Battle SOUTHCOM

Since the evacuation of Saigon in 1975, America has committed its forces to combat in more than a dozen military operations. In America's Splendid Little Wars, distinguished U.S. Naval Captain Peter Huchthausen explores the modern development of America's tradition of small wars. From the 1975 operation to recover the hijacked merchant ship SS Mayaguez in the Gulf of Siam to the 1999 "relief intervention" in Kosovo, Huchthausen presents an intimate history of each military engagement.

On the morning of December 20, 1989, US Army, Navy, Air, and Marine forces attacked Panamanian forces commanded by Manuel Noriega. Operation Just Cause was a lightning strike that had many of the characteristics of Desert Storm more than a year later.

An examination of the complex relationships between a U.S. combatant command, one of the four American global military headquarters, and its Washington, D.C. superiors, to include Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral William Crowe, Army Chief of Staff General Carl Vuono, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, and Presidents Ronald W. Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Highlighted also are the roles played by the local joint and special operations headquarters, those U.S.-based commands charged with providing military reinforcements to the region, and those government officials responsible for regional diplomatic, intelligence, and economic affairs.

Written shortly after the completion of Operation JUST CAUSE, this monograph traces the involvement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff in planning and directing combat operations in Panama. The study begins with the initial development of contingency plans in February 1988 and concludes with General Manuel Noriega's surrender to U.S. officials on 3 January 1990. Relying primarily upon Joint Staff files and interviews with key participants, the author, Dr. Ronald Cole, provides an account of the parts played by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command in planning for operations in Panama and their roles in the combat operations that followed. In the summer and fall of 1989, while American attention focused on events in Eastern Europe which heralded the end of the Cold War, developments in Panama raised the possibility of combat much closer to home. Operations in Panama would test the changes to the U.S. military command system brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Panama would also try the team at the head of that system?President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, and the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army. Strengthened by personal relationships formed during earlier administrations, this team would, in a large measure, determine the operational success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.

In the summer and fall of 1989, while American attention focused on events in Eastern Europe which heralded the end of the Cold War, developments in Panama raised the possibility of combat much closer to home. Operations in Panama would test the changes to the U.S. military command system brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Panama would also try the team at the head of that system-President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, and the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Army. Strengthened by personal relationships formed during earlier administrations, this team would, in a large measure, determine the operational success of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms.Questions about the effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the system of unified commands had been raised at intervals since the Vietnam War. In 1982 the retiring Chairman, General David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, proposed increasing the authority of the Chairman and the commanders in chief (CINCs) of the unified commands and strengthening the joint staffs supporting them. Fueled by reported shortcomings in service cooperation and interoperability during the 1983 invasion of Grenada and by the role of a cumbersome chain of command in the deaths of 241 U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system prompted lengthy congressional deliberations and eventual enactment of the changes Jones had proposed.Widely viewed as the most significant defense legislation since the National Security Act of 1947, Goldwater-Nichols sought to streamline the command and control of U.S. military forces engaged in contingency operations. After designating the CJCS as the President's principal military advisor, the Act made the Chairman specifically responsible for the preparation and review of contingency plans-a function he performed in conjunction with the CINCs. It further allowed the President to direct that communications between the National Command Authorities and the commanders of the unified commands be transmitted through the Chairman. The CINCs were, in turn, given full combatant command authority over their service components allowing them to control the organization and employment of these forces. Operation JUST CAUSE would demonstrate the effect of these changes.In 1988, as relations with Panama deteriorated, the commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), General Frederick F. Woerner, Jr., U.S. Army, had developed a strategy which gradually increased the strength of U.S. forces in Panama to deter the dictator, General Manuel