THE HAQQANI NETWORK

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by

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How does the Haqqani Network make decisions? The decisions the Haqqani Network makes in the next five years will likely influence the future of Afghanistan. This study reviews existing literature to better understand how the Haqqani Network makes decisions through the qualitative analysis of three key decisions the organization made in the past: the inclusion of foreign fighters, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11. The results show that the Haqqani Network makes decisions to protect and maintain its autonomy.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

September 11, 2001 is considered one of the worst days in United States (U.S.) history. Although the al-Qa’ida network was the mastermind behind the September 11 attack on the twin towers, the Haqqani Network provided al-Qa’ida the necessary assistance to plan, train, and execute this elaborate plan to attack the U.S. The Haqqani Network was able to accomplish this task because it maintained control of its area of Afghanistan since the Soviet forces withdrawal in 1989.

The U.S. has been in Afghanistan for over 12 years and is currently in the process of transferring operational responsibility to Afghanistan security forces. Groups that have fought against U.S. forces are now deciding to stop the fighting and are attempting to integrate themselves into the political process in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network is considered the largest and most significant of these groups. The decision the Haqqani Network makes in the coming years has the potential to greatly affect the future of Afghanistan.

Authors from the Combating Terrorism Center at WestPoint, The Heritage Foundation, authors, other academia, and media have recognized the significance of the Haqqani Network and have performed a great deal of research on its history and its affiliation with al-Qa’ida. However, little research has assessed how the Haqqani Network makes decisions? To understand how the Haqqani Network makes decisions, factors that may influence these decisions must also be understood. Considering these factors will help analysts to predict future decisions the Haqqani Network may make.
This study will attempt to develop an understanding for how the Haqqani Network makes decisions to provide the U.S. Army leadership with an assessment of how the Haqqani Network will affect the future of Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the author will conduct a qualitative review of three major decisions the Haqqani Network has made since its inceptions: The decision to include foreign fighters, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11. The review of these decisions will not provide a conclusive analysis of how the Haqqani Network makes decisions, but provide additional knowledge to the body of knowledge to how the network makes decisions.

Although the Haqqani Network is separate from al-Qa’ida, very few will disagree that the Haqqani Network provided al-Qa’ida the necessary assistance to plan the September 11, 2001 attacks (Rassler and Brown 2011). The past decisions of the Haqqani Network have had a large impact on the U.S. and surely will have an impact on Army operations in Afghanistan. This research study will be an in-depth study that examines the decisions the Haqqani Network has made in the past and will attempt to research potential decisions they may face in the future.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the September 11, 2001 attacks has caused Afghanistan to be suspended in the minds of both policy makers and military personnel for the next few decades. Afghanistan became the cold war battleground of the 1980s when the Afghan Government, backed by the Soviet military, faced off with the Afghan mujahidin, backed by Pakistan and the United States. In most recent years, people of the world will remember Afghanistan because of its connection to the September 11, 2001 attacks. People fail to realize that Afghanistan is a country filled with
rich and complex history that has resulted in the current makeup of its people and has
affected the way the Haqqani Network makes decisions.

Since its inception, the Haqqani Network has made many decisions in the
complex environment of Afghanistan and the environment has helped to shape how the
network makes decisions. The combination of a dynamic history that includes an array of
factors has resulted in a complex and dynamic environment that can be equated to an
obstacle course the Haqqani Network navigates. The Haqqani obstacle course’s factors
include the Silk Road, history of invaders, Zadran tribe, Nang Pakhtuns, deobandism,
jihad, politics, reconciliation, Afghan Government and Pakistan.

Afghanistan has at least a dozen major ethnic groups: Baluch, Chahar Aimak,
Turkmen, Hazara, Pakhtun, Tajik, Uzbek, Nuristani, Arab, Kirghiz, Pashai, and Persian.
Afghanistan came to include multiple ethnic groups as a result of the Silk Road. The Silk
Road was a network of trade routes that was active from about 300 BC to 200 AD and
linked the Eastern Roman border in the Middle East to the Chinese border Queensland
(Queensland 2013). Many of the Silk Road paths crossed through northern Afghanistan.
The pursuits of the Silk Road led to the constant bombardment and destruction of the
local dynasties. Many of these invaders pursued Afghanistan because of its links to the
Silk Road.

Furthermore, “Armies marched to and fro devastating the land and murdering the
people, laying siege to city after city, and destroying whatever had been left by the
invading army that preceded it” (Ritscher 2013, 1). This obstacle course has been shaped
by invaders throughout history from Alexander the Great and all the way until the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Constant invasion of foreign armies resulted in the people
of Afghanistan and especially the people of the Haqqani Network possessing a warrior mentality.

Additionally, the Haqqani Network core is comprised of the Zadran tribe from the highland Pakhtuns, referred to as Nang Pakhtuns. The Zadran remain both in Pakistan and Afghanistan with the establishment of the Durand Line. Being on either side of the Durand Line provides the Haqqani Network with local support on either side of the border. “Nang Pakhtuns generally inhabit the mountainous fringe of the Pakhtun universe where the land is poor and life is harsh; Nang societies are acephalous and segmentary in structure, and codes of conduct are bound by traditional codes of honor” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 22). Furthermore, the Nang Pakhtuns are a clerical led society vs. a tribal led society. Many of the Nang Pakhtuns can trace their Islamic orthodoxy to Deobandism. Jones provides insight to where Deobandism traces its roots.

Deobandism is a conservative Islamic orthodoxy that follows a Salafist egalitarian model and seeks to emulate the life and times of Prophet Mohammed. The Deobandi philosophy was founded in 1867 at the Dar ul-Ulum (Abode of Islamic Learning) madrassa in Deoband, India. Deobandi madrassas flourished across South Asia, and they were officially supported in Pakistan when President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq assumed control of Pakistani government in 1977. Deobandism became widely practiced in Pakistan, and to a lesser degree in Afghanistan, with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam as its primary political proponent. It holds that a Muslim’s primary obligation and principle loyalty are to his religion. Deobandis believe they have a sacred right and obligation to wage jihad to protect the Muslims of any country. (Jones 2008, 27)

The Nang clerical leader established Deobandi madrassa networks that would produce students (talibs). The Deobandi madrassas in turn,

Afforded the clerical leaders a base of manpower capable of sustaining talib militias, periodically fielded by these clerical leaders to either resist the encroachment of state power or to enforce social-moral control, which accorded mullahs a military power that they could use in pursuit of personal or ideological objects, becoming a coercive influence within the tribal set-up. (Rassler and Brown 2013, 25).
Rassler and Brown go on to describe, the Nang Pakhtuns were known for using their local military power to protect their autonomy from conscription, taxation, and any attempt to prevent their practice of veiling and seclusion of women known as “purdah” (Rassler and Brown 2013). Nang Pakhtuns were a society fighting for their autonomy and way of life before Jalaluddin Haqqani was born. Jalaluddin was born into a world in which the highland Pakhtuns were mobilized in the defense of their territory and the protection from the state meddling with their tribal or Islamic way of life. Jalaluddin was heavily influenced by his studies at the Dar al-‘Ulum Haqqaniyya madrassa in the North West Frontier Province. According to Rassler and Brown, This madrassa was birthplace of Pakhtun Islamism and is considered the birthplace of the Haqqani Network, and the establishment from which the network takes their name. During the 1970 to 1980 period, the “Haqqaniyya network,” a group of Haqqaniyya graduates used practices of Islamist mobilization in the highland tribal area of both Pakistan and Afghanistan from which many of the Taliban leadership arose. In fact, Jalaluddin Haqqani was the first to declare jihad in Afghanistan in 1973. Rassler and Brown, provide Mawlawi Aziz Khan an early Haqqani Network member’s account of Jalaluddin’s declaration.

As soon as Daoud declared the establishment of the Republic through the national radio [on 17 July 1973], Mawlawi Sahib Jalaluddin Haqqani declared jihad in the village of Nika, Zadran, and raised the flag of jihad there. He announced the commencement of jihad by loud speakers throughout the region, and some ulama and Taliban [madrassa students] joined him. (Rasser and Brown 2013, 45).

Since the call for Jihad, the Haqqani Network has remained instrumental in fighting for the Nang Pakhtun’s autonomy; this was especially prevalent during the Afghan fight against the Soviet Union. During this period, the Haqqani Network started to form alliances with other Afghan mujahidin factions. The Haqqani Network made its
first ties with influential Afghan Islamist to include: Yunis Khalis, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ‘Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyf, Burhanudin Rabani, and Ahmad Shah Massoud, all of which were united by an Islamist movement in Kabul (Rassler and Brown 2011). Eventually, the Haqqani Network would strategically align itself with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s group Hizb-e-Islami. The alliance provided the greater Pakhtun movement with the necessary strength to control a large portion of the Afghan Mujahidin. This alliance is also significant because it was maintained until the network decided to ally with the Taliban.

After the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network initially chose to use politics to solve their problems. On 7 through 9 May 1990, Jalaluddin Haqqani went as far to establish the National Commanders Shura. The National Commanders Shura was comprised of 27 major mujahidin field commanders that had been involved in the fight against the Soviets (Rassler and Brown 2013). “Although a primary Pakhtun organization, the National Commanders Shura later included the famous Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, Shi’a commanders, and northern military leaders” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 85).

At the same time, the Haqqani Network leadership became a defacto reconciliation committee. According to Rassler and Brown in mid 1992, Hekmatyar was moving his units south of Kabul and at the same time Massoud worked to secure Kabul, Jalaluddin Haqqani created a reconciliation committee in an attempt to bring the rival factions into negotiations (Rassler and Brown 2013). The Zadran tribe became skilled negotiators at this time, because it dealt with disputes at the local level throughout the Nang area of Afghanistan.
Early in his tenure as the leader of Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai recognized the significance of Jalaluddin’s Haqqani’s influence and proceeded to invite Jalaluddin Haqqani to serve as the Afghan Prime Minister. Jalaluddin Haqqani refused the offer because of the presence of American troops (Shahzad 2004). The presence of U.S. troops represents an invading force in the eyes of the network. President Hamid Karzai may have recognized Jalaluddin Haqqani’s ability to act as a politician in the post-Soviet Afghanistan. This view may have been the result of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s ability to establish the National Commanders Shura. *Al Jazeera* provides insight to how the Haqqani Network has maintained its influence in Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan and has proceeded to exert its influence in Afghanistan by making several assassination attempts against President Karzai (*Al Jazeera* 2011). The Haqqani Network’s ability to attack the President of Afghanistan represents the instability within the country. The Haqqani Network’s ability to conduct precision attacks in Kabul represents the level of prowess the network maintains in Afghanistan. A U.S. Commander once referred to the Haqqani Network as “the most resilient enemy Network out there” and one of the biggest threats to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and the Afghan government in Afghanistan (Partlow 2011, 1). The Network is the most resilient because it has maintained its existence through over 10 years of precision targeting by U.S. forces and is one of the biggest threats NATO forces face because of its ability to attack with precision.

According to Perlez, Schmitt, and Gall, Pakistan’s leadership recognized the necessity to broker a deal with the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Government with the NATO troop withdrawal on the horizon (Perlez, Schmitt, and Gall 2010). Pakistan
has maintained a long relationship with the network since the days of the Afghan
Mujahidin and wants the network to have the ability to influence Afghanistan. The result
will allow Pakistan to maintain a level of influence over its neighbor. President Obama
reinforced this notion of troop departure during his February 2013 State of the Union
address by announcing the withdrawal of 34,000 troops by February 2014. Because of
this announcement, one important question comes into play: how will the Afghan
Government and Haqqani Network decide to coexist, with the plan for U.S. complete
withdrawal in the future inevitable? President Karzai’s willingness to negotiate with the
same group that has made several assassination attempts on his life demonstrates the
importance of the integration of the Haqqani Network in the future of Afghanistan. The
U.S. Government debated on recognizing the Haqqani Network as a terrorist group
because of the impact it will have on the U.S. and Pakistan relationship. The Haqqani
Network is deeply rooted in Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan and
is reportedly closely affiliated with the Pakistani Army. The sheer fact that the head of
the Pakistani Army, General Kayani, and Pakistan’s spy chief, Lieutenant General.
Ahmad Shuja Pasha, were able to facilitate face-to-face meetings with President Hamid
Karzai, demonstrates the relationship between the Pakistan Army and the Haqqani
Network (Perlez, Schmitt, and Gall 2010). The Pakistan Army’s relationship with the
network is significant because the Haqqani Network is directly linked to attacks against
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and U.S. forces work closely with the Pakistani Army in
combating terrorism. The Pakistani Army is attempting to maintain a balancing act
between the two relationships.
Assumptions

The following assumptions are believed to remain true and add relevance to the research project. Although the Haqqani Network may lose some of its leadership due to U.S. targeting, a formidable leadership presence will remain intact; the remaining leadership will be able to make significant decisions for the network as a whole. The Haqqani Network will maintain a foothold in Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan. The relevant actors will behave rationally, in a manner that can be predicted, by understanding their past actions and motivational drivers.

Limitations

Time constraint is a major limitation of the study, which will in turn limit the amount of time dedicated to analyzing and assessing past research regarding the Haqqani Network. In addition, the inability to interview Haqqani Network leadership will limit this study’s ability to gain in-depth insight to the network’s plans and intentions. The inability to conduct on-the-ground interviews in Afghanistan and Pakistan will limit the perspective offered for this study. The investigator affiliated with the U.S. Army may offer a bias when interpreting the results from this study. Additionally, the majority of the material used for this study comes from the perspective of authors that are affiliated with the Department of Defense. This study lacks the perspective of individuals from Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Delimitations

This study will not look at original copies of documents produced by the Haqqani Network, and will only look at translated English versions. Therefore, the original
translator potentially can influence the results of these documents. Furthermore, this study will only look at unclassified material that is available to the public. This study will not review any classified material pertaining to this subject.

**Conclusion**

This review will attempt to highlight the significance of the Haqqani Network’s potential influence on the future of Afghanistan. This study will attempt to develop an understanding for how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. To accomplish this, the author will review three major decisions the Haqqani Network has made since its inception: The decision to include foreign fighters, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11. The review of these decisions will not provide a conclusive analysis of how the Haqqani Network makes decisions, but provide additional knowledge to the body of knowledge to how the network makes decisions. The next chapter will review the literature on this topic and will provide an assessment of the significance of that material to this study. It will be followed by an explanation of the methodology and then the subsequent chapters will examine each issue in detail. The final chapter will contain the conclusion and recommendations for U.S. Army leadership regarding the Haqqani Network.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review the current literature on the Haqqani Network and will provide an assessment of the significance of that material to this study. There has been a remarkable amount of material written on Jalaluddin Haqqani and the Haqqani Network.

Many authors have conducted in depth research on the history of the Haqqani Network, the network’s connections to al-Qa’ida, the network’s connections to foreign fighters, the network’s connection to the Taliban, the criminal aspect of the network, and how the network receives its funding. Part of the research to date has indirectly covered how the Haqqani Network makes decisions however; little research has attempted to understand the mentality of the network. This study will address the gap (shortcomings) in the literature by researching how the network makes decisions.

Understanding the Haqqani Network’s decision making will provide an understanding on how the network navigates the environment of Afghanistan. The environment of Afghanistan is complex and dynamic and can be equated to an obstacle course. The obstacle course of Afghanistan includes Pakhtuns, Pakhtun Wali, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Sunni, Shia, different political movements, Islamists, Jihadists, and foreign fighters, as well as the involvement of Pakistan, India, Iran, and the United States. While navigating the obstacle course of Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network has managed to make several important decisions. This study examined three of these decisions and the literature written about them: the network’s decision to include foreign fighters, the network’s decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11. The review of these decisions will help to better
understand the factors that contribute to how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. Lastly, each form of literature is reviewed along with each decision the Haqqani Network made. Selected literature is reviewed within multiple sections because of its applicability to the correlating decision.

**Haqqani Network Decision to Include Foreign Fighters**

Hegghammer provides excellent insight to the root of support provided to foreign fighters in Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia (2010). He provides insight to how a new populist Hijazi pan-Islamism emerged and provides insight to how the Hijazi pan-Islamist community came to existence. The repression and exile of Muslim Brotherhood activists in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in the 1960s, led to a large diaspora of Muslim Brotherhood activists to move to the Hijazi area of Saudi Arabia. He details that this movement created a global network of charities for inter-Muslim aid. He provides his prospective as an academic with extensive knowledge regarding violent Islamism in Saudi Arabia.

Rassler and Brown present critical information on the Haqqani Network’s inclusion of foreign fighters (2011). They describe how the Haqqani Network can trace its roots to the early anti communist movement during the 1960s and 1970s in Afghanistan. During this period, the Haqqani Network transformed from a highland Pakhtun organization into an organization that can help to influence the future of Afghanistan. Additionally, the Haqqani Network established its first connections to the Persian Gulf. They provide an excellent review of the evolution of the Haqqani Network and its association with al-Qa’ida, but they do not provide specific analysis of how the
network makes decisions. They provide their perspective on the Haqqani Network as Department of Defense academics from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. The Combating Terrorism Center has provided Rassler and Brown an excellent opportunity to access captured documents from Afghanistan and the ability to yield information on the Haqqani Network from the Department of Defense.

Rassler and Brown expand upon their previous publications by providing an in-depth historical review of the evolution of the Haqqani Network (2013). Specifically they provide insight to how the network is one of the first Afghan fighters accredited with incorporating foreign fighters in its ranks. They also provide insight to how Bin Laden established his own training camp north of Haqqani Network Zhawara base. They note that the Haqqani Network may not have allowed Bin Laden to establish his camps in Haqqani territory if he had not provided something in return. Of note, they highlight that the list of foreign fighters that had fought alongside the Haqqani Network is the “who’s who” of al-Qa’ida today. These fighters can trace their origins to the Haqqani Network camps. A shortfall of this research is the authors fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors that led to the Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters.

Peters offers excellent insight to how the Haqqani Network finances its operations (2012). Specifically, she highlights that the Haqqani Network ran madrasas for fundraising, rather than for Islamic purposes, knowing they will attract Arab donors. She states that Jalaluddin Haqqani went as far as marrying an Arab woman, to maintain his connection to the Middle East. The marriage has helped to ensure his personal ties to the Gulf and the flow of funds. She discusses New York Times reporter David Rohde’s
experience while being captive in Haqqani territory in Miram Shah, Afghanistan, details the interactions young Afghan and Pakistani Taliban members had with foreign fighters. Peters provides her insight as an academic affiliated with the Department of Defense. Her publication regarding the Haqqani Network’s financing is a detailed account concerning the network’s financing. However, Peters does fail to provide specific analysis on factors other than financial that led the Haqqani Network’s inclusion of foreign fighters. This study will provide insight to other than financial factors that led to the network’s inclusion of foreign fighters.

Additionally, Peters identifies Haqqani Network’s activities in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010). Specifically, she provides insight into how Haqqani Network has maintained its connection to the Gulf, by having its members receive funding from donations from the Gulf region and payments from al-Qa’ida. Furthermore, she points to the fact that Sirajuddin Haqqani, the half-Arab son of Jalaluddin Haqqani and current leader of the network, is fluent in Arabic and has worked closely with foreign fighters. Her publication provides insight regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contribute to the Haqqani Network making its decisions. This study will attempt to discover the factors that contribute to how the network makes decisions.

Although the previous research has provided insight to the Haqqani Network’s activities, they fail to provide analysis of how the network makes decisions. Specifically, Rassler and Brown fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors that led to the Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters. Additionally, Peters fails to provide specific analysis on factors other than financial that led the Haqqani Network’s
inclusion of foreign fighters. Her additional publication provides insight regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contribute to how the Haqqani Network makes its decisions. This study will attempt to fill the gap (shortcomings) by discovering the factors that contribute to how the network made the decision to include foreign fighters.

Haqqani Network Decision to Ally with the Taliban Movement

Kuehn and Linschoten provide excellent insight to when the Haqqani Network decided to join the Taliban Movement (2012). They also provide insight to the significance of the Haqqani Network joining the Taliban and how Bin Laden viewed it. They provide excellent insight to the fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, but fail to discuss in detail the factors that contributed to the Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban.

Rassler and Brown underline that initially in October 1993 Benazir Bhutto replacement of Nawaz Sharif, led Pakistan to become frustrated with Hekmatyar and began to look toward supporting the Taliban (2013). Pakistan’s shift toward the Taliban may have provided the Haqqani Network with an insight to which organization to ally with in the future. They provide insight to how the Haqqani Network may have realized the necessity to recognize the Taliban as an organization rising to power, when the Taliban captured Ghazni at the end of 1994. They note that in February 1995, the Mansur family, a long time Haqqani Network ally joined the Taliban. At this Point, Haji Din Muhammad, a long time associate of Jalaluddin Haqqani wrote of his account when he consulted with Yunis Khalis about how to respond to the Taliban. Although Jalaluddin
Haqqani was at first reluctant to join the ranks of the Taliban, he later decided to join after negotiating for their autonomy in exchange for support. They also note that despite the military successes, the relationship between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban continued to be strained. The Haqqani Network leadership felt powerless to make military decisions, further leading to a strained relationship. October of 1996, al-Qa’ida finally decided to provide support to the Taliban. Lastly, they fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors to how the Haqqani Network makes decisions.

According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency report, Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the Taliban Movement in 1995, when the Taliban captured the eastern city of Jalalabad Ziemke-Deckens’ (2010). They provide a summary report of the Haqqani Network activities, but fail to provide specific analysis of how the network makes decisions.

Peters provides insight into the Haqqani Network’s association with the Taliban (2012, 21). She states the “Taliban leadership appeared to respect the Haqqani Network’s military prowess and contracted its fighters in 1997 to lead the offensive against the Northern Alliance on the Shomali Plains north of Kabul, as well as during other key engagements. She discusses how Haqqani’s official role as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs put him in a position to consolidate control over trade that passed through his control zone.” She notes that Jalaluddin Haqqani did not seek out any real decision making role in Kabul. He preferred to function more or less independently, neither fully a part of the Kandahar based movement, nor contested by it. Her publication is a detailed account regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contribute to the Haqqani Network making
its decisions to ally with the Taliban. This study will address the factors that contributed to the network’s decision to ally with the Taliban.

The previous research has provided insight to the Haqqani Network, but fails to provide analysis of how the network makes decisions. Kuehn and Linschoten provide excellent insight to the fundamental differences between the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, but fail to discuss in detail the factors that contributed to the Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban. Furthermore, Rassler and Brown fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors to how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. Additionally, Jalalabad Ziemke-Deckens’ provides a summary report of Haqqani Network activities, but fails to provide specific analysis of how the network makes decisions. This study will analyze the factors that contributed to how the network makes decisions. Lastly, Peters’ publication is a detailed account regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contributed to the Haqqani Network making the decisions to ally with the Taliban. This study will attempt to fill the gap (shortcomings) by discovering and analyzing the factors that contributed to how the network made the decision to ally with the Taliban.

**Haqqani Network Decision to Maintain an Alliance with the Taliban after 9/11**

Jones provides insight to the Haqqani Network decision to join the Afghan insurgency (2008). Additionally he notes, leaders of the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other insurgent groups (presumably the Haqqani Network) looked to overthrow the Afghan Government because they wanted to replace it with a government grounded in an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam. He also notes many of the Pakhtun factions felt
marginalized by northern ethnic groups because many important powerful ministries were in the hands of the Panjshiri Tajiks. This may have further made the Haqqani Network feel disenfranchised from the new Afghan Government and pushed them toward fighting in the Afghan insurgency. He also provides insight to the lack of security and governance provided by Hamid Karzai’s Government. His publication provides excellent information regarding the Haqqani Network’s decision to join the neo-Taliban, but fails to analyze the factors that have contributed to this decision.

Kuehn and Linschoten provide excellent insight to when the Haqqani Network decided to maintain its relationship with the Taliban (2012). They note Mullah Omar appointed Jalaluddin Haqqani the overall commander of the Taliban forces on October 6th before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This appointment signifies the state of the Taliban before the invasion, but also signifies the amount of trust that was bestowed upon the Haqqani Network before the U.S. invasion. This is a major change from the days of the Taliban takeover when the Haqqani Network did not have operational control of its own members. They also highlight the Haqqani Network leadership state of affairs before the U.S. invasion. They note Jalaluddin Haqqani made proposals to the U.S. Government in 2002 by sending his brother to Kabul. His brother was only to be beaten and disgraced. Providing his current state of affairs at the time, Jalaluddin decided to join with the Taliban. They highlight, the Haqqani Network role became increasingly important in 2003. Jalaluddin Haqqani became the head of the Miram Shah shura and held a seat at the Taliban’s Leadership shura in Quetta. They note, Sirajuddin Haqqani received a visit from Mullah Obaidullah in 2003 asking for his help with an insurgency in Afghanistan. They highlight, Sirajuddin Haqqani takes substantial pains to converse that they are
followers to the Taliban leadership. They note, the al-Qa’ida leadership relied and coordinated with the Jalaluddin Haqqani to avoid friction or tension with the Kandahari leadership of the Taliban. They provide excellent insight, but fail to analyze the factors that contributed to the Haqqani Network to continue to ally with the Taliban.

Rassler and Brown provide insight into the decade following 9/11, the Haqqani Network would further amalgamate with the Taliban and perform in a similar way to the preceding decades (2013). The Haqqani Network actions would prove fundamental to the Taliban and Pakistan’s efforts to influence the outcome of Afghanistan. They also highlight a missed opportunity for the U.S. Government to negotiate with the Haqqani Network after 9/11. Jalaluddin Haqqani was prepared to switch loyalties following the defeat of the Taliban. Pakistan urged the U.S. Government to accommodate him and potentially provide him a role in the Afghan Government. However, the Bush administration would accept nothing less than an unconditional surrender because the Haqqani Network may have known the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden.

Furthermore, Rassler and Brown emphasize how President Hamid Karzai’s support for a Haqqani Network rival, Badshah Khan Zadran may have further swayed the network toward supporting the Taliban’s fight against the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) (2013). Additionally, the evolution from Jalaluddin Haqqani to Sirajuddin Haqqani has not changed the overall goals of the network in a post-2001 period. The central goal for the Haqqani Network remains the same: local control and autonomy in the Loya Paktia (Waziristan) and a sharia based Islamic Government in Afghanistan. They also note that since joining the Taliban, the Haqqani Network has
provided the Taliban with the ability to improve its fighting capabilities and the ability to strengthen its campaigns in Kabul.

Rassler and Brown explain the current relationship between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban through excerpts from author Thomas Rutting (2013). Rutting also highlights that the Taliban provide the Haqqani Network autonomy in its area of control. The Haqqani Network is able to maintain its autonomy and at the same time is able to hide under the Taliban umbrella. They note that Pakistan is leaving North Waziristan unchecked, which can potentially allow North Waziristan to continue to act as the center of gravity for terrorists from around the world. They also note that the Haqqani Network provides the Pakistan Taliban the ability to learn new tactics and the ability to employ these newly acquired skills in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Taliban then is able to take these skills and employ them across the border in Pakistan. Although this method is effective for the Pakistan Taliban, it is extremely complex for the Haqqani Network because of its relationship with the Pakistani Military. They provide insight to David Rohde’s, a New York Times journalist who was kidnapped and held by the Haqqani Network, account of his time spent in North Waziristan. They note how Pakistan sees the Haqqani Network as an important element to the reconciliation effort for Afghanistan.

As of mid 2010, Pakistan publically announced its intentions to negotiate a deal between the Haqqani Network, the Karzai Government, and the United States. They provide insight to how the Haqqani Network is able to navigate the obstacle course of Afghanistan today. The Haqqani Network is linked with over 80 madrassas along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. This organizational structure has performed as an instrument for the Haqqani Network to develop influence and provide assistances and
religious direction to local communities in the tribal areas. They also note that Norwegian scholar Anne Stenersen proved this through her study of over 90 films released by al-Qa’ida’s digital media production cell al-Sahab. Stenersen’s study revealed the footage of attacks conducted in Haqqani Network area (Khost and Paktika) account for 50 percent of the related videos. They note the development of suicide attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices as an example of the exchange of ideas at the Haqqani Network training camps.

Rassler and Brown, the Haqqani Network also benefits from hosting international jihadists at its camps in recent years (2013). The Haqqani Network is able to gain access to additional fighters and resources to continue to support its fight to keep autonomy and fight against ISAF. Additionally they note how the Pakistani Taliban have established a relationship that allows them to fight alongside Haqqani Network fighters in Afghanistan to hone their skills. Lastly, they fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors to how the Haqqani Network makes decisions.

Peters provide insight into the Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Taliban (2012). She notes, the Haqqani Network had remained operationally and financially autonomous from the Taliban. However, the two groups have collaborated on some military campaigns in the post-2001 phase of the Afghan conflict. She also provides insight into how Haqqani Network leaders have leveraged strategic alliances and relationships to consolidate their position of authority within the community and to secure their sources of funding. Her publication is a detailed account of the Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Taliban, but it fails to address the factors that contributed to the network making the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11.
Peters provides insight into Haqqani Network’s activities in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan (2010). She points out that the Haqqani Network appears to collaborate closely with the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa’ida, both in terms of launching terror attacks and, specifically with the Pakistani Taliban, engaging in illicit activity, particularly kidnapping. She continues to point out that Haqqani Network is becoming closer to al-Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani, in terms of launching tactical operations and attacks, specifically with the Pakistan Taliban. She provides excellent information regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contribute to the Haqqani Network’s decision to maintain its relationship with the Taliban.

Curtis’ publication provides insight to the Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Pakistan Taliban (2012). She notes the violence perpetrated by the Pakistan Taliban the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qa’ida is mutually reinforcing and helps perpetuate each group’s ability to conduct attacks against the targets it chooses. As of recently, she reports the Haqqani Network has repeatedly pledged its loyalty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. “Sirajuddin Haqqani reportedly announced he would request Mullah Omar’s blessing for a ‘blitzkrieg’ against U.S. and NATO forces in coming months” (Curtis 2012, 1). She provides information on the Haqqani Network to allow policy makers to make informed decisions regarding the network and Afghanistan. She analyzes America’s economic, security and political relationships with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other nations of South Asia as a senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Her publication provides excellent insight to Haqqani Network’s current
relationship with the Taliban, but fails to provide insight to the factors that have maintained this relationship.

All of the previous research has provided excellent insight to the Haqqani Network, but fails to provide analysis of the factors that contribute to how the network makes decisions. Jones’ publication provides excellent information regarding the Haqqani Network’s decision to join the neo-Taliban, but fails to analyze the factors that have contributed to this decision. Also, Kuehn and Linschoten provide excellent insight, but fail to analyze the factors that contributed to the Haqqani Network to continue to ally with the Taliban. Additionally, they fail to provide specific analysis of the contributing factors to how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. Peters’ publication is a detailed account of the Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Taliban, but fails to address the factors that contribute to the network making its decisions to maintain its relationship with the Taliban. This study will address these factors that contribute to how the network makes decisions. Peters’ provides excellent information regarding the crime and insurgency in the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but fails to address the factors that contribute to the Haqqani Network’s decision to maintain its relationship with the Taliban. This study will address the factors that contribute to how the network made its decision to maintain a relationship with the Taliban. Curtis’ publication provides excellent insight to Haqqani Network’s current relationship with the Taliban, but fails to provide insight to the factors that have maintained this relationship. This study will provide insight to the factors that have contributed to the network maintaining its relationship with the Taliban.
This study will attempt to fill the gap (shortcomings) by discovering and analyzing the factors that contributed to how the network made the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study attempts to discover how the Haqqani Network makes decisions by conducting a qualitative review of the current literature regarding the network. Of note, the following assumptions are believed to remain true and add relevance to the research project. First, although the Haqqani Network may lose some of its leadership due to U.S. drone strikes, a formidable leadership presence will remain intact. Second, the remaining leadership will be able to make significant decisions for the network as a whole. Third, the Haqqani Network will maintain a foothold in Miram Shah, Pakistan, and Paktia Province, Afghanistan.

A qualitative study was selected for this research because it will allow for a thorough review of the existing body of knowledge regarding the Haqqani Network. The benefit of conducting a qualitative research study is that it provides depth and detail regarding specific aspects of the Haqqani Network. The drawback of conducting this qualitative research study is that it does not allow for interviews of individuals with first hand knowledge of material regarding the Haqqani Network. This research will describe what the Haqqani Network considers important. Additionally, the author will attempt to determine the outside influences of the Haqqani Network and the level in which these entities can influence the network. Finally, the author will analyze the impact of future decisions the Haqqani Network may make and how it will affect U.S. policy in Afghanistan.
This study will collect relevant data pertaining to the Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters, to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11.

The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters in its ranks was chosen because the author believes this was a critical decision that eventually led to the network being successful against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this decision led to the inception of al-Qa’ida. Arguably, if the Haqqani Network had not decided to include foreign fighters in its ranks, then the attacks on 9/11 may have never occurred. Additionally, the world potentially would not be in a fight against terrorists all over the world attempting to maintain a connection or affiliation with al-Qa’ida.

The network’s decision to ally with the Taliban Movement was chosen as the second major decision to analyze because the author believes that this decision will provide insight to how the network creates alliances. Today, the Haqqani Network is a formidable element within the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani Network would not be able to maintain its stature and autonomy if it did not have alliances allowing for its success. Understanding how the Haqqani Network forms these alliances will potentially provide insight into how the network will form alliances in the future.

The network’s decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11 will help in understanding how the network has formed a relative recent decision. In addition, this analysis will help to form an understanding as to how and why the Haqqani Network decided to maintain the alliance. The Haqqani Network may have decided to disassociate itself with the Taliban and integrate itself into the new Afghanistan, but instead decided to maintain its alliance with the Taliban. The analysis of this decision can potentially
provide insight to why the Haqqani Network chose not to ally itself with Karzai and the new Afghanistan.

The author believes that these three decisions are some of the most significant decisions the Haqqani Network has made since its inception. Additionally, these decisions will potentially help to determine how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. All of the data collected will be unclassified, publically available information. The data will be obtained from the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library. Additionally, data will be collected from the Internet. This data will consist of journals, news articles, research institution publications, and other published scholarly work on the Haqqani Network.

The research will also focus on laying the groundwork of the Haqqani Network and the impact it has had on Afghanistan. This will include a review of the Haqqani Network evolution starting before the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan. It will provide the necessary context to show the relevance of the Haqqani Network and the roles the unit played throughout Afghanistan’s history.

Furthermore, this study will attempt to identify the major contributing factors that led the Haqqani Network to make the decisions to include foreign fighters, to ally with the Taliban Movement, and to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11. Perez (2013), factors that contribute to making decisions can be identified by two principal causes. First, a person might make a decision as a rational actor in light of material structures (distribution of natural resources, geography, terrain, climate, etc.) and manmade institutions (economic systems, rules, organizations, policies, etc.). The second
cause is a result of a person’s interior thoughts or communal attributes (e.g., culture, ideologies, religiosities, secularities, worldviews, ethical norms, etc.).

The author will attempt to accomplish this through the review of the incentive structure in which the Haqqani Network made these decisions. In addition, the author will attempt to discern: how the Haqqani Network perceived the costs and the benefits; how did physical, material, and institutional factors affect their decisions; how did ideational and cultural factors affect their decisions?

Overall, the framework explained in chapter 1 links the primary research question to the subordinate research questions and formulated the course of research. This framework supports the methodology and shows the importance of the Haqqani Network and its connection to the future of Afghanistan. The analysis of these relationships, explored in chapter 4, provides the baseline to answer these research questions. Chapter 4 will serve as the analytical framework for the discoveries made during this research. The result of this study will further add to the body of knowledge regarding how the Haqqani Network makes decisions.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

This chapter will attempt to provide insight into how the Haqqani Network makes decisions while navigating the complex and dynamic obstacle course of Afghanistan. How the Haqqani Network navigates, this obstacle course can potentially provide insight as to how the network will navigate the future obstacle course of Afghanistan.

In order to have an understanding of how the Haqqani Network makes decisions, this study will focus on three critical decisions the network has made: the network’s decision to include foreign fighters, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to support a global Jihad.

Haqqani Network Decision to Include Foreign Fighters

The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters into its ranks was a critical decision that eventually led to the network being successful against the Soviet Union. Moreover, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the foreign fighters became well trained fighters ready to wage Jihad around the world. This decision led to the establishment of al-Qa’ida. Arguably, if the Haqqani Network had not decided to include foreign fighters in its ranks, then the attacks on 9/11 may have never occurred. The analysis of this decision will help to provide insight into how the Haqqani Network arrived at this decision.

To understand why the Haqqani Network included foreign fighters, one must first understand where the network can trace its roots. The Haqqani Network can trace its roots to the early anti communist movement during the 1960s and 1970s in Afghanistan.
Hegghammer highlights that during the 1970s, a new populist Hijazi pan-Islamism emerged “as a result of strategic action by marginalized elites employed in nonviolent international Islamic organizations. Seeking political relevance and increased budgets, these activists—who were mostly based in the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia—propagated an alarmist discourse emphasizing external threats to the Muslim nation” (Hegghammer 2010, 56). Essentially, this movement received its momentum during the same period in which the Haqqani Network was forming.

Furthermore, the Hijazi pan-Islamist community came to existence. The repression and exile of Muslim Brotherhood activists in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in the 1960s, led to a large diaspora of Muslim Brotherhood activists on the move to the Hijazi area of Saudi Arabia. The migrants were a well educated bunch in need of employment. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was creating its university structure and needed professors. A large amount of the migrants ended up teaching at the Saudi Arabian institutions. Eventually, these now settled Muslim Brotherhood activists began creating pan-Islamist propaganda in support of the oppression of Muslims around the world. Hegghammer also notes, Saudi Arabian incumbent elites “allowed and periodically competed with, pan-Islamist propaganda for fear of being perceived as lacking sympathy with suffering Muslims abroad. At the heart of the story of trans-nationalization of jihad is thus a process of elite completion” (Hegghammer 2010, 57). At this same time, the Haqqani Network was transforming from a highland Pakhtun organization into an organization that could help to influence the future of Afghanistan.

Before including foreign fighters into its ranks, the Haqqani Network first needed to establish a connection to the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the Haqqani Network was
moving toward the Persian Gulf, the populist Hijazi pan-Islamism moment was gaining ground in the Hijaz region of Saudi Arabia. This movement created a global network of charities for inter-Muslim aid. These charities deployed workers to Afghanistan in support of Muslims affected by the Soviet invasion. These charities also created the opportune situation for the Haqqani Network to recruit foreign fighters, to fight for Muslim solidarity. During this period, the Haqqani Network established its first connections to the Persian Gulf. The Haqqani Network appears to have been able to capitalize on the momentum of the populist Hijazi pan-Islamism movement.

Although not specifically stated, one can logically assume that the Haqqani Network first established its connection to the Persian Gulf to receive funding during the first Jihad against the Afghan Communist Government. The Haqqani Network appears to have established its initial roots both financially and operationally in preparation for an all out war against the Afghan Communist Government. The establishment of funding streams from the Persian Gulf led to the inclusion of foreign fighters. The inclusion of foreign fighters also led to the establishment of training camps. Rassler and Brown (2013), the Haqqani Network’s establishment of the Zhawara base served as its central training facility for its own fighters and also for foreign fighters.

The Haqqani Network benefited substantially from the inclusion of foreign fighters. In return, the Haqqani Network received additional resources, a committed group of fighters, and the technical skills the fighters had to offer. Essentially, the network strengthened its capability to allow for tactical level success, resulting in the network’s ability to protect its autonomy. The networks autonomy is defined as its ability to control (retain) its territory, ability to self govern, and the ability to practice Pakhtun
traditions. The Haqqani Network’s actions coincide with Malet’s theory of foreign fighters. “Malet’s theory argues that transnational recruitment occurs when local insurgents attempt to broaden the scope of conflict so as to increase their resources and maximize their chances of victory” (Hegghammer 2010, 64).

The integration of foreign fighters became increasingly important after the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network is one of the first Afghan fighters accredited with incorporating foreign fighters in its ranks. Egyptian journalist Mustafa Hamad also known as Abu’l-Walid al-Masri was critical in showing the Haqqani Network and their struggle to the international Arab audience. Abu’l-Walid al-Masri played a role in the superiority of the Haqqani conflicts as the destination of choice for the first of the Afghan Arab war fighters. Many Afghan mujahidin viewed the early Arab fighters as “suicidal madmen” or religiously “intolerant bigots.” The Haqqani Network on the other hand allowed the Arab fighters to fulfill their duty to Jihad.

The Haqqani Network not only allowed Arab fighters to establish bases and train, but also integrated Arab fighters into its ranks. The Arab fighters not only enhanced the Haqqani Network ranks, but also significantly raised the moral of the Afghan mujahidin. The Haqqani Network went as far as allowing Arab Commanders, such as Osama Bin Laden, to establish their own camps. Bin Laden established his own training camp north of Haqqani Network Zhawara base. Bin Laden went on to establish al-Qa’ida, an Islamic Army capable of fighting Jihad anywhere in the world. Bin Laden declared his war against the U.S. from camps he established in Haqqani Network territory. The Haqqani Network may have not allowed Bin Laden to establish his camps in Haqqani territory if he had not provided something in return. Bin Laden is believed to have bank rolled
several Haqqani camps and provided the use of his construction equipment in return for
the establishment of his camps. Al-Qa’ida found freedom to maneuver in Haqqani-
controlled territory while receiving constraints from the Taliban in the 1990s. “Viewed
through this prism, the group's relationship with al-Qa’ida appears driven by belief and
ideological solidarity rather than simply long-standing personal connection.”

The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters came about in several
ways. At first, the network appears to have made its decision to include foreign fighters
for monetary reasons. The Haqqani Network ran madrasas for fundraising, rather than for
Islamic purposes, knowing they will attract Arab donors. The Haqqani Network has
maintained its connection to the Gulf, by having its members receive funding from
donations from the Gulf region and payments from al-Qa’ida. The network utilized the
financial resources it received to support and maintain its military strength, further
resulting in the retention of its autonomy. Moreover, the main mosque in Khost,
Afghanistan is linked to the Haqqani Network, as it was constructed with funds from the
Gulf. Second, Jalaluddin Haqqani went as far as marrying an Arab woman, to maintain
his connection to the Middle East. This marriage has helped to ensure his personal ties to
the Gulf and the flow of funds. Furthermore, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the half-Arab son of
Jalaluddin Haqqani and current leader of the network, is fluent in Arabic and has worked
closely with foreign fighters. Jalaluddin Haqqani’s appointment of his son as the leader of
the network has helped to further solidify the Haqqani Network’s relationship with Arab
fighters for the inevitable future. Finally, the Haqqani Network continues to include
foreign fighters because of the training and knowledge they can provide. David Rohde’s
experience, while being captive in Haqqani territory in Miram Shah, Afghanistan, details
the interactions young Afghan and Pakistani Taliban members had with foreign fighters. The Haqqani Network’s commanders and foreign militants were present in Miram Shah and other towns. Young Afghan and Pakistani Taliban members revered the foreign fighters; these foreign fighters used their influence and taught them how to make bombs.

The foreign fighter movement would not exist today without the populist Hijazi pan-Islamism movement, one can discern that the Haqqani Network was able to both capitalize on this movement and keep it alive today. The foreign fighters that had fought alongside the network have become the commanders of today’s fight against the West in Afghanistan, Africa, and around the world. The significance of how these commanders were influenced by the Haqqani Network demonstrates the significance of the network’s decision to incorporate foreign fighters into its ranks. These commanders continue to support Haqqani Network operations both directly and indirectly. The network in return, receives assistance in protecting and maintaining its autonomy.

**Analysis of Contributing Factors**

The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters was a combination of attributes of a rational actor and communal attributes. The rational attributes included finances and resources. The communal attributes included ideology. Ultimately this decision was made to protect the Haqqani Network’s autonomy. Furthermore, the foreign fighter phenomenon was able to explode during a period in which disenfranchised Muslim Brotherhood members were looking for an outlet to defend Islam.

The Haqqani Network first made its connection to the Middle East a financing network to establish its fight against communism. The establishment of a finance network led to the inclusion of foreign fighters. It appears that the Haqqani Network decided to
establish the finance network and included foreign fighters to increase the available finances and resources. The finances helped to pay their fighters and purchase the necessary equipment to fight the Soviet Union.

Individuals from the Middle East were willing to both donate money and to fight to defend Muslims. The inclusion of the foreign fighters appears to have been a “win win” for the Haqqani Network. The Haqqani Network received the necessary funding to support their cause and at the same time received fighters to provide depth to their ranks.

The Haqqani Network was able to accomplish these tasks under the auspices of religion. The Haqqani Network marketed as an organization that is willing to give foreign fighters the opportunity to perform their Jihad. The Hijazi pan-Islamism created the opportune situation for the Haqqani Network to recruit foreign fighters, to fight for Muslim solidarity.

Lastly, the Haqqani Network made the decision to include foreign fighters to protect its autonomy. The inclusion of foreign fighters provided the network with additional troop strength, finances, and tactics from around the world. The Haqqani Network utilized the resources it gained from the inclusion of foreign fighters to gain tactical success that resulted in the protection of its autonomy. The network had the ability to deploy additional fighters when necessary to allow for a decisive victory.

**Haqqani Network Decision to Ally with the Taliban Movement**

Analysis of the Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban Movement is significant because it can potentially provide insight as to how the network creates alliances. Today, the Haqqani Network is a formidable element within the Afghan
insurgency. The Haqqani Network would not be able to maintain its stature and autonomy if it did not have alliances allowing for its success. Understanding how they form these alliances will potentially provide insight as to how the network will form alliances in the future.

The Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban was not an easy decision. Many events occurred that led to the Haqqani Network making this decision. Initially in October 1993, Benazir Bhutto replacement of Nawaz Sharif, led Pakistan to become frustrated with Hekmatyar and began to look toward supporting the Taliban. Pakistan’s shift toward the Taliban may have provided the Haqqani Network an insight as to which organization to ally with in the future. Reportedly, the Haqqani Network did not make its decision officially until a few years later.

The Haqqani Network may have reached its decision to ally with the Taliban, as a way to maintain relevance, as the Taliban started to engulf a large amount of territory within Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network may have realized the necessity to recognize the Taliban as an organization rising to power, when the Taliban captured Ghazni at the end of 1994. The capture of Ghazni placed the Taliban on the doorstep of the Haqqani Network.

February 1995, the Mansur family, a long time Haqqani Network ally joined the Taliban. At this Point, Haji Din Muhammad, a long time associate of Jalaluddin Haqqani wrote of his account when he consulted with Yunis Khalis about how to respond to the Taliban.

It happened that the Taliban went to Paktika, Khost and Paktia. Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had a very large military power in Khost and Paktia, dreaded this kind of development of the Taliban. This was at a time when the
Taliban also did not have an understanding with the forces of the mujahidin. The Taliban were already in Paktia when Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqqani came to Nangarhar and met with Mawlawi Khalis. Mawlawi Khalis said to him: do not fight with them; yourself, try to understand their words, and they also will understand—in order that there be no blood spilled amongst us (Rassler and Brown 2013, 104).

Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the Taliban Movement in 1995 when the Taliban captured the eastern city of Jalalabad.

Haqqani allying with the Taliban was so significant that it involved Osama Bin Laden. The journalist Abdel Bari Atwan’s account:

Bin Laden said to me, I did the Taliban a very big favor when I introduced Haqqani—who is a close friend of bin laden—to defect and leave the Rabbani government, and join the Taliban. And because of that, the Taliban managed to actually conquer Kabul. Why? Because Haqqani is a professional general, a professional military man. And the Taliban lacked their professionalism. (Kuehn and Linschoten 2012, 137)

Although Jalaluddin Haqqani was first reluctant to join the ranks of the Taliban, he later decided to join after negotiating for their autonomy in exchange for support. The network protected and retained its autonomy by allying with an organization that it was fundamentally disparate from. The Nang Pakhtuns again desired to maintain their autonomy from an outsider. Although the Taliban were also Pakhtuns, the Taliban were not from the highlands, which is a clear distinction in Pakhtun society.

The Haqqani Network became a significant fighting force that Mullah Omar was able to call onto to reinforce his Taliban decisively at significant engagements. “Taliban leadership appeared to respect the Haqqani Network’s military prowess and contracted its fighters in 1997, to lead the offensive against the Northern Alliance on the Shomali Plains north of Kabul, as well as during other key engagements” (Peters 2012, 20). The
Haqqani Network, deciding to ally with the Taliban, may have been the momentum the Taliban needed to continue to move toward Kabul.

Although the Taliban and the Haqqani Network were successful, the relationship between the network and the Taliban was tense at times. Despite the military successes, the relationship between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban continued to be strained. The Haqqani Network leadership felt powerless to make military decisions further leading to a strained relationship. In October of 1996, al-Qa’ida finally decided to provide support to the Taliban. This decision may have come because of al-Qa’ida’s relationship with the Haqqani Network. Al-Qa’ida may have felt obligated to ally with the Taliban after the Haqqani Network made its decision to ally with the Kandahar based Taliban, because al-Qa’ida wanted to remain a relevant force in Afghanistan.

The Haqqani Network went on to maintain its alliance with the Taliban after the Taliban swept Afghanistan. During the Taliban regime, Haqqani accepted a position as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs. “Haqqani’s official role as the Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs put him in a position to consolidate control over trade that passed through his control zone” (Peters 2012, 21). Jalaluddin Haqqani did not seek out any real decision making role in Kabul. He preferred to function more or less independently, neither fully a part of the Kandahar based movement, nor contested by it. Rassler and Brown provide a quote from Jalaluddin Haqqani when he was the minister of border regions: “I am also the minister of border regions. Our tribes are settled on both sides of the Durand line since ages. Our houses are divided on both sides of the border. Both sides are my home. Pakistan is my home. And besides, my migration hasn’t ended” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 129). Jalaluddin Haqqani the leader of the Haqqani Network
saw his position as the Minister of Tribal Affairs as an opportunity to provide influence within his tribal area.

**Analysis of Contributing Factors**

The Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban was a tactical decision made with the attributes of a rational actor. The Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban Government was a decision based on the tactical necessity at the time it was made. The Haqqani Network allied with the Taliban Movement to protect their solidarity and autonomy. The decision was not made easily and the decision involved potential risk.

The Nang Pakhtuns again desired their autonomy from an outsider. Although the Taliban were also Pakhtuns, the Taliban were not from the highlands, which is a clear distinction in Pakhtun society. The Haqqani Network’s ability to maintain its autonomy and fear of losing it appears to have guided its decision to ally with the Taliban Movement. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban were able to find some common ground in the form of government that should run the country. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban did share the belief that Afghanistan should be an Islamic Nation guided by religious principles.

Although members of the Taliban fought side-by-side members with the Haqqani Network during the fight against the Soviet Union, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement was not made in a vacuum. The Haqqani Network was first willing to fight the Taliban to protect its autonomy. The Haqqani Network understood the Pakistan Government was moving towards supporting the Taliban and the Taliban was knocking on the doorstep of the network’s territory. The advice of trusted allies and its own members persuaded the Haqqani Network leadership to ally with the Taliban. The
Taliban taking control of the entire country may have seemed to be the inevitable at the time, but the reality is that the Taliban would not have been able to accomplish this task without the Haqqani Network.

The Haqqani Network allying with the Taliban Movement may have been the turning point in the Taliban’s fight for Kabul. The Haqqani Network was able to supply the Taliban with additional fighters that helped the Taliban face off with the Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud's in the north. Massoud, who had once been an ally of the network, now threatened the autonomy of the network, so Haqqani moved against him with the Taliban. Without this direct support, the Taliban potentially would not have been able to take control of Kabul.

**Haqqani Network Decision to Maintain an Alliance with the Taliban after 9/11**

Analysis of the Haqqani Network’s decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11 will help to have an understanding of how the network has formed a relative recent decision. In addition, this analysis will help to form an understanding as to how and why the Haqqani Network decided to maintain the alliance. The Haqqani Network may have decided to disassociate itself with the Taliban and integrate itself into the new Afghanistan, but instead decided to continue its alliance with the Taliban. The analysis of this decision can potentially provide insight as to why the Haqqani Network chose not to ally itself with Karzai and the new Afghanistan.

Mullah Omar appointed Jalaluddin Haqqani the overall commander of the Taliban forces on October 6th before the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. This appointment signifies the state of the Taliban before the invasion, but also signifies the amount of trust
that was bestowed upon the Haqqani Network before the U.S. invasion. This is a major change from the days of the Taliban takeover when the Haqqani Network did not have operational control of its own members. After Jalaluddin Haqqani’s appointment, he appears to have been concerned with moving to North Waziristan.

The decade following 9/11, the Haqqani Network would further amalgamate with the Taliban and perform in a similar way to the preceding decades. The Haqqani Network actions would prove fundamental to the Taliban and Pakistan’s efforts to influence the outcome of Afghanistan. “The 9/11 attacks and the U.S. response did not cause the Haqqani Network to disassociate itself from al-Qa’ida and its global jihad, but rather have arguably brought the network and al-Qa’ida members even closer together” (Rassler and Brown, 2013, 121). The Haqqani Network and al-Qa’ida strengthened their alliance because they are fighting for survival and in a war against the West. Additionally, leaders of the Taliban, al-Qa’ida, and other insurgent groups (presumably the Haqqani Network) looked to overthrow the Afghan Government because they wanted to replace it with a government grounded in an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam.

Jalaluddin Haqqani attempted to begin the negotiation process with the U.S. Government in 2002 by sending his brother to Kabul. His brother was only to be beaten and disgraced. Providing his current state of affairs at the time, Jalaluddin decided to join with the Taliban. Jalaluddin Haqqani was prepared to switch loyalties following the defeat of the Taliban. Pakistan urged the U.S. Government to accommodate him and potentially provide him a role in the Afghan Government. However, the Bush Administration would accept nothing less than an unconditional surrender because the Haqqani Network may have known the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden.
Many of the Pakhtun factions felt marginalized by northern ethic groups because many important powerful ministries were in the hands of the Panjshiri Tajiks. This may have further made the Haqqani Network feel disenfranchised from the new Afghan Government and push them toward fighting in the Afghan insurgency. Karzai was unable to provide security and resources at the local level. Additionally, the new Afghan Government was riddled with corruption. This led to Afghans in rural areas feeling excluded and alone. “As one World Bank study concluded, the primary beneficiaries of assistance were ‘the urban elite.’ This disparity triggered deep-seated frustration and resentment among the rural population” (Jones 2008, 20). The Taliban capitalized on this opportunity by instituting its form of Sharia law in these areas. The Haqqani Network appears to have taken advantage of the same factors in its territory.

President Hamid Karzai’s support for a Haqqani Network rival Badshah Khan Zadran may have further swayed the network toward supporting the Taliban’s fight against the ISAF. The Haqqani Network role became increasingly important in 2003. Jalaluddin Haqqani became the head of the Miram Shah shura and held a seat at the Taliban’s Leadership shura in Quetta. The Haqqani Network’s ties to the Arab world and Pakistan provided them with influence among the Taliban. The isolation of Mullah Omar, along with the arrest of Taliban leadership, led to the Haqqani Network importance.

Additionally, the evolution from Jalaluddin Haqqani to Sirajuddin Haqqani does not appear to have changed the overall goals of the network in a post-2001 period. The central goal for the Haqqani Network remains the same: local control and autonomy in the Loya Paktia (Waziristan) and a sharia based Islamic Government in Afghanistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani received a visit from Mullah Obaidullah in 2003 asking for his help
with an insurgency in Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network formally joined the Afghan insurgency in 2003 and was assigned to its eastern front.

The Haqqani Network had remained operationally and financially autonomous from the Taliban. However, the two groups have collaborated on some military campaigns in the post-2001 phase of the Afghan conflict. Since developing this cooperative agreement with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network has provided the Taliban with the ability to improve its fighting capabilities and to strengthen its campaigns in Kabul. The Haqqani Network leaders have leveraged strategic alliances and relationships to consolidate their position of authority within the community and to secure their sources of funding.

Rassler and Brown explain the current relationship between the Haqqani Network and the Taliban through excerpts from author Thomas Rutting:

Symbiotic relationship with the “Kandahari” Taleban [SIC] holds because it is mutually beneficial. It gives the Haqqani Network access to the label of the Taleban, as the most popular insurgent organization, while the Taleban are enabled to project presence in regions that have never been their strongholds and to present themselves as more than a purely Kandahari movement. (Thomas Rutting 2013, 134)

Essentially, both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network benefit from maintaining the existing relationship. The Haqqani Network is able to affiliate with the Taliban by name, allowing the organization to be less likely to be isolated and fractured. Additionally, the Taliban benefits from the current arrangement because the Haqqani Network provides the Taliban the ability to appear as if it controls parts of Afghanistan, that in reality it is unable to do.

The Haqqani are not subjected to the Taliban practice of rotating governors and commanders. This has provided the network with flexibility to operate how it sees fit.
Also, the network’s long standing history, as a well established organization has resulted in the Taliban providing them with its own organizational autonomy. The Taliban provide the Haqqani Network autonomy in its area of control. The Haqqani Network is able to maintain its autonomy and at the same time is able to hide under the Taliban umbrella.

The Haqqani Network also reportedly receives autonomy from the Pakistani Military. Pakistan, leaving North Waziristan unchecked, can potentially allow North Waziristan to continue to act as the center of gravity for terrorists from around the world. Specifically, al-Qa’ida may grow and maintain ties with the Haqqani Network after the U.S. military withdraws from Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network’s continued association with al-Qa’ida may prove to be problematic to Pakistan’s reconciliation efforts. Pakistan wants the network and the Afghan Government to negotiate a settlement, to allow for peace. If the network maintains its relationship with al-Qa’ida, the U.S. Government may persuade the Afghan Government not to reconcile.

Additionally, The Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Pakistani Taliban has become problematic for the Pakistani Military. The Haqqani Network appears to collaborate closely with the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa’ida, both in terms of launching terror attacks and, specifically with the Pakistani Taliban, engaging in illicit activity, particularly kidnapping. The violence perpetrated by the Pakistan Taliban the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and al-Qa’ida is mutually reinforcing and helps perpetuate each group’s ability to conduct attacks against the targets it chooses. The Haqqani Network is becoming closer to al-Qa’ida and the Pakistani Taliban under the command of Sirajuddin Haqqani, in terms of launching tactical operations and attacks,
specifically with the Pakistan Taliban. The Haqqani Network provides the Pakistan Taliban the ability to learn new tactics and to employ these newly acquired skills in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Taliban then is able to take these skills and employ them across the border in Pakistan. Although this method is effective for the Pakistan Taliban, it is extremely complex for the Haqqani Network because of its relationship with the Pakistani Military. The Pakistani Military attempts to gain from Haqqani Network’s relationship with the Pakistan Taliban, by utilizing the network to negotiate with the Pakistan Taliban. This relationship is another example of how complex the obstacle course of Afghanistan can be and how organizational relationships in Afghanistan are not simplistic.

This complicated relationship is the reason the Pakistan Military is attempting to persuade the U.S. Military leadership to negotiate with the Haqqani Network, as the U.S. Military withdrawal nears. Essentially, the Pakistan Military needs the network to be able to negotiate with the Pakistani Taliban. Additionally, the network provides the Pakistani Military with an ally in Afghanistan that it has worked with, since the fight against the Soviets. The Haqqani Network’s symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani Military allows the two organizations to coincide without hostilities. Rassler and Brown provide David Rohde’s, a New York Times journalist who was kidnapped and held by the Haqqani Network, account of his time spent in North Waziristan.

North Waziristan is an absolute Taliban mini-state. They completely control the area. There are Pakistani bases throughout the area, but I saw very little evidence that the Pakistanis were getting out and doing any patrolling.

At one point a Taliban commander [Badruddin Haqqani, Sirajuddin’s brother] took me on a drive in North Waziristan for three hours in broad daylight.
While we were on that drive, we actually ran into a Pakistani army re-supply convoy. The vehicle in front of us, which had local civilians in it, pulled over when they saw the convoy, and all of the civilians got out of the car.

With our car, we pulled to the side of the road, and suddenly the driver of the car, who was a well known Taliban commander, just he got out, and we stayed in the back seat. Our guard loaded his Kalashnikov rifle and ordered me to cover my face and to not move. I was amazed to watch this convoy drive by.

The Pakistani Soldiers did look very nervous. they drove by our vehicle and the Taliban commander driving our car simply smiled and waved hello to the Pakistani soldiers as this convoy drove past. He was completely confident and didn’t see them as any major threat. (Rassler and Brown 2013, 165-166)

The Haqqani Network is afforded the same benefits the Taliban receive in Rohde’s firsthand account. Rohde’s goes on to explain that the Taliban Commander had stated the Taliban had a truce with the Pakistani Army. Part of the truce detailed that all civilian vehicles have to stop and all civilians must exit the vehicle when the Pakistani Army is in the vicinity. The Taliban is only required to have the driver exit the vehicle. Rohde’s firsthand account is an example of how the Haqqani Network and Taliban are able to exist alongside the Pakistani Army in a complex environment.

Furthermore, Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence also provides the Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan a sense of impunity. The Pakistani Military has even declared the area off limits from U.S. Predator strikes because of their close affiliation with the Pakistan Taliban; it is likely the network is offered the same preferential treatment in North Waziristan. The Haqqani Network is likely coordinating with the Taliban in Quetta and potentially experiencing similar types of treatment in North Waziristan.

Pakistan’s relationship with the Haqqani Network, demonstrates the significance the network will have on the future of Afghanistan. Pakistan sees the Haqqani Network as an important element to the peaceful future of Afghanistan. As of mid 2010, Pakistan
publically announced its intentions to negotiate a deal between the Haqqani Network, the Karzai Government, and the United States. This announcement demonstrates the utility the Haqqani Network provides to Pakistan. In addition, this announcement demonstrates the significance to this study. This study can help the U.S. Government by providing insight into how the network makes decisions and what is important to the network. This understanding will better arm the U.S. Government with the necessary knowledge to negotiate an effective settlement for the future of Afghanistan.

As of recently, the Haqqani Network has repeatedly pledged its loyalty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Sirajuddin Haqqani reportedly announced he would request Mullah Omar’s blessing for a blitzkrieg against U.S. and NATO forces in coming months.

Sirajuddin Haqqani takes substantial pains to express that they are followers to the Taliban leadership. As an example, Kuehn and Linschoten provide a statement made by Sirajuddin Haqqani:

> The Haqqani Group or the Haqqani Network Group is not an official name or name we chose. This name is used by the enemies in order to divide the Mujahidin. We are under the highly capable Emirate of the Amir of the Faithful Mullah Umar, may Allah protect him, and we wage Jihad in the path of Allah. The name of Islamic Emirate is the official name for us and all the Mujahidin in Afghanistan. (Kuehn and Linschoten 2012, 271)

The Haqqani Network is able to navigate the obstacle course of Afghanistan today. The Haqqani Network is linked with over 80 madrassas along the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. This organizational structure has performed as an instrument for the Haqqani Network to develop influence; provide assistance, and religious direction to local communities in the tribal areas. “The Haqqani Network of madrassas has always been a tool through which the organization can propagate its worldview and prepare
young, ideologically motivated recruits to wage jihad in Afghanistan” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 131).

Additionally, the Haqqani Network has not promoted global Jihad or openly backed international terrorism. However, the Haqqani Network has publically supported to fight in Afghanistan. “The Haqqani Network walks a fine line though, as thus far the group has not been a direct participant in global jihadist activity-despite assisting al-Qa’ida over multiple decades” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 184). Although, the Haqqani Network does not directly promote global jihad, the network does indirectly support global Jihad based on its local relationship with al-Qa’ida. The Haqqani Network has served as al-Qa’ida’s closest ally on the local level since the inception of the mujahidin’s fight against the Soviet Union. The al-Qa’ida leadership relied and coordinated with Jalaluddin Haqqani to avoid friction or tension with the Kandahari leadership of the Taliban. This was the result of the Taliban recognition of the damaging impact of foreign jihadists.

In recent years, al-Qa’ida has been able to continue to employ its fighters alongside Haqqani Network fighters in Afghanistan. Norwegian scholar Anne Stenersen proved this through her study of over 90 films released by al-Qa’ida’s digital media production cell al-Sahab (Rassler and Brown 2013). Stenersen’s study revealed, the footage of attacks conducted in Haqqani Network areas (Khost and Paktika), that account for 50 percent of the related videos. This study proves that the Haqqani Network’s area of operations serves as a major battleground for al-Qa’ida fighters.

The Haqqani Network bases have become a place for fighters from multiple factions, from around the world to exchange ideas and practice tactics. Fighters from
around the world can improve their capabilities by learning the most successful practices from other fighters. In essence, fighters are able to learn from other fighters’ success and failures. The development of suicide attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices is an example of the exchange of ideas at the Haqqani Network training camps. Al-Qa’ida is suspected of introducing these tactics into the Afghan area of operations from lessons learned in Iraq. Suicide attacks have become one of the most lethal forms of attacks since its introduction into the Afghan theater of operations.

The Haqqani Network also benefits from hosting international jihadists at its camps in recent years. The Haqqani Network is able to gain access to additional fighters and resources to continue to support its fight to keep autonomy and fight against ISAF. Additional resources help to prevent the Haqqani Network from having any single point of failure. Extra fighters help to provide another layer of depth to the amount of fighters the Haqqani Network can access. The exchange of ideas and the practice of tactics will likely continue based on recent statements made by Haqqani Network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani: “The doors are open for all mujahidin who fight to apply Allah’s will. . . . We are ready to receive all foreigners, including Arabs, who want to fight alongside us” (Rassler and Brown 2013, 186). The Haqqani Network has learned to guarantee its relevance and to conserve its autonomy, it must provide “services or other items of value” to its local, regional, and global partners.

Additionally, the Pakistani Taliban has established a relationship that allows them to fight alongside Haqqani Network fighters in Afghanistan to hone their skills. The Pakistani Taliban then takes what they have learned and utilizes it to conduct attacks within Pakistan. The Haqqani Network has continued to serve as a place for jihadists
from around the world to learn and exchange ideas. Essentially, the Haqqani Network camps served and continue to serve as a place to train, teach, and export Jihadi tactics, techniques, and procedures. Although the Haqqani Network does not advocate attacks outside of Afghanistan arguably, they support attacks outside of Afghanistan by supporting factions that conduct these attacks.

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Haqqani Network came to a crossroad on whether to stay with the Taliban or to negotiate with the United States. It appears that all negotiation attempts failed between the Haqqani Network and the U.S., further pushing the network towards the Taliban. The Haqqani Network formally joined the Afghan insurgency in 2003 and was assigned to its eastern front.

The Haqqani Network was only able to control a small part of the country proportionate to what the Taliban controlled. Essentially, the Haqqani Network allied with the Taliban at the tactical level to better their chances of harassing the ISAF, allowing the network to maintain their autonomy.

The Haqqani Network has become a formidable entity with the Afghan Taliban structure. The U.S. State Department formally designated the Haqqani Network a terrorist organization in September 2012 following a Haqqani linked attack on the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan. This designation came approximately a year after the U.S. Government made attempts to negotiate with the Haqqani Network through Pakistan. The attempts of the U.S. Government to delay the designation of the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization because of its significance within Afghanistan, demonstrates the significance of the network and the impact it will have on the future of Afghanistan.
Members of the Taliban are war weary and want the Taliban to be included in the future political process in Afghanistan. The Taliban realizes that the past alliance with al-Qa’ida, prior to 9/11 was a major error because it ended in their topple. The Taliban’s willingness to participate in the political process may persuade the Haqqani Network to do the same. The Haqqani Network has demonstrated its willingness to negotiate in the past and will likely be willing to negotiate in the future, if it is in the interest of maintaining the autonomy of the group.

Analysis of Contributing Factors

The Haqqani Network’s decision to again ally with the Taliban after 9/11 was a tactical decision made with the attributes of a rational actor. The Haqqani Network’s decision to maintain the alliance with the Taliban after 9/11 is was a decision based on necessity, resentment, and autonomy. This decision was made out of the tactical necessity to survive. The Haqqani Network was not going to combat Afghan Security Forces and ISAF at the same time. Allying with the Taliban gave them a better chance to survive. Additionally, the Taliban provided the Haqqani Network a larger umbrella to blend in with. Blending in with the overarching Taliban organization provided the Haqqani Network with a better chance to survive.

Additionally, the Haqqani Network made the decision to ally with the Taliban after 9/11 because they resented the new Afghan Government and the United States. First, President Karzai chose to ally with the Haqqani Network’s enemy in the network’s own territory. This further isolated the Haqqani Network. In addition, the Haqqani Network leadership was told the U.S. Government would only accept absolute surrender and wanted to know the location of Osama Bin Laden. Absolute surrender meant total...
embarrassment for the Haqqani Network leadership and providing the location of Osama Bin Laden would disenfranchise the network from al-Qa’ida.

Lastly, the Haqqani Network made the decision to ally with the Taliban after 9/11 because the Taliban would provide the network with its own autonomy. The Haqqani Network was and is able to conduct its own attacks and govern its own territory. Although the Haqqani Network is based out of North Waziristan and fights in Afghanistan, the network still arguably has a sense of autonomy. The autonomy may only come from the Taliban, but the author believes the Haqqani Network understands the environment will change with the inevitable withdrawal of U.S. military forces. The Haqqani Network may make decisions after the U.S. withdrawal to retain its autonomy. These decisions may include the forming of new alliances, a negotiation with the Afghan and U.S. governments, and the end of the networks involvement in the Afghan insurgency.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate and analyze how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. The previous chapters investigated the answer to the primary research question: how does the Haqqani Network make decisions? The author was attempting to discover how the Haqqani Network makes decisions. Finally, this chapter will recommend further research that is beyond the scope of this study.

In answering the primary research question, the author analyzed three significant decisions the Haqqani Network has made in the past to understand the factors that contribute to how the network makes decisions. The three decisions included: the inclusion of foreign fighters, the decision to ally with the Taliban Movement, and the decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11.

This chapter presents conclusions found during the research of this thesis on the factors the Haqqani Network utilizes when it makes decisions. Additionally, this chapter contains recommendations on how U.S. policy makers can better deal with the Haqqani Network based on the factors it utilizes when making decisions.

The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters was a combination of attributes of a rational actor and communal attributes. The rational attributes included finances and resources, while the communal attributes included ideology. It appears that the Haqqani Network decided to establish the finance network and included foreign fighters to increase the available finances and resources. The finances helped to pay their fighters and purchase the necessary equipment to fight the Soviet Union. The Haqqani Network received the necessary funding to support their cause and at the same time
received fighters to provide depth to their ranks. The Haqqani Network was able to accomplish this under the auspices of religion. The Haqqani Network marketed as an organization that is willing to give foreign fighters the opportunity to perform their Jihad. The Hijazi pan-Islamism created the opportune situation for the Haqqani Network to recruit foreign fighters to fight for Muslim solidarity.

Specifically, the Haqqani Network made the decision to include foreign fighters to protect its autonomy. The Haqqani Network’s decision to include foreign fighters was a tactical decision made with the attributes of a rational actor. The Haqqani Network utilized the resources it gained from the inclusion of foreign fighters, to gain tactical success that resulted in the protection of its autonomy. The inclusion of foreign fighters provided the network with additional troop strength, finances, and tactics from around the world. The Haqqani Network utilized the resources it gained from the inclusion of foreign fighters to gain tactical success that resulted in the protection of its autonomy. The network had the ability to deploy additional fighters when necessary, to allow for a decisive victory.

The Haqqani Network’s decision to ally with the Taliban was a tactical decision made with the attributes of a rational actor. Furthermore, they allied with the Taliban Movement to protect their solidarity and autonomy. Their ability to maintain its autonomy and fear of losing it appears to have guided its decision to ally with the Taliban Movement. The Network and the Taliban were able to find some common ground in the form of government that should run the country. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban did share the belief that Afghanistan should be an Islamic nation guided by religious principles.
The advice of trusted allies and its own members persuaded the Haqqani Network leadership to ally with the Taliban. The Taliban taking control of the entire country may have seemed to be the inevitable at the time, but they may not have been able to accomplish this task without the Haqqani Network.

The Network’s decision to maintain an alliance with the Taliban after 9/11 was a decision based on necessity, resentment, and autonomy. The network made the decision to again ally with the Taliban after 9/11 out of necessity to survive. Allying with the Taliban gave the Haqqani Network a better chance to survive. The Taliban provided the network a larger umbrella to blend in with. Blending in with the overarching Taliban organization provided the network with a better chance to survive and maintain the freedom of action they desired.

Additionally, the network made the decision to ally with the Taliban after 9/11 because they resented the new Afghan Government and the United States. First, President Karzai chose to ally with the network’s enemy in its own territory. Second, Jalaluddin Haqqani attempted to begin the negotiation process with the U.S. Government in 2002. The U.S. Government would only accept absolute surrender. Providing his current state of affairs at the time, Jalaluddin decided to join with the Afghan insurgency.

Lastly, the network made the decision to ally with the Taliban after 9/11 because the Taliban would provide the network with its own autonomy. The network was and is able to conduct its own attacks and govern its own territory. The autonomy may only come from the Taliban, but the author believes the network understands the environment will change with the inevitable withdrawal of U.S. Forces.
The conclusions derived during the research resulted in the realization that the Haqqani Network sought to protect its autonomy in each instance. The network’s decisions were at times a combination of attributes of a rational actor and communal attributes. Although the decisions were separated by several years, the network made each decision to protect their autonomy.

It is recommended that U.S. Policy makers and U.S. Military leaders understand that the Haqqani Network will make decisions in the future to protect the network’s autonomy. The operation that resulted in the death of the Osama Bin-Laden may have demonstrated the U.S. Governments willingness to pursue terrorists worldwide, to the Haqqani Network.

**Recommended Further Research**

This research was conducted to answer one specific question. However, there are other sources of information and ways to investigate and analyze what the Haqqani Network will do in the future, to protect its autonomy after ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan. One of the aims of this study was not only to show how the Haqqani Network makes decisions but to demonstrate the network’s significant role in the future of Afghanistan. To improve on this study it would help to analyze how U.S. Policy will affect the Haqqani Network’s future decisions.
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