan’s economic development. As such, energy is our top assistance priority, supporting the goal of job creation, security, and political stability in Pakistan. We continued to fund infrastructure rehabilitation projects, especially in

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clean energy, and provided technical assistance to Pakistani energy institutions, including
distribution companies, to increase power generation and improve performance.

**Economic Growth:** Through a range of programs and public-private partnerships in agriculture
and other sectors of Pakistan’s economy, U.S. assistance helped Pakistan create jobs and foster
economic growth. In 2014, the United States made awards for the Pakistan Private Investment
Initiative, a public-private program in which U.S. capital, matched equally by private sector
funding, was committed as equity to small- and medium-sized Pakistani enterprises to provide
much needed liquidity.

**Stabilization:** The United States supported Pakistan’s efforts to make its territory inhospitable
to violent extremists by strengthening governance and civilian law enforcement capacity and
promoting socioeconomic development, particularly in areas bordering Afghanistan and other
targeted locations vulnerable to violent extremism. Our efforts included road construction, small
community-based grants, police and governance training, and providing equipment to civilian
law enforcement.

**Education:** Pakistan’s ability to educate its youth is critical to its economic growth and future
trajectory. U.S. education programs focused on increasing the number of students who enroll in
and complete courses in primary and tertiary educational institutions; and improving the quality
of that education – with a specific focus on reading – to prepare Pakistani students for the
workforce. We are also committed to building bridges between Pakistani and American students
and professionals through exchange programs.

**Health:** The provision of basic health services in Pakistan is inadequate for much of the
population, particularly for rural populations. U.S. health programs supported the Government
of Pakistan’s efforts to deliver healthcare, particularly in the areas of maternal and child
health. U.S. assistance was also used to support Government of Pakistan initiatives to construct
health clinics and hospitals, fund the acquisition of medical materials, and provide critical family
planning and reproductive health care.

**Humanitarian Assistance:** Since October 2009, over US $1.3 billion of emergency
humanitarian assistance has been provided to Pakistan in response to floods and conflict, above
and beyond bilateral assistance. During the historic 2010 floods, funding from the American
people helped 10 million flood-affected citizens, who received rescue services, food, emergency
shelter, cash grants, and even seeds to replant crops.

**International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:** Pakistan took important steps to
counter violent extremists operating in the areas bordering Afghanistan during 2014. These steps
included intensifying support to civilian law enforcement and border security agencies. The
United States directly supported Pakistan’s efforts to build the capacity of its civilian law
enforcement and border security agencies by providing training, equipment, infrastructure, and
aviation assistance. U.S. assistance helped build capacity in law enforcement agencies
responsible for holding areas cleared by Pakistan’s military, protecting local populations from
militant attacks, and maintaining law and order. Collectively, these efforts enhanced the
counterinsurgency, law enforcement, and counternarcotics capacities of Pakistan’s civilian law
enforcement and border security agencies. Improved security will, in turn, facilitate economic development, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR): The United States provided assistance to strengthen Pakistan’s export control system to prevent transfer of WMD and related technology. NADR/Export Control and Related Border Security funds were used for nonproliferation export control training addressing legal/regulatory reform, export licensing systems, customs enforcement, general inspection, WMD detection training for border control personnel, and procuring specialized radiation/chemical detection equipment. The United States also provided targeted assistance to build Pakistani law enforcement capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. NADR/Global Threat Reduction Programs (GTR) provided assistance to Pakistan to prevent terrorist access to biological expertise, materials, and technology. GTR engaged scientists to reduce bio-security threats against the United States by supporting pathogen security, safe and secure laboratory conduct, and disease detection and control.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): FMF promotes the development of Pakistan’s long-term counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism capabilities to enable security and stability throughout the country, particularly in the conflict-affected areas bordering Afghanistan, and to improve Pakistan’s ability to lead and/or participate in maritime security operations that support counterterrorism aims. We continue to focus FMF towards seven core capabilities: precision strike; air mobility/combat search and rescue; battlefield communications; night operations; survivability and countering improvised explosive devices; border security; and maritime security/counter-narcotics. To support this, the United States obligated nearly US $270 million in FMF in 2014.

International Military Education and Training (IMET): Pakistan’s IMET program supported professional military education for Pakistan’s military leaders, emphasizing respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, including civilian control of the military. IMET also supported effective management of Pakistan’s defense establishment through training in logistics, defense acquisition, and resource management. A significant portion of this funding supports training related to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan. To build capacity and cooperation between our security forces, Pakistan receives the largest amount of IMET of any of our global partners, at nearly US $5 million annually.

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF): PCCF builds the capability of Pakistan’s Army, Air Force, and Frontier Corps to clear and hold terrain in contested areas throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas by providing targeted equipment and training for COIN/counterterrorism operations. In FY 2013, we provided US $425 million in FY 2012 PCCF funding for execution. FY 2012 is the final fiscal year that funding was requested for this program.

Measures to ensure that assistance has the greatest long-term positive impact on the welfare of the Pakistani people and their ability to counter terrorism: Over a quarter of U.S. civilian assistance is implemented via Pakistani partners, including the Government of Pakistan
and private sector actors, when practicable. This is done to strengthen local capacity and increase sustainability, providing the greatest possible long-term impact of U.S. assistance. Increasingly, the Administration is also implementing public-private partnerships to engage the private sector as a long-term partner in Pakistan’s development.

**COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA**

The United States and Saudi Arabia have a strong bilateral relationship. Multiple high-level visits in 2014 deepened this relationship at the personal and institutional level and provided senior officials from both countries the chance to discuss means of improving coordination. In 2014, high-level visits from President Barack Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, and anti-ISIL Coalition Special Envoy General John Allen, among others, reaffirmed the importance of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

During 2014, the Government of Saudi Arabia, working in coordination with the United States, continued to build and augment its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a robust counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of U.S. and Saudi citizens in both countries, and to enhance the security of infrastructure in Saudi Arabia critical to the global economy. Saudi Arabia continued its long-term counterterrorism strategy to track and halt the activities of terrorists and terror financiers, dismantle the presence or reconstitution of al-Qa’ida-affiliates, impede the ability of militants to operate from or within Saudi Arabia, and to implement laws against supporting terrorist groups and travel to conflict zones. Saudi Arabia welcomed UN Security Council Resolutions 2170 and 2178, expanding existing counterterrorism programs and rhetoric to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and leveraged terrorist finance provisions of its Law for Crimes of Terrorism and Terrorist-Financing (CT Law) to combat funding of violent extremist groups in Iraq and Syria. Saudi Arabia’s robust legal counterterrorism apparatus was bolstered in 2014 by the introduction in February 2014 of a new counterterrorism law that further strengthened existing counterterrorism laws.

Saudi Arabia sought to expand economic and civic opportunities for its people. Nearly 60 percent of the Saudi populace is under 25 years of age. The late King Abdullah promoted an economic development agenda, and Saudi Arabia has sought to address economic sources of social discontent, such as housing scarcity and the need to create jobs for millions of Saudis.

The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to reeducate and regulate imams, prohibiting them from inciting violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education. The King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue continued to promote tolerance and respect for diversity through its dialogue and awareness-raising programs. Some religious figures not directly associated with the establishment, however, reportedly made statements that promoted intolerant views.
The United States continued to support Saudi Arabia in reforms it is undertaking by facilitating Saudi nationals studying in the United States and promoting educational exchanges; encouraging increased bilateral trade and investment, urging Saudi Arabia to take actions necessary to attract job-creating partnerships with U.S. companies; and supporting programming in such areas as judicial reform and women’s entrepreneurship, as well as the Ministry of Interior’s extensive prison rehabilitation program, the Mohamed bin Naif Counseling and Care Center, to reduce recidivism among former inmates charged with crimes related to terrorism.

Throughout 2014, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in its territory by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about terrorist activity. The government offered rewards for information on terrorists, and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of hundreds of AQAP and ISIL members and supporters. As a result, the Saudi Arabian government successfully disrupted a 98-member ISIL cell active in Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the year, Saudi security professionals regularly participated in joint programs and information exchange agreements around the world, including in the United States and Europe. The Saudi Arabian government has continued to provide specialized training programs for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies to combat terrorist financing. In 2008, the two governments concluded a Technical Cooperation Agreement and a year later established the joint Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) to implement it, institutionalizing a Saudi-funded bilateral program of technical assistance focused on the protection of critical infrastructure and the Saudi public. Through the OPM-MOI program, U.S. agencies are helping Saudi Arabia improve its ability to thwart terrorists before they act and to defend against terrorist attacks if they occur. On August 8, 2013, Saudi Arabia pledged US $100 million to the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre, which was transferred in August 2014. In April 2014, the Saudi Arabian government participated in the U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Strategic Cooperation Forum Task Force on counterterrorism and border security. Saudi officials have issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the Saudi Arabian government has hosted international counterterrorism conferences on combating extremist ideology and countering terrorist financing. On September 11, 2014, Saudi Arabia hosted a counterterrorism conference in Jeddah, which was attended by ministers from the GCC, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United States, at which all parties declared their shared commitment against terrorism and ISIL. The Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior also hosted the 17th Annual International Conference and Exhibition for Industrial Security, Fire, and Occupational Safety, and Health in November 2014, which focused on strengthening industrial security practices and coordination between the government and private sectors to protect key infrastructure from terrorist attack.

U.S.-Saudi collaboration was not confined to bilateral issues. With political upheaval across the region throughout the year, the United States consulted closely with the Saudi government on regional stability, including in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. Working both bilaterally and multilaterally through the GCC and the Arab League, the Saudi government provided leadership in promoting peaceful transitions. Saudi Arabia has cooperated regionally and internationally on
counterterrorism issues as demonstrated by its participation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Saudi Arabia is a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force. As part of its strategy to support these transitions and promote stability throughout the region, the Saudi government increased the scope of its economic and development assistance. On the humanitarian front, Saudi Arabia pledged a US $500 million grant to the UN for Iraq humanitarian assistance in July 2014, US $60 million in Syria humanitarian assistance at the International Pledging Conference in Kuwait, and US $104 million in humanitarian assistance to the World Food Program for refugees in Syria, Ethiopia, and in Kenya.

Saudi Arabia has been a leading partner in the international Coalition against ISIL, participating in Coalition airstrikes against ISIL in Syria, and offering to host a train and equip program for the moderate Syrian opposition. In addition, Saudi Arabia has enacted tough criminal penalties for those traveling to fight in foreign conflicts and has enforced those penalties. The Saudi Arabian government and religious leaders have issued many statements against ISIL which the government considers a serious threat to its national security.

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**BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS INITIATIVES: OUTREACH TO FOREIGN MUSLIM AUDIENCES**

This section is provided by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

Four of the five broadcast entities under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) provided programming for countries with large Muslim populations in 2014: the Voice of America (VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, and Afia Darfur), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia.

- Eighteen of RFE/RL’s broadcast languages – almost two-thirds of the total – were directed to regions with majority-Muslim populations, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Additional broadcasting regions in the Russian Federation included the majority Muslim populations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the North Caucasus.
- VOA has been particularly successful in reaching non-Arabic-speaking Muslim audiences, with strong performances in Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tanzania, among other places.
- The Middle East Broadcasting Networks broadcast throughout the region to more than 340 million people, 93 percent of who are Muslim.
- VOA and RFE/RL provided news and information to Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in Dari and Pashto. Together, RFE/RL and VOA reached nearly 53 percent of Afghan adults each week.
- Radio Free Asia broadcast to the more than 16 million mainly ethnic Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of northwestern China and Central Eurasia.

The BBG used the latest communications technologies to avoid jamming of its signals and to reach audiences through digital and other communications tools, such as web chats and blogs.
THE MIDDLE EAST

Arabic: Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) has five bureaus/production centers in the region, in addition to its main studios in Virginia, and a network of regional correspondents. MBN broadcasts to a population that includes an estimated 317 million Muslims or about 23 percent of the world’s Muslim population. MBN takes a diverse approach to reaching the largest potential audience, using three platforms: television (Alhurra TV), radio (Radio Sawa), and digital (Alhurra.com and RadioSawa.com). The networks provide a unique, local perspective of breaking news, current events, and balanced coverage on topics such as freedom of speech, religion, and the role of women in society and politics. Alhurra also produces programs encouraging freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and non-violence.

Radio Sawa’s network of stations, broadcasting 24/7, is designed to reach the Arabic-speaking population under the age of 35. It broadcasts 325 newscasts per week about the Middle East, the United States, and the world.

Radio Sawa broadcasts on FM in Morocco, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, and Djibouti. Radio Sawa broadcasts on medium wave to Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan; and was available on the Arabsat, Nilesat, and Eutelsat satellite systems.

Iraq: Every week, 36 percent of Iraqi adults – some 6.3 million people – listened to or watched one of the four BBG broadcasters serving the country: Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq, and VOA Kurdish. Alhurra and Radio Sawa continued to be very successful given their localized dedicated streams to Iraqi news and information. One in three Iraqis say Alhurra is their most important source of information. Radio Sawa is one of the top radio stations among adults. Radio Free Iraq, with five percent weekly reach on radio and internet, and VOA Kurdish reached 3 percent of Kurdish-speaking Iraqis weekly.

Kurdish: In 2014, the Kurdistan region in particular faced heavy attack from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. The VOA Kurdish Service has covered the crisis on a daily basis by conducting interviews with regional analysts and through stringer reports from the region. The Sinjar region was a primary target when thousands of Yezidis had to flee to the Kurdistan region and women and children were taken hostage. VOA Kurdish conducted many interviews with people on the ground.

Persian: VOA’s Persian Service provided relevant global and regional news relating to Iran and crucial information about U.S. policy toward Iran and the region. VOA Persian delivered original television programming for six hours per day. In addition, VOA and Radio Farda each produced one hour of Radio-on-TV (ROT), starting with VOA Persian’s ROT Tamasha and followed by Radio Farda’s ROT “Sobhane Ba Khabar.”

VOA’s Persian Service did exceedingly well in bringing worldwide coverage on timely issues to the people of Iran. For example, it attracted a wide television and online audience during its coverage of the Iranian National Team during the World Cup in June. VOA Persian also had
extensive live coverage in August of the Iranian national volleyball team’s first visit to the United States. VOA Persian was on the ground during the Iran nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries, and had live coverage of the Iran nuclear talks in November where the P5+1 countries agreed to extend the deadline to implement the commitments described in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) through June 30, 2015.

RFE/RL’s Radio Farda broadcast newscasts at the top of each hour, followed by reports, features, interviews, and regular segments on youth, women, culture, economics, and politics.

- Radio Farda sent a correspondent to Vienna in February, May, and November to provide exclusive, around-the-clock Persian-language coverage for its audience in Iran of the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 countries. Radio Farda also secured interviews with U.S. chief negotiator and Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman, and former State Department special advisor on nonproliferation and arms control, Robert Einhorn.
- Radio Farda’s comprehensive human rights monitoring is unique inside Iran. It is listened to by prison inmates who rely on it for accurate reporting on their cases.
- Radio Farda’s online community continued to grow. Its main Facebook page has a fan base of 1,335,000.
- Radio Farda’s circumvention strategies to fight internet blockage by the Iranian regime remained successful, with nearly 168 million page views logged in 2014.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghan: VOA’s Afghan Service covered all aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan and the border region on call-in shows as well as in reports and interviews. In addition, the Service covered Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, which included visits of officials and dialogues and agreements between the two countries, and progress made in their joint counterterrorism efforts.

In addition, the Service provided coverage of the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant in the Middle East, U.S. and world efforts against the organization, its reach in the region, and reports of cells/existence of the terrorist organization in Afghanistan.

Moreover, the Service also covered an unprecedented gathering of religious scholars from across Afghanistan who convened to praise the Afghan security forces’ fight against violent extremists. Maulawi Abdul Basir Haqani, a representative of the Ulema (the body of scholars who are authorities on Muslim religion and law), joined the program live from the Kabul studio and spoke in unanimity with the new government’s efforts to support the Afghan military.

In the past year, the Service expanded its social media outreach by providing a platform for free expression of ideas that run counter to the violent extremist narrative.

The Service also joined forces with internationally recognized pop star/UN Goodwill Ambassador Farhad Darya in a successful campaign to encourage Afghan citizens to get out and vote in two rounds of presidential elections in the face of Taliban threats and intimidation.
Urdu: VOA Urdu reporters in Washington and stringers in five major Pakistani cities were reported on terrorism-related activities as they unfolded.

The Pakistan/Afghanistan Border Region: VOA Deewa broadcasts go directly to Pakistan’s most terrorism-prone regions and neighboring Afghanistan, where the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and the Haqqani Network are known to operate.

The Service regularly engages Muslim scholars, analysts from U.S.-based think tanks, and Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders on violent extremism. Deewa guests participate in discussions with question and answer sessions on violent extremist ideology.

Bangla: The VOA Bangla Service continuously prepares interview-based reports, features, roundtable discussions, and call-in shows on terrorism themes.

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan: RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service content was delivered via its internet website, mobile site, and social media platforms. The web strategy attracted a younger audience to this bilingual (Kazakh and Russian) site, providing opportunities for interactivity and exploring new genres such as video reporting. The Service’s reporting on Kazakh terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq was widely quoted in local Kazakh media and sparked many discussions on Kazakh language web forums.

Kyrgyzstan: RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service is the most trusted radio news source in Kyrgyzstan, according to an October 2014 survey conducted by the International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys Ltd./The Gallup Organization, SIAR Research and Consulting, and USAID. The Service’s daily TV news show and weekly talk show were broadcast during prime time hours on the largest national channel, which is the news source of choice for 34 percent of the population.

Tajikistan: RFE/RL’s Tajik Service served as one of the most reliable sources of news and information in Tajikistan. As early as 2013, RFE/RL’s Tajik Service was covering the participation of Tajik terrorists in the Syrian conflict. The Service reported on the personal details of Tajik youth fighting in Syria and interviews with relatives, politicians, and religious leaders.

Uzbekistan: RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service’s weekly 30-minute TV program and daily 30-minute radio broadcast featured interviews with U.S. and international sources on topics including religious extremism, terrorism, and U.S.-Uzbekistan and U.S.-Central Asian relations. VOA Uzbek regularly covers the Fergana valley. The Service distributed original stories to mobile phone subscribers. Reports were also accessible on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook; and Russia based MoiMir, VKontakte, and Yandex. VOA Uzbek has FM radio affiliates in Northern Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, and a TV affiliate in Southern Kyrgyzstan.

Turkmenistan: RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service provides a vital, unmatched service to its audience, despite the fact that it is not allowed to have a bureau or accredited journalists within the country. It is the only international media company providing regular multi-media reporting
from inside the country, with original video reporting and photojournalism. The Service provided a unique and important voice covering social issues such as homelessness, housing conditions, and travel restrictions on Turkmen citizens, while its reporting on human rights cases has brought critical attention to cases of activists and journalists imprisoned or detained.

**EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC**

**China:** VOA China’s Branch delivers news, including religious and local issues affecting more than 22 million Chinese Muslims, to China via satellite television, radio, internet, social media, and mobile channels in Mandarin, Cantonese, and Tibetan. One report in 2014 on Beijing’s crackdown on Uighur culture and religion in Xinjiang entitled “Beards, Veils, and the Uighur-Han Tensions” was reposted by the Uighur American Association’s website and by Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti’s China-based Uighur Online. Mr. Tohti was sentenced to life in prison for several charges and part of the state evidence used against him in the trial was his use of the above mentioned VOA three-part series of articles on his website.

**Indonesia:** VOA’s Indonesian Service’s 2014 weekly audience grew to more than 33 million people or 18.9% of the adult population. About 85% of Indonesians are Muslim making it the country with the single largest Muslim population. VOA Indonesian TV news and information products were regularly seen on eight of Indonesia’s 11 national stations, and more than 30 local and regional TV stations. VOA Indonesian radio is heard on over 400 FM affiliates across the archipelago. Overall, the Service produced nearly four hours of TV per week and more than eight hours daily of original radio programming throughout the year. During the month of Ramadan in 2014, the Indonesian Service produced eight special 30-minute episodes of “Muslim di Rantau” (Muslims Abroad) for the national public broadcaster, TVRI.

**Thailand:** VOA’s Thai Service has 11 affiliate radio stations in southern Thailand. VOA Thai broadcasts news and information eight hours and 30 minutes per week to all its affiliates; it also produces a weekly video report for placement with TV networks in Thailand. The programs emphasize the U.S.-Thailand relationship, religious and cultural diversity, and education.

**Myanmar:** VOA’s Burmese Service closely monitored relations between the Buddhist and Muslim communities in Myanmar while reporting on events and ways to promote mutual trust, tolerance, and understanding. VOA weekly call-in discussion programs have provided effective fora to discuss sensitive issues and stimulate further dialogue. VOA Burmese broadcasts daily radio and television programs with a popular web site. The VOA Burmese Bureau in Yangon also participated in local media seminars to discuss professional journalism standards and to identify and counter hate messages.

**EUROPE AND EURASIA**

**The Russian Federation and Ukraine:** VOA’s Russian and Ukrainian Services regularly address terrorism-related issues and threats in the United States and other key areas of interest to the target audience. Journalist Fatima Tlisova provided VOA Russian with enterprise reporting related to the first anniversary of the Boston bombings and the beginning of the trial of suspected Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. VOA Russian’s reports related to the Boston
terrorist attacks generated a significant social media response and numerous shares on social media.

RFE/RL’s Russian Service provides accurate, independent, and wide-ranging news and analysis of a wide range of issues affecting its Russian audience.

**Tatarstan/Bashkortostan:** The Tatar and Bashkir communities are the two largest Muslim communities in Russia. RFE/RL’s Tatar/Bashkir Service was the only major international media producing content in the Tatar and Bashkir languages and provided listeners with objective news and analysis on issues such as Russia’s policy toward ethnic and religious minorities, centralization, corruption, the role of Islam in predominantly Muslim regions, and gender issues. The Service’s webpage, the most technologically advanced state-of-the-art web source in Tatar, continued to be a virtual meeting place for people to discuss these and other issues.

**North Caucasus:** Broadcasting in the Avar, Chechen, and Circassian languages, RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service reported the news in a region where media freedom and journalists remained under severe threat.

**Turkey:** VOA’s Turkish Service has been reporting on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and global terrorism extensively.

**The Balkans:** VOA’s Balkan Services provided extensive coverage of the rise of violent extremism in the region’s countries with sizeable Muslim populations – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, and Serbia. More than 4.7 million adults weekly consumed VOA content across broadcast and digital platforms in Albania, Kosovo, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. VOA coverage highlighted the threats posed by international terrorist networks that recruit foreign fighters for the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and for al-Qa’ida and its affiliates. Balkan media outlets cited and widely republished VOA’s coverage of the September 2014 UN meeting chaired by President Obama.

RFE/RL’s Balkan Service is the only inclusive source of news in a region where genuine media freedom remains elusive and many outlets reflect ethnic divisions. Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga spoke to the Service in August 2014 about the arrest of over 40 men accused of fighting with violent extremists in Syria and Iraq; on September 3, the Service was among the first to report on a police operation in BiH that broke up a network that recruited fighters for Syria and Iraq. The Service interviewed the wife of one man who took his eight-year-old son with him to fight in Syria.

**Azerbaijan:** VOA’s Azerbaijani Service delivered daily TV and web programming focused on the country’s political dynamics as the authorities increased pressure on political activists and civil society groups. VOA Azerbaijani commenced cooperation with RFE/RL’s regularly programmed reports and interviews targeting the large Azeri population in northern Iran, with an emphasis on the Azeri minority’s demands for cultural rights, human rights, and the regime’s attempts to suppress dissent and the rights of Iran’s minorities.
When it was banned from FM airwaves, RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service lost more than half of its reach in Baku. It subsequently turned to both the internet and satellite television to reconnect with listeners. The Service’s “Korrupsiometr” web portal features the latest laws and regulations, along with Azerbaijani lawyers responding to audience questions.

On December 26, Azerbaijani authorities raided and closed RFE/RL’s Baku Bureau in connection with a law on “foreign agents,” subsequently questioning 26 journalists and staff members. Limited Azerbaijani Service programming continued from Prague.

AFRICA

**Hausa:** VOA’s Hausa Service has provided comprehensive, multimedia coverage of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Northern Nigeria through its daily news programming, interactive call-in shows, and audio streaming and postings on its website. The Service also launched a new, dynamic 24/7 mobile stream that enables VOA to go live at any time to cover breaking news. In an effort to reach young audiences, VOA Hausa recently launched a new half-hour daily radio program called “Today and Tomorrow.” Throughout the year, the Service has given special attention to the efforts by Nigeria’s military Special Task Forces to rout Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, especially in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States. As a result of its expansive coverage, VOA has been threatened by Boko Haram. However, the Service increased its coverage of the violent tactics being used against Nigerian civilians, military, and government. In May 2014, VOA Hausa sent a reporter to Northern Nigeria, who spent more than a month covering Boko Haram’s terrorist attacks and the resulting devastation of towns and villages. He was able to interview some of the Chibok girls who had been taken hostage and escaped, their mothers and teachers, as well as religious and community leaders.

**Somali:** VOA’s Somali Service airs a weekly radio program called “Islamic Affairs,” which focuses on issues of interest to Muslims. Topics include terrorism, violence, and the role of Islam in conflict resolution. For example, a recent segment of “Islamic Affairs” included an interview with a Somali-American cartoonist known as “Average Mohamed,” who focuses on violent extremism and its effects. Another segment was devoted to the coexistence of people of different faiths, following reports in Iraq that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was targeting Yazidis. Throughout the year, VOA’s Somali Service provided blanket coverage of violent extremist activities, including a series of radio and television reports about the recruitment of Somali-Americans in Minneapolis by terrorist groups such as ISIL and al-Shabaab. The Service also secured an exclusive one-on-one interview with Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who talked about his country’s efforts to combat al-Shabaab.

**Swahili:** VOA’s Swahili Service broadcast to large Muslim populations in Tanzania and Kenya, and smaller Muslim communities in Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2014, the Service increased its efforts to reach the Muslim communities in Kenya’s Indian Ocean coastline, where the city of Mombasa was rocked by several terrorist attacks. To improve its coverage in the area, VOA Swahili is opening a reporting center in Mombasa and is hiring additional local reporters to provide comprehensive coverage of religious politics in Mombasa and the nearby Lamu area, which has been beset by al-Shabaab activities. Following the raid and closure of the most popular mosque in Mombasa by the Kenyan government, VOA
Swahili aired two live call-in shows in November 2014, which received praise from the city’s Muslim community for providing space and equal time to opposing sides – those who support government measures and those who oppose them. Both sides called on the government to reopen the mosque, which occurred three days after the second call-in show.

**French to Africa:** VOA’s French to Africa Service provided extensive coverage of the conflict in Mali and its impact on the sub-region. In 2014, VOA continued to broadcast its daily news and information program in Bambara, the most widely spoken local language, as well as a weekly newscast in Songhai, the most prevalent language in the north of the country. The Service also reaches Muslims through “Sahel Plus,” a 25-minute weekly French language program with news and features about issues of common concern in the Sahel region. In addition, VOA French to Africa aired a weekly program called “Dialogue des Religion,” which offers discussions with Muslim scholars and experts on various aspects of Islam. Throughout the year, the Service also provided full coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency through reports and interviews with French-speaking residents in Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger.

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**ENGLISH**

On September 10, VOA English joined with VOA Central News to produce a 90-minute Radio/TV/Web simulcast around President Obama’s speech on the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), complete with analysis and Congressional reaction. VOA set the scene with the White House Correspondent, State Department Correspondent from Jordan, Pentagon Correspondent, and senior correspondents/analysts. Coverage included a live interview with Representative Eliot Engel (D-NY). The Service used social media to solicit questions from around the world during the President’s speech and updated the speech live as the President spoke. Throughout the speech, the White House correspondent tweeted quotes and other highlights.

On June 12, the English Division interviewed the Governor of Kirkuk in Iraq, Dr. Najmaldin Karim, regarding the security situation and the moving of more than 15,000 Kurdish Peshmerga fighters into Kirkuk Province to protect it against ISIL. A number of terrorism experts were interviewed, including Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute.
Chapter 6
Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). FTO designations play a critical role in the fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities.

In 2014, the following FTOs were designated by the Department of State: Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah, and Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia on January 13, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis on April 10, and Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem on August 20. Also in 2014, the Department of State revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia on July 15.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended:

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B)
Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D)
Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T)
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)
Army of Islam (AOI)
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Boko Haram (BH)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)
Hamas
Haqqani Network (HQN)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)
Hizbullah
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)
Jamaah Islamiya (JI)
Jundallah
Kahane Chai
Kata’ib Hizbullah (KH)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Lashkar e-Tayyiba
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC)
Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Nusrah Front (ANF)
Al-Qa’ida (AQ)
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Al-Shabaab (AS)
Shining Path (SL)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
**ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES**

**aka** Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades

**Description:** The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a July 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against Israel. The group is divided into two branches: the Arabian Peninsula-based Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after the now-deceased founder of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula; and the Lebanon-based Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Ziad al Jarrah, a Lebanese citizen who was one of the planners of the September 11 attacks on the United States.

**Activities:** AAB has relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, and is responsible for numerous rocket attacks fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon. These attacks in Israel have targeted population centers, including Nahariya and Ashkelon. In addition to rocket attacks, AAB carried out a July 2010 suicide bombing attack against the Japanese-owned oil tanker M/V M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz.

In November 2013, AAB began to target Hizballah. It claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded over 140, and warned that the group would carry out more attacks unless Hizballah stops sending fighters to support Syrian government forces.

In February 2014, a twin suicide bomb attack targeting the Iranian cultural center in Beirut killed four people; AAB claimed responsibility for the attack and said that it had carried out the bombings as retaliation for Hizballah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict. AAB is also believed to have been responsible for a series of bombings in Hizballah-controlled areas around Beirut. A June suicide bombing at a police checkpoint on the Beirut-Damascus highway targeted Lebanese General Security head Major General Abbas Ibrahim, who narrowly escaped. Also in June, a suicide bombing in the Beirut neighborhood of Tayyouneh killed a security officer and wounded 25 people.

In July, AAB briefly turned its attention back towards Israel, firing a series of rockets into northern Israel in response to Israel’s Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** AAB is based in Lebanon and operates in Lebanon and Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown
aka ANO; Arab Revolutionary Brigades; Arab Revolutionary Council; Black September; Fatah Revolutionary Council; Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was founded by Sabri al-Banna (aka Abu Nidal), after splitting from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad. Leadership of the organization after Nadal’s death remains unclear. ANO advocates the elimination of Israel and has sought to derail diplomatic efforts in support of the Middle East peace process.

Activities: The ANO has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. It has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s and was expelled from its safe haven in Libya in 1999. Major attacks included those on the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the 1986 attack on the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi in 1986, and the City of Poros day-exursion ship attack in Greece in 1988. The ANO was suspected of assassinating PLO Deputy Chief Abu Iyad and PLO Security Chief Abu Hul in Tunis in 1991, and a senior Jordanian diplomat in Beirut in 1994. In 2008, a Jordanian official reported the apprehension of an ANO member who planned to carry out attacks in Jordan. There were no known ANO attacks in 2014.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: ANO associates are presumed present in Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: The ANO’s current access to resources is unclear, but it is likely that the decline in support previously provided by Libya, Syria, and Iran has had a severe impact on its capabilities.

ABU SAYYAF GROUP

aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement)

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. ASG is the most violent of the terrorist groups operating in the Philippines and claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The group split from the much larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998.

Activities: The ASG engages in kidnapping for ransom, bombings, ambushes of security personnel, public beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. In April 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 people, including 10 Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three U.S. citizens and 17 Philippine nationals from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including U.S. citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. A Philippine military hostage rescue operation in June 2002 freed U.S. hostage Gracia Burnham,
but her husband, U.S. national Martin Burnham, and Deborah Yap of the Philippines were killed. Philippine and U.S. authorities blamed the ASG for a bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed a U.S. service member. In one of the most destructive acts of maritime violence, the ASG bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay in February 2004, killing at least 116 people.

In 2014, ASG remained active, conducting numerous attacks on civilian and government targets in the southern Philippines. On July 28, 40 to 50 ASG militants with assault rifles opened fire on civilians traveling to celebrate the end of Ramadan, killing at least 21, including six children, and wounding 11. At least four members of a Talipao civilian security force were killed in the attack. In a July video, senior ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon, also an FBI most-wanted terrorist, swore allegiance to ISIL and ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Philippine police conducted a number of raids and arrests of ASG members in 2014, including an ASG leader, Khair Mundos. Mundos confessed to having arranged the transfer of funds from al-Qa’ida to ASG to be used in bombings and other criminal acts throughout the island of Mindanao.

**Strength:** ASG is estimated to have 400 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The ASG operates primarily in the Philippine provinces of the Sulu Archipelago, namely Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi; and on the Zamboanga Peninsula. The group also operates in Malaysia.

**Funding and External Aid:** The ASG is funded through kidnapping for ransom operations and extortion, and may receive funding from external sources including remittances from supportive overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based violent extremists. In the past, the ASG has also received assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya, whose operatives provided training to ASG members and helped facilitate several ASG terrorist attacks.

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**AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE**

aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) is composed of an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in September 2000. AAMB’s goal is to drive the Israeli military and West Bank settlers from the West Bank in order to establish a Palestinian state loyal to the Fatah.

**Activities:** AAMB employed primarily small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers as the intifada spread in 2000, but by 2002 turned increasingly to attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel. In January 2002, the group claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing inside Israel. In 2010, AAMB launched numerous rocket attacks on communities in Israel, including the city of Sederot and areas of the Negev desert. Again in December 2011, AAMB launched rockets aimed at communities in the Negev. The attack caused no injuries or damage. In November 2012, two men recruited by AAMB were arrested in connection with stabbing a student in the Israeli city of Beersheba. That same year, AAMB
claimed that they had fired more than 500 rockets and missiles into Israel during Operation Pillar of Defense, the week-long Israeli Defense Force operation in Gaza. In February 2013, AAMB claimed responsibility for a rocket attack in southern Israel, which landed outside of the city of Ashkelon. In summer 2014, AAMB joined Hamas in fighting Israel during Operation Protective Edge, and released a recruitment video showing fighters training in November.

**Strength:** A few hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Most of AAMB’s operational activity is in Gaza but the group also planned and conducted attacks inside Israel and the West Bank. The group has members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran has exploited AAMB’s lack of resources and formal leadership by providing funds and guidance, mostly through Hizballah facilitators.

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### ANSAR AL-DINE

**aka** Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith

**Description:** Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22, 2013. Operating in Mali, AAD was created in late 2011 after AAD’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, failed in an attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the March 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations (including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia law upon the civilian population living in the areas it controlled.

Beginning in January 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other violent extremist groups, eventually forcing AAD and its allies out of the population centers they had seized. AAD’s leader Iyad ag Ghali, however, remained free and in August 2014, Ghali appeared in an AAD video threatening to attack France.

**Activities:** AAD has received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Government of Mali – most notably in the capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Tessalit, Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu – between January and April 2012. In March 2012, Tuareg rebels, reportedly including AAD, executed 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapped 30 others in an attack against the town of Aguelhok. Before the French intervention in January 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control who did not comply with AAD’s laws, reportedly faced harassment, torture, or execution.

AAD was severely weakened by the French intervention in Mali, but continued to participate in and support attacks in Mali, reportedly including bringing arms and fighters into Kidal in September 2013, in advance of an AQIM-led attack that killed at least two civilians. In December 2014, AAD took responsibility for firing at least nine rockets at the UN base in Tessalit, Mali, and is suspected to have been behind a second rocket attack on the same base a few days later.
Strength: AAD has fractured and its members have been largely scattered by the French intervention in Mali. The group’s membership numbers were unknown at the end of 2014.

Location/Area of Operation: Northern Mali, Southwestern Libya

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception, and some factions of AAD are believed to maintain close ties to the group.

ANSAR AL-ISLAM

aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22, 2004, Ansar al-Islam’s (AAI’s) goals include expelling western interests from Iraq and establishing an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia law. AAI was established in 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan with the merger of two Kurdish violent extremist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. On May 4, 2010, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i, AAI’s leader, was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad and remains in prison. On December 15, 2011, AAI announced a new leader, Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibrahim.

Mullah Krekar (aka Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad), an Iraqi citizen and the founder of AAI, continued to reside in Norway on a long-term residence permit. In March 2012, a trial court in Norway convicted Krekar of issuing threats and inciting terrorism, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Krekar appealed, and in December 2012, an appeals court affirmed his convictions for issuing threats and intimidating witnesses, but reversed his conviction for "inciting terrorism." The appeals court reduced his sentence to two years and 10 months in prison.

Activities: AAI has conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Coalition Forces. AAI has conducted numerous kidnappings, executions, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. The group has either claimed responsibility or is believed to be responsible for attacks in 2011 that killed 24 and wounded 147. During August and September 2013, AAI claimed attacks against Iraqi Army security forces, as well as an attack against an individual associated with the Iraqi government.

In 2014, AAI claimed responsibility for attacks that occurred near Kirkuk, Tikrit, and Mosul, Iraq. AAI’s attacks were primarily directed at the Iraqi police and security forces, and in one instance an oil field. AAI claims to have killed several Iraqi military members, law enforcement officials, and claims to have obtained weapons and vehicles.

Strength: Although precise numbers are unknown, AAI is considered one of the largest Sunni terrorist groups in Iraq.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Primarily northern Iraq, but also maintains a presence in western and central Iraq.

**Funding and External Aid:** AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

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**ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN BENGHAZI**

*aka* Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; Al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya and has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, and assassinations and attempted assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-B were involved in the September 11, 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four American citizens were killed in the attack, including Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, Tyrone Woods, and the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens.

In 2013 and 2014, AAS-B is believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in Benghazi.

In addition to its attacks, AAS-B controls several terrorist training camps in Libya, and has trained members of other terrorist organizations, some of which operate in Syria, Iraq, and Mali. At least 12 of the 28 individuals involved in Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s al-Mulathamun Battalion’s January 2013 attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria, were trained in AAS-B camps.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Benghazi, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** AAS-B obtains funds from AQIM, charities, donations, and criminal activities.

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**ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN DARNAH**

*aka* Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya and has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets, and assassinations and attempted
assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya. In October 2014, AAS-D publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL.

**Activities:** Members of AAS-D were involved in the September 11, 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Four American citizens were killed in the attack, including Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, Tyrone Woods, and the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens.

In 2013 and 2014, AAS-D is believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in Benghazi.

In addition to its attacks, AAS-D maintains several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and has trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Syria and Iraq.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Darnah, Libya

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**ANSAR AL-SHARI’A IN TUNISIA**

aka Al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 13, 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was founded by Specially Designated Global Terrorist Seif Allah Ben Hassine in early 2011. AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of locations that tourists frequent. AAS-T has also been involved in recruiting youth in Tunisia for fighting in Syria.

**Activities:** Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia was involved in the September 14, 2012 attack against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of over one hundred U.S. employees in the Embassy. In February and July 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of two Tunisian politicians, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi. In October 2013, AAS-T attempted to carry out suicide attacks against two tourist sites in Tunisia. The first attack took place when a bomber blew himself up outside a hotel in Sousse, Tunisia, resulting in no other fatalities. On the same day, police prevented a suicide bombing in Monastir, Tunisia, when they arrested a would-be bomber at the Tomb of Habib Bourguiba.

Throughout 2014, Tunisian security forces continued to clash with AAS-T members.

**Strength:** Unknown
Location/Area of Operation: Tunisia and Libya

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

ANSAR BAYT AL-MAQDIS

aka Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Supporters of the holy place

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on April 9, 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) rose to prominence in 2011 following the Egyptian uprisings and is responsible for attacks on Israel and Egyptian government and security elements, and tourists in Egypt. In November 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Activities: ABM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli interests, including a July 2012 attack against a Sinai pipeline exporting gas to Israel and an August 2012 rocket attack on the southern Israeli city of Eilat. In September 2012, ABM militants attacked an Israeli border patrol, killing one soldier and injuring another.

In October 2013, ABM claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing targeting the South Sinai Security Directorate in el Tor, which killed three people and injured more than 45. In January 2014, ABM successfully downed an Egyptian military helicopter in a missile attack, killing five soldiers on board; and also claimed responsibility for four attacks involving car bombs and hand grenades in Cairo, which left six people dead and over 70 wounded, many of them civilian bystanders.

ABM has targeted government officials, including the September 2013 attempted assassination of the Egyptian Interior Minister, and the January 2014 assassination of the head of the Interior Minister’s technical office. In February 2014, ABM claimed responsibility for the bombing of a tour bus in the Sinai Peninsula, killing the Egyptian driver and three South Korean tourists, in its first attack against foreign tourists.

In October 2014, ABM beheaded four individuals who they claimed spied for Israel. Also in October, ABM claimed an attack on a security checkpoint that left over 26 Egyptian soldiers dead and wounded 26 others, including civilians. ABM subsequently released a video of the attack as part of its announcement declaring allegiance to ISIL in November 2014.

Strength: ABM is estimated to have several hundred fighters in the Sinai and affiliated cells in the Nile Valley.

Location/Area of Operation: Even though ABM’s operations are based out of the Sinai Peninsula, the group’s reach extends to Cairo and the Egyptian Nile Valley, and across the border into Gaza.
**Funding and External Aid:** Although the source of ABM’s funding is largely unknown, there are indications that ABM may receive funding from external actors.

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**ARMY OF ISLAM**

*aka* Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 19, 2011, the Army of Islam (AOI) is a Gaza-based terrorist organization founded in late 2005 that is responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Governments of Israel and Egypt, as well as American, British, and New Zealander citizens. Led by Mumtaz Dughmush, AOI primarily operates in Gaza. It subscribes to a violent extremist Salafist ideology together with the traditional model of armed Palestinian resistance. AOI has previously worked with Hamas and is attempting to develop closer al-Qa’ida contacts.

**Activities:** AOI’s terrorist acts include a number of rocket attacks on Israel, the 2006 kidnapping of two journalists in Gaza (an American and a New Zealander), and the 2007 kidnapping of a British citizen in Gaza. AOI is also responsible for early 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt, and allegedly planned the January 1, 2011 Alexandria attack on a Coptic Christian church that killed 25 and wounded 100. On July 28, 2012, AOI released a statement that one of its members, Nidal al ‘Ashi, was killed fighting in Syria and in November 2012 announced that they had carried out rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, a designated foreign terrorist organization. In August 2013, an Israeli official reported that AOI leader Dughmush was running training camps in Gaza. In August 2014, Israeli forces reportedly intercepted and killed several AOI fighters who were reportedly planning to attack Israel.

**Strength:** Membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Gaza, with attacks in Egypt and Israel.

**Funding and External Aid:** AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

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**ASBAT AL-ANSAR**

*aka* Asbat al-Ansar; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; AAA; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar is a Lebanon-based violent Sunni extremist group composed primarily of Palestinians with links to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other Sunni violent extremist groups. Some of the group’s stated goals include thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country, although the group remains largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.
Activities: Asbat al-Ansar first emerged in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, the group assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group has also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. In October 2004, Mahir al-Sa’di, a member of Asbat al-Ansar, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for his 2000 plot to assassinate then-U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, David Satterfield. Members of the group have traveled to Iraq between 2005 and 2011 to fight Coalition Forces. Asbat al-Ansar has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon due in part to concerns over losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp. AAA did not publicly claim any attacks in 2014.

Strength: The group has at least 650 members.

Location/Area of Operation: The group’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: It is likely that the group receives money through international Sunni extremist networks.

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AUM SHINRIKYO

aka A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute; A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho; Aleph; Aum Supreme Truth

Description: Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Jailed leader Shoko Asahara established AUM in 1987, and the organization received legal status in Japan as a religious entity in 1989. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of AUM as a religious organization following AUM’s deadly 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo. Despite claims of renunciation of violence and Asahara’s teachings, members of the group continue to adhere to the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

Activities: In March 1995, AUM members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 13 people and causing up to 6,000 to seek medical treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese government revealed the group was responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin gas attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed seven and injured approximately 500. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995; in February 2004, authorities sentenced him to death for his role in the 1995 attacks, but authorities have not yet carried out the sentence. In 2010 and 2011, several death sentences for other AUM senior members were finalized or affirmed by Japanese courts. In 2012, the final three AUM fugitives were arrested after 17 years on the run.

Since 1997, the group has split into two factions, both of which have recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprises, and acquired property. In July 2000, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian AUM followers who had planned to detonate bombs in Japan as part of an operation to free Asahara from jail and smuggle him to Russia. In August 2012, a Japan Airlines flight to the United States was turned back after receiving a bomb threat demanding the release of Asahara.
Although AUM has not conducted a terrorist attack since 1995, concerns remain regarding its continued adherence to the violent teachings of Asahara.

**Strength:** As of December 2014, AUM membership in Japan was approximately 1,650 with another 160 in Russia. AUM continues to maintain at least 32 facilities in 15 prefectures in Japan and continues to possess several facilities in Russia. (At the time of the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, the group claimed to have as many as 40,000 members worldwide, including 9,000 in Japan and 30,000 members in Russia.)

**Location/Area of Operation:** AUM’s principal membership is located in Japan; a residual branch of about 160 followers live in Russia.

**Funding and External Aid:** Funding primarily comes from member contributions and group-run businesses.

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**BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY**

aka ETA; Askatasuna; Batasuna; Ekin; Euskal Herritarrok; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; Herri Batasuna; Jarrai-Haika-Segi; K.A.S.; XAKI

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava; the autonomous region of Navarre; and the southwestern French territories of Labourd, Lower-Navarre, and Soule. ETA is listed as a terrorist organization by Spain and the EU. In 2002, the Spanish Parliament banned the political party Batasuna, ETA’s political wing, charging its members with providing material support to the terrorist group. In June 2009, the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on Batasuna. In September 2008, Spanish courts also banned two other Basque independence parties with reported links to Batasuna. In 2010, when Batasuna continued to try to remain engaged political activities, divisions among parts of ETA became publicly apparent.

**Activities:** ETA primarily has conducted bombings and assassinations. Targets typically included Spanish government officials, businessmen, politicians, judicial figures, and security and military forces; however, the group has also targeted journalists and major tourist areas. The group is responsible for killing 829 civilians and members of the armed forces and police, and injuring thousands since it formally began a campaign of violence in 1968.

ETA has committed numerous attacks in the last four decades. Some of the group’s high profile attacks include the February 2005 ETA car bombing in Madrid that wounded more than 20 people at a convention center where Spanish King Juan Carlos and then Mexican President Vicente Fox were scheduled to appear. In December 2006, ETA exploded a massive car bomb that destroyed much of the covered parking garage at Madrid’s Barajas International Airport. ETA marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2009 with a series of high profile and deadly bombings,
including the July attack on a Civil Guard Barracks that injured more than 60 people, including children.

By October 2011, after ETA was militarily debilitated and politically isolated, the group announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity.” Given that the group has made and broken several past ceasefires, Madrid rejected this announcement and demanded that ETA disarm and disband. The group has yet to disband formally or give up its weapons arsenal since this latest cessation of armed activity.

Since 2007, more than 700 ETA militants have been arrested, including 16 arrested in 2014, both in Spain and abroad. Collaboration with France, the UK, Germany, and Mexico led to successful arrests in 2014.

**Strength:** Estimates put ETA membership of those who have not been captured by authorities at fewer than 20. There are approximately 455 ETA members in prison in Spain and France, one is incarcerated in Germany, and another in Portugal.

**Location/Area of Operation:** ETA operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but the group has attacked Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

**Funding and External Aid:** ETA is probably experiencing financial shortages given that the group announced publicly in September 2011 that it had ceased collecting “revolutionary taxes” from Basque businesses. This extortion program was a major source of ETA’s income.

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**BOKO HARAM**

*aka* Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14, 2013, and led by Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram (BH) is a Nigeria-based group responsible for numerous attacks in northern and northeastern Nigeria that have killed thousands of people since its emergence in 2009. The group espouses a violent Sunni extremist ideology and at times has received assistance, including funds and training, from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

**Activities:** Among its major attacks, BH was responsible for the August 26, 2011 bomb attack on the UN building in Abuja that killed at least 21 people and wounded dozens more. The group is also responsible for the January 2012 attacks in Kano, Nigeria, in which a wave of bomb attacks in the city killed more than 180 people in a single day.

Boko Haram has increasingly crossed Nigerian borders to evade pressure and conduct operations. In February 2013, Boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the Far North of Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped a French priest in Cameroon. In December 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked
civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected Boko Haram members along Nigeria’s borders. In 2013, the group also kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.

Boko Haram had its deadliest year in 2014, killing approximately 5,000 Nigerian civilians. The group also declared its own “Islamic state” in 2014 and began seizing territory from the Nigerian military throughout the northeast. In February 2014, BH killed dozens of people in two separate attacks, one on the farming village of Izghe in Borno state and the other on the fishing village of Doron Baga on Lake Chad. In April 2014, BH kidnapped at least 276 female students from a school in Chibok, Borno state. On June 2, 2014, at least two hundred people, mostly Christians, were massacred by BH militants in and around Gwoza, Borno state. On November 28, 2014, BH militants attacked the central mosque in Kano, Nigeria, killing approximately 120. BH conducted three attacks in Abuja and one attack in Lagos in 2014.

**Strength:** Membership is estimated to be several thousand fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, Lake Chad Basin, and southeast Niger.

**Funding and External Aid:** BH receives the bulk of its funding from criminal activities such as kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, and extortion.

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**COMMUNIST PARTY OF PHILIPPINES/NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY**

aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; the CPP; New People’s Army; the NPA

**Description:** The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) – the New People’s Army (NPA) – is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Jose Maria Sison, the Chairman of the CPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), also lives in the Netherlands and has become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA had an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, used city-based assassination squads.

**Activities:** The CPP/NPA primarily targeted Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refused to pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA charged politicians running for office in CPP/NPA-influenced areas for “campaign permits.” In addition to its focus on Philippine governmental targets, the CPP/NPA has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines. In 1987, the CPP/NPA conducted direct actions against U.S. personnel and facilities, killing three American soldiers in four separate attacks in Angeles City. In 1989, the CPP/NPA issued a press statement claiming responsibility for the
ambush and murder of Colonel James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Ground Forces Division of

Over the past few years, the CPP/NPA has continued to carry out killings, raids, kidnappings,
acts of extortion, and other forms of violence which are directed mainly against domestic and
security force targets. In May 2013, the Armed Forces of the Philippines reported that from
2011 through the first quarter of 2013, 383 people, including 158 civilians, were killed in
encounters between the CPP/NPA and government forces.

On July 10, 2014, heavily armed NPA fighters attacked a municipal police station in Surigao del
Norte, and held four police officers captive during the attack, wounding two of them. At least
two soldiers were killed and another wounded following a confrontation with suspected NPA
rebels in Negros Occidental on July 17, 2014. During a nominal “holiday” ceasefire with the
Government of the Philippines in December 2014, NPA carried out multiple attacks, including
setting fire to construction equipment and a civilian’s vehicle, abducting a jail warden, and
shooting and killing three military-affiliated individuals – all unarmed and in civilian clothes.
The NPA continued to use explosive and improvised explosive devices to target police and
security forces.

On March 22, 2014, two leaders of the CPP/NPA, Benito Tiamzon and his wife Wilma, were
arrested by Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police in Aloguinsan,
Cebu. Abraham Delejero Villanueva, a suspected leader of the CPP/NPA, was also arrested on
July 20, 2014, and on August 5, 2014, Eduardo Almores Esteban, a high-ranking official in the
CPP/NPA, was arrested by the military and police in Jaro, Iloilo, Philippines.

Strength: The Philippine government estimates there are 4,000 CPP/NPA members.

Location/Area of Operation: Rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of northern and eastern
Mindanao. There are also cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.

Funding and External Aid: The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion and theft.

CONTINUITY IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

aka Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 13, 2004, the Continuity
Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group formed in 1994 as the clandestine
armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein; it split from Sinn Fein in 1986. “Continuity” refers to the
group’s belief that it is carrying on the original Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) goal of forcing
the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA). In 2012,
CIRA released a statement claiming it had new leadership, after previous leadership was ousted
over allegations that it was acting to the detriment of the organization.

Activities: CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it
has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. On
occasion, it provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. CIRA did not join the Provisional IRA in the September 2005 decommissioning, and remained capable of effective, if sporadic, terrorist attacks.

The group has remained active in the past three years. In December 2012, a plot by CIRA to murder an Irish national serving in the British army was foiled by Irish police. In January 2013, the group claimed responsibility for firing shots at police officers in Drumbeig, Craigavon County, Northern Ireland. In March 2014, CIRA claimed responsibility for an attempted bomb attack on the home and vehicle of a Police Service of Northern Ireland officer.

**Strength:** Membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50. Police counterterrorism operations have reduced the group’s strength.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

**Funding and External Aid:** CIRA supported its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

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**GAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA**

*a* al-Gama’at; Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya; GI; Islamic Gama’at; IG; Islamic Group

**Description:** Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Once Egypt’s largest militant group, IG was formed in the 1970s. In 2011, it formed the Construction and Development political party that competed in the 2011 parliamentary elections, winning 13 seats. Egypt-based members of IG released from prison prior to the 2011 revolution have renounced terrorism, although some members located overseas have worked with or joined al-Qaeda (AQ). Hundreds of members, who may not have renounced violence, were released from prison in 2011. The external wing, composed of mainly exiled members in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state. IG’s “spiritual” leader, the “blind Sheikh,” Omar Abd al-Rahman, is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Supporters of Abd al-Rahman have called for reprisal attacks in the event of his death in prison.

**Activities:** In the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG has not committed a known terrorist attack in recent years.

**Strength:** At its peak, IG likely commanded several thousand core members and a similar number of supporters. Security crackdowns following the 1997 attack in Luxor and the 1999
ceasefire, along with post-September 11 security measures and defections to AQ, have probably resulted in a substantial decrease in what is left of an organized group.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The IG is believed to have maintained a presence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, the UK, Germany, and France.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**HAMAS**

*aka* the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Forces; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions

**Description:** Hamas was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Hamas possesses military and political wings, and came into being in late 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The armed element, called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based network of “Dawa” or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. Hamas retains control of Gaza.

**Activities:** Prior to 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, improvised explosive device attacks, and shootings. Hamas has not directly targeted U.S. interests, although U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks against Israeli targets. In June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah, the Gaza borders were closed and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza, using the Sinai and maritime routes. Hamas has since dedicated the majority of its activity in Gaza to solidifying its control, hardening its defenses, building its weapons caches, tightening security, and conducting limited operations against Israeli military forces.

Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel from late December 2008 to January 2009. From November 14-21, 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Despite the Egypt-mediated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in 2012, operatives from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) coordinated and carried out a November bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. On July 8, 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective Edge in Gaza with the intent on stopping rocket fire into Israel, which had increased following Israeli military operations after the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas.
Strength: Several thousand Gaza-based operatives with varying degrees of skills are in its armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, along with its paramilitary group known as the “Executive Force.”

Location/Area of Operation: Since 2007, Hamas has controlled Gaza and also has a presence in the West Bank. The group retains leaders and facilitators that conduct political, fundraising, and arms-smuggling activities throughout the region. Hamas also has a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: Historically, Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran. In March 2014, Israel intercepted a weapons shipment containing rockets, mortars, and ammunition destined for Hamas and PIJ in Gaza. The group also raises funds in the Gulf countries and receives donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world through its charities, such as the umbrella fundraising organization, the Union of Good. Hamas’s supply lines continued to suffer since the crackdown on smuggling tunnels in the Sinai Peninsula by the Egyptian military.

HAQQANI NETWORK

aka HQN

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 19, 2012, the Haqqani Network (HQN) was formed in the late 1970s, around the time of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Jalaluddin Haqqani, HQN’s founder, established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid-1980s, and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Jalaluddin retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group began participating in the insurgency and became known as the Haqqani Network.

Activities: HQN has planned and carried out a number of significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan government and civilian targets. HQN’s most notorious attacks in recent years include an attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in June 2011, which killed 11 civilians and two Afghan policemen; a September 2011 truck bombing in Wardak Province, Afghanistan, which wounded 77 U.S. soldiers; a 19-hour attack on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul in September 2011, which killed 16 Afghans, including at least six children; a June 2012 suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno, which killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100; and a 12-hour siege of the Spozhmai Hotel in Kabul in June 2012, which resulted in the death of at least 18 Afghans, including 14 civilians. HQN was also involved in holding U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who was kidnapped in 2009 and remained in captivity until he was released in May 2014.

HQN’s attacks continued in 2014. In July, Afghan officials blamed HQN for a suicide attack at a market in Orgun, which killed over 70 people, and an attack against the airport in Kabul. In November, Afghan officials implicated HQN in an attack in which a suicide bomber killed more than 60 people at a volleyball game in Paktika province. In addition to these attacks, multiple
HQN plots, many planned against Afghan officials in Kabul, were disrupted by the Afghan police before they could be carried out.

HQN suffered numerous setbacks in 2014, including the capture of two senior members, Anas Haqqani and Hafiz Rashid, by Afghan security forces in October.

**Strength:** HQN is believed to have several hundred core members, but it is estimated that the organization is also able to draw upon a pool of upwards of 10,000 fighters with varying degrees of affiliation. HQN cooperates closely with the larger Afghan Taliban and also draws strength through cooperation with other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan, including al-Qa’ida, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Jaish-e Mohammad.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HQN is active along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and across much of southeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Loya Paktia. The group’s leadership has historically maintained a power base around Pakistan’s tribal areas.

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it receives through its connections to other terrorist organizations, HQN receives much of its funds from donors in Pakistan and the Gulf, as well as through criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, and other licit and illicit business ventures.

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**HARAKAT-UL JIHAD ISLAMI**


**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on August 6, 2010, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization refocused its efforts on India. HUJI seeks the annexation of Indian-administered Kashmir and the expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan. It also has supplied fighters for the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition, some factions of HUJI espouse a more global agenda and conduct attacks in Pakistan. HUJI is mostly composed of Pakistani militants and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. HUJI has experienced a number of internal splits and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida (AQ) in recent years, including training its members in AQ training camps. Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, one of HUJI’s top leaders who also served as an AQ military commander and strategist, died on June 3, 2011.

**Activities:** HUJI has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks. HUJI reportedly claimed responsibility for the September 7, 2011 bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 dead and an estimated 76 wounded, although another group separately claimed responsibility for the bombing. HUJI sent an email to the press stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. HUJI did not publicly claim any attacks in 2014.
**Strength:** HUJI has an estimated strength of several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HUJI’s area of operation extends throughout South Asia, with its terrorist operations focused primarily in India and Afghanistan. Some factions of HUJI conduct attacks within Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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<th>HARAKAT UL-JIHAD-I-ISLAMI/BANGLADESH</th>
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**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 5, 2008, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was formed in April 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. In October 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. HUJI-B has connections to Pakistani terrorist groups such as HUJI, al-Qa’ida, and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) that advocate similar objectives. The leaders of HUJI-B signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared American civilians legitimate targets.

**Activities:** In December 2008, three HUJI-B members were convicted for the May 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria of the Awami League in a grenade attack on January 27, 2005. HUJI-B committed no known attacks in 2013, however in March of that year, police in Dhaka arrested a group of militants which included some HUJI-B members. The group was preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals; and bombs, bomb-making material, and counterfeit currency were found when the arrest took place. In October 2014, a number of HUJI-B members were arrested, including a bomb expert. Some HUJI-B members may have traveled to Pakistan to receive military training from LeT.

**Strength:** HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans, but its total membership is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The group operates primarily in Bangladesh and India. HUJI-B trains and has a network of madrassas in Bangladesh.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international Muslim NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B and other Bangladeshi terrorist groups.

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<th>HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN</th>
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Activities: HUM has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri terrorist group al-Faran, which kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; the five reportedly were killed later that year. HUM was responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 1999 that resulted in the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar, who was imprisoned by India in 1994 and then founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) after his release. Another former member of Harakat ul-Ansar, Ahmed Omar Sheik, was also released by India as a result of the hijackings and was later convicted of the abduction and murder in 2002 of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

HUM targets Indian security and civilian targets in Kashmir. The group conducted numerous attacks on Indian interests from at least 2005 through 2013. There were no known HUM attacks in 2014.

Strength: HUM has a few hundred armed supporters, who are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris. After 2000, a significant portion of HUM’s membership defected to JEM.

Location/Area of Operation: Operating from Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as several cities in Pakistan, HUM conducts terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir and Afghanistan. HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: HUM collects donations from wealthy and grassroots donors in Pakistan.

HIZBALLAH

aka the Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

Description: Hizballah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme
Leader, which was Ali Khamenei in 2014. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with Syria, and like Iran, the group is providing assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Hizballah has strong influence in Lebanon, especially with the Shia community. Hizballah plays an active role in Lebanese politics, and the group holds 12 seats in the 128-member Lebanese Parliament and two seats in the 24-member Council of Ministers. Hizballah’s political strength grew in the wake of the 2006 war with Israel and the group’s 2008 takeover of West Beirut, although its reputation and popularity have been significantly undermined by the group’s active support for the Asad regime.

Hizballah provides support to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as a number of local Christian and Muslim militias in Lebanon. Besides overt political support, support includes the covert provision of weapons, explosives, training, funding, and guidance.

Activities: Hizballah’s terrorist attacks have included the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and on the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area and, separately, kidnapped an Israeli non-combatant in Dubai. Although the non-combatant survived, on November 1, 2001, Israeli Army Rabbi Israel Weiss pronounced the soldiers dead. The surviving non-combatant and the bodies of the Israeli soldiers were returned to Israel in a prisoner exchange with Hizballah in 2004.

Two attacks against UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeepers – an attack in late July 2011 that wounded six French citizens and a second attack days later that injured three other French soldiers – were believed to have been carried out by Hizballah. Also in 2011, four Hizballah members were indicted by the U.N.-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an international tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. A fifth Hizballah member, Hassan Habib Merhi, was indicted in October 2013.

In 2012, Hizballah increased the pace of its terrorist plotting, and was implicated in several terrorist plots around the world. In January 2012, Thai police detained a Hizballah operative on immigration charges as he was attempting to depart Thailand from Suvarnabhumi International Airport. He led police to nearly 10,000 pounds of urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok. The Hizballah operative was convicted of possessing bomb-making materials by a Thai court in September 2013. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison.

In Cyprus, a suspected Hizballah operative was detained by the Cypriot authorities on July 7, 2012 for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists in Cyprus. The trial began in September 2012, and on March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.
In July 2012, a terrorist attack was carried out on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Sarafovo Airport near the Bulgarian city of Burgas. The explosion killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, and injured 32. On February 5, 2013, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Tsvetan Tsevtanov publicly linked two operatives in the Burgas bombing to Hizballah, and in July 2013, the Bulgarian government identified the operatives as Hassan al-Hajj Hassan, a dual Canadian-Lebanese citizen; and Meliad Farah, a dual Australian-Lebanese citizen. In August 2013, Hizballah claimed responsibility for an attack on the Lebanese-Israeli border that wounded four members of an Israeli military convoy.

In May 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Hizballah’s support for the Asad regime carried into 2014, and the group remained active in Syria. Separately, in October 2014, Hizballah set off an explosive device on the border between Lebanon and Israel. The attack wounded two Israeli soldiers.

**Strength:** Tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Hizballah is based in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. As evidenced by Hizballah’s activities during the course of 2012 and 2013, the group is capable of operating around the globe. As of December 2014, Hizballah fighters were assisting Asad regime forces in many areas across Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran continued to provide Hizballah with training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid; Syria has furnished training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support. Hizballah also receives funding from private donations and profits from legal and illegal businesses. Hizballah receives financial support from Lebanese Shia communities in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. As illustrated by the Lebanese-Canadian bank case, Hizballah supporters are often engaged in a range of criminal activities that benefit the group financially. These have included smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, trafficking in narcotics, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

**INDIAN MUJAHEDDEEN**

aka Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

**Description:** The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 19, 2011. An India-based terrorist group with links to Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, IM has been responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005, and has caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other U.S.-designated terrorist entities including Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad Islami. IM’s stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their oppression of Muslims.
Activities: IM’s primary method of attack is multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against economic and civilian targets to maximize terror and casualties. In 2008, an IM attack in Delhi killed 30 people; IM was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38 and injured more than 100. Individuals associated with IM probably played a facilitative role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks carried out by LeT that killed 166 people, including six Americans. In 2010, IM carried out the bombing of a popular German bakery in Pune, India, frequented by tourists, killing 17 and injuring over 60. In 2013, IM conducted multiple bombings and terrorist attacks, killing dozens of innocent civilians and injuring hundreds more.

In 2014, IM reportedly continued to plan serial bombings throughout India. The Delhi Police Special Cell and Rajasthan Antiterrorism Squad disrupted a major terrorist attack in Rajasthan on March 23 when they arrested four suspected IM terrorists and confiscated 250 kg of explosives, including over 70 bombs. Indian authorities stated that IM was planning terrorist attacks in Delhi in September, and police seized a file with IM’s letterhead that mentioned plans to target Indian cities.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: India

Funding and External Aid: Suspected to obtain funding and support from other terrorist organizations, and from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

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**ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION**

aka Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihod Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama’at; The Libyan Society

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on June 17, 2005, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is a Sunni violent extremist organization that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s and is currently based in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Najmiddin Jalolov founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) in March 2002, but the group was renamed IJU in May 2005. Although IJU remains committed to overthrowing the Government of Uzbekistan, it also has a global agenda, seen in its attacks on Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Activities: The IJU primarily operates against ISAF and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and continues to pose a threat to Central Asia. The group claimed responsibility for attacks in March and April 2004 in Uzbekistan, targeting police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In July 2004, the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent. In September 2007, German authorities disrupted an IJU plot to attack U.S. military bases and personnel by detaining and prosecuting three IJU operatives, including two German citizens. Foreign terrorist fighters
from Germany, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe continued to travel to the Afghan-Pakistan border area to join the IJU to fight against U.S. and Coalition Forces.

In 2013, two IJU videos showed an attack against an American military base in Afghanistan and an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier at a base in Afghanistan. In January 2014, IJU released a video threatening the Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia. In May 2014, IJU claimed a joint operation with the Afghan Taliban on an Afghan military base in Khost province, and released a video of the attack.

**Strength:** 100 to 200 members

**Location/Area of Operation:** Based in Pakistan and active in Afghanistan, IJU members are also scattered throughout Central Asia and Europe.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN**

aka IMU

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 25, 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) goal is to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state. For most of the past decade, however, the group recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe and has focused on fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IMU has a relationship with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In April 2012, IMU leader Abu Usman Adil died and Usman Ghazi was named the group’s new leader.

IMU’s leadership cadre remains based in Pakistan’s tribal areas and operates primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan. Top IMU leaders have integrated themselves into the Taliban’s shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Operating in cooperation with each other, the Taliban and IMU have expanded their presence throughout northern Afghanistan, and have established training camps in the region. Group members may have also traveled to Syria to fight with violent extremist groups.

**Activities:** Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly focused on attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. In late 2009, NATO forces reported an increase in IMU-affiliated foreign fighters in Afghanistan. In 2010, IMU claimed responsibility for the September 19 ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops in Tajikistan. On October 15, 2011, IMU claimed responsibility for a suicide assault on a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team based in the Afghan province of Panjshir that killed two Afghan civilians and wounded two security guards. In 2013, IMU remained active and carried out numerous attacks that killed civilians and police, including a joint attack with the Taliban in May and a suicide attack near Bagram Air Base that targeted a U.S. military convoy.
On June 8, 2014, IMU claimed an attack on Karachi’s international airport that resulted in the deaths of at least 39 people. IMU posted photos online of 10 men holding AK-47s after the attack. On September 26, IMU senior leader Usman Ghazi announced the group’s allegiance to ISIL. The IMU released a statement praising the December 16 Peshawar school attack, carried out by TTP.

**Strength:** 200-300 members

**Location/Area of Operation:** IMU militants are located in South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran.

**Funding and External Aid:** The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.

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**ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND THE LEVANT**

*aka* al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al-Jihad/Bilad al-Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State in Iraq; Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; Al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant, organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world and the West’s support for and the existence of Israel. In late 2004, he joined al-Qa’ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. After this, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as AQI. Zarqawi traveled to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and led his group against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006. In October 2006, AQI publicly re-named itself the Islamic State in Iraq, although within the past year the group adopted the moniker Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to express its regional ambitions as it expanded its operations to include the Syrian conflict. Since 2012, ISIL has been led by Specially Designated Global Terrorist Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, aka Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badi, aka Abu Du’a. On May 15, the Department of State amended the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of AQI to add aliases, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and to make ISIL the organization’s primary name. In June 2014, ISIL leader al-Baghdadi declared an Islamic caliphate.
Activities: As AQI, ISIL has conducted high profile attacks, including improvised explosive device attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure; videotaped beheadings of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 11, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 22, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004); suicide bomber attacks against both military and civilian targets; and rocket attacks. ISIL perpetrates the majority of suicide and mass casualty bombings in Iraq using foreign and Iraqi operatives. ISIL was active in Iraq in 2012 and 2013; in 2013 alone it was responsible for the majority of deaths of the over 7,000 Iraqi civilians killed that year. ISIL was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria during 2013, including against other militant opposition groups, and participated in a number of kidnapping incidents against civilians, including aid workers and reporters.

ISIL remained active in 2014, launching numerous attacks on a variety of targets in both Syria and Iraq. In January, ISIL captured Fallujah, Iraq, and proclaimed an Islamic state there. In June, the group took over Mosul, the second most populous city in Iraq, and a large part of the surrounding Nineveh province. In early July, ISIL captured Syria’s largest oilfield, the al-Omar. By late July, they took a Syrian 17th Division base near Raqqah. In early August, the group captured the Iraqi city of Sinjar, precipitating a humanitarian refugee crisis when the Yazidi, an Iraqi minority ethnic group living in the area, fled to avoid ISIL atrocities. Reported atrocities include the massacre of Yazidi men and the holding of Yazidi women and girls captive and selling them as slaves. In mid-August, ISIL beheaded U.S. journalist James Foley; in September, the group beheaded journalist Steven Sotloff; in October, ISIL killed British aid worker Alan Henning; and in November, American aid worker and ISIL hostage Peter Kassig was also murdered. In late December, ISIL captured a Jordanian pilot after his aircraft malfunctioned and he ejected into ISIL-controlled territory.

Strength: Estimates at year’s end placed the number of fighters that ISIL can muster between 20,000 and 31,500.

Location/Area of Operation: ISIL’s operations are predominately in Iraq and Syria, although supporters and associates worldwide who are inspired by the group’s ideology may be operating without direction from ISIL central leadership. In October 2014, Ansar al-Shari’a-Darnah publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL, and in November 2014, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis pledged allegiance to the group. Also in October 2014, the chief spokesman of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and five regional commanders defected from TTP and publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL.

Funding and External Aid: ISIL receives most of its funding from a variety of businesses and criminal activities within areas it controls in Iraq and Syria. Criminal activities include robbing banks, smuggling oil, looting and selling antiquities and other goods, as well as extortion and kidnapping for ransom.

JAMA’ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS-SUDAN (ANSARU)

aka Ansaruu; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14, 2013, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) publicly splintered from Boko Haram in January 2012. Ansaru’s leadership structure remains unclear; however, Khalid al-Barnawi held one of the top leadership positions within the organization. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted western and international civilians and Nigerian government and security officials and is responsible for the deaths of civilians and a number of Nigerian security personnel. Ansaru’s stated goals are to defend Muslims throughout all of Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests, but to avoid killing innocent Muslim civilians. While Ansaru claims to identify with Boko Haram’s objectives and struggle, it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.


Strength: Total membership is unknown. Given its narrower scope of operations, it is estimated that Ansaru’s membership is much smaller than that of Boko Haram’s.

Location/Area of Operation: Ansaru’s operations take place in northern Nigeria.

Funding and External Aid: Ansaru maintained a working relationship with Boko Haram and during 2014 may have rejoined with the larger group.

JAISH-E-MOHAMMED

aka the Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqaan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 26, 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is based in Pakistan. JEM was founded in early 2000 by Masood Azhar, a former senior leader of Harakat ul-Ansar, upon his release from prison in India in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages. The group’s aim is to annex Indian-administered Kashmir to Pakistan and expel Coalition Forces from Afghanistan, and it has openly declared war against the United States. Pakistan outlawed JEM in 2002. By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam-ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar; and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar who was released from Pakistani custody in August 2004. Pakistan banned KUI and JUF in November 2003.

Activities: JEM continued to operate openly in parts of Pakistan despite the 2002 ban on its activities. Since its founding, JEM has conducted many fatal terrorist attacks in the region. JEM claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in Indian-administered Kashmir, including an October 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly
building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government has publicly implicated JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JEM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. Pakistani authorities reportedly suspect that JEM members may have been involved in the 2002 anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila that killed two Americans. In December 2003, Pakistan implicated JEM members in the two assassination attempts against President Musharraf. In 2006, JEM claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, including the killing of several Indian police officials in the Indian-administered Kashmir capital of Srinagar. In December 2013, JEM threatened to kill Indian politician Narendra Modi if he were elected Prime Minister. Though they did not publicly claim any attacks, JEM members continued to clash with Indian forces in Kashmir in 2014.

**Strength:** JEM has at least several hundred armed supporters in Pakistan.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Kashmir in India; Afghanistan; and Pakistan, particularly southern Punjab.

**Funding and External Aid:** To avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani government, since 2007 JEM has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods. JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations.

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**JEMAHAH ANSHORUT TAUHID**

aka JAT; Jemmmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99

**Description:** The Department of State designated Indonesia-based group Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, JAT seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia, and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT maintains ties to JI and other indigenous terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

**Activities:** JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of several Indonesian police. JAT has robbed banks and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb-making materials. In October 2012, two policemen investigating an alleged terrorist camp linked to JAT were tortured and found dead in Poso, and authorities implicated JAT in the killings. In December 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in Central Sulawesi after a group of 10 to 15 gunmen ambushed a police patrol in the area. In 2013, Indonesian authorities conducted two raids that killed five JAT
members who had fled Poso after they had killed several police officers. Police found a pipe bomb and other bomb-making materials at the JAT camp.

In July 2014, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir pledged allegiance to ISIL and instructed his followers to fight with ISIL. JAT members are fighting in Syria, and Indonesian authorities have arrested some JAT members upon their return.

**Strength:** JAT is estimated to have several thousand supporters and members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** JAT is based in Indonesia with suspected elements in Malaysia and the Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** JAT raises funds through membership donations; bank robberies, cyber hacking, and other illicit activities; and legitimate business activities such as operating bookstores and other shops.

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**JEMAHAH ISLAMIYA**

aka Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyah; Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; JI

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 23, 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir that seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. More than 400 JI operatives have been captured since 2002, including operations chief and al-Qa’ida associate Hambali. In 2006, several members connected to JI’s 2005 suicide attack in Bali were arrested; in 2007, Muhammad Naim (a.k.a. Zarkasih) and JI military commander Abu Dujana were arrested; and in 2008, two senior JI operatives were arrested in Malaysia and a JI-linked cell was broken up in Sumatra. In September 2009, JI-splinter group leader Noordin Mohammad Top was killed in a police raid. In February 2010, the Indonesian National Police discovered and disbanded a violent extremist training base in Aceh in which former members of JI and other Indonesian violent extremist groups participated. The police raid resulted in the capture of more than 60 militants, including some former JI operatives, and led authorities to former JI senior operative Dulmatin, one of the planners of the 2002 Bali bombing. In March 2010, Dulmatin was killed outside of Jakarta. In January 2011, JI member Umar Patek was captured in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and put on trial in Indonesia, where he was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison in June 2012 for his role in the Bali bombing.

**Activities:** In December 2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic facilities in Singapore. Other significant JI attacks include the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200, including seven U.S. citizens; the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta; the September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and the October 2005 suicide bombing in Bali, which killed 26, including the three suicide bombers.
On July 17, 2009, a JI faction led by Top conducted the group’s most recent high-profile attacks, when two suicide bombers detonated explosive devices at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta that killed seven and injured more than 50, including seven Americans. The Philippine military announced it had killed two JI members in separate incidents in the south of the country in late 2012, including one of the group’s senior-most representatives to the Philippines.

In November 2014, Indonesian authorities released former JI bomb-maker Taufik Abdul Halim from prison after serving a 12-year sentence for attempting to bomb a Jakarta shopping mall in 2001.

**Strength:** Estimates of total JI members vary from 500 to several thousand.

**Location/Area of Operation:** JI is based in Indonesia and is believed to have elements in Malaysia and the Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** JI fundraises through membership donations and criminal and business activities. It has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and illegitimate charities and organizations.

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**JUNDALLAH**

aka People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran; Jundullah; Jondullah; Jundollah; Jondollah; Jondallah; Army of God (God’s Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM)

**Description:** Jundallah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 4, 2010. Since its inception in 2003, Jundallah, which operates primarily in the province of Sistan va Balochistan of Iran, and the Baloch areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, has engaged in numerous attacks, killing and maiming scores of Iranian civilians and government officials. Jundallah’s stated goals are to secure recognition of Balochi cultural, economic, and political rights from the Government of Iran, and to spread awareness of the plight of the Baloch situation through violent and nonviolent means.

**Activities:** In March 2006, Jundallah attacked a motorcade in eastern Iran, which included the deputy head of the Iranian Red Crescent Security Department, who was then taken hostage. The Governor of Zahedan, his deputy, and five other officials were wounded; seven others were kidnapped; and more than 20 were killed in the attack. An October 2009 suicide bomb attack in a marketplace in the city of Pishin in the Sistan va Balochistan province, which killed more than 40 people, was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s. In a statement on its website, Jundallah claimed responsibility for the December 15, 2010 suicide bomb attack inside the Iman Hussein Mosque in Chabahar, which killed an estimated 35 to 40 civilians and wounded 60 to 100. In July 2010, Jundallah attacked the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing approximately 30 and injuring an estimated 300. In 2013, attacks continued in the Sistan va
Balochistan province; however, it is unclear if Jundallah was involved in these attacks. There were no known attacks attributed to Jundallah in 2014.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Jundallah has traditionally operated throughout Sistan va Balochistan province in southeastern Iran and the greater Balochistan area of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**KAHANE CHAI**

**aka** American Friends of the United Yeshiva; American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir; Committee for the Safety of the Roads; Dikuy Bogdim; DOV; Forefront of the Idea; Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva; Jewish Legion; Judea Police; Judean Congress; Kach; Kahane; Kahane Lives; Kahane Tzadak; Kahane.org; Kahanetzadak.com; Kfar Tapuah Fund; Koach; Meir’s Youth; New Kach Movement; Newkach.org; No’ar Meir; Repression of Traitors; State of Judea; Sword of David; The Committee Against Racism and Discrimination (CARD); The Hatikva Jewish Identity Center; The International Kahane Movement; The Jewish Idea Yeshiva; The Judean Legion; The Judean Voice; The Qomemiyut Movement; The Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund; The Voice of Judea; The Way of the Torah; The Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea; Yeshivat Harav Meir

**Description:** Kach – the precursor to Kahane Chai – was founded by radical Israeli-American Rabbi Meir Kahane, with the goal of restoring Greater Israel, which is generally used to refer to Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Its offshoot, Kahane Chai (translation: “Kahane Lives”), was founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin, following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United States. Both organizations were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on October 8, 1997. The group has attempted to gain seats in the Israeli Knesset over the past several decades but won only one seat in 1984.

**Activities:** Kahane Chai has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. The group is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the First Palestinian Intifada in 2000. Since 2003, Kahane Chai activists have physically intimidated Israeli and Palestinian government officials who favored the dismantlement of Israeli settlements. Although they have not explicitly claimed responsibility for a series of mosque burnings in the West Bank, individuals affiliated with Kahane Chai are widely suspected of being the perpetrators. There were no known Kahane Chai attacks during 2014.

**Strength:** Kahane Chai’s core membership is believed to be fewer than 100. The group’s membership and support networks are overwhelmingly composed of Israeli citizens that live mostly in West Bank settlements.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba in Hebron.

**Funding and External Aid:** Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

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**KATA’IB HIZBALLAH**

aka Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezbollah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 2, 2009, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was formed in 2006 and is a radical Shia Islamist group with an anti-Western outlook and violent extremist ideology that has conducted attacks against Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition targets in Iraq. KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians that support the legitimate political process in Iraq. The group is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda by filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to Lebanese Hizballah and receives support from that group and its sponsor, Iran.

**Activities:** KH has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including improvised explosive device bombings, rocket propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety with attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. KH was particularly active in the summer of 2008, recording and distributing video footage of its attacks. In June 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in a rocket attack in Baghdad when KH assailants fired between three and five rockets at U.S. military base Camp Victory. The group remained active in 2014, participating in fighting in Syria and Iraq against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), but has not conducted an attack on U.S. interests since July 2011.

**Strength:** Membership is estimated at 400 individuals.

**Location/Area of Operation:** KH’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but also include fighting alongside pro-regime forces in Syria. Traditionally, KH conducted the majority of its operations in Baghdad, but its operations have expanded across Iraq in response to ISIL.

**Funding and External Aid:** KH is heavily dependent on support from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

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**KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY**

aka the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; the People’s Defense Force; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; Kurdistan People’s Congress; People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL
Description: Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, launched a campaign of violence in 1984. The PKK’s original goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, but in recent years it has spoken more often about autonomy within a Turkish state that guarantees Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights.

Activities: In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Anatolia was the scene of significant violence; some estimates placed casualties at least 40,000 persons. Following his capture in 1999, Ocalan announced a “peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. Ocalan’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment; he remains the symbolic leader of the group. The group foreswore violence until June 2004, when the group’s hardline militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed ceasefire of the previous five years. Striking over the border from bases within Iraq, the PKK engaged in terrorist attacks in eastern and western Turkey. In 2009, the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after a PKK-initiated attack in July 2011 that left 13 Turkish soldiers dead. In 2012, there were multiple car bombings resulting in the deaths of at least 10 people. Primary targets included Turkish government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey.

Widely publicized peace talks between Ocalan and the Turkish government to resolve the conflict began at the end of 2012. Peace talks continued throughout 2014 with the ceasefire holding, even with sporadic PKK attacks on Turkish government forces, including one attack in September where three Turkish police officers were killed.

Strength: Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 members; 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.

Location/Area of Operation: The PKK operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: The PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe and from criminal activity.

LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA

aka al Mansooreen; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama’at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama’at-i-Dawat; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; Jama’at-ud-Da’awah; Jama’at-ud-Da’awah; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiFi; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; Falah-e-Insaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity; Humanitarian Welfare Foundation; Human Welfare Foundation; Al-Anfal Trust; Tehrik-e-Hurmaat-e-Rasool; Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on December 26, 2001, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) is one of the largest and most proficient of the traditionally anti-India-focused terrorist groups, with the ability to severely disrupt already tense regional relations. LeT formed in the late 1980s as the terrorist wing of the Islamist extremist organization, Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad, a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist mission organization and charity originally founded to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, LeT is not connected to any political party. Shortly after LeT was designated as an FTO, Saeed changed its name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and began humanitarian projects to circumvent restrictions. LeT disseminates its message through JUD’s media outlets. In addition to LeT’s creation of JUD, LeT has repeatedly changed its name in an effort to avoid sanctions; other LeT aliases and front groups include Al-Anfal Trust, Tehrik-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, and Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awwal. Elements of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM) combined with other groups to mount such attacks as “The Save Kashmir Movement.” The Pakistani government banned LeT in January 2002, and JUD in 2008, following the 2008 Mumbai attack. LeT and Saeed continue to spread terrorist ideology, as well as virulent hate speech condemning the United States, India, Israel, and other perceived enemies.

Activities: LeT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993; several high profile attacks inside India; and operations against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. The group uses assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Indian government officials hold LeT responsible for the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai against luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a popular café that killed 166 people – including six American citizens – and injured more than 300. India has charged 38 people in the case; most are at large and thought to be in Pakistan.

In March 2010, Pakistani-American businessman David Headley pled guilty in a U.S. court to charges related to his role in the November 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai, as well as to charges related to a separate plot to bomb the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. In May 2011, Headley was a witness in the trial of Tahawwur Rana, who was charged with providing material support to LeT. Rana was convicted for providing material support to LeT in June 2011, and was sentenced to 14 years in prison in January 2013.

In June 2012, Indian authorities arrested LeT member Sayeed Zabiuddin Ansari, alias Abu Jindal, one of the instigators of the November 2008 Mumbai attack. LeT is alleged to have been responsible for a March 2013 attack on Indian paramilitary forces in the Indian-controlled Kashmir city of Srinagar, which killed five people and wounded 10 others.

LeT continued carrying out attacks in 2014. LeT was responsible for the May 23 attack on the Indian consulate in Herat, Afghanistan. Throughout the course of 2014, LeT terrorists have engaged in repeated gun battles with Indian security forces in Kashmir. These clashes have killed or injured over 20 Indian law enforcement agents, military personnel, and civilians.
Strength: The size of LeT is unknown, but it has several thousand members in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistani Punjab; Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab Provinces in Pakistan; and in the southern Jammu, Kashmir, and Doda regions.

Location/Area of Operation: LeT has global connections and a strong operational network throughout South Asia. LeT maintains a number of facilities, including training camps, schools, and medical clinics in Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: LeT collects donations in Pakistan and the Gulf as well as from other donors in the Middle East and Europe, particularly the UK. LeT front organizations continued to openly fundraise in Pakistan and solicited donations in the Pakistani press during 2014.

LASHKAR I JHANGVI

aka Army of Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 30, 2003, Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and other attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and was banned by the Government of Pakistan in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban as the ruling government in Afghanistan, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists, providing safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. LJ works closely with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.

Activities: LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted responsibility for numerous killings of Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan. In January 1999, the group attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province. Media reports linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a March 2002 grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad that killed two U.S. citizens.

LJ attacks in 2012 killed hundreds of people; attacks ranged from suicide bombings to targeted shootings of ethnic Hazaras.

In 2013, LJ continued targeting individuals and groups of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. A January dual bombing in Quetta left upwards of 80 Pakistanis dead and over 100 wounded. In February, LJ claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Quetta that killed at least 84 people and wounded around 200 more. In June, LJ conducted a complex attack in which they detonated a bomb targeting a bus carrying female university students. After the students were brought to a local hospital for treatment, LJ stormed the hospital with small arms and grenades. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Pakistani civilians.
In January 2014, at least 24 people were killed and 40 others wounded in a bombing that targeted a bus carrying Shia pilgrims. LJ claimed responsibility for the attack. Also in January, LJ attempted to carry out a suicide bombing at a school in the predominantly Shia area of Hangu, Pakistan. The attack was thwarted when a 15-year old student tackled the bomber; the student, Aitezaz Hassan, died of his injuries. No other staff or students were harmed.

**Strength:** Membership is assessed in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** LJ is active primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Karachi, and Baluchistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Funding comes from wealthy donors in Pakistan, as well as the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. The group engages in criminal activity to fund its activities, including extortion.

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**LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM**

aka Ellalan Force; Tamil Tigers

**Description:** Founded in 1976 and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became a powerful Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka. Despite its military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government in 2009, the LTTE’s international network of sympathizers and financial support persists.

**Activities:** Although the LTTE has been largely inactive since its military defeat in Sri Lanka in 2009, in the past the LTTE was responsible for an integrated battlefield insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders. It conducted a sustained campaign targeting rival Tamil groups, and assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Although most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers, LTTE also had an amphibious force, the Sea Tigers, and a nascent air wing, the Air Tigers. Fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government escalated in 2006 and continued through 2008.

In early 2009, Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE’s key strongholds, including their capital of Kilinochchi. In May 2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed LTTE leader Prabhakaran and other members of the LTTE leadership and military command, and declared military victory. There have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka that could verifiably be attributed to the LTTE since the end of the war, but a total of 13 LTTE supporters, several of which had allegedly planned attacks against U.S. and Israeli diplomatic facilities in India, were arrested in Malaysia in 2014.

LTTE’s financial network of support continued to operate throughout 2014.

**Strength:** Exact strength is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Sri Lanka and India
**Funding and External Aid:** The LTTE used its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies. The group employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for its activities.

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**LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP**

aka LIFG

**Description:** The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the early 1990s, LIFG emerged from the group of Libyans who had fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan and pledged to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. In the following years, some members maintained an anti-Qadhafi focus and targeted Libyan government interests. Others, such as Abu al-Faraj al-Libi, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2005, aligned with Usama bin Laden and are believed to be part of the al-Qa'ida (AQ) leadership structure. On November 3, 2007, AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a formal merger between AQ and LIFG. However, on July 3, 2009, LIFG members in the UK released a statement formally disavowing any association with AQ, suggesting the group had fractured/lost internal cohesion. In September 2009, six imprisoned LIFG members in Libya issued a 417-page document that renounced violence. More than 100 LIFG members pledged to adhere to this revised doctrine and have been pardoned and released from prison in Libya since September 2009.

**Activities:** LIFG has been largely defunct operationally in Libya since the late 1990s when members fled predominately to Europe and the Middle East because of tightened Libyan security measures. In early 2011, in the wake of the Libyan revolution and the fall of Qadhafi, some LIFG members returned to Libya and some created the Movement for Change (LIMC), and became one of many rebel groups united under the umbrella of the opposition leadership known as the Transitional National Council. Former LIFG and LIMC leader Abdel Hakim Bil-Hajj was appointed the Libyan Transitional Council’s Tripoli military commander during the Libyan uprisings, and has denied any link between his group and AQ. There were no known terrorist attacks carried out by LIFG in 2014.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Since the late 1990s, many members have fled to southwest Asia, and European countries, particularly the UK.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**MUJAHIDIN SHURA COUNCIL IN THE ENVIRONS OF JERUSALEM**

aka: Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; MSC; Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem; Mujahideen Shura Council; Shura al-Mujahedin Fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis; Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin; Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen; Magles Shoura al-Mujahiddin
Description: The Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem is a consolidation of several Salafi terrorist groups based in Gaza that have claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israel since the group’s founding in 2012.

Activities: On August 13, 2013, MSC claimed responsibility for a rocket attack targeting the southern Israeli city of Eilat. Previously, MSC claimed responsibility for the March 21, 2013 attack in which Gaza-based militants fired at least five rockets at Sderot, Israel, and the April 17, 2013 attack in which two rockets were fired at Eilat, Israel. In addition to the rocket launches, MSC claimed responsibility for a cross-border improvised explosive device attack on June 18, 2012 that targeted an Israeli construction site, killing one civilian.

Strength: MSC is estimated to have several hundred fighters.

Location/Area of Operation: MSC operates in Gaza.

Funding and External Aid: MSC’s access to resources in 2014 is unclear.

AL-MULATHAMUN BATTALION

aka al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; al-Murabitoun; The Sentinels

Description: The al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 19, 2013. Originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AMB became a separate organization in late 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. In Belmokhtar’s first public statement after the split, he threatened to fight against Western interests and announced the creation of the sub-battalion, “Those Who Sign in Blood.” In August 2013, AMB and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-Murabitoun.”

Activities: AMB’s Those Who Sign in Blood sub-battalion claimed responsibility for the January 2013 attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the death of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. Seven other Americans escaped the attack.

Before their merger, in May 2013, AMB cooperated with MUJAO in twin suicide bombings in northern Niger on a Nigerien military base in Agadez and a French uranium mine in Arlit. The coordinated attacks killed at least 20 people, including all of the attackers.

AMB’s attacks continued in 2014. In February, AMB claimed responsibility for attacking French forces with rockets near the Timbuktu airport. In May, AMB claimed responsibility for an attack against a military base and a separate car bomb attack against a mine in Agadez region,
Niger, which wounded 14 employees. In July, AMB claimed responsibility for a car bomb targeting a patrol of French soldiers in Gao, Mali, which killed one and wounded seven.

**Strength:** Membership levels of AMB are unknown; however, the al-Murabitoun terrorist group constitutes one of the greatest near-term threats to U.S. and international interests in the Sahel, because of its publicly stated intent to attack Westerners and proven ability to organize complex attacks.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Niger

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, AMB is likely funded through kidnapping ransoms and other criminal activities.

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**NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY**

**aka** ELN; Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

**Description:** The National Liberation Army (ELN) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The ELN is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964. It is primarily rural-based, although it also has several urban units. The ELN remains focused on attacking economic infrastructure, in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons, and extorting foreign and local companies. The Colombian government began exploratory peace talks with the ELN in January 2014, although formal peace negotiations had not started by year’s end.

**Activities:** The ELN engages in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, drug trafficking, and extortion activities. The group also uses intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; and has been involved in the murders of teachers and trade unionists. The group has targeted Colombia’s infrastructure, particularly oil pipelines and equipment. In recent years, including 2014, the ELN launched joint attacks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s largest terrorist organization.

During 2014, the ELN launched fewer attacks against oil pipelines, but according to Colombian authorities, the group caused more damage than in 2013. The ELN was responsible for eighty percent of the pipeline attacks in 2014. On June 20, the ELN bombed a police station in Bogota injuring three people. On June 29, the group attacked a pipeline in Arauca department which resulted in 13 people injured and suspended production at the Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s oil field. In a demonstration of its ability to attack the capital city and in advance of the August presidential election, the ELN placed five leaflet bombs in Bogota on July 29, with several exploding prior to detection. On September 14, an ELN sniper shot dead two workers sent to repair a damaged section of an oil pipeline that had been bombed by the group near the town of Teorama, Norte de Santander.

**Strength:** Approximately 2,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.
**Location/Area of Operation:** Mostly in the rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia, as well as the border regions with Venezuela.

**Funding and External Aid:** The ELN draws its funding from the illicit narcotics trade and from extortion of oil and gas companies. Additional funds are derived from kidnapping ransoms. There is no known external aid.

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**PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION**

aka PIJ; Palestine Islamic Jihad; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizbollah Bayt al-Maqdis; Al-Quds Squads; Al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; Al-Awdah Brigades

**Description:** Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, PIJ is committed to both the destruction of Israel through attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets and the creation of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, including present day Israel.

**Activities:** PIJ terrorists have conducted numerous attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. PIJ continues to plan and direct attacks against Israelis both inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. Although U.S. citizens have died in PIJ attacks, the group has not directly targeted U.S. interests. PIJ attacks between 2008 and 2011 were primarily rocket attacks aimed at southern Israeli cities, and have also included attacking Israeli targets with explosive devices. In November 2012, PIJ operatives, working with Hamas, detonated a bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv, leaving 29 civilians wounded. In December 2013, four PIJ operatives were arrested by Israeli authorities for their role in a bus bombing near Tel Aviv. In March 2014, PIJ carried out a wave of rocket attacks into Israeli territory. While the group claimed they fired 130 rockets and mortars, 60 were believed to have reached Israel. In September 2014, PIJ members claimed they were building tunnels from Gaza to use during future attacks against Israel.

**Strength:** PIJ has fewer than 1,000 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Primarily Gaza with minimal operational presence in the West Bank and Israel. Other leadership elements reside in Lebanon and official representatives are scattered throughout the Middle East.

**Funding and External Aid:** Receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran.

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**PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION**

aka PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front

**Description:** The Palestinian Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. In the late 1970s, the Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF) splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and then later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (a.k.a. Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Activities:** Abbas’s group was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups into the 1990s. In April 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq. The PLF took part in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentarian elections but did not win a seat. In 2008, as part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hizbullah, Samir Kantar, a PLF member – and purportedly the longest serving Arab prisoner in Israeli custody – was released from an Israeli prison.

After 16 years without claiming responsibility for an attack, the PLF claimed responsibility for two attacks against Israeli targets on March 14, 2008. One attack was against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, Israel, and the other involved a PLF brigade firing at an Israeli settler south of the Hebron Mountain, seriously wounding him. On March 28, 2008, shortly after the attacks, a PLF Central Committee member reaffirmed PLF’s commitment to using “all possible means to restore” its previous glory and to adhering to its role in the Palestinian “struggle” and “resistance” through its military. There were no known PLF attacks in 2014.

**Strength:** Estimates have placed membership between 50 and 500.

**Location/Area of Operation:** PLF leadership and membership are based in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE**

**aka** PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist group founded by George Habash, broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The group earned a reputation for large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed at least 20 U.S. citizens. A leading faction within the PLO, the PFLP has long accepted the concept of a two-state solution but has opposed specific provisions of various peace initiatives.

**Activities:** The PFLP increased its operational activity during the Second Intifada. This was highlighted by at least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001, to avenge Israel’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year. In 2008 and 2009, the PFLP was involved in several rocket attacks launched primarily from Gaza against
Israel, and claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza, including a December 2009 ambush of Israeli soldiers in central Gaza. The PLFP claimed responsibility for numerous mortar and rocket attacks fired from Gaza into Israel in 2010, as well as an attack on a group of Israeli citizens. In October 2011, the PFLP claimed responsibility for a rocket attack that killed one civilian in Ashqelon. In 2012, the Israeli Shin Bet security agency arrested several members of PFLP for plotting to carry out attacks on IDF checkpoints and planning to conduct kidnappings.

On November 18, 2014, two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with the PFLP entered a synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing five people, including three American citizens, and injuring over a dozen, per media reporting.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.

**Funding and External Aid:** Leadership received safe haven in Syria.

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**POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL COMMAND**

aka PFLP-GC

**Description:** The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on resistance and less on politics. Originally, the group was violently opposed to the Arafat-led Palestinian Liberation Organization. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, has led the PFLP-GC since its founding. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syria and Iran.

**Activities:** The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. The group’s primary recent focus was supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons. The PFLP-GC maintained an armed presence in several Palestinian refugee camps and at its own military bases in Lebanon and along the Lebanon-Syria border. In recent years, the PFLP-GC was implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel. In 2009, the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Northern District, Israel. In 2011, the PFLP-GC targeted Israeli communities in a March 20 rocket attack by its Jihad Jibril Brigades in the city of Eshkolot, Southern District, Israel. The attack caused no injuries or damage.

In November 2012, PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although four Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives were later arrested for being behind the attack. In 2013, the PFLP-GC issued statements in support of the Syrian government, Hizballah, and Iran. The group was accused of participating, along with Syrian
regime forces, in a battle at the al-Yarmouk refugee camp in July, using a rocket to target and kill civilians in the camp. In 2014, PFLP-GC appointed new leadership to conduct military operations and deploy Palestinian fighters.

**Strength:** Several hundred

**Location/Area of Operation:** Political leadership is headquartered in Damascus, with bases in southern Lebanon and a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The group also maintains a small presence in Gaza.

**Funding and External Aid:** Received safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

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**AL-NUSRAH FRONT**

**aka** Jabhat al-Nusra; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad

**Description:** Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 15, 2014, and is led by Specially Designated Global Terrorist Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani. It was formed in late 2011 when al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghldadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells in the region. In 2013, the group split from AQI and became an independent entity. ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Asad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state; it currently controls a portion of Syrian territory from which it participates in the Syrian conflict.

**Activities:** ANF has been active in a number of operations against other factions in the Syrian Civil War. The group claimed responsibility for the Aleppo bombings in 2012, the al-Midan bombing in January 2012, a series of Damascus bombings in 2012, and the murder of journalist Mohammed al-Saeed. In December 2013, ANF abducted 13 nuns from a Christian monastery in Maaloula and held them until March 9, 2014. In late February 2014, ANF claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack on an army checkpoint in Hermel, Lebanon, claiming it was in retaliation for Hizballah’s involvement in the civil war in Syria. In March, ANF reportedly kidnapped 30 Palestinians in the Yarmouk refugee camp, located near Damascus. In May, American citizen Abu Huraira al-Amriki, reportedly working for ANF, carried out a suicide truck bombing in Idlib. There were no reported casualties, but this is believed to be the first example of an American conducting a suicide attack in Syria. Also in May, high-ranking Syrian military official and head of Syria’s air defense, Lt. Gen. Hussein Ishaq was killed in clashes with ANF. In June, it was reported that ANF had enlisted child soldiers into its ranks. In the same month, it was also reported that ANF militants killed a 14-year-old boy in Lebanon. On August 28, ANF militants kidnapped 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers from Golan Heights in the UN Disengagement Observer Force Zone. The Fijian soldiers were later released in September. In early November, ANF attacked moderate rebel groups associated with the Free Syrian Army in Idlib. The rebel groups surrendered local towns to ANF and some members defected to ANF, while others were arrested.
**Strength:** Total membership is unknown, although estimated to be in the low thousands.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Al-Nusrah Front receives funding from a variety of sources, such as ransom payments accrued through kidnapping operations and donations from external Gulf-based donors.

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**AL-QA’IDA**

aka al-Qa’eda; Qa’idat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qa’idat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Laden Network; the Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1999, al-Qa’ida (AQ) was established by Usama bin Laden in 1988. The group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamist extremists for the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union. AQ’s strategic objectives are to remove Western influence and presence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia law that ultimately would be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. AQ leaders issued a statement in February 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. AQ merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001. Many AQ leaders have been killed in recent years, including bin Laden and then second-in-command Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, in May and August 2011, respectively. Al-Rahman’s replacement, Abu Yahya al-Libi, was killed in June 2012. Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri remained at-large at year’s end.

**Activities:** AQ and its supporters conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992, and claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993. AQ also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing up to 300 individuals and injuring more than 5,000. In October 2000, AQ conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39.

On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania – leaving over 3,000 individuals dead or missing.
In November 2002, AQ carried out a suicide bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya that killed 15. In 2003 and 2004, Saudi-based AQ operatives and associated violent extremists launched more than a dozen attacks, killing at least 90 people, including 14 Americans in Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri claimed responsibility on behalf of AQ for the July 7, 2005 attacks against the London public transportation system. AQ likely played a role in the unsuccessful 2006 plot to destroy several commercial aircraft flying from the UK to the United States using liquid explosives. AQ claimed responsibility for a 2008 suicide car bomb attack on the Danish embassy in Pakistan that killed six, as retaliation for a Danish newspaper re-publishing cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and for Denmark’s involvement in Afghanistan.

In January 2009, Bryant Neal Vinas – a U.S. citizen who traveled to Pakistan and allegedly trained in explosives at AQ camps, was captured in Pakistan, extradited to the United States, and charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit murder. Vinas later admitted his role in helping AQ plan an attack against the Long Island Rail Road in New York and confessed to having fired missiles at a U.S. base in Afghanistan. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant and U.S. lawful permanent resident, was charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, to commit murder in a foreign country, and with providing material support to a terrorist organization as part of an AQ plot to attack the New York subway system. Zazi later admitted to contacts with AQ senior leadership, suggesting they had knowledge of his plans. In February 2010, Zazi pled guilty to charges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

In a December 2011 video, AQ leader al-Zawahiri claimed AQ was behind the August kidnapping of American aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein remained in captivity until his death in January 2015 in a U.S. counterterrorism operation in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In September 2014, AQ leader al-Zawahiri and other AQ leaders announced the establishment of Pakistan-based AQ in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Two days after the announcement, two Pakistani warships were attacked in Karachi; AQIS took responsibility for plotting the attack almost one week later. The thwarted plan included commandeering the ships and missile system to attack nearby American warships. AQIS claims the orders came from al-Zawahiri. In February 2014, AQ removed the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant as an affiliate.

**Strength:** In South Asia, AQ’s core has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives – including bin Laden in May 2011 – have disrupted communication, financial, facilitation nodes, and a number of terrorist plots. However, AQ serves as a focal point of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups – AQAP, AQIM, al-Nusrah Front, and al-Shabaab – and other violent Sunni Islamist extremist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network also have ties to AQ. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are “inspired” by the group’s ideology may be operating without direction from AQ central leadership, and it is impossible to estimate their numbers.

**Location/Area of Operation:** AQ was based in Afghanistan until Coalition Forces removed the Afghan Taliban from power in late 2001. Since then, the group’s core leadership is believed to
reside largely in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. AQ affiliates – al-Nusrah Front, AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab – operate in Syria and Lebanon, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara, and Somalia, respectively.

**Funding and External Aid:** AQ primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters, as well as from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

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**AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA**

**aka:** al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on January 19, 2010. In January 2009, the leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. This announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s self-stated goals include establishing a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, as well as implementing Sharia law. On September 30, 2011, AQAP cleric and head of external operations Anwar al-Aulaqi, as well as Samir Khan, the publisher of AQAP’s online magazine, *Inspire*, were both killed in Yemen.

The FTO designation for AQAP was amended on October 4, 2012, to include the alias Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS). AAS represents a rebranding effort designed to attract potential followers in areas under AQAP’s control.

**Activities:** AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both internal and foreign targets since its inception in January 2009, including: a March 2009 suicide bombing against South Korean tourists in Yemen, the August 2009 attempt to assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, and the December 25, 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. AQAP was responsible for two unsuccessful attempted attacks against British targets during 2010. In October 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States via cargo plane. The parcels were intercepted in the UK and in the United Arab Emirates. AQAP attacks in 2012 targeted the Yemeni military, including a February 2012 suicide car bombing that killed 26 Yemeni soldiers in Hadramawt Governorate.

AQAP, operating under the alias AAS, carried out a May 2012 suicide bombing in Sana’a that killed 96 people. Also in May, press reported that AQAP allegedly plotted to detonate a bomb aboard a U.S.-bound airliner using an improvised explosive device (IED). Although there was no imminent threat to U.S. jetliners, the device, which was acquired from another government, was similar to devices that AQAP had previously used in past attempted terrorist attacks.
In 2013, AQAP focused its targeting efforts on the Yemeni military. In September, AQAP carried out a coordinated attack on two military targets in southern Yemen that killed at least 21 Yemeni soldiers. In December, an AQAP attack on the Yemeni Defense Ministry headquarters compound in Sanaa, Yemen killed 52 people, including civilian medical personnel.

In 2014, AQAP claimed responsibility for over 150 attacks in Yemen, using tactics such as IEDs, suicide bombings, and small-arms attacks. The group aggressively targeted both Houthis and Yemeni military and government institutions, including military bases, the Presidential palace in Sana’a, military checkpoints and vehicles, and the police academy in Sana’a. Over 75 Yemeni government or military personnel were killed in these attacks.

In September 2014, AQAP launched a rocket attack against Yemeni security forces around the perimeter of the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a. The attack did not cause any casualties, but was followed two months later by an IED attack at the northern gate of the embassy that injured multiple embassy security guards. Also in November, AQAP attempted to detonate explosives targeting the U.S. and British Ambassadors to Yemen. In December, AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack against the Iranian ambassador’s residence in Sana’a that killed one guard and two pedestrians.

**Strength:** AQAP is estimated to have approximately one thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Yemen

**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP’s funding primarily comes from robberies and kidnap for ransom operations, and donations from like-minded supporters.

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**AL-QA’IDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB**

**aka** AQIM; Group for Call and Combat; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

**Description:** The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002. After the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida (AQ) in September 2006 and became known as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Department of State amended the GSPC designation on February 20, 2008, to reflect the change. Although AQIM remains largely a regionally-focused terrorist group, it has adopted a more anti-Western rhetoric and ideology, and has aspirations of overthrowing “apostate” African regimes and creating an Islamic state. Abdelmalek Droukdel, aka Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadoud, is the group’s leader.

**Activities:** After 2007, when AQIM bombed the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers killing 60 people, AQIM’s northern leadership was largely contained to the mountainous region of northeastern Algeria, and the group’s southern battalions focused mostly on its kidnapping for ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation across Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, to plan and conduct expanded operations. Militants with ties to AQIM were involved in the September 11,
2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and three staff members.

In 2013, AQIM attacked regional security forces, local government targets, and westerners in the Sahel, including a suicide bombing that killed two Malian civilians and injured six Malian soldiers.

In April 2014, AQIM killed 14 Algerian soldiers in an ambush on a convoy in mountains to the east of Algiers, making it one of the deadliest attacks on the Algerian military in several years. AQIM claimed responsibility for the May 27 attack on the house of Tunisia’s interior minister, Lotfi Ben Jeddou.

In addition to conducting attacks, AQIM continues to conduct kidnap for ransom operations. The targets are usually Western citizens from governments or third parties that have established a pattern of making concessions in the form of ransom payments for the release of individuals in custody. In November 2014, AQIM released a video of two Western hostages, a Dutch national and a French national who were later released in December.

Strength: AQIM has several hundred fighters operating in Algeria with a smaller number in the Sahel. Since the French intervention in northern Mali, AQIM’s safe haven in northern Mali is less tenable for the organization and elements have moved to remote regions of northern Mali or to southwestern Libya. AQIM is attempting to reorganize in the wake of setbacks inflicted upon them by the combined French and African forces.

Location/Area of Operation: Northeastern Algeria (including but not limited to the Kabylie region), Libya, Tunisia, northern Mali, and Niger.

Funding and External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and criminal activities to finance their operations.

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**REAL IRA**

aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Ogláigh Na hÉireann

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 16, 2001, the Real IRA (RIRA) was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the September 2005 weapons decommissioning. In September 1997, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein’s adoption of the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members, including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt, for a ceasefire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks.
Activities: Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after that group renewed its ceasefire in 1997. These members brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the RIRA. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, and police in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which was established to oversee the peace process, assessed that RIRA members were likely responsible for the majority of the shootings and assaults that occurred in Northern Ireland.

The group remained active. In February 2013, two alleged RIRA members were arrested by Irish police while attempting to carry out the assassination of a local drug dealer. Police searched the van they were traveling in and found two loaded handguns and facemasks.

Strength: According to the Irish government, the RIRA has approximately 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and Republican sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s continuing ceasefire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: The RIRA is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers. The RIRA was also reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans and to have occasionally collaborated with the Continuity Irish Republican Army.

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA

aka FARC; Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most violent, and best-equipped terrorist organization. The FARC began in the early 1960s as an outgrowth of the Liberal Party-based peasant self-defense leagues, but took on Marxist ideology. Today, it only nominally fights in support of Marxist goals, and is heavily involved in illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The FARC has been responsible for large numbers of kidnappings for ransom in Colombia, and in past years has allegedly held as many as 700 hostages. The FARC’s capacity has been degraded by a continuing Colombian military offensive targeting key FARC units and leaders that has, by most estimates, halved the FARC’s numbers – estimated at approximately 8,000 in 2013 – and succeeded in capturing or killing a number of FARC senior and mid-level commanders. In August 2012, the Colombian President announced that exploratory peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC were underway. The formal talks began in Norway and then moved to Cuba, where they continued in 2014. These talks are the first such peace negotiations in over a decade and the fourth effort in the last 30 years. Although the government and the FARC reached a tentative partial agreement on three of the five agreed upon points, no overall peace agreement was concluded by the end of 2014.
**Activities:** Over the years, the FARC has perpetrated a large number of high profile terrorist acts, including the 1999 murder of three U.S. missionaries working in Colombia, and multiple kidnappings and assassinations of Colombian government officials and civilians. In July 2008, the Colombian military made a dramatic rescue of 15 high-value FARC hostages including U.S. Department of Defense contractors Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howe, who were held in captivity for more than five years, along with former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

In 2014, the FARC focused on launching mortars at police stations or the military, placing explosive devices near roads or paths, and using snipers attacks, and ambushes. In 2014, FARC attacks on infrastructure, particularly on oil pipeline and energy towers, decreased. Security forces and government buildings were the most common terrorist targets, although civilian casualties occurred throughout the year.

Although FARC attacks decreased in 2014, the group committed a number of significant attacks. On March 15, the FARC killed two policemen in Tumaco, Nariño, after kidnapping and torturing them. In the run-up to the August presidential elections, the FARC increased terrorist attacks throughout the country. A FARC attack on a transmission tower in Buenaventura left 400,000 people without power. Three soldiers died when they detonated land mines laid by the FARC in Norte de Santander. A FARC attempt to attack a military base in Miranda, Cauca with grenades killed a four-year-old girl and wounded two others. FARC attacks in Meta left 70 oil wells without power and 16,000 people without potable water. On September 16, the FARC attacked a police patrol in Tierradentro, Córdoba, killing seven police and injuring five others. On November 5, the FARC killed two indigenous leaders near the southwestern municipality of Toribio for taking down a sign honoring a late FARC leader. On November 16, the FARC kidnapped a Brigadier General and two companions near Quibdo, Choco. Several days earlier, the FARC kidnapped two soldiers in Arauca. On November 22, the FARC launched an amphibious attack on Gorgona Island, in the Pacific Ocean, killing the island’s police commander and injuring six police officers.

**Strength:** Approximately 8,000 to 9,000 members, with several thousand additional supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Primarily in Colombia; however, FARC leaders and combatants have been known to use neighboring countries for weapons sourcing and logistical planning. The FARC often use Colombia’s border areas with Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador for incursions into Colombia; and used Venezuelan and Ecuadorian territory for safe haven.

**Funding and External Aid:** The FARC is primarily funded by extortion, ransoms from kidnapping, and the international drug trade.

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**REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER**

aka Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri; 17 November

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) is a radical leftist group established in 1975.
Named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta, 17N is opposed to the Greek government, the United States, Turkey, and NATO. It seeks the end of the U.S. military presence in Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the EU.

**Activities:** Initial attacks consisted of assassinations of senior U.S. officials and Greek public figures. Between 1975 and 1991, four American citizens were killed by 17N. The group began using bombings in the 1980s. 17N’s most recent attack was a bombing attempt in June 2002 at the port of Piraeus in Athens. After the attempted attack, Greek authorities arrested 19 17N members. The convictions of 13 of these members have been upheld by Greek courts. There were no known 17N attacks in 2014.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Athens, Greece

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE’S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT**

aka DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, while “Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and Turkish establishments. Its goals are the establishment of a socialist state and the abolition of harsh high-security Turkish prisons.

**Activities:** Since the late 1980s, the group has primarily targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials, although it has conducted attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities, since 1990. The DHKP/C assassinated two U.S. military contractors and wounded a U.S. Air Force officer in the 1990s, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with attacks against Turkish police in January and September of that year. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised explosive devices against official Turkish targets and U.S. targets of opportunity.

Operations and arrests against the group have weakened its capabilities, although attacks have continued. In June 2004, the group was suspected of a bus bombing at Istanbul University that killed four civilians and wounded 21. In July 2005, police intercepted and killed a DHKP/C suicide bomber who attempted to attack the Ministry of Justice in Ankara. In June 2006, the
group killed a police officer in Istanbul; four members of the group were arrested the next month for the attack.

The DHKP/C was dealt a major ideological blow when Dursun Karatas, leader of the group, died in August 2008. After the loss of their leader, the DHKP/C reorganized in 2009 and was reportedly competing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party for influence in both Turkey and with the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

The group was responsible for a number of high profile attacks in 2012 that included a suicide bombing of a police station in Istanbul. This tactic continued in 2013 when, on February 1, a DHKP/C operative exploded a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Besides himself, the explosion killed a Turkish guard and seriously wounded a visiting Turkish journalist. In March 2013, using grenades and rocket launchers, three members of the group attacked the Ministry of Justice and the Ankara headquarters of the Turkish Justice and Development political party. The DHKP/C also claimed a similar attack in September 2013, when two members of the DHKP/C fired rockets at the Turkish National Police headquarters and a police guesthouse. One operative was arrested and the other killed after the attack. No other Turkish casualties were reported in either attack. In March 2014, DHKP/C claimed a shooting at a protest that left one man dead.

Strength: Membership includes an estimated several dozen members inside Turkey, with a support network throughout Europe.

Location/Area of Operation: Turkey, primarily in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Other members live and plan operations in European countries.

Funding and External Aid: The DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion, and raises funds primarily in Europe.

REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

aka RS; Epanastatikos Aghonas; EA

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 18, 2009, Revolutionary Struggle (RS) is a radical leftist group with Marxist ideology that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of the Greek leftist groups 17 November and Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

Activities: RS first gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for the September 5, 2003 bombings at the Athens Courthouse during the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS claimed responsibility for a number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, including a March 2004 attack outside of a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the January 12, 2007 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack on the U.S. Embassy in Athens, which resulted in damage to the building. In 2009, RS increased the number and sophistication of its attacks on police, financial institutions, and other targets. RS successfully bombed a Citibank branch in Athens in March 2009, but failed in its vehicle-borne IED attack in February
2009 against the Citibank headquarters building in Athens. In September 2009, RS claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack on the Athens Stock Exchange, which caused widespread damage and injured a passerby.

In 2010, the Greek government made significant strides in curtailing RS’s terrorist activities. On April 10, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leadership figure Nikos Maziotis. In addition to the arrests, the Greek raid resulted in the seizure of a RPG launcher, possibly the one used against the U.S. Embassy in Athens in the 2007 attack. On April 3, 2013, five members of RS were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Maziotis and one other accused RS conspirator were convicted in absentia. Both remained at-large after disappearing in July 2012, after they were released following 18 months pre-trial confinement. Greek police alleged that Maziotis was involved in an armed robbery of a bank in Methana, Greece, after his fingerprints were found at the crime scene. On July 16, 2014, Maziotis was arrested after a shootout with Greek police in an Athens shopping district.

After a period of inactivity, the group remerged in April 2014 with a bomb attack outside a Bank of Greece office in Athens; the blast caused extensive damage to surrounding structures but no casualties.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Athens, Greece

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**AL-SHABAAB**

aka The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; the Youth; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 18, 2008, al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have undertaken a violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the series of transitional Somali governments. In 2014, the group continued to fight to discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia.

Al-Shabaab is an official al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate and has ties to other AQ affiliates including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In September 2014, former al-Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, was killed and replaced by Ahmed Diriye.

The group is composed of Somali recruits as well as a number of foreign fighters. Since 2011, al-Shabaab has seen its military capacity reduced due to the efforts of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces against al-Shabaab; and clashes, some violent, within the group.
itself. Despite al-Shabaab’s loss of key territory since 2012, the organization was able to maintain its hold on large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia in 2014, and conducted attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Federal Government of Somalia, recruit new fighters, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group has claimed responsibility for several high profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. It has been responsible for the assassination of numerous civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. Al-Shabaab fighters and those who have claimed allegiance to the group have conducted violent attacks and have assassinated international aid workers and members of NGOs.

In its first attack outside of Somalia, al-Shabaab was responsible for the July 11, 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda during the World Cup, which killed nearly 76 people, including one American citizen. In 2013, al-Shabaab again expanded its activities outside of Somali and staged a significant attack in September against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The siege resulted in the death of at least 65 civilians – including foreign nationals from 13 countries outside of Kenya – six soldiers and police officers, and hundreds of injured.

In 2014, al-Shabaab carried out several attacks, including a May attack on the building of the Federal Parliament of Somalia, that injured at least two lawmakers; a May bombing attack on a restaurant in Djibouti that was popular with foreigners that killed 20 and wounded at least 15; and an attempted attack in July on Villa Somalia, the Somali Presidential Headquarters. In mid-November, al-Shabaab attacked a bus traveling in northern Kenya, singling out and killing 28 non-Muslims. In early December, al-Shabaab killed 36 Christians working in a quarry in northern Kenya. On December 25, al-Shabaab fighters penetrated the Mogadishu International Airport compound for the first time in several years, ambushing and killing at least 10 AMISOM soldiers and contractors.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have several thousand members, including a small cadre of foreign fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Al-Shabaab has lost full control of significant areas of territory. In September 2012, al-Shabaab lost control of Kismayo, a vital port it used to obtain supplies and funding through taxes. In October 2014, al-Shabaab lost another strategic port in Baraaaw to AU and Somali troops. Despite these losses, al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in the middle and lower Juba regions, as well as Bay, Shabelle, and Bakol regions, and maintained its presence in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within Puntland’s larger urban areas.

**Funding and External Aid:** Since 2012, al-Shabaab has seen its income diminish due to the loss of the strategic port cities of Kismayo, Merka, and Baraaaw; furthermore, it lost a general ability to freely levy taxes in certain urban areas in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab continued to operate and carry out attacks despite fewer financial resources, however, and still
obtained some funds through illegal charcoal production and exports, taxation of local populations, and foreign donations.

Because al-Shabaab is a multi-clan entity, it reportedly receives donations from individuals in the Somali diaspora; however, the donations are not always intended to support terrorism, but also to support family members.

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**SHINING PATH**

**aka** SL; Sendero Luminoso; Ejercito Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerrilla Army); EGP; Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (People’s Liberation Army); EPL; Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru); PCP; Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Maritategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Maritategui); Socorro Popular del Peru (People’s Aid of Peru); SPP

**Description:** The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. SL’s stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments. In the 1980s, SL was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. The Peruvian government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, capturing Guzman in 1992, and killing a large number of militants.

Today, SL operates primarily in the Apurimac, Ene, and Montaro River Valley (VRAEM), an area that accounts for half of Peru’s total cocaine production. The organization was significantly weakened by an August 2013 operation conducted by a joint military-police task force in the VRAEM that resulted in the deaths of two of the SL’s top operational leaders, Alejandro Borda Casafranca (also known as Comrade Alipio) and Martin Quispe Palomino (also known as Comrade Gabriel). The demise of Alipio and Gabriel was the biggest blow sustained by the SL since the capture of SL’s then-national leader, Comrade Feliciano, in 1999.

**Activities:** SL carried out approximately 20 terrorist attacks in 2014, a significant drop from the estimated 50 attacks the group conducted in 2013. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two soldiers and the wounding of six soldiers, two police officers, and seven civilians. SL did not demonstrate the ability to conduct attacks in Lima.

**Strength:** Peruvian officials estimated that SL consisted of approximately 100 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Peru, with most activity in rural areas, specifically the Huallaga Valley and the Apurimac, Ene, and Montaro River Valley of central Peru.

**Funding and External Aid:** SL is primarily funded by the illicit narcotics trade.

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**TEHRIK-E TALIBAN PAKISTAN**
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 1, 2010, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistan-based terrorist organization formed in 2007 in opposition to Pakistani military efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Previously disparate tribal militants agreed to cooperate and eventually coalesced into TTP under the leadership of now deceased leader Baitullah Mehsud. TTP was led by Hakimullah Mehsud from August 2009 until his death in November 2013. Following Hakimullah Mehsud’s death, TTP has been led by Mullah Fazlullah, formerly the leader of TTP’s chapter in the Swat area of Pakistan. Since Fazlullah became TTP’s leader, the group has been engaged in violent infighting. A rival faction led by Khan Said – a former TTP commander who had previously clashed with Hakimullah – publicly split from TTP in May 2014. Separately, TTP entered into peace talks with the Pakistani government in early 2014, but the talks collapsed in June 2014. In October 2014, the chief spokesman and five regional commanders defected from TTP and publicly pledged allegiance to ISIL.

TTP’s goals include waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani military and state, as well as against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and overthrowing the Government of Pakistan. TTP uses the tribal belt along the Afghan-Pakistani border to train and deploy its operatives, and the group has ties to al-Qa’ida (AQ). TTP draws ideological guidance from AQ, while AQ relies on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This arrangement gives TTP access to both AQ’s global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members.

Activities: TTP has carried out and claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests, including a December 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khowst, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens; and an April 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens. TTP is suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. TTP directed and facilitated the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosive device in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010.

Throughout 2011 and 2012, TTP carried out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. Attacks in 2011 targeted civilians, Pakistani government and military targets, and an American consulate convoy in a series of suicide bombings and attacks. In 2012, TTP carried out attacks targeting a mosque, police checkpoint, a Pakistani Air Force base, and a bus carrying Shia Muslims.

In 2013, TTP attacked both civilian and government targets. In May, three TTP bombings, two targeting political parties and a third targeting a newly-created elite police force killed 14 people and wounded 54 others. In September, a TTP suicide bomber struck outside a church in Peshawar, Pakistan, killing 81 and wounding approximately 140. In October, a Pakistani government minister and nine other civilians were killed when a suicide bomber, believed to be a member of a local branch of the TTP in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, struck outside the...
official’s home during the Eid al-Adha holiday. In November, twin bomb attacks targeting a Shia neighborhood of Karachi, Pakistan killed six people and wounded 35 others.

TTP continued attacking both civilian and Pakistani government targets in 2014. In January, a TTP suicide attack on a police convoy in Karachi killed three and injured 10 others. Also in January, a bombing against a military convoy, which was carried out by TTP in the Pakistani town of Bannu, killed at least 20 Pakistani soldiers and wounded at least 30. Two days later, a TTP suicide bombing at a bazaar in Rawalpindi killed eight soldiers and three children. In February, at least 13 policemen were killed and almost 60 others were injured in a suicide bombing targeting a bus carrying officers to a local training center near Karachi. In June, TTP launched two consecutive attacks against Karachi’s international airport, one on June 8 and the second followed two days later. In the June 8 attack, carried out in conjunction with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a squad of commandos, disguised as government security forces, stormed the airport. The ensuing fight between security forces and the TTP, which lasted through the night, killed at least 36 people. The second attack, in which at least two gunmen opened fire on a guard post at the airport perimeter, caused no casualties. In December, TTP laid siege to a primary school in Peshawar, Pakistan. The eight-hour assault on the school killed 145 people, 132 of whom were children.

**Strength:** Several thousand.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan

**Funding and External Aid:** TTP is believed to raise most of its funds through kidnapping ransoms, criminal activity, and extortion.
Chapter 7
Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

*Country Reports on Terrorism 2014* is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutory excerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a discussion of the interpretation and application of those terms in this report are included below.

**Excerpts and Summary of Key Statutory Terms:**

Section 2656f(a) of Title 22 of the United States Code states as follows:
(a) … The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing -

(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country -

(i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;

(ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 2405(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; and

(iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report; and

(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations;

(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 2405(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;

(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on -

(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals
(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing
further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought
coopera in preventing the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism
against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section
2656f(a) as follows:

(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more
than one country;

(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups
which practice, international terrorism.

Interpretation and Application of Key Terms. For purposes of this report, the terms
“international terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitions assigned to them
in 22 USC 2656f(d) (see above). The term “non-combatant,” which is referred to but not defined
in 22 USC 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel
(whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.

It should be noted that 22 USC 2656f(d) is one of many U.S. statutes and international legal
instruments that concern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which use definitions for
terrorism and related terms that are different from those used in this report. The interpretation
and application of defined and related terms concerning terrorism in this report is therefore
specific to the statutory and other requirements of the report, and is not intended to express the
views of the U.S. government on how these terms should be interpreted or applied for any other
purpose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlation between the interpretation of
terms such as “non-combatant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribed to similar
terms pursuant to the law of war (which encapsulates the obligations of states and individuals
with respect to their activities in situations of armed conflict).

Statistical Information. Pursuant to 22 USC § 2656f(b), this report should contain “to the
extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including
United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group
during the preceding calendar year.” This is satisfied through the inclusion of a statistical annex
to the report that sets out statistical information provided by the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Center of Excellence, based at the University of Maryland. The
statistical annex includes a discussion of the methodology employed by START in compiling the
relevant data. This report does not contain statistical information specifically concerning combatants. The focus of the terrorism report, as is clear from the definition of terrorism, is on violence against noncombatant targets.

**Contextual Reporting.** Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national population is not meant to imply that all members of that population are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything other than a tiny fraction of such larger populations. It is terrorist groups--and their actions--that are the focus of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence.

Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily “international terrorism” and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.